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War Without Front: 
Atamans and Commissars in Ukraine, 1917-1919 
 
Abstract  
 
The double Revolution of 1917 buried the old Romanov Empire without installing anything 
definite in its stead. It did, however, attenuate authority to the extreme, producing a climate 
propitious to the emergence of socio-political projects each with a claim upon the present and 
the future. One of such projects was the revolutionary warlordism known under the name of 
atamanshchina. Reaching greatest scope and complexity on the territory of modern-day 
Ukraine, this predominantly peasant phenomenon represented, on one hand, an effort of the 
countryside to fill in a power vacuum by institutionalizing the rural insurgency. On the other 
hand, as an efficient form of military self-organization, it embodied a factor of paramount 
importance in the ongoing Civil war – to be courted and reckoned with. The Bolsheviks 
appeared to have been the most successful in that task, establishing a type of joint dominion 
with the warlords over Ukraine in the months following German departure (Nov. 1918). 
Experiment for all those involved, this alliance attempted to reconcile the atamans’ suspicion 
of disciplinary regimes with the Bolshevik war-making imperatives. Ultimately, this 
experiment proving disastrous, the notion of party-state centralism collided against the 
practice of revolutionary particularism and compelled the partners to split under the dramatic 
circumstances of the Grigoriev’s uprising. Drawing heavily from archival sources, this work 
looks, therefore, at the manner whereby major players came to recognize their own political 
identities and ends – not in the least the Bolsheviks themselves, who evolved from the unsure 
parvenus to the seasoned Staatsmachthaber (“state power holders”) in the course of their 
interaction with the forces of rural revolt.   
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Part I: Institutionalized Insurgency: Project Overview 
 
Whether driven by an onerous administrative chore or, on the contrary, by the desire to take 
in a dose of a big city air after the unrelenting rural winter, the couple of Dunin-Kozickis 
picked the least appropriate season for traveling to Kiev (Kyiv). It was in the middle of 
March and this meant that a notorious bezdorizhzhia, a creeping mélange of dirt and snow, a 
cantankerous child of vernal elements, took hold of the countryside roads, metamorphosing 
them into nearly impassable mud swamps. The journey, accomplished during clement 
weather in 5-6 hours, became a veritable ordeal, testing the limits of endurance of all those 
involved: the inanimate droshkies, which creaked and coughed in their exactions of pity, 
horses, their feet stuck in the mud, dragging on with flagging resolve of sentient creatures, 
and, finally humans, who, although sheltered from physical hardships, found the strain of 
monotony no less deleterious than the abrasion of labor. When the night finally came, 
effacing all hopes of reaching Kiev in one day, the party decided to stop at a guest house in 
Belaia Tserkov (Bila Tserkva) and rest there before hitting the road again in the morning.
1  
 
It was there, in that inn named in a risible rebuttal of its provincial whereabouts “European,” 
that the spouses learned the shocking news from the innkeeper: the Tsar was toppled and 
herewith the Dynasty and the Empire came to an end. At first, fatigue prevented them from 
registering the ramifications of such cataclysmic turnabout, but then, some minutes or maybe 
hours later, in their room cozily snuggled in feather comforters, with the Dziennik Kijowski 
(“Kiev Daily”) in their hands, they began to discern the contours of the event’s grandeur. 
“The charm of the printed word enthralled us,” remembered Maria Dunin-Kozicka. “Inspired 
by hope of standing perhaps on the threshold of the Slavic spring of nations, we set out to 
                                                 
1 Maria Dunin-Kozicka, Burza od wschodu (Łomianki: LTW, 2007), 11   
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Kiev on the evening train.” There, in the city of multitudinous crowds, they became 
witnesses of the first “procession of freedom” as massive demonstrations in support of 
changes became to be known. 
As an uninterrupted wave flowed the human stream along the Kreshchatik 
street, hurrying to reach the City Hall, where the revolutionary powers now 
sat. Fiery speeches were being declaimed there. Red, revolutionary banners 
passed before the eyes of thousands spectators, who crowded up the space on 
the pavement. The wind unfurled them, displaying at once the words of 
defiance, cast at the faded spirit of the tsarist order  
“Long live Russia freed from the tyrants!”…  
“We demand the summoning of the Constituent Assemby!” 
“Land and Freedom to the toilers!” 
“Long live Federal Russian Republic!” 
“Seven-hour working day! Freedom to trade-unions!” 
“Long live revolutionary, free Russia!” 
 
Observing the exaltation of the masses with the hindsight of subsequent events, Kozicka-
Dunin felt obliged to add: “The Revolution – as usually in its first moments before it turns 
into a sanguinary fury, which never gets its fill of offerings and destructive follies – showed 
up in the radiant guise of the goddess of freedom.”
2  
 
Like the Kievan crowds, most of the Tsar’s former subjects readily succumbed to the 
intoxicating excitement of the early days. Most – but not all. General Anton Denikin, who 
had a chance to see the surreptitious intrigue unfold behind the festive performance of the 
revolution from the very outset belonged to the small coterie of skeptics. The vision of 
“enthused faces,” the music of “excited speeches,” “the joy of being emancipated from the 
hovering incubus” affected him much less than did the first army decrees aiming to loosen 
the screws of its overworked and rickety structure.
3 His initial alarm found indirect 
confirmation in Petrograd, whither he was summoned to discuss the possibility of becoming 
                                                 
2 ibid., 12 
3 Anton Denikin, Ocherki russkoi smuty (Minsk: Kharvest, 2004), v. 1, 48  
  4
the Army’s new Chief-of-Staff. Everywhere in the capital city he felt the weight of 
dereliction and indiscipline. “Streets were busy as before, yet dirty and overfilled with the 
new masters of the situation – all clothed in army overcoats, but infinitely removed from the 
toils of military life and only poised to defend and deepen the revolution.” He further 
continued:  
I read a lot about the exulted mood, which apparently reigned supreme in 
Petrograd, but I haven’t found it. Anywhere… Contrived animation; 
invigorating and uplifting phrases, which have nonetheless long grown 
wearisome; and anxiety, deeply-planted anxiety in hearts. Plus the total 
absence of practical work: ministers in essence had neither the time, nor the 
occasion to concentrate and take hold of their departmental affairs; the 
wound-up bureaucratic machinery, creaky and lame, continued to work 
somehow with its old parts attuned to new transmissions.
4 
 
The heavy atmosphere of the post-revolutionary abeyance chafed the General and, grasping 
at the first opportunity, he rushed back to the Front if only to preserve it from the corrosive 
miasma spreading from the center outward.  
 
This emotional ambivalence even if tilting on the side of enthusiasm, overblown and hence 
grotesque, harked back to the fundamental fallout of the fatidic February. Ramming into the 
mighty walls of czarism, the Revolution tore a gaping chasm, all the more disorienting in its 
cavernous presence because of the ingrained habit to regard those walls as flat-out 
impregnable. Many, sensing the matter of history melt before their eyes and slip from under 
their feet, felt as if suspended in a vacuum, without a clear downward pull or indications as 
to where one might veer in the absence of true gravity. Along with the few maverick 
peasants of the Starokonstantinov (Starokonstantyniv) district in Volhynia, those individuals 
must have thought aloud: “No good will ever come out of it…With the Tsar gone there is 
                                                 
4 ibid., v. 1, 78   
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neither order nor any use (tołku).”
5 The word of “Freedom,” vulgarized through abusive 
references and haphazard incantations, was bringing the careworn listeners its sinister 
overtone: Free for all! Free for all! Free for all!  
 
That chasm in the ordered flow of time, intangible at first, began to take on concrete 
manifestations in the same proportion as that State, managed up to now by the defunct 
dynasty, was picking up the gait en route to its own disintegration. Cracks quickly appeared 
on its polyglot and polymorph body, sequestering one estate from another, a class from a 
class, a newly-born and self-affirming nation from the Empire and other nations. Naturally 
reflecting those developments in the rear, the army too quickly shed its unifying corporate 
identity, unleashing millions of gun-wielding men into the interior to the effect of giving 
those cracks a battle-line appearance. By the time of the October coup, the barely subdued 
uncertainty burst into a bellicose quarrel with each of the active players laying a claim over 
the past and the future, the body politic and the social body, material resources and human 
capital. A host of all-encompassing projects, budding in the propitious climate of the 
revolutionary interim, came to fruition in the course of these struggles, being designed as 
they were either to mend the gaps in the texture of time or to fill them in with the new 
techniques for mediating rapports between groups and individuals.  
 
To these latter belonged the rural warlordism or atamanshchina (or otamanshchina in 
Ukrainian), a phenomenon receiving its name from the warlords’ (atamans or otamans) 
nostalgic submission to the memories of the Cossack past. Both in terms of scope and 
                                                 
5 Zofia Kossack, Pożoga (Kraków: Greg, 2008), 12  
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internal complexity it reached its apogee on the territory of the modern-day Ukraine,
6 a key 
region of the former Empire where the Civil War had its first act played out and where it was 
destined to go through the denouement.
7 As an expression of broader peaant militancy, the 
advent of atamanshchina was announced – somewhat prematurely – in spring months of 
1917 with the state losing its proverbial monopoly over the means of violence to the self-
defense organizations sprouting in urban centers and countryside alike. Acting at first within 
bounds of relative legality, the peasant groups lost much of their inhibition toward August-
September of 1917 as they turned to arms in resolving pressing issues of “land and freedom,” 
transforming the villages, in the apt phrase of the best known ataman Nestor Makhno, into 
“military-revolutionary camps.”
8 Their growth temporarily checked by the Austro-German 
occupation of Ukraine, as peasant para-military units came back to the fore of events in the 
summer of 1918, giving the recrudescent Center and its foreign protectors a mighty if not 
fully effective shake. The next twelve months witnessed the rise of the atamans to the 
position of quasi-absolute hegemony so much so that the Bolshevik commissars no less than 
the Nationalist emissaries had to pay homage to these informal power-brokers and court 
favors with them if they wanted their formal dominion recognized. This period, 
unprecedented and portentous at once,
9 lasted at least until May 1919 when the Grigoriev’s 
uprising broke a quaint ataman-Bolshevik alliance, although atamanshchina itself, in a 
modified form and under modified slogans, would persist well after all other contesters laid 
down their arms at the feet of victorious Moscow.  
                                                 
6 Nikolai Kakurin, Kak srazhalas’ revoliutsiia (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990)¸ v. 1, 97 
7 Andrea Graziosi, Bol’sheviki i Krest’iane na Ukraine, 1918-1919 gody (Moscow: Airo-XX, 1997), 42 
8 Makhno, Spovid’ anarkhista (Kyiv: Kniha rodu, 2008) 64 
9 Andrea Graziosi calls the Ukrainian peasant movement “the prototype of the great national-emancipatory 
struggles (natsional’no-osvoboditel’nych)” of the twentieth century. It is somewhat of a stretch to say the 
Ukrainians discovered the use of the peasant militancy for the nationalist agendas, but his thought, when seen as 
describing the praxis rather than the idea, seems to be fundamentally correct (Graziosi, 70)   
  7
 
Barring testimonies of the atamans and their followers, participants of those events treated 
peasant militancy as an exponent of ubiquitous chaos, an elemental force of apocalyptic 
proportions. “The movement,” wrote in his diary the Volunteer Army General Aleksei von 
Lampe about atamanshchina, “threatens to brush us aside along with the Bolsheviks and will 
trigger off foreign intervention and [the imposition of] protectorate.”
10 Thoroughly 
metropolitan, this perspective registered a shift in the locus of power from the urban 
municipalities to the innumerable villages and hamlets scattered across the wide terrain from 
Don to Danube. All of a sudden the city saw itself striped of its privileged position from 
which it dictated and exacted, being reduced to a non-productive agglomeration of famished 
tenants left at mercy of its transient rulers; amply supplied with arms, the village, on the 
other hand, thrived. Nothing provided a more poignant expression to this role reversal than 
the conquest of Kiev accomplished by the peasant bands in mid December 1918; other 
examples, less spectacular but all the more suggestive as a result, studded the progression of 
the “red,” “black” and “yellow-blue” peasant insurgents during the vertiginous campaigns of 
the year 1919. To those of the policy-makers and strategy-planners who had to eyes to see, 
the consequence of the changed constellation could have not been clearer: the war, as the 
contest over power, could only be won there, where the power now resided – deep in the 
hinterland, away from the stalled industrial hubs and paralyzed railroad arteries.  
 
For all its unprecedented character, the ascendancy of the rural insurgency over the city did 
not herald the triumph of anarchy as most of its antagonists and even some of its apologists 
(in the Makhnovite camp) claimed. Collapse of a city-centered state with its bureaucracy, its 
                                                 
10 GARF f 5853 o 1 d 1 л 134   
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army of recruits, its tax-collecting agencies, its post and telegraph services still fell 
noticeably short of chaos even if what came in its stead held in none too high an esteem any 
of the aforementioned perquisites. Buttressed by a network of revolutionary committees 
(revkom, pl. revkomy), bound to their leaders by sinews of respect and obedience, armed 
peasant detachments – stationary or mobile – brought forth a system of rule, which in many 
respects best reflected popular political hopes in the aftermath of the February revolution. 
The practice of electing one’s own commanders (vybornoe nachalo), the emphasis on the 
voluntary nature of “consciptions” (printsip dobrovol’chestva, or dobrovol’cheskoe nachalo) 
– principles linked with the change in the disciplinary regime following the release of Order 
Nr 1 – retained their appeal, entering as hallowed tenets into the unwritten constitutions of 
the ataman-led peasant militias. The act of translating the gospel of Revolution into the 
preexisting idiom of peasant parochialism yielded a new political canon wherein plethora of 
rural communes arrogated upon themselves the privileges of small universes to the near-
exclusion of the grand-style politics. 
 
That this was the system with which one could and had to work was demonstrated by the six 
month collaboration between the commissars and atamans, of which the Ukrainian Front and 
the separate Ukrainian Red Army were the most conspicuous products. That this was, 
moreover, a profoundly anti-etatist system, jealous of its gains lest they be snatched by the 
eager Center, found incontrovertible proof in the systematic defections of peasant bands 
away form the side marked by the self-strengthening proclivities to the one espousing looser 
notions of discipline. This happened in November of 1918 with the peasants flocking to the 
banner of rebellion hoisted by the Directorate; two months later the above scenario was given  
  9
another run as the wave of peasant insurgency, aggrieved by the UNR usage of ancien 
regime practices (starorezhmnye poriadki), turned to greet advancing Bolshevik troops; 
finally, May of 1919 saw those latter lose control over their mosaic forces and the insurgents-
turned-red army men revert to the condition of unaffiliated “political banditry.” As a result, 
insurgency – both as a manner of conducting a certain type of revolutionary politics and of 
defending associated order – lost the status of an extraordinary event, acquiring instead 
elements which allow one to speak of its institutionalized character. This came in closest to 
making a reality of Trotsky’s permanent revolution as an everyday condition – with a crucial 
caveat that the peasantry (as opposed to the working class) was standing at the van of 
history’s relentless procession.  
  
Part II: Setting the Stage 
A.  Land and People  
 
Although in currency among certain nationalist-minded intellections, Ukraine as a 
geopolitical concept did not exist before 1917 – not so in the minds of the imperials 
bureaucrats. Known either under a vague appellation of “South of Russia” (Iug Rossii) or 
“Little Russia,” it encompassed a territory of nine provinces with seats in Kharkov (Kharkiv), 
Yekaterinoslav (Katerynoslav, present-day Dnipropetrovsk), Poltava, Simferopol (Taurida 
province), Chernigov (Chernihiv), Kiev, Kherson, Zhitomir (Zhytomyr, Volhynian province) 
and Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podilsky, Podolian province). The last three provinces 
formed the so-called South-Western krai, or Kiev General Government, which from 1912 
onwards also included small Kholm (Chełm in Polish) province detached from the Kingdom  
  10
of Poland. Not counting Austrian-controlled Galicia and Bukovina, nine Imperial provinces 
roughly coincided with the boundaries of the modern Ukrainian state and would constitute 
the minimum programme of territorial reclamations advanced by diverse national (or 
nationalist) governments in the course of the Civil War.  
 
The key geographic feature of the land is the divide running from east to west and separating 
the southern steppes from the northern hillocks and forests. Although the weather in the 
southern half (Yekaterinoslav, Taurida and Kherson) could be rather rough, rendering it, as 
one contemporary statistical survey asserted, “unfit for vegetation,”
11 the black earth, found 
there in abundance, made that region one of the most fertile in the whole empire. This 
combination of fertility and hibernal “inclemency” naturally resulted in the predominance of 
the spring (iarovye) cultures, with Yekaterinoslav province alone, for example, producing in 
1899 a little less than a third of Ukraine’s total spring wheat harvest (40 out of 130 millions 
poods) and a quarter of its barley (27 out of 110 million poods). Consequently, the seasonal 
nature of peasant field labor essentially struck out few weeks in April and May for any 
activity other than sawing – a fact of non-trivial importance, as the Austrians harried by 
peasant rebels from mid summer of 1918 and Grigoriev bereft of peasant support in late 
spring 1919 would discover in time to their discomfiture.  
 
In contrast to the southern steppes, the north lavished the viewer with diverse landscape 
forms: the eastern woodless plains changed into luxuriating lowlands along the banks of the 
Dnieper River, which in their turn gave way to hillier surfaces as intimation of the 
approaching Carpathians.  Matching this diversity, sundry crops were being grown there 
                                                 
11 Vsia Rossiia, (Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Suvorina, 1900), 456  
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despite the fact that the soil, especially in Chernigov and in parts of Kiev province was 
substantially inferior to the black earth. Thanks to mild winters and abundance of snow, the 
six Northern provinces specialized in the production of winter cultures – rye in particular. 
That meant that the busiest time on peasant calendars corresponded to the months of 
September and October, prior to the folk holiday of Pokrov (October 14). Without elevating 
the suggestion to the level of a strict causality, it appears fair to assume that the activities of 
the peasant bands in Kiev and Poltava provinces in the fateful Autumn of 1918 owed 
something to the end of the sowing season and hence to the availability of spare time.  
Table 1: Ukrainian Provinces in the context of European Russian (1897)
12 
Province  
Population 
(in 
millions) 
Density 
(per sq. 
verst) 
Urban 
population 
(%) 
% 
Peasant 
estate 
number 
of 
individual 
per 
houshold 
population 
growth, 
thousands 
(%) 
European 
Russia   94.2  22.1 12.9 77.1 5.8
1,716 
(1.8%) 
Chernigov 2.3  49.9 9.1 87.2 5.7 41  (1.8%) 
Kharkov 2.5  52.1 15.1 90.8 6.2 49  (1.9%) 
Kherson 2.7  43.9 28.9 67.5 5.5 51  (1.9%) 
Kiev 3.6  79.71 12.9 77.8 5.5 73  (2%) 
Podolia 3  81.9 7.3 80.8 5.2 53  (1.7%) 
Poltava 2.8  63.4 9.9 88.5 5.7 50  (1.8%) 
Taurida 1.4  27.3 20 77.6 6.1 36  (2.5%) 
Volhynia 3  47.4 7.8 74.9 5.7 61  (2%) 
Yekaterinoslav 2.1  37.9 11.4 87.3 6.1 64  (3.1%) 
 
As follows from Table 1, the nine Ukrainian provinces belonged to the most densely 
populated areas of the empire with the population density exceeding the national average by 
a factor of two or more. Moreover, Ukraine’s 24 million residents procreated at the pace 
                                                 
12 Table based on data taken from N.A. Troinistsky, Obshchii svod po imperii rezul’tatov razrabotki dannykh 
pervoi Vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia proizvedennoi 28 ianvaria 1897 goda (Saint-Petersburg: Izdanie 
Tsentral’nogo Statisticheskogo Komiteta Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1905) ( v. VIII (Volynskaia Guberniia, 
1904), v. XVI (Kievskaia Guberniia, 1904), v. XXXII (Podol’skaia Guberniia, 1904), v. XXXIII (Poltavskaia 
Guberniia, 1904), v. XLI (Tavricheskaia Guberniia, 1904), v. XLVII (Khersonskaia Guberniia, 1904), Vsia 
Rossiia (1900), Obzor Ekaterinoslavskoi Gubernii za 1909 god (Yekaterinoslav: Tipografiia gubernskogo 
pravleniia, 1910) Karmannyi Atlas Rossii (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie A.F. Marksa, 1907), N.A. Rubakin, Rossiia 
v tsyfrakh: strana, narod, sosloviia, klassy (Saint Petersburg: Izdanie “Vestnika Znaniia,” 1912), A. Rusov, 
Opisanie Chernigovshchiny (Chernigov: Tipografiia Gubernskago Zemstva, 1898-1899).  
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which was deemed high even in the context of the extraordinary growth rate maintained by 
the Russian empire at the turn of the century (1.8% annually). The three southern provinces – 
the Novorossiia in the parlance of the day – held the honor of being the fastest growing 
region in the country, result achieved not only by the high natality figures (500 per 10,000), 
but also by the relatively low mortality (281 per 10,000 as compared with the all-Russian 
average of 321).
13 The latter was all the more unusual because Ukraine, to the greater extent 
than the rest of the empire, was a true peasant land when judged from the perspective of the 
estate distribution as well as the proportion of non-urban inhabitants. Brushing shoulders 
with the rural folk who counted among the hungriest in the region between the Urals and the 
Vistula river (Voronezh and Tambov), the Ukrainian peasant obviously profited from the 
higher fecundity of the soil and a moderate household size – at least by the Russian standard.  
Table 2: Town-Village Divide in nine Ukrainian Provinces (1897)
14 
Province  
% male 
literacy 
(province 
/town/ 
district)
15 
% population 
below 20 y. 
old (province 
/towns/ 
districts)  
% "Small 
Russians" 
(province/ 
town/ 
district) 
% "Great 
Russians" 
(province/ 
town/ 
districts) 
% Jews 
(province/ 
town/ 
district) 
% Poles 
(province/  
town/dist) 
Chernig 
29.8/50.4/27.7 
 50.9/47.4/51.3  66.4/*/* 21.6/*/* 5/*/*  */*/* 
Kharkov 
25.9/50.8/21.5 
 50.8/43.1/52.1  80.6/*/* 17.7/*/* .5/*/* */*/* 
Kherson 
35/54/26.9 
 50.8/42.3/54.3  53.5/17.2/68.2 21.5/45/11.3 11.8/28.4/5.1 1.1/3.1/.3 
Kiev 
27.6/55.7/23.1 
 51.5/41.7/52.9  79.2/28.1/86.7 5.9/33.2/1.8 12.1/31/9.3 1.9/4.7/1.5 
Podolia 
15.5/33.8/14.1 
 50.5/45.9/51  80.9/32.5/84.8 3.3/15/2.3 12.2/46/9.6  2.3/4.9/2.1 
Poltava 
27.8/64.1/23.7 
 52.7/48/53.2  93/57.2/96.9 2.6/11.4/1.7 4/29.3/1.2  .1/1.1/.04 
Taurida 36.9/53.1/32.6 51.9/41.1/54.5 42.2/30.2/50.1 27.9/49.1/22.6 3.8/11.8/1.8  .7/2.2/.3 
Volhynia 24.4/50.22/22  51.3/43.13/52.1 70.1/19.7/74.4 3.5/19/2.2.  13.2/50.8/10 6.2/7.6/6 
Yekater  31.5/53.3/28.7 51.6/44.6/52.1 68.8/*/* 16.4/*/* 4.8/*/*  */*/* 
                                                 
13 Rossiia v tsyfrakh, 44 
14 See footnote 12 due to the absence of sources, data on Chernigov, Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav provinces 
remain incomples; there is no doubt, however, the the figures, had they been available, would have maintained 
the general trend.  
15 “Province” is the percentage of the said population relative the entire province; “town” is the percentage 
relative to the total population of the provincial cities and towns; “districts” is the percentage relative to the 
total population of the province less that of the cities and towns, i.e. rural population  
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Despite all those points of distinction, externally Ukraine looked very much like an extension 
of Russia’s prodigious corpus, subduing or exacerbating certain imperial tendencies 
according to its own temperament. It was only when seen from within that the major rifts 
started to come to light, with none perhaps being of greater import than the one separating 
Ukrainian village from a town. Provincial and district centers, let alone such metropolises as 
Odessa (Odesa), Kiev, Kharkov or Yekaterinoslav, stood out like alien bodies embedded in 
the unbroken mass of peasant element. In comparison with their peers in the land, urban 
residents were older, wealthier and incomparably more literate – urbane, in short. The two 
groups had to overcome substantial hurdle in order to reach understanding – quite literarlly, 
for, with the exception of the Poltava province, speakers of the “Little Russian dialect” 
everywhere comprised a minority of the urban population. In linguistic terms, cities and 
towns in the central and southern parts of Ukraine were dominated by the Jews and the 
“Great Russians”; in the West, by the Jews, and, to a lesser extent, by Poles. Fragmentary 
data reveal even stronger domination of the non-Ukrainians if translating the anonymous 
head counts into terms of economic and, ultimately, cultural power. In other words, in and of 
themselves, the Ukrainians were more than just a peasant nation par excellence, representing, 
as Mykhailo Drahomanov put it, a “plebian nation” neatly circumscribed within the 
boundaries of the exploited group.
16 This non-accidental coincidence soldered national 
demands with the program of social emancipation so much so that twenty years later the act 
of balancing between those two moments evolved into an exercise of political tightrope 
walking, with each careless step embodying the fatal danger for the major performers on 
display.  
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During the intervening years between the all-Russian census and the outbreak of the 
Revolution the situation in the Ukrainian countryside changed markedly, although the city 
lost none of its foreignness in the eyes of the rural population. For one, the village went 
through the process of internal differentiation expedited by the agrarian revolts in 1905-1906 
and the panoply of government halting measures. Before 1906 most of the land owned by the 
peasant “estate”, i.e. about 20 million desiatins, belonged to the communes (mir), which 
periodically distributed it between their members in the form of the land allotments (nadel).
17 
Privately owned plots (podvornoe khoziaistvo) constituted only a fraction of the total land in 
peasant possession and were largely concentrated in the northeastern parts of the country 
(Poltava, Kharkov). With the introduction of the Stolypin’s land reforms and the removal of 
the last formal ties binding individuals to their mirs, the number of the private smallholders 
rapidly took off even in the Steppe provinces where the practice of private ownership among 
the peasants had only feeble roots. Thus by 1911 about a third of all peasant economies of 
the Yekaterinoslav and Kherson provinces left their communes and formed separate 
homesteads (khutora); in Taurida province that number reached 40 per cent.
18 This exodus, 
accompanied by the steady diminution of the per capita landholding size, naturally widened 
the gap between the rural poor and the landless villagers on one hand and the well-to-do 
peasants with an endowment of 9 desiatins or more; the sizeable category of the middle 
peasants, about 33 per cent by some counts,
19 served as a mediator between the two extremes, 
allaying resentments and maintaining a semblance of unanimity for the time being. Yet, in 
the winter and spring of 1918, the internal tensions unseen in the smoke of the burning 
                                                 
17 Vsia Rossiia 
18 D. Erde, Revoliutsiia na Ukraine (Kharkov: Proletariy, 1927), 16 
19 ibid., 17  
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landlord manors would come to light, forcing many a homesteader back into the mir and 
putting the rest on the watchful defensive.  
 
Although the education in the Russian was never made free nor compulsory, the Ukrainian 
village progressed in wide strides towards initiating its youth to the benisons of universal 
enlightenment. Within the span of fourteen years the number of elementary schools increased 
by 50%, reaching the number of almost nineteen thousand in 1911. Literacy appeared to have 
expanded at the comparable rate. In the Poltava province alone, for example, the percentage 
of individuals who could read and had a modicum of writing skills rose from 16.9% to 
23.7%.
20 The cumulative population of pupils and students oscillated around the figure of 
half a million in 1909 – a dramatic departure from the puny 67,000 at the time of the 
Emancipation.
21 To be sure, the spirit of the Valuev Circular and Ems Ukase still reigning 
unperturbed, there was little talk of conducting instructions in the “Little Russian dialect of 
the Russian language.” However, to a certain extent the niche for the education in vernacular 
was filled by the organizations similar to Prosvita, which began to sprout in the Russian part 
of Ukraine shortly after the October Manifesto, adapting the structure of the Austrian 
counterparts to their own circumstances. Focusing on the “lower layers of the society,” 
Prosvita organized reading groups in the villages, built libraries, filling them with the 
Ukrainian language titles with subjects ranging from the lubok-style popular tales to the 
classics of Kotliarevsky and Shevchenko.  
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The relentless spread of the secular education made the figure of a teacher a cynosure on the 
stage of provincial life. Yet, despite his growing importance, it cannot be said that the teacher 
inspired universal admiration. Resistance came first and foremost from those, upon whose 
prerogatives he was believed to have impinged – or whom he himself regarded as his natural 
adversaries. “To the vilest enemies of school as a source of literacy (istochnik gramoty)” 
wrote one embittered teacher from the Chernigov province, “belong the village big wigs 
(zapravily) – volost elders, scribes, he-men-kulaks (bogatyri-kulaki) and the Jews.” 
The teacher, who directly confronts the peasantry and depends upon it, who 
gives himself up to his task not formally, but with his soul – that teacher 
won’t get away unscathed. What might prevent the guzzler-scribe or someone 
else of his mould from compiling a denunciation against the teacher, accusing 
him of all possible crimes?... Every priest too treats the teacher as his enemy, 
looks at him askance, and, although he does not challenge him openly, he 
spreads hearsays and rumors of the most unfavorable quality.
22 
Ordinary peasants, appreciative as they might be of the services rendered to them and their 
children by the village teachers, could easily succumb to the hostile rhetoric of their 
traditional leaders. The teacher, after all, was still a foreigner, stemming more often than not 
either from the nobility or clergy; the fact that as many as a half of them were females 
created additional difficulties in endearing the patriarchal world of the peasant mir to the new 
forms of moral authority.
23 
 
Overcoming those difficulties, impecunious and constantly on guard, the teacher nevertheless 
succeeded to connect the village with the external world, bringing the volatile hodge-podge 
mixture from the socialist and nationalist ideas to the somnolent circles of his rural clientele. 
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As his personal ambition merged with the selfless concern for the welfare of “the injured and 
the insulted,” the teacher began to set himself in opposition to that regime and that system, 
on whose payroll he found himself listed. His perseverance gradually melting lingering 
suspicion, the village too habituated itself to regarding the teacher as a spokesman of its 
interests, delegating him at first to the uezd and provincial assemblies and then, when the 
Petrograd events announced the dawn of a new era, to the inchoate inter-party committees. In 
this environment, wrote Boris Stelletsky, the Head of Staff of Hetman Skoropadsky, “only a 
minor push from the exterior was needed to transform the modest figure of a teacher into an 
ardent preacher of revolutionary teachings, an organizer and a leader of popular masses in 
their struggle against the inveterate ‘enemies of the people’.”
24 
 
The immediate future fully borne out veracity of Stelletsky’s judgment. During the Civil War 
the word “teacher”, more so even than that of the returning “frontline soldier,” became nearly 
synonymous with the phenomenon of atamanshchina and other forms of peasant insurgency. 
In his report on “banditry” in 1919, an agent of a regional CheKa put forth an assertion with 
an alacrity betraying its self-evident nature, i.e., that “most of the atamans are former popular 
teachers (narodnye uchitelia).” A list of individuals follows, who abandoned stuffy 
classrooms for the open fields of guerilla lifestyle, replacing a teacher’s pointer with a 
Berdan rifle and a heavy cavalry saber: certain Grigory Pirkhovka near Boguslav (Bohuslav) 
a nameless gymnasium instructor in the Borispol (Boryspil’) uezd, Sheniuk in Zhitomir, 
etc.
25 To those obscure curios one could add teachers-cum-atamans with all-Ukrainian 
renown, akin to Struk who operated in the environs of Chernobyl or Volynets from the area 
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of Gaisin (Haisyn). Divided, as individuals are, by shades of political preferences, as 
members of a professional substratum teachers evinced remarkable unity in their active 
reception of the revolution with its uncertain prospects, giving substance to their position as a 
distinct type of rural intelligentsia.  
 
Thus, the world populated by the Ukrainian peasant on the eve of the revolution could be 
best described as developing. On one hand it manifested essential features of a traditional 
society: large families, squalor and as a consequence high mortality, the lowest literacy rate 
in Europe, a geographical and mental estrangement from the urban seats of power, a skewed 
demographic distribution with an unusually large proportion of teenagers, all still too young 
to learn caution, etc. On the other hand, none of those aspects seemed fixed forever as might 
have been the case a generation or two earlier; the village was in flux, growing more cultured 
with the passage of each year, losing its internal solidarity under the impact of economic and 
political challenges. Traditional authorities, attending to the spiritual growth of the 
communities entrusted to their care, saw their moral mandate mortally curtailed as the 
secularly-minded teachers, judges, agronomists or doctors began to apply their incisive if not 
overly nuanced penchant for social criticism. They brought in new ideas, all the “isms” of the 
modern age, with each refuting the possibility of transcendence outside of history and 
purporting to have perfectly divined the meaning of human becoming. One had to follow 
instructions implicitly contained in those novel doctrines, casting aside the cloak of 
uninformed condition, if one wished to enter the world of universal equity.   
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Yet, while vying for the bodies and minds of the countryside folk, tradition and modernity 
were not the types of reified entities with clear demarcations between corresponding modi 
operandi. Existing side by side, they percolated each other and produced transient symbolic 
systems of recognizably mixed parentage. The Cossack myth, an ingenious adaptation of the 
historical past to the rapidly changing present, was one of the typical and signal hybrid 
phenomena. Its importance grew as it was gaining in currency amidst popular masses, 
invisibly evolving the full array of terms to serve the needs of political articulation and 
lending – when the time comes – the peasant militancy the name under which it would be 
known to a friend and foe alike.  
 
B.  The Cossack Myth  
 
A subject of several reanimation attempts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, by the time of the Crimean War the Ukrainian Cossack Host was definitively a 
dead institution. Many of the mavericks, who thought of escaping the fate of their 
Zaporozhian peers in the thickets of the Danube river delta, returned to the birthplace of their 
fathers unable to come to terms with the new Ottoman loyalties (1828). The Black Sea 
Cossacks, formed from the materials of the abolished Sich with the blessing of Grigori 
Potemkin were gradually transferred to the Kuban region where they would constitute the 
backbone of the newly established Cossack Host. The Imperial state, its hold on the hitherto 
unclaimed steppes firmly secured, announced the closing of the southwestern frontier and  
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canalized the energies of hand-picked inhabitants towards the goals of its continued 
expansion.
26  
 
Expiring as a tangible body, the Ukrainian Cossack Host cleft to its turf in the mnemonic 
domain with obstinacy amassed over two hundred years of autonomous existence. Members 
of the military gentry (starshyna) carefully groomed their proud ethos and convoluted 
genealogies, passing them onto successive generations; meanwhile substantial apologetic 
literature lionized virtues of the individual Cossack hetmans such as Petro Sahaidachny, Ivan 
Mazepa, and, of course and above all, Bohdan Khmelnitsky. This was an essentially 
aristocratic mythology, which combined, as Serhii Plokhy averred, both “political needs and 
historical beliefs” of the ruling elite.
27 The heroic reconstruction of the past served to fill the 
void triggered by the practical desuetude of the Cossack gentry, enabling the endangered 
estate to militate coherently for the preservation of old privileges in the ongoing debate with 
the encroaching center.  
 
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a radical revaluation of the myth’s 
applicability. Expanding beyond the gentry circles, for whose internal consumption it was 
originally conceived, the Cossack hagiography soon reached largely illiterate peasant masses. 
who recognized in its libertarian narrative a reflection of their own aspirations.  This 
reappropriation of the old ideological tropes found an early expression in the agrarian 
discontent, which affected several districts of the Kiev and Chernigov provinces in the last 
year of the Crimean War. Adumbrating in many ways what would transpire three score later, 
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the movement of the “Kyiv kozachchina” brought hundreds of peasants into spontaneously 
organized “Cossack” squads. These emerged in response to the conscription orders with an 
idea that everyone joining popular militias (the “Cossacks”) would be made free and receive 
landlord’s land in reward once the war is over. Although the villagers themselves denied any 
imputation of rebellious intent, the unsanctioned self-organization, the election of atamans 
coupled with the overt anti-serfdom rhetoric amounted to a high treason in the eyes of the 
tsarist authorities.
28 Their reaction, directed at suppressing the peasant initiative, drove 
another wedge between the elitist original of the myth and the inchoate popular version 
thereof, for the State, previously a guarantor of liberties and privileges, had unquestionably 
set itself up as the major hurdle on the way of obtaining them.  
 
The popularization of the Cossack mythology progressed to the rhythm of the generous 
literary outpouring of the Ukrainian writers and historians. Shevchenko led the way with his 
epic poem Haidamaks and a cycle Kobzar, entwining peasant elemental revolt with the 
visions of Cossack liberty across his steady stanzas. The romantic view of the Zaporozhians 
as the defenders of the common folk, champions of justice and freedom, blossomed on the 
pages of Panteleimon Kulish’s prose, and in the dialogues of Mark Kropyvntytsky’s plays, 
etc.
29 Toward the end of the nineteenth century historical novels in the style of Walter Scott 
were being complemented with a swarm of popular histories, no more veracious than 
fictionalized accounts but efficacious all the same. Works of Adrian Koshchenko, sketches of 
Dmytro Iavornitsky, despite their apparent one-sidedness (or thanks to it), became veritable 
bestsellers which stayed in print for thirty years up to the time of the revolution. Mykhailo 
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Hrushevsky, the dean of the Ukrainian national historiography, working in the footsteps of 
his great predecessors, also tried his hand in producing historical vignettes.  The 
paradigmatic text in that regard entitled in a folkloristic style About the Cossack Bat’ko 
Bohdan Khmelnitsky created a portrait of a national leader, who, apart from his controversial 
decision to place Ukraine under the Tsar’s Alexis scepter, was uncompromisingly given over 
to the task of “finding truth and freedom” in the midst of a powerful popular upheaval.
30 
 
In a certain sense, the revolution received its first symbolic treatment in the dramatic reversal 
to which the figure of a Cossack had been subjected, both in works of the Ukrainian men of 
letters and in minds of their audiences. From an embodiment of gentry’s pride, jealous of his 
privileges as a servitor of the state and aware of his distinction from the common masses, the 
Cossack transmogrified into Freedom’s faithful child, unremittingly on guard lest the lords 
grow insolent and the boyars abusive. A frontiersman, his was not the stance of a loner, full 
of pathos and futility, braving the violent gales of history; instead, the Cossack emerged 
surrounded by the jovial community of the like-minded die-hards, an aspect which must have 
appealed to the collectivist sensitivities of overawed peasant readers. The putative 
involvement of the Cossack in the multifaceted struggle against the economic, political and 
social domination of the foreigners girt him in a perfect store of tropes, from which the 
disaffected consumers at the turn of the century could always find something to their liking – 
be it a language of national revolt, a violent condemnation of social iniquities or a non-
cooperation with a colonial state both remote and heedless of the interests of the people.  
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It seemed natural that when the hour of the revolution chimed its exulted tune the whole 
generation of young activists turned to the metaphors imbibed from the tales of the Cossack 
glory. Refusing to proceed to the front under the pretext of defending new order back home, 
the units of the Imperial army were only too eager to rechristen themselves after some 
illustrious hetman or his faithful lieutenants. Paramilitary groups, emerging in the spring and 
summer of 1917 to take over functions of the tsarist law-enforcing agencies, believed that 
they were giving the Cossack practice of self-rule another lease of life. Their descendants, 
atamans proper, went even further, believing, as did ataman Iukhym Bozhko to be the 
embodiments of modern-day Cossacks and proceeding to recreate Sich with a museum-like 
precision as though taking a cue from Repin’s tableau and accompanying commentaries.
31 
Champions of Sich and its traditions – although not to such a theatrical extent – were the 
volunteers from the Galician crown land, whose enthusiasm betrayed a desire to efface the 
shame for having never been a part in the mainstream of Cossack history. When creating 
their own armed forces, leaders of sundry national regimes were tailoring old imperial ranks 
to fit the imagined hierarchy of the Zaporozhian host. Finally the Red Army regiments 
formed in the interior of Ukraine or along its borders in the last months of 1918 rummaged 
through names, signs and symbols, to be changed into titular lucky charms which might 
smooth the transition from the world as it was to the world as it should be. Of all belligerents, 
only the Whites and the Poles refused to scoop from the abundant stocks of Cossack-related 
paraphernalia as if accentuating their unconcealed foreignness to the unfolding of the 
Ukrainian quandary.  
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This ubiquitous Cossack-mania was not exclusive to the agents of atamanshchina, although 
it does hint at its complexity and explain some of the confusion which ensued whenever 
principal commentators of the age attempted to give this phenomenon an encompassing 
definition. Thus, Vynnychenko, for instance, having mostly in mind the UNR officers 
(“otomans” in the official parlance) and the Volhynian partisans nominally subordinated to 
the Directorate, thought that atamanshchina represented the unhale prevalence of the military 
caste over the civilians in determining the political orientation of the regime. Vynnychenko’s 
plangent narrative of the power slipping into the hands of the officer “junta” – the otomans – 
jibed well with his intention to lay the entire blame on Petliura, de jure the “Head Otoman,” 
for all the dismal failures which befell the first serious sovereignist endeavor in modern 
Ukrainian history.
32 Trotsky, whose own object of observation consisted of the countless 
bat’ki and insurgent atamans entering en mass into the ranks of the Ukrainian Red Army, 
saw essential features of atamanshchina in the cultivated “unprofessionalism” of the 
commanders and the soldiers, proclivity to exercise the uncalled-for initiative, finally, on a 
broader level, in the tendency to pursue autonomous course of action in disregard of the 
central plan. No doubt, each of those divergent interpretations captured something of the 
phenomenon, although, swayed by the community of terms that the Cossack myth brought 
into use, both Trotsky and Vynnychenko (along with many others) tended to look at the 
variegated praxis much at the expense of the “pre-linguistic” etiology. For, besides young 
men with spirits straddling tradition and modernity, and Cossack-inspired ideology upon 
which they avidly seized to mount over their speechlessness, atamanshchina required 
another element – a catastrophic event – to come into being: the War with its simultaneous 
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effect of inuring individuals to violence and of weaning them from obeying the invisible 
authority of the state.
33 
 
C.  The War 
 
As the interwar French classic La Grande Illusion suggested, the war which broke out in 
August 1914 on the European continent still had something vestigially chivalrous about it. 
On the eve of the first wartime Christmas, soldiers in the area of the beleaguered fortress 
Przemyśl, both the besieged and those carrying out the siege, used to leave out gifts for each 
other in the open – as tokens of humanity and mutual respect. Around the same time an 
Austrian pilot shot down by the Russians was buried with honors due to his rank; few days 
later the Russians dropped a photo behind the enemy lines, showing the grave of the fallen 
airman.
34 Prisoners as a rule were kept in manageable conditions, even in the frosty Siberia, 
with the postal traffic between the relatives back home and the camp inmates being operative 
throughout the entire period of the war.  
 
However, from the first days the war distinguished itself by the unprecedented brutality, 
staggering losses in men and materiel, an imagination-defying price, which never seemed 
sufficiently high to buy the coveted victory. In the east, where the exchange of territories 
won and lost still made an impression of sweeping strategic movements, entire armies were 
often sacrificed to death, injuries and captivity. The encirclement and the annihilation of 
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Samsonov’s 2
nd Army in East Prussia set the tone and it was later replayed as a gloomy 
leitmotif in the taking of the aforementioned Przemyśl with its booty of a 120,000 garrison, 
in the excruciating winter battles over the Carpathian passes, in the concentrated attack of 
fire and steel at Gorlice, finally in that epic effort of Russia’s arms in the summer and fall of 
1916, which brought one of the opponents on the verge of defeat and the other – on the verge 
of exhaustion. For, although Russia with its 15 and a half million mobilized, about 9.3% of 
the total population,
35 appeared as still possessing untapped resources – its allies and 
adversaries having brought to arms much higher proportion of the population – its 
obsolescent conscription laws combined with structural limitations of space and 
demographics (such as the lesser productivity of a Russian worker) severely constrained the 
pool of reservists. Alarms, voiced timidly in 1914 and 1915, grew loud and peremptory 
towards the end of the next year: at the rate with which the front and, more importantly, the 
rear were consuming able-bodied men, the war was as good as lost.
36  
    
Divided between the two states, Ukraine got more that its fair share of destruction, exertion 
and population loss. Figures found in Golovin’s study show that the percentage of able-
bodied men mobilized in southwestern provinces of the Russian Empire varied between 
34.2% (for the Yekaterinoslav province) to almost 50% (for Volhynian and Poltava 
provinces),
37 altogether about 3.5 million individuals.
38 Immense amount of property was 
lost, especially in Galicia and Bukovina, which became scenes of the largest operations 
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undertaken by the Russian army in the war. Animals were drafted on the unprecedented scale 
with the result that as many as 40% of all households in the Russian part of Ukraine found 
themselves entirely bereft of horses.
39 
 
The war affected Ukraine not only materially, but also morally. Peasants remaining in 
villages, who may have seen their kinsfolk and horses drafted for the needs of the war, lived 
through a paradoxical prosperity caused by the wartime prohibition and the governmental 
cash handouts. Now with more money at their disposal the rural population began acquiring 
taste for consumption, enacting what many outside observers registered as moral 
degeneration, a veritable feast in time of plague. “Simple women,” wrote Hans Limbach, a 
Swiss citizen residing in Kherson province, “who hardly had enough to eat in their life, 
found themselves suddenly in possession of flowing money.” 
Cakes, sweetmeats, candies (Schleckwaren), silk and velvet became at once 
necessities for them. It was outrageous to see them come and go all perfumed 
and rouged; one could image only too well how they perfumed and rouged 
themselves! And yet not only grown up women, but also little toadies (kleine 
Kröten) who could barely count to four.
40 
Even before the Revolution made it permissible, Limbach informs the reader, the 
peasants learned to demand a raise in a rather peremptory fashion. One maid in 
Limbach’s service asked for additional fifty kopecks and when questioned what for, 
she retorted without a hint of hesitation: “For the make-up.” Needless to say, her 
answer contained little of that Russian peasant’s proverbial insentience to hardship 
upon which both the regime and the urban society came to rely – if only out of 
ignorance.  
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At the same time news of defeats and incompetence carried by the soldiers had a much 
shorter course to traverse in Ukraine than everywhere else before leaving a deep abrasion 
upon the popular psyche. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly Jews from the Pale, 
their plight inscribed in their bodies and engraved on their tattered appurtenances, inundated 
the cities, causing bouts of compassion among some as well as fits of anger among others 
chafed at the sight of uninvited guests. With armies stationed in Volhynia and Podolia and 
rears organized farther east to support them, Ukraine received the taste of a military rule as 
the population was accustoming itself to the heavy-handed and unceremonious manners of 
men in uniform. The enthusiasm for the war – and hence the active support of the state – 
were wearing out, but so did collective sensitivities for the individual lot, a type of a paradox 
which often results when the passive perseverance in and of itself acquires characteristics of 
a principal social virtue.  
 
Entering into the battle as the subjects of multiethnic, dynastic empires, raw conscripts from 
Galicia and Russian “Dnieper Ukraine” have seen their loyalties subjected to the most 
strenuous test. In multiple cases the crisis was inspired by the encounter with the gospel of 
nationalism, the tenets of which appeared incomparably more relevant in the age of national 
rivalries. The word “Ukrainian” used only sparingly before 1914 in the official discourse of 
the Dual Monarchy, and almost never in the realm of Tsar firmly entered into the approbated 
political parlance with the emergence – on the Austrian side of the hill – of civil and military 
bodies purporting to represent interest of the Habsburg “Ruthenians” and Romanoff “Small 
Russians.” Thus on August 1, 1914 the “Main Ukrainian Council” (HUR) came into being in  
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Lemberg (pol. Lwów/ukr. Lviv), creating in its own turn the “Ukrainian Military Board” 
(UBU) charged to deal with the army-related affairs. The HUR was soon transformed into 
the “General Ukrainian Council” (ZUR) reflecting the expansion of prerogatives to areas 
beyond the limits of the Galician crown land.
41 More portentous than any of those 
abbreviated agencies was the establishment of the first national Ukrainian unit, the two-
battalion strong Legion of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. Although the legion owed its 
existence to the special imperial authorization from Kaiser Franz Josef, it became soon the 
institutional crucible in which new corporate identity was being forged and which, as the war 
wore on, would come into irreconcilable conflict with that of its royal patrons.  
 
Wary of the problems that the Pandora box of the “Ukrainian quandary” contained, the 
Tsarist regime did its best to keep silent all talks of national autonomy. Yet, when the 
revolution had done away with the monarchy, removing the obstacle for the Ukrainian self-
organization, the national movement began to gather momentum at vertiginous speed.  
 
Identities and loyalties evolved as much on the level of the individual as they did on the 
plane of empires, nations and groups. In the environment where survival depended primarily 
on cooperation with one’s fellow-soldiers, strangers to each other on the civvy street but 
brothers at the trenches, the figure of the immediate commander rose dramatically in 
prominence. If he seemed aloof, cowardly or unfair, he was quietly vilified, often as a 
concrete manifestation of the Center’s criminal insolvency; if, on the other hand, he proved 
himself to be “one of our own,” cherishing the common man and paying attention to his 
                                                 
41 Wolfdieter Bihl “Die Ukraine-Politik Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg” in Die Besatzung der 
Ukraine 1918 historischer Kontext, Forschungsstand, wirtschaftliche und soziale Folgen, ed. Wolfram Dornik 
et al. (Graz: Verein zur Förderung der Froschung von Folgen nach Konflikten und Kriegen, 2008), 55  
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concerns, the reward might be something greater than simple admiration – personal 
attachment if not a quasi-feudal devotion might be in store for him. “Varyvoda,” wrote one 
of the Sich riflemen about his superiors “is, as a commander, an extraordinarily kind man. 
He is like a father: everywhere he takes care of us, doing his best to meet our 
needs. One regards and treats us differently now. Captain (sotnik) Lysniak is 
another valuable addition. He is flesh and bone a rifleman like us, half-civilian. 
He directs everything and does everything himself. One rarely meets people 
like that in the civilian life.
42  
On the invisible scales of power the war was thus pushing the center of gravity away from 
the remote bureaucracies towards men standing nearby, giving rise to the politics of the 
proximate and, in fact, effectuating a sort of “re-immanentization” of the art of governance. 
The distant state was growing more distant, being menaced to disappear entirely from the 
field of vision. When this happened, as it did in Russia, and the state became quaintly 
unimportant, the bonds connecting the Army with the Center were as good as dissolved, 
letting the revolution and infrastructural collapse rush into the resultant vacancies.  
 
No wonder then that a great many of the future atamans, perhaps even their majority, came 
from the pool of the NCOs (unter-ofitsery) and ensigns (praporshchiki) of the former Tsarist 
army.
43 Having risen through the ranks in the course of the war, they felt little attachment to 
the half-decimated caste of the professional officers – the kadroviki. Without the protective 
sheath of esprit de corp, these bottom-rung officers had shown themselves particularly 
susceptible to the rhetoric of the revolutionary criers – socialists, Bolsheviks, nationalists, etc. 
At the same time they remained what they always were: common soldiers, mostly of peasant 
issue, intoxicated with the first quaffs of power just enough to overcome self-doubt without 
                                                 
42 cit in Skrukwa, 64  
43 Angel, Struk, Zeleny, Grigoriev, Sokolovsky all belonged to that group. Makhno is, as is often the case with 
him, an odd egg in the dozen.   
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tumbling into the abyss of abuse. Since they could lead their men into mortal danger for the 
abstract imperial interests none could fully comprehend, the task of eradicating class enemies 
appeared all the more easier. In a word, combining in perfect measure transcendence of 
revolutionary ideology with immanence of revolutionary politics, they were perfectly cut for 
the role of the rural power-brokers once the countryside detached itself from the orbit of 
urban authority.  
 
Civilians and the military experienced the war differently, but the lessons they drew evinced 
many commonalities. First of all, through conscious state policies, clandestine revolutionary 
activities or as a result of the unwilled consequences of demographic crises,
44 one learned to 
regard himself and his surroundings through the prism of new doctrines. Furthermore, the 
war, a school of violence, provided the space, or “spaces”
45 where violent acts could be 
exercised and observed. Honing to the perfection the social eye-hand coordination, it created 
a cast of perpetrators, who had no difficulties committing atrocities, and a much larger 
contingent of spectators, who did not shy away from it in the state of utter revulsion. Finally, 
the war had discredited the state, stripping it of its status as a sine qua non condition for 
social existence. Whether in the trenches or on board of numerous privately-sponsored 
charity organizations, people began to accustom themselves to the idea of acting 
independently, without expecting official sanction and often in opposition to it. This gradual 
weaning away from the tutelage of the tsarist administration lay at the root of the parastatal 
complex (as Peter Gatrell put it), accompanied by the process of Entstaatlichung, or “de-
                                                 
44 For the connection between the refugee crisis and the issues of national autonomy in Russia during the First 
World War, see Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press,1999) 
45 Idea taken from Felix Schnell’s book, Räume des Schreckens.  
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statization,” in Felix Schnell’s apt expression. Starting from two different points of departure, 
the Army and the social body proceeded inbound to meet each other half-way, united as they 
were by the welter of disenchantment and hopefulness, but also by the spreading insentience 
for the acts of physical and moral aggression.  
 
The transition from the First World War to the Civil War resulted precisely from the merge 
of the Front with the remaining rear, that casting of the frontline existence onto fabric of 
civilian life. Atamanshchina, which saw the “peasant army” transform into the major vehicle 
of the radical revolutionary changes, was only the most poignant manifestation of that 
amalgamation.  
 
Part III: Intellectual Background, Sources and Secondary Literature  
 
 
The project, well before it had a single written word to show for itself, was already gestating 
in the metaphysical conviction that the relationship between Time and Space is mediated by 
what Spengler used to refer to as “Style.” “Time gives birth to Space,” he asserts in his 
classical work,
46 and this birth, really the act of creating meaningful references (symbolic or 
material) and of simultaneously inscribing the space into the resultant constellation, unfolds 
according to a certain impalpable worldview centered at the culture-specific notion of Fate 
(Schicksal/Fügung/Bestimmung). Revolutionary time is no exception to that – in fact, it 
might be even seen as an unfairly seamless confirmation of the above idea, given how self-
conscious its major actors are of history’s alleged presence and of posterity’s unblinking eye. 
Then again, that intervening (self)consciousness is not necessarily a roadblock, but a sign-
                                                 
46 Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, (München: C.H. Beck, 1912) v.1, 240  
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post to transcendence, being subsumed, as ideologies are, within the ineffable intellectual 
climate usually associated with the condition of modernity.  
 
The question of historical consciousness aside, the Revolution attempted to paint the 
changing space to the hues of its preferences – and so in a manner which was more internally 
consistent than one is usually inclined to believe. Practically this means (as it does in 
Spengler’s Decline) that there existed a profound affinity between variegated expressions of 
participation in “history” with common “revolutionary streak” running through all of them. 
Thus deliberations over tactical minutiae – disciplinarily, a sphere of military history – are 
woven into notions of the revolutionary substitute to the state (prerogative of “political 
history”), which are, in their own tern, overlain with visions of fair social order 
(“social/cultural history”), being echoed, no doubt, in forms of revolutionary prosody and 
preferred geometries of plastic art. Without tackling that last aspect of aesthetics, this 
dissertation assumes the “stylistic unity” and tries to present the phenomenon of 
atamanshchina not through the narrow perspective of, say, military undertakings, but as an 
overarching symbol of the age, affecting or afflicting people’s senses and deeds in the world 
sunk into post-war “chaos.”  
 
This approach – a hybrid of epistemological centralism and methodological libertarianism – 
opened the gates for the host of other ideas. Trotsky’s concept of “permanent revolution” as a 
quasi-normal condition, during which issues raised by the initial upheaval are addressed 
without cataclysmic seizures, certainly proved helpful in understanding the “staying power”  
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of the Ukrainian warlordism.
47 The classical equation of the state with the agency possessing 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence remained proximate and prominent even if the 
dissertation arrived at a conclusion that the loss of monopoly and the ongoing clash of claims 
does not necessarily result in the emergence of “anti-state” with some radically different 
system of anarchic rapports. Calling for a timely remedy, the tough substance of Weberian 
“ideal types” became more yielding thanks to the intellectual tenderizers derived from the 
works of British social historians: Eric Hobsbawm, E.P. Thomson and George Rudé to name 
the best known. Thus, by placing his “social bandit” at the disposal of the scholarly 
community, Hobsbawm managed to transform an allegedly aimless highwayman into a 
powerful historical figure, an agent operating in the realm of power. In Hobsbawm’s works, 
however, the bandit (and the Ukrainian atamans would have been surely included into that 
category) acquires shape mainly in the light of an anachronistic backlash against the 
relentless advance of modernity, the point justly contested in studies of Anton Blok and 
Charles Tilly. The parallels drawn between the functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus and 
organized crime coupled with the image of the Sicilian mafia occupying recesses of power 
on a tacit fiat from the center brought into relief the ambiguity of rapports between the 
representatives of formal authorities (the “Commissars”) and the informal power-brokers (the 
“Atamans”) at the peripheries of the Russian empire.
48 
 
                                                 
47 That cannot be said about his doctrinaire Marxist division of the revolution into “stages,” which are all 
allegedly unfolding in a near-simultaneous fashion in a society bent on building socialism.    
48 See Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969); Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian 
Village, 1860-1960: a Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974); Charles Tilly, The 
Vendée (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964); Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as 
Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).     
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Just as the original theoretical framework owed its existence to multiple parents, so too did 
the final narrative stem from sources of different types and varying degrees of “reliability.” 
In fact, reliability as such – as a yardstick of scientific truthfulness – becomes secondary, 
with facts never fully belonging to the realm of “objective history” and impressions never 
being entirely grounded on the vanishing isles of fiction. Thus, in line with the idea that facts 
are in some ways observations modified or even generated by current prejudices, memoirs, 
diplomatic communiqués, newspaper clips, pamphlets, matter-of-fact military dispatches, 
hearsays, novels and outright disinformation ploys – all are brought to work with and against 
each other. Straddling a vague position between primary sources and secondary literature, the 
analytic works written by the participants of the events in their immediate wake – works of 
Antonov-Ovseenko, Denikin, Erde, Arshinov or Khrystiuk – received much attention, 
although not necessarily to correct previous accounts but to trace the evolution of the never-
dying past in the mercurial present. Together these documents, either published or not, 
created an environment redolent with suggestions as to why, for example, different players 
all claiming the honor of being Bolshevik, failed to find common language and ended up at 
each other’s throats. The task of the historian in collating them consisted, therefore, in toning 
down noisy assertions of authenticity or veracity – which so many authors were keen on 
making – as if limning out afresh the sanguinary debates over legitimacy in the climate of 
broached possibilities.  
 
A watershed event of the twentieth century, the Russian Revolution engendered an immense 
body of academic literature. Yet, studies specifically on atamanshchina remain few and far 
between, marred either by cavalier reduction of the peasant insurgency to opportunism and  
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license, or, as is the case with many contemporary Ukrainian authors,
49 by the glib ascription 
of romantic platforms to the individuals only vaguely aware of the national moment in the 
Revolution. In the Soviet discussion of the phenomenon the most insightful works were also 
the earliest ones, books exemplified by Dmitry Lebed’s brochure Itogi i uroki trekh let 
anarkho-makhnovshchiny (1921) and, especially, by Mikhail Kubanin’s Makhnovshchina 
(1926). Although unfolding within the rigid constrains of Bolshevik agrarian terminology, 
they compensated for their analytical failures with the attentiveness to detail no less than 
their stunning candor. Kubanin, for example, is not only willing to call the makhnovite 
movement circumstantially progressive but also to admit the deeply-rooted adversity 
separating the Bolshevik power from the bulk of the Ukrainian peasantry.
50   
 
From late 1920s onward concessions of that sort became dangerous as the Civil War “Green 
armies,” peasant units of self-defense, or urban gangs saw themselves diminished to the 
machinations of the Kulaks-Entente-White Guard cabal. This precipitous disavowal of their 
importance ultimately led to their near-total disappearance from the historical narrative. In 
Likholat’s some 700-page Razgrom natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraine, 1917-
1922 gg., the name of  Makhno is not mentioned once. Another typical study of the period – 
history of Odessa, published on the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution – 
deliberately ignored the role of Grigoriev’s troops in driving out the French and Greek forces; 
it would have been too much of an embarrassment to admit that Grigoriev acted as a Red 
                                                 
49 Numerous works by Roman Koval’ and Viktor Savchenko are by far the worst in that respect. A monograph 
of Volodymir Sidak on Petro Bolbochan is better, yet it still avails itself the terminology of heroization and 
condemnation. Volodymir Lobodaev’s recent work on Free Cossacks – Revoliutsiina stykhiia – in this respect 
represents a breath of fresh air in the otherwise cloying atmosphere of nationalist encomia, endeavoring, as it 
does, to present the important phenomena independently of the sovereignist projects which attempted to usurp it 
to their own ends.  
50 M. Kubanin, Makhnovshchina: Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie v stepnoi Ukraine v gody grazhdanskoi voiny 
(Leningrad: Priboi, 1926), 56  
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Army commander.
51 That a number of canonical figures in the Soviet Civil War hagiography 
– Shchors being only the most well-known among them – emerged from the insurgent 
movement and that the unaffiliated atamans thought of themselves as architects of the 
Revolutionary order – that incontrovertible fact receded into the mist of staged oblivion. 
 
Works written outside of the Soviet Union exhibited similar tendencies either towards 
depreciation of atamanshchina or romanticization thereof. The chapter on Ukrainian 
developments during the Civil War in William Chamberlin’s long-standing classic The 
Russian Revolution is pointedly entitled “Whirlpool of Peasant Anarchism.” Writing in early 
1970s, American historian Arthur E. Adams presents the reader with a vision of “the 
peasants and Cossacks fighting for land and freedom.”
52 The monographs dealing 
specifically with Makhno – those of Michael Palij, Michael Malet or Alexandre Skirda – 
appear to have taken ex post claims to the anarchist inheritance made by Makhno and his 
émigré entourage at their face value - so much so that ideology, vague though it might be, 
evolved into the central tenet of the entire narrative. An otherwise meticulous scholar, Skirda 
proceeds to tackle Ukraine’s great insurgent with a staggering and unscholarly goal in mind: 
to wit, “to derive from the movement teachings useful for the current revolutionary 
project.”
53 
 
Fortunately, such deviations were straightened out recently under the impact of newly 
available documents and infusions from cultural studies, sociology and political science. 
                                                 
51 S.M. Kovbasiuk, ed., Odessa: Ocherk istorii goroda-geroia, (Odessa: Odesskoe obl. Izdatel’stvo, 1957), 169 
52 Arthur E. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine; the Second Campaign, 1918-1919 (Port Washington, NY: 
Kennikat Press, 1973), 89 
53 Alexandre Skirda, Nestor Makhno: Le cosaque libertaire (1888-1934): La Guerre Civile en Ukraine 1917-
1921 (Paris : Editions de Paris, 1999), 416  
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Bolsheviki i Krest’iane na Ukraine, 1918-1919 gody, Andrea Graziosi’s Russian-language 
monograph (1997), a short but intelligent book, consciously avoids depicting peasant 
insurgents as noble freedom fighters doomed from the start by the inequality of means. 
Instead, he brings into focus the fact of lasting collaboration between the Ukrainian 
Bolsheviks and the rebels, founding it, however, upon a type of august misunderstanding 
(nedorozumenie).
 54 The introduction of the “national-socialist” discourse into the discussions 
of peasant aspirations belongs to one of the truly felicitous discoveries of the last two 
decades; yet, if anything, Graziosi errs on the side of stressing too much the transparency and 
distinctiveness of the newly-found ideology. In the final account, according to the Italian 
scholar, the Bolsheviks remain Bolsheviks and the atamans, who let themselves be 
instrumentalized by the Party – stay champions of a national cause, an impression running 
counter to the widespread contemporary opinion about the low degree of national 
consciousness (natsional’naia osvedomlennost’) among the Ukrainian rural masses.  
 
An interesting and much needed perspective on the events in Ukraine is provided by the 
fresh work of Felix Schnell, Räume  des Schreckens. Together with notable monographs of 
Christian Gerlach (Extremely Violent Societies), Jörg Baberowski (Der Feind ist überall) and 
Timothy Snyder (Bloodlands), it exemplifies the now growing field of the so-called 
“violence studies”; yet, in contrast to Baberowski or Snyder with their interest in state-
organized calamities, Schnell investigates violence stemming from below.
55 The first Jewish 
pogroms, occurring before and during the First Russian Revolution, opened up “the spaces of 
horror” with the population not only acclimating to acts of violence but learning to mobilize 
                                                 
54 Graziosi, 106ff  
55 Schnell, 12  
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itself for the performance thereof. Embodying the second wave of destruction, loot and 
murder, the Civil War was by all accounts the apex of the unsanctioned yet organized 
violence – all the more so, of course, since the state, unlike in 1905-07 and 1928-1933, 
ceased to exist for all intents and purposes. Herein, however, lies a set of essential issues that 
Schnell leaves unaddressed: namely, the extent to which violence perpetrated by popular 
militias represented the functional substitute of the activities of the defunct state and the role 
those organizations played in the emergence of the new state apparatus.  
 
This dissertation does not purport to fill in the blanks left out in the historiograpical corpus 
anent the subject of Ukrainian insurgency. Without diminishing virtues of the 
aforementioned works, it tries to offer, however, an alternative view of atamanshchina. 
Neither merely the concretization of peasant aspirations usurped by the Bolsheviks, nor 
exclusively the advent of systematized license ushered by the disappearance of legitimate 
authority, atamanshchina arose as an institutional response to the power vacuum, not an anti-
state, but a counter-state, uniting in its ranks undifferentiated masses of future claimants to 
state power. Bolsheviks and non-Bolsheviks alike – categories defying easy descriptions 
beyond self-ascriptions – worked within the framework of peasant militancy as equal 
partners till the clampdown of Moscow and the speedy reply of Grigoriev’s troops sundered 
erstwhile allies apart and incrusted them within the ring of implacable enmity.  
 
Ultimately, it is this conscious reluctance to deal in fixed political categories that sets this 
work apart not only from the atamanshchina-specific studies but also from the magisterial 
narratives of the Russian Revolution – the canonical texts of Richard Pipes or the current  
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standard history by Orlando Figes. However complex and suggestively confusing it might be, 
the Civil War is regarded by most of authors in terms of sheer struggle for power; from the 
perspective of the outcome it becomes rather insubstantial whether the ‘people’ was the 
victim or the accomplice of the principal culprit. The present work, on the contrary, sees the 
post-revolutionary chaos as the period of crystallization of political identities, a gradual 
switch from vague sentiments to lapidarian creeds. The first two years following the 
Revolution (summer 1917-summer 1919) elapsed under the sign of political, military and 
diplomatic experimentations with naiveté, euphoria, imperfect understanding of other and of 
self all mixed in some measure. In a sense, the struggles of those months owed more to the 
February than October, for, dogged as they were, they still maintained the possibility of the 
all-Left ruling coalition, atamanshchina being, in fact, one of its workable manifestations. 
The initial disillusionments experienced with the bitterness of the early lovers encouraged the 
process of differentiation among the players, the drawing-up of war aims with the inevitable 
return to the techniques of rule practiced from before the Revolution. This was not the Civil 
War yet, but only its bloody preamble, the long farewell to the fantasies of utopian politics 
and the greeting of Realpolitik.  
 
Covering the period of this preamble – from the double turnabout of the 1917 to the 
Grigoriev’s revolt – this dissertation is divided into four parts of uneven length. The first and 
the longest deals with the pendulum-like movement of the countryside from the complete 
withdrawal from the arena of imperial politics to its subsequent return as a key element in the 
all-Russian (or all-Ukrainian) struggle (Summer 1917 to Summer 1918). The second part 
gives an account of the anti-Hetman revolt (November to December 1918), a zenith of rural  
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ascendancy in the eyes of the urban contemporaries. Disproving the myth of Soviet 
centralism, the third chapter traces the evolution of atamanshchina along the path of its 
institutionalized development, which made it assume forms of a separate Ukrainian Front 
and separate Ukrainian Red Army (September 1918 to March 1919). Those two remarkable 
entities, the quasi-autonomous expulsions of the peasant insurgency, are also treated at length 
in the last chapter, largely as subjects of heated debates between the leading Bolsheviks 
about the form of the revolutionary armed forces and the future of the revolutionary state 
(January 1919 to June 1919). In the end, it was the debate over the Bolshevik party itself – or, 
rather, over its role in the post-revolutionary world. Never conclusively settled it was brought 
to an issue with the outbreak of the Grigoriev’s revolt, sending the Bolsheviks towards the 
ideal of a one-party state and leaving the atamans the unenviable lot of political banditry.  
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From the Railroads to Country Roads: Birth of Peasant Insurgency  
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Those landowners who decided to persevere through the first revolutionary fall and winter of 
1917-18 away from the famished cities in their country estates well understood that they ran 
the danger of being looted. They lived in anticipation of a peasant throng, emboldened by 
speeches, alcohol and ungovernable soldiers, standing before the gates of the courtyard and 
clamoring for the blood of the “blood-suckers”, or at least for their property. “Each day, 
recalled Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, then a young teacher married to a manorial steward in 
Volhynia, Dziennik Kijowski (“Kiev Daily News,” the main organ of the Polish minority in 
Ukraine) brought us a fresh list of destroyed manor-houses and murdered victims from the 
Kiev province and Right-bank Ukraine. With calm and weightiness, without chasing after 
sensation, in a modest column entitled “Our Disasters” facts were given that sent chills down 
our spine… Each day we read aloud that frightening litany, looking with apprehension for 
the names of our acquaintances, friends and kinfolk.”
1 The path of negotiating with the villagers, pursued by some of Kossak’s peers, was 
becoming increasingly untenable, whereas the dogged defense of the old privileges in the 
environment of the waning authority was beginning to bear the features of a dignified suicide. 
 
Only few of the landowners managed to make it to the new, “great and terrible” year of 1918 
in the familiar setting of their manors; surely none succeeded in keeping the land, livestock 
and equipment from being ‘socialized’, a contemporary euphemism for the appropriation of 
goods. The passing of the so-called Land Law (zemel’nyi zakon) by the Central Rada, 
abolishing private ownership and raising the principle of the collectivized possession into the 
                                                 
1 Kossak, 23   
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basis of social relations,
2 provided little more than a legal embellishment to the accomplished 
process. This massive transfer of national wealth proceeded as if by itself, without much 
interference either from Kiev or Kharkov, unable or unwilling to keep it unwilling or even 
keep the process orderly.  
 
The village, gripped by “a naïve political ambition… to be its own master,”
3 became 
inaccessible to the metropolitan voices used until now to getting their commands received 
without further discussion. This new political behavior stood at the very essence of the state 
vitiation, more so than the pogroms of the manor houses, brutal beatings of the functionaries 
or the rejection of army service. In the context of the burgeoning civil war, the autonomy of 
the peasant world represented the disjunction between the question of formal power and the 
need – or even desire – to control the country-side. This paramount fact of the present reality 
translated itself in the form that the struggle for the remaining carcass of the state assumed, 
namely, in the tactical convention of the armed detachments to progress along the railroads, 
skirting the outlying villages, and aiming directly at the key junctions and towns en route to 
provincial capitals.  
 
The control, established in such a manner through the victory of the pro-Bolshevik forces in 
February of 1918, was gossamer at best, prone to be broken as easily as a cobweb tautly 
extended to the tips of the desiccated branches. The Germans with their twenty odd 
Landwehr divisions on the mission of delivering the hard-pressed Central powers from the 
narrowing ring of the Allied blockade, at once exposed the weakness of the Bolshevik hold 
                                                 
2 For full text of the Land Law see Pavlo Khrystiuk, Zamitky i Materiialy do istorii ukrains’koi revoliutsii 1917-
1920 rr (New York: Vydavnitstvo Chartoryis’kykh, 1969), v. 2, 129-131 
3 Limbach, Ukrainische Schreckensstage , 11  
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on the land. Moreover, having dispatched some of the “agents of the revolutionary disorder” 
(Umtriebe) beyond the borders of the Ukrainian state and driven back the rest into the 
underground, they had compelled the Left parties (temporarily at peace with themselves) to 
start looking “peasant-ward”, in the direction of the parochially-preoccupied but otherwise 
disengaged village. The efforts of the organizers and agitators from the ill-defined 
revolutionary front to implicate the countryside into the struggle for political authority – in 
fact, to make it into the key arbiter thereof - resulted in the emergence of the clandestine 
state, which rose up to the surface in its first bid for power during the summer months of 
1918, when the districts of the Kiev, Yekaterinoslav and Chernigov provinces went up in 
flames of peasant uprisings.  
 
Focus of the present chapter, this transition from what was dubbed the “railroad war” 
(eshelonnaia voina) to the full-scale uprisings did not merely register the change in the 
tactical notions about ways of winning the domestic war. The unprecedented scale of the 
popular involvement, the exportation of the contest well beyond the city limits into the open 
country, its ruralization in fact, signaled the egress of the native protagonists on the Left (the 
Bolsheviks, S-R’s, Ukrainian Social-Democrats, etc.) from the power cul-de-sac where they 
floundered in the wake of the administrative collapse and the speedy disintegration of the 
army. The militarized and active countryside became perforce a panacea to the ills of the 
state’s implosion, with the errant peasant partisans carrying in them the seeds of the new 
polity. Born in the heat of the summer battles, the new figure, that of the band leader, the 
future warlord and the ataman, embodied therefore the authority recrudescent and not, as the  
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contemporary opinion saw it, the all-pervasive insubordination and anarchy of the troubled 
times.  
 
Part I: Collapse of the Army: a Few Prefatory Remarks (March-November 1917) 
  
Akin to the armed neutrality, the distance that the Ukrainian countryside took vis-à-vis the 
contenders for power and their early scuffles reflected the condition of the Russian Imperial 
Army and the manner whereby it withered away. That stupendous body of armed men, the 
fifteen and a half million souls mobilized to celebrate the success of Russia’s modernization, 
was at once a liability and an asset, holding the regime and the populace in the state of co-
dependency, or, better said, of mutual hostageship. The willing and continuous acquiescence 
of the largely peasant country to transfer its most productive part into the custody of the state 
implicated the village and the city-centered officialdom in direct proportion to the intensity 
of the war effort and transformed the army into something incomparably greater than an 
institutional intermediary between the governing and the governed. In the course of the Great 
War it evolved into a crucible of aspirations, a repository of the alienated authority, authority 
itself, as Denikin pithily averred in his Sketches.
4 In such a capacity, the army stood for the 
key expression of the popular loyalties to Petrograd, attenuated and consequently dissolved 
as the spring epidemic of transgressions gave way to the self-legislated mutiny towards the 
end of the year 1917.  
 
                                                 
4 “All authority was in the hands of the army” is the exact phrase from the general’s work. (Denikin, Ocherki, v. 
1, 128)  
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That the army did not actually disappear in 1917 could probably be attributed to the force of 
inertia and affective ties, lingering despite the infrastructural collapse in a type of recognition 
lag. Totaling about 6,500,000 enlisted men and officers as late as November 1917,
5 this 
institution managed to outlive the regime it purported to support and defend. It still held 127 
enemy divisions, 80 of them German, about a third of what they had, affixed to their 
increasingly porous positions in the European provinces of the Russian Empire.
6 These 
figures, however, cannot conceal the fact that the army had long ceased being combat-worthy, 
thoroughly demoralized by the well-embedded committee politics, masterfully conducted 
German propaganda, fraternization with the adversary, lacking supplies and, of course, the 
insuperable desire for peace. The need to put a speedy end to the war, “before the first 
snow,” “before October 15” etc, turned into the leitmotif of life in the trenches, inciting the 
soldiers to the sabotaging of orders if these were judged as prolonging the conflict, to the 
destruction of the materiel so that “there won’t be anything to fight with,” ultimately, to the 
expressed rejection of that government which still toyed with the ideas of the defensive 
patriotic war.
7 Even the proverbial bolshevization of the army looked more like a façade, 
used only to accentuate the contours of the real issue. “We simply can fight no longer…,” 
said a deputy of the 8
th army to the Romanian Front Congress. “We have no faith in 
individual persons, neither Kerensky nor Lenin. We are conditional Bolsheviks – whoever 
gives us peace we’ll support.”
8 The rank-and-file mapped the frustration with the politics of 
unfulfilled promises onto the language of political extremism.  
 
                                                 
5 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (London: Penguin, 1998), 300 
6 Denikin, v. 2, 146 
7 Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980-1987), 
v. 2, 224-230 
8 ibid., v. 2, 369-370  
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When in November of 1917 the new commander-in-chief general Nikolai Dukhonin refused 
to assume responsibilities for the peace negotiations with the Central Powers, Lenin and 
Krylenko decided to bypass the Stavka, exhorting each unit to enter into the discussion of the 
armistice terms on their own.
9  The ordinary soldier, however, did not need public 
encouragements to a mandatory initiative, having long realized that the solution to the 
problem lies entirely with him. In his famous Ten Days… John Reed wrote that “the soldiers 
began to solve the peace question by simply deserting,”
10 and, as the Revolution progressed 
in the direction of the Bolshevik denouement, the aforementioned ‘method’ rapidly took on 
features of the spontaneous self-demobilization. Although there are no definitive data 
regarding desertion before and after the February Revolution, Nikolai Golovin, a Russian 
general and a preeminent military historian, claimed that with the downfall of the Romanov 
dynasty the rate of monthly registered desertion rose by the factor of five, reaching the 
cumulative figure of 365,000 by August 1 of that year.
11 On the other hand, the number of 
the unregistered deserters, i.e. of those who were called to duty but failed to appear in the 
units assigned to them, was estimated at 1,500,000 men. Adding up to 1,900,000, even that 
grand total “did not encompass the entire number of the conscripts… who were evading at 
the close of the war their military duty…”
12 Extended sick-leaves, permanent ‘meetings’ and 
‘demonstrations’ (mitingovanie) in the units, “pilgrimages” of the multitudinous “delegates” 
to the sites of revolutionary conventions – all these were forms of the latent desertion that the 
new times created for the war-weary footmen. The coming of frosts was about to give this 
massive ebb of bodies into the absorbent interior of Russia supplementary impetus – no less 
                                                 
9 ibid., v. 2, 352, Denikin, v. 2, 161-162 
10 John Reed, Ten Days that shook the World (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1919), 3  
11 Golovin, Voennye usiliia Rossii…, v. 1, 205 
12 ibid., v. 1, 206-207  
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so, perhaps, than the Decrees on Peace and on Land, promulgated by the Bolsheviks on the 
day of the October coup.  
 
The rejection of war and the urge to conclude peace without delay at whatever conditions did 
not mean that the returnees from the front blanched at the idea of violence. The opposite in 
fact was true, for the three long years of fruitless sacrifices on the battle-fields markedly 
lowered whatever inhibitions one might have retained before consigning himself to the 
dangerous magic of force. Hans Limbach, a Swiss observer of the events who worked 
administering an estate in the Kherson province, claimed that the residents lived less in the 
fear of the peasants “as [in the fear] of the thought of the homecoming Army and of the spirit 
and horrors that it would bring along.”
13 Traveling at the speed of bad news well in advance 
of the sluggish locomotives, apprehensions of that kind subjected the moral equipoise of the 
countryside to a difficult trial. Maria Dunin-Kozicka, for example, a Polish noblewoman 
from the Tarashcha district of the Kiev province, saw her hopes in the magnanimity of 
Revolution sink when the rumors of the disintegrating front began reaching her ears. 
“Incredible things (dziwy)”, she wrote in her memoirs, “were related about the soldiers, who 
take passenger trains by storm, breake the glass windows to get inside faster [and] hurl the 
travelers from their paid seats. The doors to the wagons would at times be permanently 
barricaded by the soldierly crowd as the resourceful porters would shove the travelers in and 
drag them out simply via the window, sometimes by dint of a great effort (z okrutnym 
mozołem).”
14 Although ubiquitous to the point of seeming banal, such descriptions retained 
an aspect of certain grotesque – inspiring incredulity and fright – not least because the dire 
                                                 
13 Limbach, 12 
14 Dunin-Kozicka, 37  
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danger to life and property stemmed reputedly from those that the now-targeted civilians 
long came to associate with peace, order and security.    
 
The story of the soldiers arriving to their native villages with an intention of exposing its 
slumbering denizens to the pealing message of the immediate redistribution and of rousing 
them to a corresponding action – that story occurred with frequency and regularity that may 
warrant following generalization: the man with a rifle, on leave or deserting, was at the 
vanguard of the peasant revolt. “The year of 1917 opened peasants their eyes, untied their 
hands”, wrote one villager from Podolia. “The soldiers coming back from the front were 
stirring up the conflagration with their agitation.”
15 His account is seconded by the testimony 
from Iurovo village of the Chernigov region, where some anonymous soldiers (kakie-to 
soldaty) first established the “new order” (novyi poriadok) in the republican spirit and then 
explained the intolerable injustice of exacting the 25 ruble compensation for the desiatina of 
the landlords’ patrimony;
16 according to the recollections of the peasant from Novaia 
Maiachka (ukr. Nova Maiachka) of the Taurida province the frontoviki played the key role in 
familiarizing the locals with the gospel of Bolshevism and in putting together first 
revolutionary committees. “The soldiers were becoming leaders of the peasants”, attested the 
aforementioned witness while describing the momentous changes that the relationship 
between the village and the manor underwent under the impact of the radicalized front 
returnees.
17  
                                                 
15 Ia. Iakovlev, ed., 1917 god v derevne: vospominaniia krest’ian (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967), 114; in May of 
1917 Podolian governor complained about the soldiers who regularly come to the villages and militate for “the 
idea of land seizure.” (cit in M. Frenkin, Russkaia armiia i revoliutsiia 1917-1918 (München: Logos, 1978), 
208)  
16 ibid., 131   
17 ibid., 213  
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The violent words of the radical slogans, with which the soldiers addressed peasant masses, 
echoed back with a rumble of pogroms perpetrated against the landlords and the single-
homestead farmers (khutoriane and otrubniki). As might have been expected, the men in 
uniforms led the way, “spurring the villagers to the united attacks on the lords.”
18 The 
connection of the pogroms
19 with the urgency of the land question was not always evident, 
especially when the soldiers participating in the destruction of manor houses came from the 
units stationed nearby only for a short period of time; the act itself was not made less 
political as a result, for the profanation of the allegedly inviolable right to private property as 
well as the conditional legitimization of all-permissiveness belonged to the essential 
ingredients in the appeal of the Revolution. The Chuguev Lancer regiment, billeted for the 
spring months of 1917 in a small hamlet of Semirenki (ukr. Semyren’ky), gave a good 
illustration of precisely such a formation, one that, while still remaining relatively unaffected 
by the desertion, took a change in the disciplinary regime as an instigation to a nearly risk-
free debauchery. At first marking their presence by laying waste to the domains of the local 
proprietor, “the eccentric and the collector” Jan Pruszyński, the soldiers decided to include 
the neighboring Morozovka (ukr. Morozivka/pol. Łaszki) into their ‘field of operation’ once 
the rumors of sumptuous wine reserves found there caught up with them. The regiment, 
wrote Kossak-Szczucka, “darted off to the spot to see if it was true, taking few carts along.” 
There they discovered that   
Łaszki was empty at the time, because the proprietor with his family lived in 
Zhitomir. The entry doors were broken at once and cellar was found with the 
help of the locals. There was indeed a veritable treasure trove in the form of 
                                                 
18 Dunin-Kozicka, 52 
19 Here and elsewhere the word “pogrom” is used in a Russian sense – as an act of vandalism, destruction – not 
necessarily in the narrow sense of an anti-Jewish violence.   
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enormous quantity of the old wines, vodkas and meads. Upon hearing of the 
soldiers in the yards the entire village gathered up in a multitudinous crowd, 
assisting in deaf silence the transfer of oak cask and moldy bottles. The 
soldiers loaded up their carts as much as they could and drove off, addressing 
the peasants: ‘Now it’s your turn.’ Before long the entire the entire village 
was lying drunk in rows (pokotem pijana). Peasants, women, children, even 
dogs, pigs and fowl were covering the lanes of the forecourt and the benches, 
incapable of the slightest movement. The air was suffused with a powerful, 
intoxicating odor.
20  
 
Noteworthy is not only the catalytic role of the soldiers in sparking the bout of plunder, or 
the successive participation of the villagers but also the fact mentioned later in Kossak’s 
book, that the robberies ended with the departure of the Chuguev lancers, the peasants 
themselves being still unable, in apodictic words of the author, “to commence the pogrom on 
their own initiative.”
21 She made the same point when giving an account of a similar pogrom 
in Skovorodki (ukr. Skovorodky) sometime in November of 1917. The short trip to the 
landlord’s house resembled more a religious procession than a wild onrush, with positions 
determined by a tacitly accepted hierarchy: at its head was “a throng of soldiers,” in the 
middle were women and children, “flitting like a flock of crows”; “the male peasants walked 
at the very end.”
22 Both causality and precedence came to a visible expression in this flow of 
human bodies – a kind of a pecking order establishing who could have the first serving and 
who would have to wait till the rest are satisfied.  
 
More so than the acting servicemen, the deserters often proceeded against the manor lords 
with an intention of expediting the transfer of land and property into the peasant hands. They 
acted with determination and finality of people, who had little left to lose – not just to probe 
the limits of the permissible but to make a clean break with the government and the state, 
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which had failed to deliver on its promises. Thus upon their return to their native village of 
Luganskoe (ukr. Luhans’ke) in the Bakhmut district of the Yekaterinoslav province, the 
returnees resolved to kill local landlord Smykalov and would have probably carried out their 
sanguinary plan had the condemned man not hid himself in the stable beforehand.
23 His 
Volhynian peer, the Polish octogenarian Roman Damian Sanguszko, proprietor of great 
estates and manufacturing enterprises, fared much worse. With his house surrounded by the 
disorganized crowd from the remains of the 264
th Reserve regiment, he was dragged to the 
porch and subsequently bayoneted to death. Following the murder, wrote one local observer 
few years later, “the peasants got on courageously with the partitioning of the burzhuj’s land 
without fearing anyone.”
24 In November and December of 1917, the large economies of 
Podolia and Kiev provinces were being so thoroughly destroyed by the soldiers en route to 
their homes that even the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, those ideologues of the merciless class 
war, began to ring the alarm bells against the pogromist wave; as could have been expected, 
with little effect.
25  
 
It would be difficult to arrive at a single statistic demonstrating the extent of the soldiers’ 
contribution to the agrarian pogroms and other types of peasant violence. One could collate 
the change in the number of “the pogrom-acquisitionist transgressions” (pogromno-
zachvatnicheskie pravonarusheniia), escalating from 440 in August to 958 in September
26 
against the staggering rates of desertion as well as the demographic gradient thereof; such 
operations, illustrative as they are, would raise other questions with respect to the intangible 
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24 ibid., 120-121; Kossak, 36 
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and elusive causalities. Then again, even if the necessary figures were readily available, they 
would have probably failed to capture the most important effect that the acts of violence 
perpetrated by the soldiers produced on the peasant psyche: namely, by exposing the 
helplessness of the central authority in upholding the crumbling local order, the men from the 
front helped the villagers to extricate themselves from the lingering reservations in the face 
of law, and provided them with the model of autonomous action.  
 
The Front came crashing down like a mighty edifice onto the cuddled huts below, irreparably 
altering the landscape of the country. Droves of soldiers seeped back home, and as the sight 
of the untended trenches was sinking lower on the horizon, the full ambivalence of their 
message stepped out into the lucid light. Combining seemingly incompatible elements, these 
men preached peace yet clutched readily at their arms at the slightest pretext and without 
visible provocation. Their war-fatigue did not inscribe itself exclusively within the demands 
for the immediate armistice, realized by the Bolsheviks and thus made obsolete. The aversion 
for the external war persisted for quite some time, shaping uncountable resolutions, all 
directed to exorcise the specter of another war – one that crept into the heart of the land; 
delegates from all fronts spoke out against “the fratricidal slaughter” (boinia) simultaneously 
insisting on the immediate “reconciliation of the parties.”
27 At the same time, these 
admonitions to peace and moderation notwithstanding, units sent soldiers with mandates to 
the villages of Podolia, Volhynia, Yekaterinoslav, Kherson and Kiev provinces, and these 
would talk the peasants into seizing the landlord’s property or forcing the otrubnik back into 
commune, never shirking from arson, pillage or murder themselves. “The strangest thing 
occurred: those, who could not cry out enough about the violation and against the war… 
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proceeded to violations more fiercely than any government had done, summoning to fight 
and waging the war, not against the external enemy at first, but above all against all the 
existing and the established.”
28 These lines that came from Ludendorff’s pen to describe the 
Bolshevik regime appear uncannily applicable to the ex-soldiers of the Russian Imperial 
Army and to the spirit that they came to embody and that they passed on to their peers in the 
interior. 
 
On a fundamental level, however, both the flight from the war and the easy falling back on 
the violent resolutions of the pressing questions resulted from the experience of the so-called 
Entstaatlichung as Felix Schnell put it in the recent monograph – the phenomenon of 
denationalization or even “de-statisation.”
29 The war and the Revolution strained and 
severed the ties between the soldier and the authority and released him from the bond of 
obedience towards it. The Tsarist state gravely compromised itself not only by failing to 
provide the muzhiks in uniforms with the appealing idea to die for or the war materiel to fight 
with – factors from which the Germans and the Bolsheviks drew full agitprop value only 
after Nicholas’ fall. What transformed the Army into a terrible nemesis of the regime which 
begot it was the fact of the soldiers’ dislocating and incomplete transformation from the 
peasants to citizens. In other words, called up to bear the brunt of the longest and most 
gruesome war in the meaningfully remembered past, the Russian conscript left for good the 
parochial world of the lord and the peasant, which up until now offered him the most 
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concrete and accessible model of political subservience;
30 now, palpating his way to the 
greater abstract community (whose member he was enjoined to become), he still fumbled 
fruitlessly as if in the dark, confused by the profusion of the mutually negating fingerposts. 
The great impatience with the temporizing revolutionary powers and the subsequent decision 
to take the law into one’s own hands, circumventing Petrograd or even Kiev,
31 signaled 
exactly that inability to engage the soldier and the peasant into the politics of the grand style, 
one that asked for yet another exertion at the bulwarks of the threatened patrie or on the 
construction sites of the fledgling nation. Instead, the galvanized countryside turned onto 
itself – “to the agrarian routs and pogroms”
32 – giving substance to the gestating notion of the 
‘peasant anarchism’ and observing the inaugural phase of the power struggle with a look of 
quizzical indifference.  
 
Part II: The Railroad War (December 1917 – February 1918) 
 
A. Partitioning of the Army  
Recognizing that the corrosive developments in the army had gone too far for it to be saved, 
the new competing authorities began concentrating on the means of preserving whatever still 
could be preserved of the uniformed men and enormous war materiel stocked up on the 
frontlines and in the interior of the country. The Central Rada, whose program of radical 
social reforms and national autonomy found a strong backing among the delegates of the first 
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two All-Ukrainian Army congresses (May and June 1917), wagered its political capital on 
the continued pursuit of the politics of Ukrainization.
33 On paper the project of creating an 
ethnically homogenous national army by pruning away the non-Ukrainian elements from the 
predominantly Ukrainian units and, inversely, by culling the Ukrainians from the largely 
non-Ukrainian setting unfolded so auspiciously that by early October Symon Petliura, then 
the Rada’s Secretary of Military Affairs, could dream of twenty fully Ukrainized divisions at 
the disposal of the national Ukrainian government.
34 One Austrian observer went beyond this, 
claiming in his report to the Habsburg foreign minister Count Ottokar Czernin that in the 
immanent conflict with the Sovnarkom the Rada could count on some 30 infantry and 2 
cavalry divisions.
 35 This optimism acquired a peremptory note at the 3
rd All-Ukrainian Army 
Congress, convened between November 2 and November 14, when the delegates, speaking 
on behalf of a “three-million strong” soldierly body, resolved to carry out the Ukrainization 
of all garrisons inside Ukraine and to commence at once with the Ukrainization of the Black 
Sea fleet.
36  
 
Passed against the background of effusive loyalty vows that the smaller radas in sundry army 
detachments were pledging to the great one in Kiev, such resolutions did reflect a real 
aspiration on the part of the “politically conscious” soldiers of the Ukrainian descent (voiaky 
ukraintsi) to move from the cultural programs of the early Ukrainization towards establishing 
genuine Ukrainian army.
37 Army corps and divisions pressed for the immediate relocation 
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with an express aim of defending the national government in Kiev. The XXVI Corps of the 
9
th Army, for instance, managed to obtain Rada’s authorization to leave the now silent 
trenches in Moldova for the agitated quarters around the capital; the two regiments from the 
Ukrainized XXXIV Corps had no patience for such administrative trifles and decided to take 
off in Kiev’s direction entirely on their own initiative (samochinno).
38 Ukrainian units from 
the Fronts that did not pass through Ukrainian territory attempted to execute the same 
‘patriotic’ demarche; such was the case of 30,000 men from the XXI Corps swarming the 
suburbs of Livonia’s Volmar (present-day Valmiera in Lithuania) in anticipation of the 
south-bound trains.
39  
 
Yet, neither the declarations of loyalty nor the movements of the army units into the interior 
of the country could belie the fact that the soldiers were too affected by homesickness to be 
of much use. The Ukrainization itself was often only a pretext for a semi-sanctioned self-
demobilization, as was evidenced by the tendency of the human ‘content’ to peter out en 
route to Kiev. Both the XVII Corps of the 11
th Army and the 156 division of the 7
th Army 
ceased to exist in December 1917 according to that scenario, vanishing in the face of the new 
adversary well before the first shots were even heard.
40 Formations of the Romanian front, 
where the combined efforts of the Russian officers and the Romanian military kept the 
Bolshevik clout at bay,
41 showed no more fortitude than the rest when confronted by the 
temptation to desert. With its normal strength regulated at 35,000-40,000 men,
42 by 
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December of 1917 the XXVI Corps of the 9
th army counted about 4,000 soldiers; the X 
Corps from the same army reported the pitiful number of 600 armed men. For as long as 
these units still remained in their positions – under the surveillance of the “more 
conscientious Cossack detachments” – they were preserved from the complete disintegration; 
yet, the departure of the echelons loaded with the prospective defenders of Rada meant a 
definite farewell, if not to arms than certainly to the army, the X Corps whittling away on the 
Kremenchug (ukr. Kremenchuh)-Poltava stretch of the road and the XXVI disintegrating in 
the area of Kamenets-Podolsk, barely twenty away miles from the front line.
43 
 
All in all, despite the boastful claims and impressive figures, the support that the Central 
Rada amassed for its cause among the frontoviki was rather paltry. In Kiev itself it could 
safely rely on the Bohdan Khmelnits’ky (bohdanovtsi) and the Pavlo Polubotok 
(polubotkivtsi) regiments, two of the first units to undergo the Ukrainization within the 
Russian Imperial Army; the so-called kurin (battalion) of death, formerly a shock-troop 
formation of the Romanian front as well as the fresh Sich Riflemen battalion, made up of the 
Galician POWs from the Austrian army, were both accountable and combat-worthy.
44 By 
contrast, the remaining detachments of the Kiev garrison (those of Pavlo Doroshenko, Petro 
Sahaidachny, Taras Shevchenko, Mykhailo Hrushevsky and others) either openly espoused 
pro-Bolshevik positions or were filled with youngsters whose inexperience dulled the sharp 
point of their enthusiasm. Put together that gave a number of about 16,000 bayonets, 
concentrated inside the city and along the rail lines leading respectively to Chernigov and 
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Poltava.
45 In the Right-bank Ukraine Rada’s principal hopes for political dominance lay with 
the XXXIV Corps, rechristened into the I Ukrainian Corps and commanded by none other 
than Pavel Skoropadsky, the tsarist general with a remarkable flair for political divination. A 
smattering of garrison regiments, stationed in small and medium towns and often lacking 
direct communication with Kiev, completed the picture of the Rada’s regular armed forces, 
irregularly embedded within the flowing mass of the demobilized and demoralized soldiery.  
 
Contrary to appearances, the Bolsheviks did not have much luck recruiting the front-line 
troops to their side – certainly not more than did the Rada, its ally of convenience and the 
future competitor. True, in the weeks following the Petrograd coup, they established their 
Military Revolutionary Committees (MRC) at all command levels of the South-Western 
Front, simultaneously liquidating the old commissariats of the defunct Provisional 
Government.
46 Yet, the Bolshevik attempt at spreading their influence down to the Romanian 
front engendered an immediate counterstrike masterminded and executed by the Staff of the 
Romanian Front Commander General Dmitri Shcherbachev, who like thousands of other 
officers saw in the Rada the lesser of the two evils. On the night of December 4, less than 
twenty-four hours into its existence, the Bolshevik MRC of the Romanian front saw itself 
apprehended and its sympathizers disarmed through a conjoint Russo-Romanian action; the 
MRCs of the 9
th, 4
th and 6
th armies followed the suit few days later.
47 This offensive did not 
end there and soon all but the MRC of the 7
th army of the South-Western Front were duly 
seized and dissolved.
48 The astounding successes scored by the Bolsheviks on the terrains of 
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the Northern and Western fronts were thus counterbalanced by failures south of the Priapiat 
marches, reflecting as though through a gigantic mirror realities of the soldiers’ voting 
preferences – as much by chance as by the force of necessity.  
 
Insofar as the deep fissures in the command structure kept the above permutations isolated to 
its upper rungs (for such was indeed the essential feature of the military collapse), the 
Bolsheviks could hope to preserve their presence among the troops. Even before the October 
events shook the Russian capitals, the 15
th Regiment in Vinnitsa solemnly swore to “die but 
assure the victory of the power of the workers, peasants and soldiers.”
49 A similar mood was 
registered in the bolshevized 1
st Turkestan Corps of the Special Army,
50 the XII Corps of the 
8
th Army, or the remnants of the XVIII and XL Corps of the broken 9
th Army.
51 Most 
important support, however, came from the large II Guard Corps, a unit held in the state of 
trance by the rhetoric of the Bolshevik firebrand Yevgeniia Bosh.
52 Prompted to occupy 
Zhmerinka and its environs on Nov. 2, 1917, the corps seemed to offer the Party its main 
trump card in the coming struggle for political hegemony.
53  
 
The Bolsheviks and the Rada proceeded to divvy up the army in the manner of two robust 
siblings, who, while equally relieved by the death of their unloved parent have learned to 
treat one another with combination of jealously and disdain. Tugging at the pieces of the 
Imperial military inheritance, they contributed in process to its near-complete destruction, a 
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point illustrated by the lot of the 9
th Army: an object of intense suasion from all sides, it had 
at first split up in two and then fully disintegrated with the Ukrainian corps (X and XXVI) 
moving east and the pro-Bolshevik ones (XL and XVIII) heading north to the protection of 
the 8
th Army.
54 This partitioning of the standing army with all of its concomitant effects 
pierces through the opening phase of the revolutionary strife as one of its key lines, an aspect 
not bereft of irony, since the struggle over the state apparatus entailed in those month a 
deliberate and substantive obliteration thereof. In practical terms that meant, as Kakurin aptly 
phrased it, “the jettisoning onto the scene of the spreading civil war the wrecked fractions of 
the old army,” all poised to reach home as fast as circumstances would allow.
55 Some of 
those, indisposed, like most, to wage another war (but alacritous to jiggle with their weapons 
all the same), would find their passage barred by the tussle and traffic, and, by attempting to 
brush the obstacle aside they would provide this war with its peculiar shape and its particular 
rhythm.  
 
B. Irregular Forces  
The escape of men with arms from the enfeebled clasp of the dying state ran its course while 
the social body was overcome by the flood of pullulating irregular formations. Put in rather 
schematic terms, the bulk of the people’s militia split in two, either entering the stream of the 
so-called ‘Free Cossacks’ societies (vil’ne kozatstvo) or going the way of the ‘red guards,’ 
these latter all too often containing tinctures of the anarchist ‘black.’ The first of the two, the 
‘Free Cossackdom,' originated sometime in March or April 1917, when Nykodym Smoktii, a 
40-year prosperous peasant organized something of a patrolling force in his native Gusakovo 
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(ukr. Husakovo) village of the Zvenigorodka (ukr. Zvenyhorodka) district.
56 With its 
membership almost invariably (and always statutorily) limited to the individuals exempt 
from the military service,
57 the movement claimed to provide an answer to the challenges 
raised by the collapsing army and exaggerated by the vitiating central authority. As the 
“Instruction for the formation of the Free Cossacks in Zvenigorodka district” put it 
Recognizing the current situation of Ukraine, when the disorder is being 
spread by the dark forces, robberies are committed, when the entire bands 
deserting wholesale from the front [dezertevania … ide tsilymy bandamy z 
frontu] are laying waste in our Ukraine, purloining everything they encounter 
on the road, bullying the population of Ukraine, sowing discord and disorder 
while we lack the means to protect ourselves – for that reason we are 
beholden to rally up to the defense of our land.
58 
Watchword of the hour, this call to self-defense was regularly invoked by the growing choir 
of peasant criers as the example set by the villagers from the environs of Zvenigordka first 
crossed the district border, then that of the province, acquiring by early autumn truly all-
Ukrainian dimensions.
59  
 
Looking from the abyss of years and the distance of exile, Volodymyr Vynnychenko 
believed to have discovered a pattern which comfortably confirmed his faith in the 
goodhearted nature of the folk – namely, that the Free Cossack phenomenon as a particular 
practice of self-defense “developed especially in the front zone, where the desertion and 
crime figures were especially high.”
60 This is not exactly the case for by October 1 the 
number of the registered Free Cossack Societies both in Podolian (5 societies with 276 
members) and Volhynian provinces (1 society with 35 members) was dwarfed by that in 
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Kiev province (40 societies with 12943 members) and was still markedly lower than those in 
Poltava (11 with 840 members), Chernigov (7 with 605 members), or Yekaterinoslav 
provinces (5 with 783 members).
61 Although these statistics did not capture the full scope of 
the movement – its estimated strength varying between 45 and 60 thousand members - they 
hinted at the relationship between the peasant self-defense, the army and the civil authorities 
which was more complex than Vynnychenko’s simple proportion allowed.
62 For one the Free 
Cossacks remained aware of the persons, whose livestock, forests, lands, lakes and 
machinery the Revolution delivered into the peasants’ hands. “The struggle with those, who 
only yesterday fled from the authority, was not out of question,”
 63 wrote Yurko Tiutiunnyk 
as he offered a list of illustrious names that the vengeful exiles bore: Branickys, Shuvalovs, 
Urusovs, Engelharts, etc. He could have included those who decided to stay and face ‘the 
peasant element’ were it not self-evident. Armed with a hallowed mandate from a village 
skhod (assembly), the Free Cossacks would battle the landlords without scruples and fear. On 
November 12, for instance, the Free Cossacks of the Berdichev district were seen 
commandeering horses from the manors, allegedly to appear at the festive announcement of 
Rada’s Third Universal comme il faut; on the 18
th of the same month the head of Kiev district 
militia reported that the Free Cossacks were plundering the spirits from the local cellars 
together with the common folk; in Borshchagovka they requisitioned wood, in Motivilovka, 
landlord’s sleighs…
64 As the executors of the ‘popular will’, the Free Cossack units often 
acted in unison with the homecoming soldiers, making a mockery of their professed 
defensive aims. “The Free Cossacks in the localities not only fail to take the measures and 
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help the militia, but they actually connive with the same robbers, from whom [the movement] 
is often  made up” – authoring those plaintive lines, the Chigirin district commissar might 
have at least congratulated himself on having wisely guessed the fundamental ambiguity of 
the institution. 
65 
 
The alliance that the Free Cossacks allegedly struck with the rural troublemakers went hand 
in hand with their growing animosity towards the rural organs of control, the state militia in 
particular. Seen as superfluous, this institution was grudgingly tolerated, but only until the 
local peasant congresses, having decided to endow the Cossacks with the exclusive right to 
gun ownership, placed the militia under the penumbra of semi-legality – a unique 
predicament for a law-enforcement agency. Deriving an easy corollary from such resolutions, 
the units of peasant self-defense proceeded to the immediate disarmament of their 
competitors sparing no effort that they otherwise had been so jealously conserving in their 
lackadaisical dealings with the looters. In Chigirin (ukr. Chyhyryn), Cherkassy (ukr. 
Cherkasy), Berdichev, Kiev and Lipovets (ukr. Lypovets) districts the Cossacks unilaterally 
resolved to abolish the militia altogether, “for failing to live up to its task” as one decree had 
it, assuming all the rights and functions deemed necessary for the maintenance of order; that 
the act of defining this order belonged likewise to those called to uphold it did not raise 
concerns about the dangerous circularity of the entire undertaking.
66  In any event, the Free 
Cossacks were less a revolutionary alternative to the tsarist police force than an instrument 
for turning the countryside into a string of enclosed armed camps with government officials 
either banished or kept in the state of petrified impotence.  
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The attitude of the Central Rada towards the Free Cossack movement remained ambivalent 
and its politics followed a predictably inconsistent course. For as long as it remained a 
counter-government with a labile support base and an uncertain future, it could indulge itself 
in encouraging the spontaneous growth of this “useful and natural (pryrodnoi) 
organization.”
67 By creating a special department headed by the former ensign Apolon 
Pevnyi, the Rada extended the recognition to the Cossacks and attempted to take hold of its 
successive development; yet all plans to turn the impulse of the movement to a good account 
inevitably foundered against insufficient means, political inexperience of the Rada members 
as well as the general anxiety of the small town bureaucracy vis-à-vis the towering self-
assurance of the armed countryside.
68 One pointed version of this deeply seated urban fear 
surfaced to the light of historical action in late November-early December 1917, when the 
Ukrainian national government, while denying the few willing peasant detachments the 
entrance to the capital, attempted to blackmail them into subordination by making the supply 
of arms and instructors incumbent upon the fulfillment of certain state-issued statures.
69 
Coming so late in the game, measures of that kind could only have a marginal effect, all the 
more because the returning soldiers, walking in lockstep with the peasant militant élan, 
brought both the weaponry and the expertise required for the necessary expertise.  
 
Its apprehension of the armed village only strengthened by the failure to control it, the 
Central Rada turned to the organization of the urban analogues of the Free Cossacks. The 
best-known of such units was the so-called Kiev regiment of the Free Cossacks, assembled 
                                                 
67 Vynnychenko, 225 
68 ibid., 226; Lobodaev, 88ff, 95-101 
69 ibid., 147,169  
  67
and led by Mykhailo Kovenko, an adventuresome engineer at the machine building plant 
“Greter & Krivanek.”
70 Comprised of sixteen worker battalions (kureni), the regiment 
represented the largest voluntary force at Rada’s disposal, a distinction which in a short 
while would earn Kovenko a post of Kiev’s commandant, an endowment of near-dictatorial 
powers over the beleaguered city.
71 There had been a certain quantity of other urban squads 
of the Free Cossacks, dispersed over Ukraine: about 500 men in and around Chernigov, 300 
in Rovno (ukr. Rivne), 800 in Lugansk (ukr. Luhans’k), a 700-strong Yekaterinoslav 
detachment of ataman Gorobets, formerly student Vorobiev from the Kiev Polytechnic 
Institute.
72 Taken together, the urban units of the Free Cossacks numbered hardly more than 
4 or 5,000 individuals, i.e. less than a tenth of the estimated strength of the movement. With 
time some of them would be converted into crack fighters for the Rada’s cause, but for now 
their presence mostly vexed the grumbling city dwellers, reminding Ukrainian national 
leaders of their isolation, made only more acute through the village’s visible disengagement 
from the trajectory of their fate.  
 
Much like the largely peasant Free Cossack movement, the workers’ militias and the Red 
Guards in particular resulted from the drive towards the ubiquitous self-armament against the 
backdrop of the wilting state authority.
73 Yet, the similarities between the two new forms of 
social organization essentially end at the above assertion of common etiology. Although 
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often emerging ‘spontaneously’, forming as they did at the factory floors without the 
prefatory approbation from a local soviet, the workers’ units saw themselves quickly 
integrated into the fractious modus operandi of the all-Russian post-February party politics. 
In Kharkov, for example, the first two months of the guideless experimentation with self-
defense were over as soon as the city Bolsheviks decided to establish special district staffs 
for the Red Guard and accept respective regulations taking a cue from their Petrograd 
comrades.
74 Receiving encouragement and instruction from the radical left (with the 
Bolsheviks among the most active organizers), the workers’ militias set off on the path of 
accelerated growth, uniting by early August as many as 1,000 armed men at Kharkov’s All-
Russian Electric Company (VEK in Russian) alone;
75 two months later, the city housed a 
body of roughly 3,000 Red Guards.
76 Despite the opposition from the Mensheviks and the 
Social Revolutionaries, sizable Red Guard units were likewise established in Yekaterinoslav, 
especially at its enormous Briansky Ironworks.
77 In Kiev the locus of workers’ militancy 
sprawled around the Arsenal in the Pechersk district, where the Bolsheviks, driven by 
distrust of the Rada and eager to seize the opportune moment, hastily moved their 
headquarters.   
 
Spread against the network of party cells like an array of spangles on a gauzy tissue, 
individual Red Guard units could profit from the procurement system which was no longer 
bound to locally available resources. Thus, when a batch of 200 odd rifles from the nearby 
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regiment fell short of demand,
78 the Kharkov party bosses – Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 
alike – turned northward, where the work of dissolution converted army depots into veritable 
mining fields for weaponry and men. David Erde, then the chief editor of the Kharkov’s 
Izvestiia, was delegated by the Party Committee to Petrograd with a mission of obtaining and 
delivering revolver bullets, which he succeeded in doing, albeit not without certain 
difficulties.
79 Much more important, however, was the so-called Tula connection exploited 
with enviable efficacy in the months before October. This entailed a compromise for the 
Bolsheviks, who were only all too well aware of predominantly Menshevik leanings of the 
Workers’ Soviet at Tula as well as that of the Tula Arms Factory Committee. As a result, 
they came to rely on another Menshevik, a certain Poliakov, dispatched forth to confabulate 
with his Tula party comrades. Yet, whatever the costs of keeping this alliance, the benefits 
reared made one easily forget about them: with 5000 rifles, 300 machine guns (sic!) and 5 
rail cars full of ammunition the Bolsheviks could equip the city militants and still have 
something to spare.
80 Incidentally, the instructors too came from Tula, or, to be more precise, 
from the 30
th Infantry Regiment, transferred in July 1917 to Kharkov partly in hopes of 
making it shed its bolshevized trappings en route. With men earmarked for prominence and 
martyrdom in their midst – Nikolai (“Kolia”) Rudnev, Sergei Petrikovsky (Petrenko), Vasily 
Glagolev and others – the unit officers waded into the task of molding the unsteady rows of 
the Red Guards into battle-worthy formations, keeping a neat account of the tactical 
opportunities on the ground along with the strategic exigencies of the greater struggle.
81  
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Although neither the Free Cossack societies nor the Red Guards had enough time to ossify 
into the fully-fledged formal institutions, they still exhibited a number of internal 
commonalities which could justify the act of contrasting them (reductionist as it may be). 
The most obvious point of difference was demographic, for while the Free Cossacks 
gravitated around villages and explicitly barred frontline conscripts from becoming their 
members, the Red Guards stayed essentially urban, drawing support from the wide range of 
individuals: factory workers, civil servants, defecting soldiers and even criminals.
82 Secondly, 
contrary to the half-hearted and often botched attempts of the Rada ministers to strike a 
happy medium with the peasant self-defense, the oppositionist radical Left – Bolsheviks in 
particular – succeeded in securing the crucial initiative in forming and arming tessellated 
militia units. The involvement of the party cadres plugged the Red Guards to the immense 
trove of neglected arms and unemployed men, a substantial improvement over the situation 
of the Free Cossacks for whom the question of supply remained largely a matter of luck.
83  
 
These arms, however, came at a price, the Red Guards having to abandon their municipal 
autonomy and assume set positions before the shot of Aurora’s starting gun announced the 
beginning of an all-Russian scramble. Herein lies the third and possibly most substantive 
difference – i.e. in the foil between the retirement of the Free Cossacks to their native 
villages and the progressively guided involvement of the urban militias in the affairs beyond 
their turf. It was no surprise, therefore, that the overture to the Civil War was conducted to 
the sound of towns and cities clashing against each other, with areas of contact narrowed to 
the filigree rail-lines running both ways to expedite the moment of encounter.   
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C. The Echelon War  
 
The conflict between Kiev and Kharkov was already approaching its denouement when the 
Sovnarkom officially declared war against the Central Rada on January 17 (4), 1918. 
Sparked by the inter-party disagreements at the 1
st All-Ukrainian Congress of the Soviets, it 
began with the Bolsheviks and the left S-Rs walking out of the meeting hall to set up shop 
farther east under the uninviting glances from the local Bolsheviks. Simultaneously 
Petrograd, engaged in its first trial of strength with the rebellious Don, confronted the Rada 
with a 48-hour ultimatum, bidding it to stop the passage of all Don and Ural Cossack 
regiments through the Ukrainian territory, to abstain from further “disorganization” (meaning 
Ukrainization) of the “common” Front and finally, to join the “revolutionary army” in 
eradicating the enclaves of counter-revolution.
84 While the General Secretariat of the Rada 
(its executive branch) temporized, trying as it did to save face without erring into unsolicited 
boldness, the Bolsheviks in Kharkov elected a new Executive Committee with a rather 
farcical name of TsIKuKa (often without the intervening capitals, Tsikuka) and established 
their own government, christened, to distinguish it from the Kievan protagonist, into the 
People’s Secretariat. Having at this point depleted their reservoir of inventiveness, the 
Bolshevik-SR coalition opted to give the polity they purported to represent a cognomen 
already in use: the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Thus, with one Congress endeavoring to 
out-shout another Congress, one Secretariat mustering its forces to meet those of another 
Secretariat, one People’s Republic contesting the legitimacy of another People’s Republic, 
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the entire affair seemed to degenerate into the collision of self with its imposter mirror image, 
the fight of “authenticity” with “pretense.”  
 
But so it looked only from the perspective of intangible abstractions, a realm best fit for 
propaganda. Concretely, however, the war had already seen the first blood spilt and property 
destroyed, unfolding as the rules of the new tactics demanded; known as the echelon or 
railroad war (eshelonnaia voina), that novel technique for conducting military operations 
was perfectly captured by Nikolai Kakurin, a soldier and a historian of the Civil War.
85 
Written with precision of an army report, his strategic portrait of the period deserves an 
extensive citation: 
Against the backdrop of minor conflicts of purely local significance, 
occurrences of the greater import begin to manifest themselves: this happens 
when the struggle between the local forces is joined by other forces, which 
come from other directions or sectors, and which are related (rodstvennye) to 
one side or another. Owing to that the scale of events widens; then the 
military operations are timed (priurochivaiutsia) to certain directions, which 
as a rule coincide with the directions of the main railroad thoroughfares.  
 
The small quantity of the active military forces of which both sides availed 
themselves to resolve problems of local significance coupled with their initial 
organizational weakness tied those forces to the rail-lines…  
 
The paucity of engaged forces and the echelon character of the war create an 
impression of the extraordinary flexibility and mobility of maneuvering. 
“Armies” of few hundred men, riding in trains and therefore capable of quick 
concentration at the altogether unexpected directions, solve within few days 
the fate of the most complex and far-reaching operations.
86  
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The “echelon war” epitomized a striving to make do with what was at hand by giving some 
semblance of order to the flurry of ad hoc developments. It was a by-product of state 
attenuation and an homage to the corrosive powers of the revolutionary times – a type of a 
warfare bricolage tout court.  
 
Judged from the carefully distilled world of the war maps, the entire Bolshevik undertaking 
against the Rada looked like an enthralling sprint from the rims of Ukraine inward with Kiev 
in the center as the much-coveted prize. In the west, that is, in the provinces closest to the 
frontline, the Bolsheviks attempted to profit from the demoralized troops trading trenches for 
home by keeping their movements within the time-grid of the planned operations. Recruited 
as many of them were from the heartland of Russia, soldiers billeted in Volhynia found the 
rumors of the Rada’s obstructionist measures sufficiently incensing to proceed against Lutsk 
(ukr. Luts’k) and Rovno in order to occupy those stations.
87 Yet, having quickly run out of 
steam, they let themselves be cowed by the troops of the former XXXIV Corps (I Ukrainian), 
who disarmed and dispersed the blundering attackers. Farther south, in the area of Zhmerinka 
(ukr. Zhmerynka), the bolshevized 2
nd Guard Corps and the 2
nd Finland division hovered 
menacingly over the Podolian transit arteries. Strong in numbers and still relatively 
disciplined, they were poised to advance as far as Znamenka and then, in strategic 
perspective, farther east to Don where they expected to sort out the quandary of Kaledin.
88 
With few kilometers of advance behind, they balked on the threshold to Vinnitsa (Vinnytsia), 
tumbling over the unexpectedly spirited resistance from the Rada units there; losing a 
regiment to the act of disarmament, the units retreated in mid December to their original 
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positions.
89 Following this discomfiture some of the armed men left precipitously; the rest 
lolled in the area till January 10 (23), 1918, when the Bolshevik-inspired uprising of the 
railways employees provided them with a second chance, realized this time around, to 
occupy the Volhynian capital.
90    
 
If anything, the sporadic attempts to gain control over Podolian and Volhynian towns 
demonstrated how far the soldiers of the once respectable Russian Imperial Army had fallen. 
Insofar as the fighting was concerned, the Russian troops heading north and west were worse 
than pitiful; the units at the disposal of the Rada easily bested them, yet less by dint of the 
superior discipline, as one Austrian observer believed to have explained,
91 than simply by 
virtue of being closer to their native grounds. Although producing no impact on the outcome 
of the war, these largely bloodless clashes between the pro-Bolshevik and pro-Rada forces 
merit mentioning for giving the foretaste of power to the individual who in one year’s time 
would come to dominate the surrounding terrain – Nikofor (or Nychypir) Grigoriev. An 
appointed commissar of the Central Rada in one recently Ukrainized regiment, he gathered at 
the Zdolbunov junction 150 daredevils and led them against the garrison at Rovno on the 
night of January 12, 1918 (December 30, 1917). The attackers carried the day, taking hold of 
the city along with the countless wads of the azure five-ruble notes that the Bolsheviks 
amassed for their Headquarters at Mogilev. How Grigoriev’s band disposed of the money is 
not known, but Rovno in any event fell back into the hands of the Bolsheviks the very next 
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day.
92 Small as it may have been, the feat of Grigoriev did not pass unnoticed as he was to 
find out months later when the reestablished Rada compensated him with a high rank in the 
yet non-existing Ukrainian army.  
  
In stark contrast to such lackluster performance in the Right-bank Ukraine, in the east the 
forces allied to the Bolsheviks acted with speed and perseverance which brought them the 
sought-after triumph. This was no accident, for the Kharkov regime, in the absence of other 
means, had to rely on the individuals who did not welter in the war fatigue of their frontline 
compatriots; made up of the local Red Guardsmen and the gun-toting volunteers from central 
Russia, they demonstrated their combined worth before the SR-Bolshevik Kievan exiles had 
a chance to gather breath and reflect upon their changed circumstances. On December 9, 
1918, hundreds of the militants from VEK and the Shimansky metalworking factory united 
with the recently arrived crew of the sailors sans fleet commanded by Nikolai Khovrin and a 
much larger unit of Rudolf Sievers (Sivers), a Petrograd scion of the Baltic German family. 
They besieged and took a casern with the parked armored autos, appropriating its valuable 
contents to the accolades from their Party patrons.
93 Encouraged by this success, the Red 
Guards went on to disarm the 2
nd Reserve Ukrainian Regiment known for its pro-Rada 
(“chauvinist” in the Bolshevik terminology of the time) disposition. The detachment, a 
prodigious body of few thousand armed men, offered only a token resistance, surrendering as 
soon as the two companies from within its own ranks opened fire at their fellow-soldiers. 
With this last bastion of the Rada’s support reduced to a helpless addle crowd, the 300 
Bolshevik breakaways formed a new unit, the modest beginnings of which hardly measured 
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up to its long and eventful history. Entrusted to Vitaly Primakov, they took the name of the 
“Red Cossacks” (Chervone Kozaki) – in a conscious gesture of questioning the monopoly of 
the Free Cossacks over the “Cossack myth” with its protective aura.
94  
 
Together, the Kharkov Red Guards, Primakov’s Red Cossacks, Siever’s “flying unit” 
(letuchii otriad) and the Moscow volunteers led by the former captain Pavel Egorov 
consituted the core of the Soviet forces in the region. In harmony with their piebald origin 
and appearance, they progressed in no single direction, with some troops engaged against 
Kalidin’s Don and others fighting the Rada government. A certain unity of purpose was 
imposed with the arrival of Kremlin’s principal troubleshooter, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, 
whose cumbersome title of the People’s Commissar for the Struggle against the 
Counterrevolution in the South of Russia divulged both the extent and the vagueness of his 
prerogatives. Author of the overarching strategic plan, Antonov charged Mikhail Muraviev, 
his Chief-of-Staff, with the execution of its Ukrainian part. The nominally distinct Ukrainian 
Executive Committee limited itself to coloring the war with the Rada in national hues, its 
incursions into the operational realm inevitably kept at the level of suggestions. Yet, even in 
that advisory capacity the Kharkov Bolsheviks rarely challenged Antonov’s choices, trying 
as they did to keep up with the pace of Muraviev’s small army.  
 
In all fairness to the Bolsheviks in Kharkov, it is worth noting that Antonov could have not 
found a leader for the Ukrainian troops more intractable than Muraviev even if he were 
deliberately looking for one. A member of the Left S-R party, Muraviev offered his services 
                                                 
94 “Iz istorii Sovvlasti na Ukraine,” 183-184  
  77
to Lenin’s government in Petrograd as it was still writhing in the post-birth convulsions.
95 
This war-time officer, whom life in trenches endowed in equal measure with wounds, ranks 
and decorations, was undoubtedly a courageous and a gifted soldier, but those traits seemed 
more like transient shades cast by the permanent figures of illimitable ambition and 
unbridled violence. His was indeed the world of Manichean struggle, one in which he 
assumed the role of Virtue’s faithful lieutenant, called forth by History itself to be pitiless 
towards the partisans of Vice. In Poltava, for example, he ordered “to slaughter without 
mercy all defenders of local bourgeoisie,”
96 an injunction that, though not carried out 
verbatim, cost tens of captured cadets their lives.
97 Trotting on the outskirts of Kiev but 
already savoring the taste of its immanent fall, the Bolshevik “Commander-in-Chief” (as 
Muraviev liked to call himself) admonished his soldiers to be firm lest they show signs of 
dispensable humanity toward their enemy. Destroyed were to be “all officers and cadets, 
haidamaks, monarchists and all the enemies of revolution”
98 and so it was, in fact, that when 
the Bolshevik “bands” finally entered the prostrate city on January 27 (February 9), 1918, 
many of its residents were made to forget, in the words of one observer, “the nightmare and 
horror of the [preceding] nine-day long bombardment.”
99 Hundreds if not thousands of 
officers, students or otherwise suspiciously looking bystanders were murdered in front of 
Muraviev’s Headquarters and in the Mariinsky Park nearby, their naked bodies left to rot for 
days on, consigned but to the questionable care of stray dogs.
100 Riding on the coattails of the 
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army into their new capital, the People’s Secretariat attempted to remonstrate with the 
excesses of the Red Guardsmen, but succeeded only in adducing some pro-forma rebukes 
that the all-powerful chief addressed his men.
101 Hardly softened by such belated mea culpa, 
Muraviev’s reign of arbitrary terror ended only when the events around Odessa compelled 
him and his riffraff troops to abandon Kiev for the prospects of new exploits opening up on 
the Black Sea shores.  
 
Before Muraviev could set out eastward along the Kharkov-Kiev railway, a 1300-strong 
assemblage from the Red Guards of Kharkov and Moscow under the united command of 
Pavel Egorov seized the key junction of Lozovaia, Pavlograd and Sinelnikovo (between 
December 30 (17), 1917 and January 1 (Dec 19, 1917), 1918)
102 and after a few days of 
repose rolled straight on to Yekaterinoslav. From January 3 (Dec 22) onward this bristling 
city of 250 thousand residents became the scene of dogged street fights pitting local worker 
militias from the Briansky, pipe manufacturing and other factories against the Rada 
supporters in the guise of the haidamaks and the Free Cossacks.
103 Rather characteristically 
the regular units stationed there resolved to abstain from the conflict, attending quietly for a 
convenient moment when one of the sides could provide them with the indisputable proof of 
its ascendancy. Six days later, with victory careening mercurially from one side to another, 
the arrival of Egorov’s men finally adjudicated the sanguinary debate in Bolshevik favor. 
The next stop on the itinerary, Aleksandrovsk, fell on January 2
 (15), 1918 to one of 
Egorov’s adjutants, who then duly incorporated the so-called “free combat retinue” of the 
notorious Marusia (Mariia) Nikoforova into the ranks of the pro-Kharkov forces. From that 
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time the first Bolshevik contacts with another regional celebrity, Nestor Makhno, a kind of 
revolutionary pontiff in his native Gulai-Pole, marching at the head of the peasant column to 
Alexandrovsk to settle scores with the entrapped urban bourgeoisie.
104 Yet, in contrast to 
Marusia, sailing unhindered form place to place as an urban brigand with the invisible banner 
of the revolutionary Umwertung aller Werte unfurled high aloft, Makhno did not follow the 
Red Guards, tied to the place as much by reason of unresolved conflicts in the countryside as 
by the angst in the face of Cossack echelons approaching from the fronts of the increasingly 
irrelevant war.
105   
 
In the end, the attack on Kiev assumed the form of a baleful trident. On January 7 (20) 
Egorov brought his troops back to Muraviev, whose own offensive consisted in disarming 
“the Ukrainian garrisons unwilling to fight with whoever it was.”
106 In this manner fell 
Poltava, Romodan, Kremenchug, Lubny and finally Grebenka junction, bringing Muraviev’s 
agglomerate army within less than 100 miles from their final destination. On the north the 
brunt of the war was borne by the regiments of Reinhold Berzin and the so-called “unit of 
special purpose” of Andrei Znamensky; the former, commanding the unstable construction 
from the Siberian shards of the erstwhile Imperial army, set out from Gomel toward 
Bakhmach, capturing the city without encountering resistance on January 14 (27), 1918.
107 
The Red Guards of Znamensky, who apparently left Moscow “on their own initiative,”
108 
arrived to Ukraine’s north-eastern border just in time to supply the last props and the few 
missing extras before the drama of Hellenic intensity could regale the taste of the ‘nationally-
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conscious’ posterity. On the 16
th (29
th) of January all three columns of Muraviev’s army (led, 
respectively, by Egorov, Berzin and Znamensky) closed in around Kruty railway station 
where the few companies of the cadets, university students and grammar school pupils, 420 
men in toto, decided to make their stand.
109 Here, after a couple of hours of confused 
shooting, the youngsters betrayed and abandoned from the get-go by their commanding 
officers, found themselves surrounded by the overwhelming Bolshevik forces and were 
compelled to retreat, leaving 36 prisoners at the victor’s mercy. The losses among the Rada’s 
defenders must have certainly been high, and yet, they were far from being “completely 
annihilated” in the style of the three-hundred Spartans – a myth, cherished by the political 
exiles and diasporic historians.
110 Exaggerated too was the strategic significance of the 
“Ukrainian Thermopiles” with the Bolsheviks showing no signs of fatigue throughout the 
remaining days of campaign. They reached the threshold of Kiev on January 23 (February 5) 
to discover it astir with the throngs of the haidamaks and the Red Guards combating each 
other in and around Arsenal. The city was then subjected to a thorough and skillful 
bombardment and finally surrendered when the Ukrainized units, neutral for the time being, 
began to flock over to the Bolshevik side. The departure of autos with the Rada ministers on 
the night of January 26 (February 8) signaled the end of the war, or at least the closing of its 
first act, for neither the Bolsheviks rapt in their triumph, nor their opponents immersed in the 
visions of German deliverance could safely count on the fidelity of ever-equivocating Future.  
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On the surface the result of the conflict appears nothing short of surprising: the Rada in Kiev, 
formally supported by hundreds of thousands of well-armed soldiers, distributed among the 
plethora of Ukrainized divisions, succumbed to the onslaught of a few thousand Red 
Guardsmen, many of whom were receiving their first schooling in war-making as they went. 
The problem with the Rada was precisely in that reliance on the army at the time of its 
accelerated disintegration. The Ukrainian (or Ukrainized) frontovik was chary to fight; 
moreover, he found his position in the army increasingly onerous, the fact that, combined 
with the absence of the binding power of the officers, made his desertion a simple question 
of time. “The weak resistance offered by the Rada in the struggle against the Bolsheviks,” 
reported an Austrian council one month after Kiev’s fall, “reveal that none of the forces of 
the country (Kräftegruppen des Landes) stand decidedly behind it. The few available troops 
were strongly afflicted by Bolshevism (waren stark bolschewikisch durchwühlt) and failed in 
parts completely.”
111 Categorical, the judgment of the Austrian diplomat found enough 
examples in the conduct of the regiments stationed in Kiev, Odessa and beyond to make it 
into a near-truism.  
 
Prominent Ukrainian economist and a defense minister at the time of Bolshevik offensive 
Mykola Porsh was not alone in recognizing the fateful shortcomings of the army, when, 
raising his voice in lament, he placed the hope for the Rada’s salute squarely with the Free 
Cossack volunteers.
112 For months on such emblematic figures of the Ukrainian national Left 
as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura took many 
opportunities to speak out against regular armed forces, convinced in their early roseate anti-
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militarism that the volunteer militia complied better both with the revolutionary tasks at hand 
and the Ukrainian national character.
113 The same idea entered with lapidarian precision into 
the text of the Fourth Universal, that crowing achievement of the Rada’s legislative term. 
“[I]n lieu of the standing army (postiinoi armiiu),” it proclaimed, “[we are committed] to 
introduce people’s militia, so that our host (nashe viisko) would serve the purpose of 
defending the working masses and not the vagaries of the dominant classes.”
114 Yet, the Rada 
remained heedless of its own recommendations, being compelled, as the most obvious heir to 
the toppled Provisional government, to act like the proper state when its radical eradication 
was so vividly embossed on the agenda of the day.  
 
By the same token, the Bolsheviks – being more the Party than the State, more the Spirit than 
even the Party – were in a better position to seek the alternatives to the state and the army. In 
Ukraine, where – in spite of what they might have asserted – they embodied the mutineer 
faction arrayed against the government, the Bolsheviks worked in the direction indicated by 
the vector of decay. Dissolving armies and fronts, abolishing distinctions and authorities, the 
Bolsheviks rallied to their cause not only the explicitly anarchist elements akin to the 
brigades of Nikiforova or the Black Guards of Yekaterinoslav, but also the forces of latent 
disintegration – most obviously the workers’ militias. “All my victories in Ukraine,” 
Muraviev cabled to Lenin, “the taking of Kiev I owe to the Red Guard but not to the soldiers, 
who brought me and the People’s Commissar Antonov plenty of inconveniences in our 
efforts to form and organize the South-Western front.”
115 Everywhere entropy held sway at 
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the order’s expense, and, in the manner more metaphorical and ritualistic than many of its 
observers were willing to admit, the terrible slaughter staged by the Bolshevik forces in Kiev 
feted that ultimate triumph of the purposeful Entstaatlichung over the vestiges of Imperial 
statehood.  
 
Yet, no adherent of latent disintegration proved of greater service to the Bolsheviks than the 
Ukrainian village, engrossed in its own developments and uncompromisingly deaf to the 
urban drama nearby.  
 
Intermission: Impressions of the Bolshevik Domination in Ukraine 
 
“On the morning of January 26 Bolsheviks entered the city. They remained in Kiev only for 
three weeks and that first image of the Bolshevism that we beheld in such a short period of 
time was not bereft of brilliance and of certain demonic force.” Speaking with the mildly 
camouflaged admiration, Aleksei Gol’denveizer, a Kievan jurist, thought less of the 
Bolshevik Party that of the conquering army and its commander, “the legendary colonel 
Muraviev.”
116 This Left S-R band leader became in essence the embodiment of the Bolshevik 
authority in Kiev elevating through word and deed the continuance of ‘pitiless’ terror to the 
top in the priority list of the so-called ‘Bolshevik politics.’ With the excise of power bared of 
all the mediating layers to its irreducible (and admittedly morbid) core, the remaining issues 
seemed easy to resolve, left as they were to the simple and aboveboard arbitration of a gun.  
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Kiev now teemed with the armed servitors of the new order – or, given the plight of city, of 
the new disorder. The Red Guardsmen and the grim-looking subjects in the navy blue jackets 
with emblems of their maritime provenance patrolled the streets of the subdued metropolis, 
antic guards too anxious to indemnify themselves for the years of want and oppression to be 
wheedled away by the concerns for civic security. In the open or through the crannies of their 
concealments, residents observed with trepidation as cars and phaetons drove by, carrying 
Muraviev’s subordinates to the venues of lark and debauchery.
117 No one felt sure in their 
presence, not even members of Ukraine’s nominal government, the People’s Secretariat of 
the recently founded republic. Yevgeniia Bosh, for example, recalled how on the day of her 
arrival to Kiev she and her colleagues were accosted by the group of five or six armed men, 
who, their guns directed point blank at the apprehended party, commanded them to raise their 
hands and began searching for the identity papers. Bosh’s position as Ukraine’s Secretary of 
the Internal Affairs did not baffle those overzealous “inspectors” in the slightest; unperturbed, 
they finished their business, leaped back into their auto and speeded away without expressing 
apology let alone remorse.
118  
 
For as long as Muraviev hovered around, the Bolshevik-SR coalition in the Secretariat had to 
contend themselves with the role of a ghost government. His departure, however, added 
neither to their prestige nor efficiency. The city needed a force of 4,000 men for the 
maintenance of order, a demand that the Bolsheviks had no hope of meeting.
119 Their failure, 
wrote Nikolai Mogiliansky, an ethnographer who swapped his tenure in Petrograd for a 
political exile in Kiev, meant that “burglaries counted in hundreds every night, [b]urglaries 
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accompanied by insults, humiliations, abuse of all kinds [leveled at] the most unassuming 
and inoffensive dweller classified (qualifié) as a ‘bourgeois’.”
120 The inhabitants were left to 
face the endemic crime on their own and had to deal with the bandits according to the 
temperament or circumstances, with some succumbing into apathy and others, on the 
contrary, opting for an active resistance. Self-defense units sprung up to life, usually 
organized by the special housing committees responsible for the procurement of weapons, 
selection of the officers and the drawing up of duty schedules for the residents. Although 
mostly neighborhood-bound, formations such as the “Georgian free squad” represented a 
type of a mobile guard-on-call, promptly arriving girt for war to the location in distress.
121 
Involving at times tens of individuals from either side, the clashes between the armed 
citizens and the assailants approached antecedent street melees not only in form but also in 
content, insofar as they sustained the still unresolved power conflict just a notch below the 
level of the Bolshevik official presence.  
 
Swarmed by solicitous crowds, entrapped within the routine of daily management, the Soviet 
government had little control over the comportment of the city revkoms and commissariats 
established pell-mell in the commotion of the preceding months.
122 Some of those municipal 
governments took on rather grotesque appearances of the quasi-medieval fiefdoms wholly 
given over to the vagrancies of a Red Guard primus. According to Mogiliansky’s short 
memoirs, the town of Glukhov (ukr. Hlukhiv) exemplified precisely that category. A vibrant 
district center of the Chernigov province, the place had a misfortune of falling into the hands 
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of a certain Tsyganok, another Kronshtadt sailor of questionable sanity. His brief rule, a 
chain of “indescribable horrors,” reached its odious climax when Tsyganok resolved to 
slaughter children of the murdered landlords – out of persuasion that the “bourgeois” 
convictions would flourish in their midst like the inherited character traits. A mishandled 
bomb ultimately stopped him from carrying out such experiments in social pruning; 
exploding in Tsyganok’s hands la machine infernale dispatched him straight to the pantheon 
of revolutionary martyrs while delivering Glukhov’s dwellers from the agony of their own 
domestic hell.
123  
 
Glukhov’s was an extreme case. On the other end of the spectrum stood the Bolshevik 
authorities of Yekaterinoslav, who seemed to have succeeded in imposing some order after 
defeating their opponents. Ensconced in the city, whither he was driven by the increasingly 
hostile countryside of the Kherson province, Hans Limbach recalled how surprised he was to 
discover “that the same forces, the Bolsheviks with their Red Guards, which menaced our 
existence in the hinterland, here came to signify our protection, even saving our lives 
once.”
124 No doubt, the fact that most of the militiamen were recruited from the workers of 
local factories played its role in shaping Bolshevik thinking and their conduct, but so did 
their ongoing competition with the brigades of the self-styled Anarchists. Although both the 
Bolsheviks and their black banner-waving allies held it for their sacred duty to live off the 
city “bourgeoisie,” the latter developed a tendency to fall upon shops in broad daylight, 
bringing the commerce of this trading hub to a standstill. The Bolshevik authorities had none 
of this; apologists of imposing scheduled ‘contributions’ upon their victims, they tried to 
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keep their partners within limits through cajolement and threats, but it was to little avail. In 
the end, however, despairing at the anarchists’ recalcitrance, the Bolsheviks restored civic 
self-defense squads, whom they had helped in dismantling earlier.
125 By drawing the line 
separating the ‘legitimate’ means of extortion from the ‘illicit’ ones, the newly established 
powers evolved into the defenders of public security – in a rather circuitous fashion and 
perhaps even despite themselves.  
 
All in all, in towns and cities the Bolshevik clout was most commonly restrained by the 
presence of other groups and institutions with a stake in public management. As in the 
aforementioned instance of Yekaterinoslav, the anarchist groups would frequently divulge 
themselves to the terrified public as the uncouth and gun-wielding emissaries of the new 
dawn. To be sure, few of them employed concepts required for the sustenance of authority 
and even the Bolsheviks had to admit that the “flag of anarchism” was often used as a cover-
up for “the common criminals.”
126 In addition to that brand new species of political animals, 
the Bolsheviks had to reckon with the extant components of the administrative apparatus 
inherited from the old regime and left to handle the issues that the Bolsheviks were unable or 
unwilling to handle themselves. City Dumas kept on operating in Kharkov, Kiev and most of 
the provincial capitals with land committees standing just a rung below; Polish, Jewish and 
German organs of self-rule formed networks of their own as they attended to the interests of 
their respective communities. What is more, short of cadres, the Bolsheviks had to rely on 
the state employees of the ousted Rada despite the fact that the latter, in the acrimonious 
remark of Yevgeniia Bosh, “made the vilest (gnusneishee) impression and inspired 
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absolutely no confidence among the majority of comrades.”
127 This cohabitation and even 
collaboration between the antagonistic elements, a regrettable but necessary concession from 
the Bolshevik point of view, created a unique atmosphere, wherein some observers could 
even descry a certain charm. Thus, invoking the image of Bolshevik soldiers sauntering 
alongside the banished landlords through the boroughs of Starokonstantinov, Zofia Kossak-
Szczucka felt the need to resort to a simile: “Between the Bolsheviks of the earlier years and 
those that followed lay so great a difference as between a regular stray dog and a dog 
touched by rabies.”
128   
 
The Bolsheviks commanded the strongest presence in Kharkov and in Kiev, although even 
there it was compromised by the constant factional strife. It grew weaker as one moved away 
from the capital cities to the provincial centers and then still farther down to the district 
towns. In the hinterland, away from the main arteries, the impact of the Bolshevik 
government was as good as nonexistent. Skirted by the contesters, the village was 
accustoming itself to living on its own, a situation evocatively described in the memoirs of 
Mykola Kovalevs’ky. One of the leading members of the Ukrainian S-R party and a 
convinced opponent of the Bolsheviks, he was on his way to joining his comrades as soon as 
he heard the news of the approaching German troops. His path went through the territory 
controlled by the Red Guards, yet, wisely warned against putting too much trust in the 
railroad, he left his train at Znamenka and completed the rest of the journey in a sledge. On 
the outskirts of the first large village he was stopped by a group of armed men, whom he had 
to explain the where’s and the why’s of his travels. He soon realized that he stood in front of 
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the local militia organized “to preempt brawls and robberies.” Feeling sufficiently assuaged 
by this discovery, Kovalevs’ky quizzed his interrogators about their political leanings – i.e. 
whether they were for the Central Rada or for the Bolsheviks. “We recognize neither of the 
two (ni tych, ni druhykh),” they answered, a smirk of superiority on their faces. “We only 
preserve order in our village.”
129  
 
Later that day Kovalevs’ky was received by a peasant eager to cull out whatever information 
his guest possessed about the world outside the village. In his own turn the peasant apprised 
Kovalevs’ky that  
There were no Bolsheviks in that village. Our welcoming host told us that the 
Bolsheviks never appeared in other villages either… Everybody lived by 
rumors and daily awaited the arrival of news. Combined with the lack of 
reliable information, this detachment of our villages left its mark: people were 
disoriented and did not know what they needed to do. This is why they limited 
themselves to addressing the most urgent issues, such as defense of the village 
from the bandits… But since it was unknown which regime would come 
tomorrow, [the villagers] behaved with shrewdness (trymalysia khytro), 
without revealing their convictions, cleaving rather to the ‘none of my 
business’ principle (moia khata skraiu).
130 
 
In the Bolshevik language that meant that the “real Sovietization” failed to take roots in 1918, 
being postponed for another year until the “second coming of the Soviet power” lay a firmer 
groundwork for the integration of the countryside into the nascent polity.
131  
 
It would be unfair to say that the village sequestered itself from the drama of the echelon war 
to the point where it might be immune to the temptation of synchronizing its own 
development against the results of the struggle. Yet, the reigning misinformation made the 
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exercise of keeping abreast of changes in Kiev appear risible. The peasants of the Kherson 
province, claimed Limbach, had great difficulties distinguishing the pro-Rada haidamaks 
from the Red Guard, reading in the red pompons of the haidamak cap messages of their 
Bolshevik disposition.
132 Maria Dunin-Kozicka remembered too how the residents of her 
native Tarashcha district reacted to the news of the Bolshevik triumph. Her diary entry from 
February 1 (14), 1918 contained the following passage:  
This morning a great peasant assembly took place voting pro and contra the 
Bolsheviks. Peasants asked each other, ‘What sort of people are those 
Bolsheviks? What do they give and what do they want?’ Some would answer, 
‘Who they are – we don’t know! They sit in Kiev and give the land of the 
lords for free to the people. [Since] they conquered the Central Rada, who are 
we going to listen to?  
 
Faced with the disconcertingly rapid succession of events, the villagers were primarily 
interested in having their recent gains legitimated by whatever regime that was currently in 
power. Bearing that in mind, added Dunin-Kozicka, “the largest part of the village signed up 
(zapisała się) for the Bolshevik party” as if hedging one’s bets and propitiating spirits of the 
unknown.
133 
 
In those villages where the Bolsheviks did make an appearance, the relationships between 
them and the peasants could be tense, at times even hostile. According to Limbach, the Red 
Guards near Nikolo-Kozel’sk got off to a very bad start after letting their leader declaim 
against the bourgeois essence of the peasantry and then clamor for its immediate extirpation. 
This speech reaching solicitous ears, the peasants hurried to their rifles lest the Bolshevik 
firebrand carry out his intention.
134 Yet, more than such careless remarks, the villagers 
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chafed at the comportment of the pro-Bolshevik troops, finding the practice of “arbitrary 
requisitions” (samochinnye rekvizitsii) particularly vexing. In the region of Yelisavetgrad 
(ukr. Yelysavethrad), for example, presence of Marusia Nikiforova with her chaps, much too 
unrestrained even for their own anarchist good, resulted in a full-blown rebellion. Although it 
started in the city itself, peasants from the neighboring villages began to flock to the 
insurgents’ secour as soon as they discovered that they are fighting Marusia herself. The 
prospects of complete annihilation looming over her, Marusia took to her heels in the 
direction of Muraviev’s troops.
135 Naturally, units of Marusia’s type contributed little to the 
legitimacy of the Kharkov regime in the Ukrainian countryside; instead, looking more like 
autonomous raiding parties than the vanguard formations of the regular army, they gave 
substance to such Rada-issued pamphlets, which bid peasantry of the Uman and 
Yelisavetgrad  districts to stand up “in defense of the revolutionary conquests against the 
Bolshevik predatory bands and the bourgeoisie.”
136  
 
The four months that the Bolsheviks stayed in Ukraine was one uninterrupted race in which 
the participants would switch alternatively from being the pursuers to being pursued. Too 
short to merit the name of the rule, their term in power bore all the signs of the true 
interregnum, as Colin Ross, the Foreign Service liaison officer and a well-known war-zone 
tourist, noted in his “Impressions in the Ukraine” submitted to the Ober Ost Command on 
March 10, 1918. Spending preceding twenty days in the Bavarian Corps of General Knörzer 
as it advanced from Lutsk to Zhitomir, he compared what he saw with the Mexican 
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circumstances on the morrow of Victoriano Huerta’s fall (1914). Further he graphically 
elaborated:  
The land is divided into separate dominions (Herrschaftsbereiche), which 
spread over districts, cities, partially even only market towns and villages. The 
authority (Herrschaftsgewalt) there is in the hands of the most diverse party 
groups as well as political adventurers and dictators. There are villages which 
surrounded themselves with trenches, waging war against each other over a 
piece of expropriated land. There are atamans, who carved spheres of 
influence (Machtsphären) for themselves at certain places, where they rule 
with an assistance of life guards and mercenary troops. They dispose of 
machine guns, cannons and armored autos since weapons are scattered all 
across the country.
137  
 
In perspective, the instability of the first post-revolutionary winter could have ossified into a 
kind of warlord particularism, which would come to dominate the Ukrainian political 
landscape in 1919 and, to a lesser extent, 1920. That this did not take place owes to the 
arrival of the Germans and, more specifically, to the fact that the vital interests of the Central 
Powers were inextricably linked with the reestablishment of the functioning and pervasive 
administrative apparatus on the occupied territories.  
 
Part III: Austro-German Intervention and Bolshevik Efforts at Organizing Resistance 
 
The locomotive-propelled advance of the Red Guards, spectacular though it might have been, 
ultimately proved to be a little more than a sideshow to the peace negotiations that set the 
beribboned and bemedaled delegates of the Austro-German coalition against the tie- and 
tuxedo-clad Bolshevik “parvenus.” Choosing Brest-Litovsk as a meeting place, they put 
aside their sartorial differences (despite the loud symbolism thereof) to make space for the 
discussion of differences in geopolitics. It turned out to be a drawn-out affair, with Germans 
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insisting on obtaining parts of Poland, Lithuania and Courland and their opponents adhering 
with tenacity to the unprecedented diplomatic formula of “peace without annexations and 
contributions.”
138 It was certain that from a purely military standpoint the Central Powers 
could impose their terms as victors in the war, but the Bolsheviks, quite correctly, counted on 
the disagreements between the allies and, in particular, on the desire of the Austro-Hungarian 
government to obtain the treaty with Russia at the earliest prospect, perhaps even without 
consulting its senior partner. With its population starving, industry paralyzed by strikes, army 
command fighting for the last vestiges of strategic autonomy, the Danube Monarchy was 
hardly in the position, as the Emperor Charles wryly remarked, “to go on fighting simply in 
order that Germany should receive Lithuania and Courland as prizes of victory.”
139  
 
The arrival of the Rada emissaries to Brest-Litovsk introduced a number of new 
considerations into the complex welter of negotiable issues. Oleksandr Sevriuk, Mykola 
Liubin’sky and Mykola Levits’ky were dispatched by the government of Vsevolod 
Holubovich to plead with Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, for the immediate 
help against the Bolsheviks.
140 Ukraine with its inestimable resources, its rich agriculture and 
developed ore and coal industries was the payment offered for the liberation and neither the 
Germans nor their Habsburg ally were so dimmed by their private concerns as to let this 
opportunity go unexploited. They pounced upon it with great speed, signing a separate treaty 
with the Ukrainian People’s Republic on February 9, 1918, and recognizing the latter as a 
distinct political player. Simultaneously they regulated the amount of raw materials that 
Ukraine would have to procure for the Central Powers and settled the proportions in which 
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those deliveries would be divided between the allies.
141 Trotsky’s last-ditched attempt to 
place four delegates from the “other” – i.e. Bolshevik – Ukraine at the negotiation table in 
hopes of confounding seasoned diplomats foundered ignominiously after the Major-General 
Max Hoffman, the representative of the German High Command (OHL) at the parleys, 
unambiguously offered the selfsame individuals to return whence they came.
142 His other 
diplomatic ruses missing the mark, the Head of the Soviet Delegation decided to break off 
the talks throwing his “no war, no peace!” utterance in lieu of a more ceremonious farewell 
at the stunned audience of ministers and generals. At that point, the evidence of Bolshevik 
intransigence in their hands and the implorations from Sevriuk and Co growing more 
stentorian every minute, the Germans believed to possess an excuse sufficiently strong to 
proceed with the military intervention.  
  
On February 18, 1918 the German troops of Colonel-General Alexander von Linsingen 
began their progress in the direction of Lutsk, Rovno and Zhitomir. The Austrians were 
abstaining at first, but, warned that they might forfeit their share of the spoils should they 
remain inactive, grudgingly joined ten days later.
143 “The march,” wrote Rudolf Kiszling, an 
Austrian participant and a historian of these events, “was characterized … as the movement 
(Vorrückung) on and along the tracks,” mirroring in reverse the previous advancement of the 
Bolshevik forces.
144 From its outset, the Austro-German offensive (in reality two separate 
military undertakings) revealed that the remaining rump of the Russian Army accounted to 
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little more than a throng concentrated along the frontiers of the fallen Empire. Thus, with 
days of its glory long behind it, the “Brusilov’s” 8
th Army clambered the cars of east-bound 
trains before coming into contact with the enemy. Armies of the Romanian Front, 
demoralized by the continuing harassments by the Romanian authorities, were forming lines 
of stragglers meandering back home through the Bessarabian and Podolian countryside.
145 
Formations that stayed at their positions were duly disarmed, sometimes by units only a 
fraction of their size; such was, for instance, the fate of the three regiments of the Russian 
78
th Infantry Division (of the XXIX Corps) which surrendered their weapons to two puny 
companies of the Austro-Hungarian 54
th Rifle division.  
 
In the meantime enormous stocks of the war materiel, abandoned and unattended, fell into 
the hands of the forward-pressing Austro-German troops. The first three days of 
uninterrupted marching brought the XII Imperial and Royal Corps of the Lieutenant-General 
(Feldzeugmeister) von Braun into possession of 650 cannons, 700 ammunition wagons, 2100 
machine guns, two airfields with airplanes, etc. In Kamenets-Podolsk, the spoils of this war 
without struggle rose by additional 300 cannons and 35 mortars.
146 Within less than two 
weeks of the operation, the Russian Army, once a central pillar of the Tsarist regime and now 
a substanceless register of losses and desertions, finally followed suit of its imperial patron.  
 
Try as they might, the Bolshevik leaders had little success in holding on to the Army’s 
fragments. The role that they played in causing its dissolution, the manner whereby the 
conquest of power in Ukraine was accomplished, the anarchy, spreading in the streets and 
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cutting to the quick of the dying state – all these factors put them at great disadvantage, that 
no caboodle of agitators could ever hope to offset. Antonov’s desperate order to have the 
echelons of the 8
th Army stopped at Kharkov, its soldiers disarmed and its officers sent to 
Donbas
147 had a ring of a biblical Vox Clamantis in it and was just as effective: the soviet of 
the army, charged with the execution of Antonov’s instructions failed to do so and so the 
trains rolled on unimpeded, carrying their homesick and war-weary cargo away from the 
fields of the decisive battles.
148 The behavior of the professedly bolshevized troops equally 
left no room for optimism. Forgetting the lofty promises – if there were any made – the 
personnel of the 4
th Artillery brigade (of the Romanian front) melted away, bequeathing upon 
the overwrought Bolshevik command scraps of inoperable guns; the fate of the 13
th heavy 
artillery battalion followed the same trajectory.
149 Even the Latvian riflemen, whose 
commitment to the regime became the matter of encomiastic accounts and morbid tales 
(depending on the perspective) succumbed to the temptation of abandoning the crippled ship 
of Bolshevik power while it still drifted afloat; thus, with further resistance appearing as 
futile, both the 1
st (Ust’-Dvinsk) and the 4
th (Vidzeme) Latvian regiments decided to take off 
without any authorization to defend the Revolution where risks were lower and prospects 
brighter.
150  
 
With the Army in the state of final disintegration and without the hope of retaining any 
remnants, the Bolsheviks had to fall back on the heterogeneous detachments of the Red 
Guards, sailors and nondescript daredevils, no more than 15,000 men altogether thinly 
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stretched between the Dniester’s left embankment all the way to the Don River bend.
151 
Sufficient to defeat the Central Rada with its paper divisions, this force proved flat-out 
inadequate for the tasks at hand. Amateurs pitted against the top professionals, the Red 
Guards lacked discipline, leadership, knowledge of the terrain and the basic understanding of 
the tactical coordination. Their subordination to Antonov often being only of the most 
nominal nature, they operated, as Makhno attested in his memoirs, “at their own risk, 
frequently in the sectors where there was no adversary.”
152 This did not always result from 
the bad faith of the Red Guard commanders, more interested in their private aggrandizement 
(or salvation) than in the honest service to the common cause; rather, such abstention 
stemmed from a simple fact that very few, the Bolshevik leaders including, knew where the 
Germans exactly were, how fast they were progressing and whether they were coming in 
strength or were sending off only reconnoitering parties.
153  
 
No doubt, many of the men fighting in the ranks of the Red Guards possessed great reserves 
of courage and self-sacrifice, but the first discouraging encounters against the superior 
numbers, superior technology and superior organization produced, to put it mildly, 
dampening effects on their spirits. Thus, after sustaining heavy losses at Kholodnaia Gora 
outside of Kharkov on April 8, troops began to clamor for the immediate decampment into 
the “rear” in order to get the “reinforcement” and go through “additional training;”
154 mass-
rallies (mitingovanie) with identical requests took place on March 31 in the 1
st Kharkov 
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Proletarian regiment and other units of the so-called “Kremenchug group,” with “rear” 
defined as some comforting spot beyond Ukraine’s borders (Saratov or Tsaritsyn 
representing the most common options).
155 No blandishment seemed adequate to calm their 
overtaxed nerves and no threat of an abstract revolutionary retribution was even remotely 
comparable to the immanent menace embodied by the advancing and impregnable enemy. 
Units naturally shriveled in this oppressive environment, as workers, in Bosh’s euphemistic 
expressions, were harrying back to their lathes, or simply defecting;
156 no easy replacement 
for them could be found either, since rumors, those panic mongering emissaries, dammed in 
advance the inflow of volunteers.
157 Witnesses of the rapid diminution of available forces, 
some Bolshevik leaders resorted to morose witticisms symptomatic of exhaustion and 
pending nervous collapse. “I am going off on vacation to the tundra to form the troops from 
the Samoyeds,” was Reinhold Berzin’s snappy response to Moscow, unduly exacting in its 
demands of “positive” developments.
158  
 
In a singular twist of irony a temporary relief for the Bolshevik distress arrived from the men, 
who in two months’ time would transform into a menace to the Soviet regime on par with the 
present incubus of the Austro-German offensive. Formed in the autumn of 1917 from the 
Austro-Hungarian POWs, the two-division strong Czechoslovak Corps observed the 
tumultuous Ukrainian epics from the front seats of the encampments in Volhynia and Poltava; 
its political and military leaders nevertheless were determined to maintain the minimal 
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distance needed to keep the spectators from stumbling onto the main stage.
159 For a while 
they excelled in it, yet, the approach of Linsingen’s troops, who judged the Czechoslovaks 
guilty of a double crime of enmity and treason, spliced for the time being their fate with the 
Bolshevik survival. They possessed arms, experience and numbers to assume the leading role 
in the war with Germans, taking a stance at the threshold to Kiev and then further east in the 
Left Bank Ukraine.
160 Everywhere, as the newly appointed German ambassador to Kiev 
Alfons Mumm admitted, the Czechoslovaks fought well,
161 but nowhere as well as at 
Bakhmach, where they held the Germans at bay for more than a week.
162 The Czechoslovaks, 
however, could not defend Ukraine, neither did they fancy this idea very seriously, their 
engagements consisting only of the skillfully executed rear-guard actions aiming to extricate 
the Corps from the surrounding quagmire. Beyond lay the heartland of Russia, Urals and 
Siberia, the endless space to be harrowed before attaining the Flanders fields – and it was 
there, not in Ukraine, that the Czechoslovaks could make a run for victory with its high 
reward of national sovereignty. Most of them finally left Ukraine between March 10 and 14, 
adducing from Antonov expression of unconditional gratitude:  
The revolutionary armies will not forget the brotherly service rendered by the 
Czechoslovak Corps in the struggle of Ukraine’s working masses against the 
bands of predatory imperialism. Weapons handed over by the Czechoslovaks 
to the revolutionary armies are accepted as a brotherly gift.
163 
 
Oddly positioned within the story of the ensuing Czechoslovak revolt, the kowtowing of the 
Bolshevik leaders before the Corps stemmed from the dire predicament of the former; with 
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no space for maneuver and no time for second thoughts, they were hardly in the position of 
being picky about their allies.
164  
 
Now, once the Czechs were gone and their irregular militias proving themselves incapable of 
holding themselves together – let alone pupating into a proper army – the Bolsheviks were 
truly desperate. They appealed to the “broader masses,” but heard only an ominous silence in 
return, experiencing on their own back the disenchantment of which the Rada was the victim 
less than a month before. More effective were the attempts to arm the foreign nationals, 
which gave the Red Guards an aura of a truly polyglot force. Battalions from the Magyar 
POWs fought against their former allies alongside the Serbian and Romanian formations 
(although not too close to each other to avoid provocations). “Here I must not leave it 
unnoticed,” reported a Swedish emissary in Kharkov on March 9, 1918, “that not an 
unsubstantial number of German subjects serve in the Red Army, but at their own request 
and only to protect the interests of the Revolution.”
165 The Chinese migrant workers brought 
to Russia during the Great War to meet the problems of labor shortage represented another 
rich source of human material. With the Revolution bringing industries to a stock-still, many 
of them found the incertitude of military life far preferable to the certainty of personal ruin; 
the fact the Bolsheviks remunerated the Chinese for their efforts must have also helped in 
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making a decision.
166 Antonov charged a certain “comrade Sheng Chit Ho” (Shen-Chit-Kho, 
in Russian transliteration) with the formation of the “revolutionary battalions” in the Donets 
basin
167 adopting a mobilization plan of a Lugansk engeneer Ka Ou Hong (Ka-Ou-Khun).
168 
By Antonov’s own account, the undertaking unfolded very smoothly, Chinese workers 
joining with enthusiasm and fighting with resolve. In the southwest a sizable Chinese unit 
was organized and commanded by Iona Iakir, a twenty-one year old native of Bessarabia, an 
Imperial province presently under Romanian control. That future top officer of the Red Army 
and a decorated hero of the Polish and Wrangel campaigns did not stint on the praises when 
remembering his erstwhile subordinates: “The Chinese is staunch, he is not afraid of 
anything… [he] will fight to the last drop.”
169 According to a contemporary Ukrainian 
historian, there may have been over 5 thousand Chinese volunteers,
170 in addition to 
hundreds, if not thousands of other internationalists – a number, which despite its 
imprecision intimates at the paramount role they played at the earliest stages of the Civil War.  
 
Taken as a whole this was hardly a material suitable for any serious military endeavor and it 
still remains rather surprising that the Red Guards resisted the 300,000-strong army of the 
Quadruple Alliance as long as they did. Equally astounding was the fact that those disjoined 
forces, braving terrible odds, occasionally managed to carry out feats of hardihood and 
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audacity. A heavy fight, for instance, ensued near Birzula junction where the Austrian 30
th 
Division suffered a total loss of 800 men before capturing it.
171 In the south, where two of 
Muraviev’s three “armies” were concentrated, the Bolsheviks compelled a small German 
force to evacuate Nikolaev (ukr. Mykolaiv) and then, profiting from the uprising in Kherson, 
wrestled that port-city from the Austrians; both ports, defended with tenacity by the local 
Red Guards, were retaken only in the first week of April.
172 Another notable success was 
scored on the 15
th of March at Tsibulevo, 30 miles north of Yelisavetgrad, where a German 
cavalry regiment led itself into an ambush and was subsequently destroyed by Egorov’s 
men.
173  
 
These few minor setbacks notwithstanding, the eventual success of the Central Powers never 
provoked any doubts. The Germans and the Austrians took cities as a matter of course, often 
to the jubilation of the relieved dwellers. Rovno fell on the 21
th of February, followed by 
Zhitomir four days later. Kiev was abandoned on the 1
st of March, the whole city 
transformed into a gigantic thoroughfare, with the Czechs and the booty-laden Bolsheviks 
leaving it at one end and the German Landwehr troops entering it from another. A place apart, 
Odessa attempted to toy with the idea of a polis-like sovereignty, but succumbed all the same 
in mid March to the Austrian 2
nd Army of Field-Marshal Böhm-Ermolli. Next came the turn 
of Yekaterinoslav, occupied by the Bavarians of General Knörzer on April 5, 1918. Passing 
in steady rows before the gawking crowds, the Germans in their gray undress uniforms 
inspired respect and curiosity as the no-nonsense embodiments of the empire which stood in 
defiance to the whole world. Their Austro-Hungarian partners, coming to replace the 
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Bavarians few days later, looked on the contrary almost caricaturesque. “The foppish officers 
with their corsets, their collars, their uniforms over-embroidered with marks of distinction 
(… as if it were an army of undeniable heroes) – this all seemed ridiculous and even 
disconcerting against the martial inconspicuousness of the Germans,” recalled Limbach his 
first reaction to the Army of His Apostolic Majesty.
174 That, however, sufficed for the 
present purposes, for the Bolsheviks did not even have a fighting force worthy of the name. 
Steadily pushed further east, they let Kharkov go on April 8, Taganrog on May 1, and finally 
Rostov on May 4.
175 On that same day, 500 miles to the north, a group of three German 
officers met their Russian counterparts in the small railroad junction of Korenevo with an 
aim of drawing up new borders; leaving no place for the intermediaries between Moscow and 
Berlin, that small-scale diplomacy with potentially far-reaching consequences marked a 
definitive end to the Bolshevik first brief appearance on the stage of the Ukrainian political 
life.
176  
 
The Bolsheviks succumbed, as they had to, to the overwhelming power of the organized state. 
That they let the Germans advance as far as they did owes not only to the determination of 
their opponent (never a thing of certainty with the Austrians), but also and principally to the 
apathy of the village; to put it differently, the Bolshevik original triumph and their final 
undoing stemmed from the same seed planted in the autumnal soil of the passing year. “The 
muzhik did not wish to fight, could not, he was tired” wrote Iakir about the Bolshevik 
phenomenal retreat. “Our rallies, persuasions at the railroad stations were not yielding any 
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positive results; only a handful out of thousands was staying with us.”
177 Contrary to the 
expectations, the tolstoyan “bludgeon of the popular war” remained unraised, the peasant 
savoring the comfort of his perquisites despite the lack of clarity about German intentions. 
He was straining to size up this new authority, tantalized as he was to discover if he would be 
allowed to keep both the land and the inventory of his former lord. Forced to lie low, the 
Bolsheviks were engaged in a similar exercise, albeit for a slightly different reason: the 
German initiatives with regard to land, requisitions and administration, acting directly on 
peasant sensitivities, made up the core of the altered political sortilege wherein the 
Bolsheviks were learning to read prescriptions for their return.  
  
Dilemmas of Occupation  
 
“Once they arrived to Kiev,” wrote Nikolai Mogiliansky, “the Germans first of all cleaned up 
the train station, defiled beyond belief during the Bolshevik stay.”
178 Seen as an example of 
German pedantry, the act epitomized the imperative need of the occupying powers to have 
the infrastructure repaired and buttressed by the functioning bureaucratic apparatus. The war 
in the West dictated the simple logic: to survive the Central powers and especially Austria-
Hungary required foodstuffs; to win on top of that – coal, iron, manganese and oil.
179 
Ukraine, appearing as manna from the sky, possessed almost everything in abundance, and 
might have readily surrendered its treasures – but for the months of misrule rendering the 
land ungovernable and hence unexploitable. Thus, as Ludendorff put it later, “we had to 
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strengthen it so that it could benefit us.”
180 He and the planners in his entourage saw clearly 
that the profits reaped would be commensurate with the investments made.  
 
As straightforward as it may be, this programmatic assignment clashed with a number of 
considerations which had to be addressed before the exploitation of the occupied territory 
could commence in earnest. The most serious of them was the dilemma posed by the 
peasantry, that of its reintegration into the revived administration and, most importantly, into 
the broader market. Sheer numbers gave the peasant the key to popular legitimacy, but it was 
in his productive capacity, that he evolved, in the words of one Austrian civil servant, into 
“the most important factor in our food provisioning in general and grain supply in 
particular.”
181 To their great distress, however, the occupation powers soon realized that the 
peasant had no intention to plant above his consumption needs and those of his family.
182 
Alarming too was the discovery that the village, while possessing substantial grain supplies, 
“either hidden, or buried beneath the earth,”
183 showed little inclination to part with them. To 
extract what the peasant kept became the order of the day – but how if not by resorting to 
coercion?  
 
Under the present circumstances cash alone exerted little swaying power over the peasant. 
Rampant inflation driven by the conspiracy of the industrial collapse and money printing 
politics made the paper ruble nearly worthless, causing its virtual disappearance from the 
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circulation in Ukraine.
184 Austrian crowns and German marks fared little better, as was 
evinced by the rapid depreciation of the mark to the ruble – the exchange rate of 1.5 rubles to 
one mark set by the military at the outset of the campaign sank to about a third of the original 
value by March 7, 1918.
185 “The good, old Russian money” – the silver rubles and kopecks – 
might have worked as a possible means of exchange had the peasant not ended up owning its 
entire stock in the course of the war, development transpiring “in parts without the [input 
from the] special money-hoarding practices (Geldhamsterei), otherwise so common to 
peasantry.”
186 This aberrant situation, where the primary producer held most of the currency, 
had to be remedied, preferably by making the peasant spend his rubles in order to enable the 
subsequent purchase of his grain. In the report submitted on the 10
th of April, Roman 
Zalozieckyj, a member of an Austrian economic commission dispatched to Ukraine, 
provided a comprehensive list of means whereby money was to be extracted. It included:  
Tax payments, land sales, reintroduction of the monopoly on alcohol (already 
with the view on suppressing the unauthorized and wasteful alcohol 
distillation (Spiritusbrennens) from the grain on the land), [establishment of] 
markets for the needs of the rural population with the commonly used articles: 
sugar, salt, tobacco, petroleum, candles, tools for house and cottage industry 
(cobblers, tailors, skinners, smiths, wainwrights, potters), then household 
appliances and agricultural equipment and machines of every kind, such as: 
knives, shears, scythes, sickles, axes, hatchets, spades, saws, harrows, grain 
cleaning machines, plows, roller screws (Planeten), threshers, etc.
187 
 
An undeniable product of a meticulous mind, this catalog of recommendations and 
commodities overlooked a proposal made in March of 1918 by Count Johann Forgách, the 
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Austro-Hungarian diplomatic representative in Ukraine. As a close ally of an influential 
Polish lobby in Vienna, he believed that the peasants should offer the compensation for the 
property seized earlier. The threat of bringing the land into the state ownership or of 
restituting it to its former owner would discourage the country folk from evasion provided, of 
course, that the threat was not seen as a mere bluster.
188 
 
One could equally pursue the path of a minimum resistance, so to speak, and snatch from the 
tight grip of the peasantry what one needed without any officiating and temporizing; this 
option appeared to be the one that the Austrians were especially inclined to taking up. With 
the starving empire behind them, the Habsburg military became increasingly impatient 
maintaining the veneer of good will in the provinces under their control (parts of Podolia and 
Volhynia, Kherson and Yekaterinoslav). The reluctance of the peasantry to trade their grain 
for crowns, wrote Alfred Krauß, successor of Böhm-Ermolli on the post of the Austrian 
Army Commander, “compelled one to rely on the troop-driven requisitions.”
189 The eventual 
results fell far below set targets as Field Marshal Lieutenant von Böltz, the Commandant of 
Odessa, informed his superiors, pointing to the example of the 30
th Infantry Division which 
barely scraped together some 22,000 poods of grain (ca 360 tons) in a period of two and a 
half months.
190 Transport greatly curtailed the scope of deliveries, for the freight cars found 
in Ukraine, if not in the state of disrepair, had to be run at first on the inefficient wood in the 
absence of precious coal.
191 In addition to such infrastructural hurdles, the Austrian 
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requisitioning teams had to reckon with the peasants’ habit of running to the defenses of the 
alembic, converting the bushels of the sought-after grain into the liters of moonshine.   
 
The Germans, whose predicament on the whole was not as dire as that of their allies, could 
afford greater flexibility in their interactions with the locals. For that same reason the 
problem of obtaining existing stocks bothered them far less than did the fate of the future 
harvest. From their headquarters in Kiev, the leading German military and diplomatic 
authorities – the commanding dyad of Field Marshall Hermann von Eichhorn and his Chief 
of Staff Wilhelm Groener, ambassador von Mumm and the entourage of the region’s experts 
– saw with increasing anxiety that the Ukrainian village was not rushing to the cultivation of 
the newly acquired land, confining itself instead to the satisfaction of its narrow subsistence 
needs. “Not even a third of the normal acreage is set aside for farming. Should one fail with 
the springtime works, the entire region would be threatened with the most terrible famine by 
winter of 1918.”
192 Apocalyptic scenarios and matter-of-fact reports agreed in that regard, 
often buttressed by an aside exegesis into the peasant psyche: “The South Russian does not 
like to toil. He prefers trade and shipping transactions. From the outset of the war he began to 
learn how to make cash with his carriage. The field lies fallow – but he keeps amassing on 
end … copious amount of ruble bills,” “as he swims in money, the peasant remains too 
indolent to work without need,” etc.
193 The peasant behaved no better than a child – 
exhibiting a fatal faiblesse for glitter and heedless of his chores.   
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However important the newly-acquired taste for lucre or the rural work ethics might have 
been, the radix of the matter lay in the dynamic of the agricultural revolution itself.  After the 
property was seized and landlords were driven out, it entered into the stage where the land 
and inventory had to be divided between community members. David Erde dubbed this the 
period of “dekulakization” (raskulachivanie) as the time of confiscating surpluses from the 
wealthier peasants for the benefit of the less affluent ones.
194 The threat of redistribution 
threw the existing agrarian property relations (Agrarverhältnisse, or Besitzverhälnisse, one of 
the favorite words of the Austro-German policymakers) in disarray, a situation, wherein “the 
propertyless peasants want[ed] to retain the best and the most high-yielding parcels, and 
leave the bad pieces to their neighbors.”
195 The result was that, as reports tirelessly stressed, 
the peasant no longer knew who would reap what he had sown. Repeated for the umpteenth 
time, the old line acquired now a slightly different ring: “The peasants want to grow only so 
much as they can consume, because they fear that their own fellow-villagers would take the 
harvest for themselves.”
196 
 
Peasants coveting their neighbor’s share were not the only ones to be feared; whole villages 
would enter into noisy squabbles with each other, trying their best to prove the legitimacy of 
their respective titles over the illegitimately expropriated land. Their arguments did not need 
to involve sophisticated reasing since both weapons and resolute men with time on their 
hands were in abundant supply. “All peasants are equipped extensively with guns and hand 
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grenades,” noted a young German diplomat Wilhelm von Bülow. “Villages possess 
numerous machine guns, which they set against each other as soon as the dispute over the 
land distribution arises.”
197 The undefined property claims became thus powerfully entwined 
with the issue of arms, dangerously complicating the dilemma of spring sowing: set on 
curing the neglectful peasant of his dereliction, the occupation authorities had to start by 
disarming the village first, an operation that ran the risk of provoking resistance and thereby 
of jeopardizing the gains on which Germans and Austrians were wagering when embarking 
on the Ukrainian campaign.  
 
As days grew warmer, anticipating the advent of the sowing season, the initial unease of the 
Central Powers attained the level of urgency, and soon became barely unconcealed panic. 
Division of spoils took a clear precedence over the tasks within the conventional peasant 
routine, contributing to the widespread sense of the order placed on its head. The silent 
muzhik, trudging through ridicule and accepting exactions with the seemingly congenital 
forbearance, now seemed ready to turn the tables against his former abusers, condemning the 
city to lean times while he himself was thriving on easy rubles and luxury goods from the 
despoiled manors. That same fluke of the moment, which had buried the state and the regime 
that embodied it, sheltered the village from its own devastating impact, and made it, in fact, 
incomparably stronger with the lavish donations of arms and acres. However unstable and 
transient, this new upturned balance betrayed one of the revolution’s multiple avatars – that 
of the carnival, vigorously executed in hopes of jostling the mocked reality into the chasm of 
ruptured times.
198  
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The Germans and the Austrians decided to put an end to that carnival of Revolution lest they 
let the opportunities presented by Ukraine slip through their fingers. To accomplish this, one 
had to start by restoring private property rights abrogated through the Universals of the 
Central Rada; peasant gains could be partially recognized, but only on the condition that the 
future owners, in their novel faculty of individual proprietors, would agree to compensate 
the landlords banished earlier.
199 Although this measure could eliminate an element of 
uncertainty from property relations, it offered no guarantees with regard either to the 
efficiency of production or to the timeliness of grain deliveries.  
 
Here, anti-peasant prejudices converged with scholarly studies of the Russian experience to 
convince the occupation authorities of the benefits of estate-run economies.
200 Facts seen 
previously as unrelated – primitive cultivation techniques, ascribed penchant for violence, 
and reigning chaos of property relations – were lumped offhandedly together to characterize 
the essentials of the peasant’s soul, indicting him for his “low cultural level” and attributing 
to him a congenital inability to be his own master.
201 “If, nevertheless, the agricultural 
production in Ukraine and its food exports are very significant,” ran the lines of one learned 
treatise, “it should be credited to the great fertility of the soil as well as the business acumen 
of the large landowners.”
202 The disenchanted representatives of the Quadruple Alliance 
                                                 
199 See, for example, KA Ms Allg. Nr 58 Bericht über die Reise in die Ukraina, ertattet von Roman Zalozieckyj, 
k.k. Regierungsrat 
200 R 14362 Bericht über Eindrücke in der Ukraine, von Oblt d. Res Colin Ross; Verbindungsoffizier der 
militärischen Stelle des Auswärtigen Amtes; R 14365 “Die wirtschaftlichen Probleme der neubesetzten 
Ostgebiete” von Fürst Alexander Drucki-Lubecki 
201 KA Ms Allg. Nr 58 Bericht über die Reise in die Ukraina, ertattet von Roman Zalozieckyj, k.k. 
Regierungsrat 
202 PA Karton 1041 Die Ukraina. Ueberblick über die wirtschaftliche, historische, politische und militärische 
Entwicklung  
  112
were warming up to the idea of the landlord’s indispensability all the more so because the 
bounty from the Ukrainian cornucopia was proving harder to obtain than was originally 
expected.  
 
Resolving to back the agrarian ci-devants was by no means an easy matter, especially since 
the latter included a very substantial Polish element, considered unreliable and even inimical 
to the Reich’s interests by the German High Command (Pole bashing in general being one of 
Ludendorff’s favorite pastimes).
203 Yet, as ambassador Mumm emphasized on March 23 in 
his memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Should the execution of the immediate and the most comprehensive grain 
procurement be placed ahead of the political factors, our stance on the  land 
reform must be different from the one adapted when purely political 
standpoints appear as the most important. If the grain procurement stands at 
the vanguard of priorities, it is not Poland that we should behold in the 
landowner, but rather a factor that must not be hindered considering [the need 
for] the development and export.
204  
It could not have escaped the occupation authorities that such ‘reactionary’ politics was 
bound to provoke dissent not only in Ukraine and but also among Germany’s Social-
Democratic circles, individuals of political import akin to Matthias Erzberger and Albert 
Südekum, who took a lively interest in eastern affairs. Yet, considering the role that the 
Ukrainian grain played in the calculus of Ludendorff’s last offensive, negotiations with the 
critics of the occupation appeared wasteful. After all, in the spring of 1918 one staked 
everything on the victory in the war, or, to employ the term of the time, on the “dignified 
peace,” which promised to offer a belated exoneration for the transgressions committed in its 
name and drive present reservations into the hazy corners of the moment.   
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On the 6
th of April, 1918 Field Marshal Eichhorn released an order, marking a clear prise de 
position with respect to the urgent issue of agricultural management. Its innocuous name – 
Feldbestellungbefehl, “the sowing order” – belied a number of far-reaching stipulations. First 
of all, against the socialization schemes of the Rada government it reasserted the principle of 
private ownership, stressing the inalienable rights of those who plant and plow to retain the 
harvest from their plots. That, however, did not mean that the peasants had free hand in 
deciding what they wanted to plant and how much of the land they could allocate for sowing; 
on the contrary, abstention from cultivating arable pieces was declared a cardinal crime to be 
countered with condign retribution. Most important was the third point of the order, which 
protected remaining landholders from the abuses and encroachments of the peasantry: 
There, where the peasants cannot accomplish the sowing of the entire arable 
land of the community, and where landowners are still available, the latter 
should attend to the sowing themselves without herewith infringing onto the 
lawful division of the land among the peasants through land committees. In 
such cases the landowners must not be prevented from sowing by the peasants. 
For the purposes of cultivation and harvesting the land committees should 
provide them with horses, agricultural equipment as well as seeds upon 
request. As in the case of the peasants, the crop should belong to the person, 
who planted it.
205 
Eichhorn, Groener and others in the military headquarters were ready to go the distance 
necessary to support the surviving landowners for the sake of having fields sown on time. 
The price of jettisoning the Central Rada in Kiev did not struck them as unpardonably high 
especially since that de jure government of the reestablished Ukrainian People’s Republic 
preferred to boycott Eichhorn’s order rather than put up with the opprobrium of his anti-
socialist undertaking.
206 
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It would not be fair to say that the Germans and the Austrians intended to do away with the 
Rada’s vexing presence from the first hours of occupation. After all, the Central Powers 
brought it back into position of formal responsibility in hopes of finding in it an obliging 
advocate of their interests. The national Ukrainian orientation thought to be predominant 
among the Rada members created a nearly positive aura around it, donning upon these 
political vagabonds appearance of a no-nonsense association willing to bargain over the price 
of protection and autonomy. “A party of the sky assailants (Himmelsstürmern) and world 
improvers, without whom the great step of severing Ukraine from Russia would not succeed” 
– such was the poetic characteristic given to the Rada by Roman Zalozieckyj in his otherwise 
somber account of the Ukrainian conditions.  
It is a great merit of this party of young revolutionary minds, that in the 
difficult times of disorganization and dissolution of the old powers they… still 
evidenced so much understanding for the actual needs and possessed enough 
spirit of statesmanship that in the environment of unripe national condition 
they were able to secure upon the unstable grounds the foundation of a new 
state.
207 
Although presently feeble, the Rada was expected to become stronger in the long run with 
the population readjusting itself in the direction of the nationalist (as opposed to social) 
moment. That anticipated development in itself, wrote Colin Ross, a Foreign Service liaison 
officer, would make any projected attempt to replace the Rada “inopportune” (untunlich) 
insofar as it might mar the Germans with the unwanted reputation of conquerors and leave 
them without much credit of confidence in the country. To be sure, one could never rule out 
the possibility of the Rada’s “unruliness” (widerspenstig) as a result of its becoming aware of 
its own authority; at the same time, however, the experience gained at the helm of the state 
could lead the Rada to abandon its own ‘fantastic’ socialization platform and adopt in its 
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stead a “bourgeois” conventional mode of management – a transformation to be lauded and 
encouraged from the perspective of the Rada’s provisional patrons.
208   
 
This indulgence towards the Ukrainian government did not last very long. On a personal 
level, staid diplomats and army men from the Imperial capitals could hardly stomach the idea 
of working either with “the inexperienced lads” and “the impractical dreamers 
(Phantasten)”
209 of Holubowich’s mold, or even with the seemingly respectable Hrushevsky, 
“a helpless, meaningless doter, who serves as an external cover for the young and ambitious 
upstarts.” With the exception of few military men, claimed Major Moritz von Fleischmann, a 
plenipotentiary of the Austrian High Command (AOK), “ministers and party leaders are by 
no means to be taken seriously, individuals who abandon themselves to the unfeasible 
socialist ideas, by and large immature men of student age without a single clue about the 
management of the State apparatus.”
210 The Rada’s ministers were appearing as privately 
incapable and historically accidental blunderbusses, an impression retrospectively 
strengthened by the memory of the abasing entreaties for help with which they turned to the 
mighty delegates while the latter brooded over the Eastern Europe’s future shape.  
 
Of course, personal antipathy played a far less important role in alienating the Central 
Powers from the Rada than did the political regime it embodied. That the Rada cut a 
miserable figure – that of a powerless institution divested of technical and bureaucratic 
means to carry out its end of the deal (collecting and exporting the raw materials and 
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foodstuffs) – was received as a self-evident and unavoidable aspect of prevailing 
conditions.
211 More alarming was the fact that the Ukrainian Government inspired little 
legitimacy either among the city-dwellers or among the villagers, who were often only dimly 
aware of its existence.
212 In the view of an Austrian diplomat, the Rada’s composition 
“represent[ed] neither…the upper class … nor the broad masses in the hinterland, nor the 
industrial proletariat.”
213 The administrative impotence of the Rada coupled with its lack of 
moral authority – in other words, its combined inability to act upon population through force 
or example – jibed conspicuously well with the “rampant anarchy” to the point where the 
Rada was seen both as the progenitor and the extension of that misrule. To the foreign eye it 
was the perfect government – for the ungovernable times.    
 
Such was the conclusion at which leading German and Austrian officials began to arrive 
towards the end of March of 1918. “Whether the government has a substantial part of the 
population behind cannot be asserted,” wrote Mumm to the Reich Chancellor Georg von 
Hertling. “In fact, the peasantry sympathizes with the government to the extent that it allows 
robberies to take place and grants them a certain degree of legal sanction.”
214 In a gesture of 
verbal conciliation some Rada members were ready to recognize the socialization of the soil 
as “inexpedient” for the time being – at least according to the account of the Odessa District 
Commissar Semen Komorny;
215 yet, when placed under the examination of Eichhorn’s order, 
these allegations betrayed their essential disingenuity, the key Ukrainian ministers rushing to 
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defend Rada’s agricultural politics even at the risk of antagonizing their mighty benefactors. 
Moreover, in view of creating its own armed forces, the Ukrainian government felt entitled to 
the contents of ammunition depots scattered across the land and looked disapprovingly as the 
troops of Wilhelm and Charles scoured villages for arms, taking possession of their finds as 
battle spoils. At one point, with the resentment giving way to sheer audacity, it attempted to 
forestall further delivery of war materiel to the Command of the Austrian 4
th Army, causing 
something of a minor crisis as a result.
216 Few extra coils of this expanding spiral of 
disagreements were added on when the Ukrainian Minister of Justice Mykhailo Tkachenko 
issued a circular letter remonstrating with the German usage of their field courts in 
adjudicating matters involving Ukrainian citizens. To the Austro-German authorities, who 
were yet to recognize the sovereignty of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the functioning 
court system, even if staffed by not sufficiently punctilious military men, constituted the core 
element in the administration of occupied territories; the Ukrainians, on the other hand, 
regarded it as an intolerable offense, an intrusion into internal affairs of an independent state, 
an odium on par with Eichhorn’s demand of compulsory work on the fallow fields.
217  
 
Deviating from the anticipated grateful complaisance, the Rada was proving to be an 
intransigent body of radical politicians who were taking their tutelary role of Ukraine’s 
national leaders far too seriously for their own good. The Rada was doing remarkably little to 
motivate the peasantry to grow and deliver the grain, apprehensive as it were not only of the 
reaction that such measures might trigger in the countryside, but also of the urban 
disgruntlements in connection with the possible bread shortages and rises in living 
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expenses.
218 In matters pertaining general disarmament of the population or the setting up of 
the military courts, it conducted itself with dignity of a sovereign state unwarranted by the 
reality of foreign occupation, assuming the language that grated sensibilities of the Austro-
German representatives with its “insolent” spirit.
219 Having repeatedly asserted that the 
“[German] regiments would remain in Ukraine as long as our government has a need of 
them” (Hrushevsky),
220 the Rada ended up believing its own rhetoric. Rada’s obstructionist 
tendencies made “collaboration… impossible,” concluded Groener, Mumm, Forgách in a 
small conclave of venerable gentlemen, convened on April 23 to discuss Ukraine’s difficult 
dilemmas.
221 Nothing short of a death warrant, the verdict complemented the decision made 
at the highest level of political responsibility in Berlin and the Oberost Headquarters to lift 
the veil of innocence and proceed with the reorganization of land on one’s own initiative.
222   
 
Between the powerless yet unreasonably self-consequential Rada and the recalcitrant masses 
lay a corps of administrators, or rather that part of it, which withstood the initial storm of the 
revolution. In the first ten weeks of the Austro-German presence, public functionaries as 
whole did not distinguish themselves in the manner the occupying authorities might have 
wished, manifesting capacity for strife and sabotage far superior to the talents exacted by the 
need for good management. Numerous city and town dumas, for example, representing a 
predominantly non-Ukrainian (fremdnational) urban population, skeptical and even hostile 
towards the Ukrainizing initiatives of the Kiev government, experienced no qualms 
subverting authority of the Rada. Odessa, a polyglot metropolis with autonomist aspirations, 
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provided an exemplary case in that respect with the City Duma vying for the right to control 
local militia against the wishes of the Rada commissar Komorny.
223 Although described as 
three-quarter ‘Bolshevik’ and as representing the “ill-disposed Jewry,”
224 the Duma appeared 
to have recruited the support of the Austrian commandant Field Marshal Lieutenant von 
Böltz (married allegedly to an Odessite), who prevented Komorny from dissolving the militia 
and ultimately forced him to quit his office.
225 Similarly, as one Austrian report stressed, the 
Podolian functionaries ranged themselves decidedly against all Ukrainian state-building 
undertakings;
226 here, as in the neighboring Volhynia, such attitude was rooted not only in 
the region’s remoteness from the center, made more pronounced by the rapid infrastructural 
decay, but also in the weakness of the “nationalist” moment within the otherwise powerful 
agricultural movement of the most recent past.  
 
The Central Powers, never at fault for treating the Rada with excessive decorum, might have 
shut their eyes to the analogous behavior few rungs below had the habit of parrying 
instructions from the center not spilt over to the areas deemed vital to the occupiers. 
Hurrying to the protection of the polonophile Austrians, count Grocholski, a magnate with 
extensive landholdings both in Podolia and Volhynia, filed a complaint against the local 
administration, which had taken the peasants’ side in their conflict with the landlords, 
paralyzing land cultivation and dangerously deterring gathering of the existing crops.
227 The 
disarming of the rural populace progressing at a snail’s pace, the authorities discovered that 
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their frustration owes less to the irresolution or weakness of troops involved in gun-searching 
operations, as to the dereliction of the state agents, comportment bordering on sabotage:  
A barefaced trade in arms, wrote Major von Fleischmann in the last week of 
April, is conducted at numerous delivery-points (Ablieferungsstellen) under 
connivance of the civil servants, with the latter receiving [weapons] with one 
hand and giving away with another. The delivery affair is very superficial, the 
registration incomplete. The result of such conduct is that decent people 
(anständige Leute) end up being disarmed. [On the other hand] even the 
notorious thieves receive permission to own the guns.
228  
In his memoirs, Iurko Tiutiunnyk went beyond confirming Fleischmann’s observations by 
incrusting them into the conspiratorial ring of anti-German activities. Left by oversight of the 
occupiers to serve as the demobilization commissioner of his own Zvenigorodka district, he 
lulled the Germans into a false sense of security with a series of meaningless reports while 
extracting weapons from the populace in exchange for the fabricated certificates of surrender. 
By his own account he managed to amass a truly incredible collection of arms: 10,000 rifles, 
43 machine guns, two artillery pieces, one armored car and a “significant quantity of 
ammunition.” Enough to equip a division or two, this impressive panoply of war materiel 
waited to be disinterred from their secret caches and redistributed among the disgruntled 
populace.
229  
  
From the perspective of the Austro-German authorities, the country was gravely ill, the 
depressing state of its administration exemplifying one of the principal symptoms of that 
illness. The old apparatus was burned down to the ground and the new one had to be built on 
its ashes often by the selfsame forces that stoked the flames of the revolution. Consequently, 
asserted one contemporary observer, “young and inexperienced people were put in place of 
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the murdered or absconded civil servants … inadequately informed either about the 
economic or political conditions of the land.”
230 What is more, judged an anonymous 
Austrian intelligence officer, most of the novices happened to graduate from the ranks of the 
imperial Russian Army, having “adopted its indiscipline while losing all sense for 
subordination.”
231 Although often at odds with one another, in a certain sense the Rada in 
Kiev and the new functionaries at the provincial level represented developments of the 
shared parentage so much so that the conflict between them looked more like a quaint 
compromise promoted by the moment of political vacancy; tendency to insubordination, 
decentralization and the “dangerous” tampering with the social and economic structures 
provided plenary evidence of the deep propinquity between the two. Both Berlin and Vienna 
were aware of this, for on the day when the Rada was tried and convicted in absentia, its five 
judges, the weightiest voices of the Central powers, turned to the Ukrainian government with 
a peremptory demand: to remove “the unwholesome elements” from the state bureaucracy 
and, a true sine qua non in light of the ongoing grain uncertainties, to replace village land 
committees (in pair with the undefined “other committees”) with a set of “reliable or 
communal administrative organs.”
232 Since the Rada was relentlessly approaching the end of 
its short stint in power, it remained a question of finding that new government, nimble 
enough to walk the thin line between the fulfillment of the Austro-German conditions and the 
need for maintaining a modicum of social and national cohesion.  
 
Part IV: Hetmanate and the illusory return to normalcy 
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The arrest of the Rada members in the afternoon hours of April 28 was the first and the least 
arduous step towards reorganizing the country for which Eichhorn, Groener and ultimately 
Ludendorff were pressing with all urgency. On the next day a congregation of 8,000 
prosperous peasants – not the nondescript seliane (“villagers”), but the dignified  khliboroby 
(“cultivators/grain-growers”) – transported specifically to Kiev by the anxious Germans in 
spite of the height of the sowing season, proclaimed the former tsarist general Pavel 
Skoropadsky to be the new “Hetman of all Ukraine.” Described as “the bearer of the 
Ukrainian national idea [and] an opponent of land socialization”,
233 he appeared to the 
Germans as the perfect solution of the Ukrainian quandary, a man whose politics aided the 
transfer of Ukraine’s resources into the feed of the Central Powers’ war machine, sparing it 
the trouble of imposing direct military rule in the spirit of General governments 
(Generalgouvernements). Although his personal record was not bereft of services rendered to 
the Revolution (involvement in the Ukrainization of the XXXIV Corps, flirtation with the 
Free Cossacks, etc.), he stood for the return of the old order, attenuated by official 
disclaimers and concessions though it might be. Accordingly, the regime ushered in by his 
election was a type of reaction with few caveats – a Restoration outfitted in Cossack uniform, 
as a modern Polish historian figuratively put it.
234 
 
Bringing back the regime of land relations based in parts on the pre-revolutionary practices 
was a task of paramount importance to the new Hetman and his German protectors. On the 
day of the coup Skoropadsky issued his “Manifesto to the Entire Ukrainian People,” in which 
he declared the Rada dissolved and its most important legislations void. “The right of private 
                                                 
233 PA Liasse XI Karton 152, Telegram, von Princig, Kiew, den 30. April 1918  
234 Włodzimierz Mędrzecki Niemiecka interwencja militarna na Ukraine w 1918 roku (Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo DiG, 2000), 163  
  123
property, as a foundation of culture and civilization, are restored in the full measure and all 
decrees of the former Ukrainian government as well as those of the Provisionary Russian 
Government, [which had either negated or limited that right], are abrogated.”
235 Taking 
direct aim at the Third and the Fourth Universals of the overthrown Rada, the Manifesto in 
theory contained nothing that should have upset the equanimity of the villagers considered to 
possess an inborn ownership instinct; to assuage possible doubters, the first Hetman 
government of Fiodor Lyzohub issued a program, stating that it “shall shrink from no 
sacrifice in order to create a healthy peasantry endowed with land and capable of highest 
possible productivity.”
236 In practice, however, the restoration of the property rights, when 
understood as the restoration of property per se, placed a big question mark over the status of 
latest acquisitions, clearing the stage for the return of the dispossessed landlords to their 
pillaged estates and dispersed inventory.  
 
The abolition of the land committees followed up as a natural corollary of Hetman’s 
manifesto, for, brought to life to administer and divide the recently seized land, these 
institutions epitomized in the eyes of the new regime the arbitrariness of property relations 
sanctioned by the revolution. In their stead came land commissions, which used pre-
revolutionary agrarian laws as their vade mecum for getting through the imbroglio of gnarled 
affairs. Comprised of the former zemstvo personnel, members of the Stolypin’s land 
surveying commissions (zemleustroitel’nye komissii), agrarian experts and state 
representatives, they were elaborating the mechanism for restoring the land to their former 
                                                 
235 Doroshenko, v. 2, 59-60; words „which had either negated or negated that right“ are only found in the 
German translation of the Manifesto (R 14369 Offizielle Bekanntmachung an das ganze ukrainische Volk, 30. 
April 1918) 
236 Doroshenko, v. 2, 94-96  
  124
owners and determining the size of compensation if the stolen property was either damaged 
or destroyed in the course of the pogroms.
237 In case of the latter, entire villages might be 
presented with a single bill to be paid off at once; depending on the degree of responsibility 
established by special investigations, private fines could be placed upon peasant households, 
although, as Kossak-Szczucka remarked in her memoirs, “the passive peasant crowd, 
terrorized by the bandits and apprehensive that the greatest burdens would fall upon them, 
would concede to everything, but only on the condition that the compensation would be 
levied on the whole community.” Persuasions and threats proving insufficient, she added, the 
government agents could do little but agree to impose a lump sum contribution.
238   
 
In the absence of reliable documentation and with legal procedures devouring precious time, 
land commissions relied largely on the good faith of the estate owners and of their 
depositions. But whether it was good was another question. Speaking on behalf of her native 
Starokonstantinov district, Kossak-Szczucka felt justified in asserting that “the cases of 
power abuse by the landlords took place very rarely… In the extensive territory of our region 
I recall names of only three individuals, whom the public opinion accused of having 
submitted exaggerated figures of losses and of having collected extravagant 
indemnification.”
239 For Maria Dunin-Kozicka from Lemeshovka (ukr. Lemeshivka), such 
moderation, not to mention generosity, was a virtue upheld only on seldom occasions and by 
individuals of exceptional probity: 
The rest, passing a despairing glance over the ashes of their native domiciles 
or starring in stupor at the sepulchral troughs… could not bring themselves to 
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the height of Christian ideals. Shadows of the murdered and humiliated 
relatives loomed in front of them as they covered their faces with hands in 
feeble torture. Their hearts began to burn with a feeling of vengeance and 
passionate desire for retaliation.
240 
Nikolai Mogiliansky positioned himself somewhere in the middle of those accounts, 
recognizing how important the disposition of a local German garrisons was in bringing the 
disputes to a just issue as their commanders saw it. In Kanev district, for instance, they 
conducted themselves with full propriety and, by curbing the landowners’ thirst for revenge, 
created no bad blood in their wake. Yet, Mogiliansky admitted, “there were cases in multiple 
places when the landowners took advantage of the German force with an aim of restoring 
their rights and especially of reclaiming their looted movables. This often led to such 
conflicts that the Germans were compelled to avail themselves of the artillery.”
241 
 
The planned restoration of property to their former ownersdid little to encourage the return of 
civic peace announced as the regime’s major goal at its inaugural hour. No more reassuring 
were the effects of replacing functionaries of the revolutionary hour with the old tsarist 
technocrats. Without thinking twice about it, the new authorities dissolved the city dumas in 
their latest form, deemed as giving too much voice to the quasi-Bolshevik extremists, and 
placed dumas of earlier convocations in their lieu: in Nikolaev and Yekaterinoslav, for 
instance, the legislative duties were taken over by the bodies elected in 1916 and 1914, 
respectively.
242 Old governors, provided they weathered the storm of the past months, were 
recalled from the dungeons of obscurity to assume their pre-revolutionary functions – a 
measure underwritten by the decision of Ihor Kistiakovsky, the Hetman’s Minister of 
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Internal Affairs to remove at one stroke all existing provincial and district commissariats.
243 
Motivated by ideological considerations, this decree created new problems in place of the old 
for the reason that the regime lacked enough bureaucrats to fill the vacancies created.  
 
In the end, however, the want of cadres mattered less than the instruction issued to the 
German civil and military authorities enabling them to act independently of the Ukrainian 
administration upon perceiving a menace to the “general security.” Released one month after 
Skoropadsky’s ascent to the summit of formal power, that same instruction made it 
imperative for all appointments of the new Ukrainian starostas to go through the preliminary 
review by the German commandants of the concerned districts; although socially moderate 
and professionally competent, the new Ukrainian administrators remained too Russian in 
German eyes, individuals of unaccountable loyalties, perhaps even at odds with the designs 
of the occupying powers – credentials to questionable for them to operate without 
supervision.
244 
 
The support offered to the landlords in reclaiming their land and inventory coupled with the 
project of massive administrative overhaul undertaken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
betokened the conservative, even “counterrevolutionary” nature of the Hetmanate; creating 
its own police force gave an additional evidence that the regime was less interested in 
reconciling groups with opposing interests than in helping the elements “intoxicated” by the 
revolution to “sober up.” To promote order, or a certain version thereof, on May 18
 
Skoropadsky’s government sanctioned the establishment of the State Guard, or Varta in 
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Ukrainian. According to its statute, Varta was to be set up at all administrative levels – 
provincial, district and volost – and be divided respectively into municipal, railroad and 
countryside (sel’skaia) detachments. Considering the distances separating villages and the 
vast expanses of unsettled territory between them, forces patrolling the hinterland were 
equipped with horses; their strength was fixed at the level of one policemen per two thousand 
residents.
245 In its prospective form, the statute contained a special paragraph that, stressing 
the military nature of the organization, expressed the “extreme desirability” of “employing as 
many cadre army officers as possible.” Judged too controversial for the exposed public nerve, 
the paragraph was excised from the final draft of the document - an act of circumspection 
without much practical import, for the principle of relying on former officers was not to be 
easily abandoned.
246 
 
Far from it in fact. Ukraine literally teemed with the officers of the former Tsarist army, 
divested of any employment and lacking prospects of gaining one (brotlosen) as one German 
diplomat put it.
247 With about 90,000 of them distributed among five major cities of the 
country
248, the officers represented the natural pool from which the newly decreed Varta 
could and did built its human mainstay. If personal or structural reasons stood on the way to 
entering Hetman’s police, there remained an option of joining volunteer formations, known 
collectively as the “officer squads” (druzhiny) and financed, as was often the case, by local 
authorities and estate owners. Although their position vis-à-vis the regime was never fully 
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clarified, they served alongside the Varta detachments throughout the whole period of the 
Hetmanate, carrying out instructions of their superiors (or patrons) and maintaining order as 
they saw fit.
249     
 
It seems fair to assert that few if any of those men, who imputed a real face to the abstract 
government in Kiev, either identified with the ‘Ukrainian cause’ and or shared much 
sympathy for the peasants’ plight. The 12,000 officers found in Odessa at the time of the 
coup were described “as almost entirely Great Russian-minded” – a vague epithet 
designating a gamut of personal choices from a pointed preference for the Russian language 
and culture to the fanatical and active support of Russia United and Indivisible with a 
hereditary monarch at its head.
250 According to Kossak-Szczucka, such officers were 
primarily motivated by the desire to avenge themselves, since  
Each of them had a close relative killed either by soldiers or by peasants; each 
had suffered most terrible wrongs at the hands of the revolution. They went on 
to become volunteers with an aim of restoring the old order, harboring 
greatest conceivable hate towards the revolution [przewrotu], recognizing in 
every revolutionary agitator they beat up a murder of their mother, wife or 
brothers.
251 
Months of persecutions, horrors of Muraviev’s purges, odium of flagrant and boastful 
insubordination impelled the metamorphosis of the front-line camaraderie into the 
association of grievances to which many Russian officers must have succumbed. As a 
“natural outgrowth of the coeval state of affairs,” the Varta and the closely tied volunteer 
squads embodied an opportunity for social counteroffensive, a venue at reciprocating 
violence with an antidote of hatred.  
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Alone or in tandem with the Austrian and German troops these men were bringing the 
countryside back within the purview of state control. The visits of the military were mostly 
of the punitive character, designed to extract the inventory of arms, assure the payment of 
compensation to the landlords, supervise the fulfillment of Eichhorn’s instructions 
concerning the illegally appropriated land and, when needed, drive the malingering peasant 
laborers back into the fields. These operations did not invariably degenerate into licentious 
and cruel bacchanalias, described with inimitable gusto by the leaders of the ousted 
Ukrainian Left;
252 still, often – all too often – they were conducted without much regard for 
the sensibilities of the peasant populace.  
 
The Germans, as the strongest and the most disciplined of the allies, could afford to maintain 
a degree of professional distance in their contact with the rural “delinquents”; they acted 
preferentially through fees, exacting, as the instruction to Eichhorn’s troops from May 31 
suggests, 600 poods (about 10 tons) of grain or the equivalent quantity of livestock for each 
desiatina (slightly above one hectare) of damaged field land.
253 It was not, however, beyond 
them to seize upon the old and humiliating “techniques of repression” – such as public 
birching – abolished, apparently for good, together with the regime, which made such a 
generous use of them. According to the German General Counsel in Odessa Ohnesseit, the 
ruthlessness of the German troops in the region shocked even the landowners in whose name 
“disciplinary actions” were carried out. Relaying their concerns, he wrote:  
It is stated that in accomplishing the task of driving the predatory peasants 
away from the estate lands and of forcing them to return stolen objects, the 
[German troops] proceed with unnecessary cruelty against the peasantry, 
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beating them up in a particularly inhumane fashion. The peasants were not so 
bad, they were only seduced and the landlords would have probably been able 
to persuade them amicably to surrender their loot. One should have killed 
those poor peasants immediately instead of beating them up so horribly.
254   
The author of the cited dispatch could not contain his anger at the sign of landlords’ 
ingratitude, who should have known better whom to thank for preserving their life and 
sources of livelihood. All the same, the rumors, exaggerated or not, kept on circulating 
unchecked, welling up to a surge that caused early consternation among the Left-oriented 
parliamentarians in Germany.
255   
 
Owing to the progressing state of demoralization in their army, the situation on the Austrian 
side of the hill was markedly worse. Mogilianki recalled that the conflicts there flared up 
more often than in the German zone; more frequent too were the cruel reprisals, which “were 
causing deep anarchy and disintegration of the village life.”
256 Far from chivalrous deliverers 
of the propaganda leaflets, the Imperial and Royal troops stepped into the boiling cauldron of 
rural politics as the instrument of retaliation at the disposal of the aggrieved old order. As 
was the case with the small village of Strazhgorod (ukr. Strazhhorod) near Gaisin in Podolia, 
the standard ritual of reestablishing authority consisted of two acts – first the villagers would 
be enjoined to surrender weapons in possession and then, granted the fulfillment of the 
former demand, be summoned to the market place to receive the corrective therapy of knouts 
and ramrods.
257 Should the resistance be offered, an extraordinary and sanguinary third act of 
mass execution might be added to the usual procedures, with the Hungarian units in 
particular showing an untrammeled alacrity for participation. Their zeal in bringing the 
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‘rebellious’ countryside back to its ‘senses’ unduly impressed Hetman, to the point, in fact, 
where he was asking the Habsburg ambassador if it were possible to employ exclusively the 
Hungarians or, at least, to fortify the more hesitant Galician and otherwise Slavic 
detachments with the Magyar contingent.
258 As for the landlords themselves, admitted 
Kossak-Szczucka, those among them wishing to live in peace with peasantry, “having tried 
[the Magyars] once shrank away from their help as if offered by the Satan.”  
 
For the reasons partially alluded to, Hetman’s own Varta and the auxiliary officer squads 
were by far the worst mediators of order, compromising for the most part the regime they 
purported to serve. In contrast to the regular Austro-German units, venturing from their 
urban bases to the hinterland for short sojourns, they were often permanently attached to the 
villages and as such were charged to bring the not fully accomplished justice to its dramatic 
finale. In the aforementioned Strazhgorod, for instance, arriving after the Austrians, the 
Varta pressured the village into turning over all principal “instigators of turmoil”; the culprits 
once seized, Varta officers subjected them to strenuous torments: the apprehended were 
hanged to the trees, flogged and mauled with some losing their teeth as a result.
259 Throwing 
them into the prison, the Varta at least allowed them to get away with their lives, an act of 
leniency to be sure. Several residents of Gulai-Pole, including Makhno’s brother and a war 
cripple Yemelian Makhno, had less luck with the Hetman’s police: accused of assisting the 
“notorious bandit” Makhno, they ended their days facing the firing squad.
260 In Gulai-Pole as 
in uncountable other villages and hamlets sequestered for pacification, the executioners knew 
their victims personally, perhaps even in the capacity of victims themselves at the time when 
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the latter seemed to be having the upper hand; naturally, that codependency of recriminations 
adulterated the act of justice (whatever it meant) by spicing it with the condiments of private 
vendettas.  
 
Moving in lockstep with the demoralization of the forces involved, the violence evinced in 
policing actions revealed the clout that the old political prejudices exerted over the making of 
the new regime. The Hetman’s government did not stint on liberal stock phrases, stressing 
tirelessly its commitment to the program of rights and reforms; moreover, Skoropadsky 
himself believed that only the peasantry organized along the Stolypin lines of small but 
sound homesteads could provide the necessary foundation for the Ukrainian state-building 
efforts. Yet, notwithstanding those designs, the Hetmanate proceeded against the peasantry 
as if it were in the state of rebellion, condition calling for the immediate corrective measures. 
The fait accompli of the agrarian pogroms and the ensuing lull had little bearing on the 
decisions made in Kiev as the state was meting out punishments belatedly and retroactively 
for the transgressions decriminalized several times over by the antecedent power-holders 
(Provisional government, the Bolsheviks and the Rada). In contrast with its official 
declarations, Skoropadsky’s regime pretended to ignore the disruption of the revolutionary 
months, picking up the threads of the repressively-paternalist agrarian politics where the 
Tsarist State abandoned them in March of 1917.  
 
Hetman’s retroactive reprisals found their ex post facto justification in the spring resurgence 
of the peasant militancy. Gauges of public mood, provincial reports were relaying news of 
arson, pillage and insubordination back to the center, evoking images all too redolent of the  
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autumnal pogroms. In early May of 1918 villagers of the Kupiansk (ukr. Kup’ians’k) district 
in the eastern part of the country took up arms in the manner of an old-fashioned Russian 
bunt, leaving twenty burned manors in their blazing wake.
261 In Sumy district a sumptuous 
palace of count Stroganov as well as the house of his steward went up in flames, burying a 
fortune of few million rubles underneath its rubble.
262 The notorious “red rooster” – the old 
Slavic symbol of premeditated conflagration – traveled further west and south, to 
Verkhnednieprovsk (ukr. Verkn’odniprovs’k), Konstantinograd (ukr. Kostiantynohrad), 
Chigirin, Zvenigorodka and other districts.
263 Annihilation of existing estates was complete 
with the destruction of inventory, livestock and harvests; in Iziaslav district of the Volhynian 
province peasants were reported to be destroying the seeds set aside for the fields; peasants 
of the Kherson province accomplished the same ‘maneuver’ by feeding their cattle with the 
sowing seeds.
264 Varying in intensity, these destructive acts converged in the grand strategy, 
not unlike scorched earth, rendering the land uninhabitable and menacingly uninviting for the 
landlords who might have thought otherwise.  
 
Those among them who were not dissuaded by lunges of hostility and decided to come back 
did so often at their own risk. On June 6 Starosta of the Yelisavetgrad province reported the 
murder of a certain Moiseev, a squire from the Aleksandriia district.
265 His peer from the 
region of Kremenchug, a large landowner Gusev, met similar fate at the hands of local 
peasants, with whom he had an altercation “on the ground of land relations.” Another 
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returnee, left undisclosed by the official communiqué, fell victim to the peasant disturbances 
on his estate near Radomysl during the first week of June.
266 True enough, the wave of 
killings never reached the proportions of earlier outbursts, kept in check as it were by the 
mounted Varta units or the regular army detachments stationed nearby; yet, if anything the 
presence of these restraining factors served to bring out the conditionality of the landlords’ 
return and augmented the opprobrium that it signified in the villagers’ eyes.  
  
The Ukrainian peasant who was lapsing back into the rebel’s posture had many reasons for 
resentment, the state-sanctioned restitution of property providing certainly an important but 
not an all-encompassing impulse. It is true, as Kossak-Szczucka wrote, that many landlords, 
upon receiving “on paper” all of their possessions back, had to confront a team of surly 
villagers, equipped with rifles and bombs, cutting their progress to the ruined manors with 
the simple “we won’t let you in.”
267 At the same time, she admits, these very peasants from 
the Novoselitsa (ukr. Novoselytsia) village land committee, wary of the new regime’s policy, 
arrived to Starokonstantinov to plead with their former pan (“master”) to make him hasten 
his return and reclaim the old house.
268 Similar episode with the villagers voluntarily 
surrendering “the lord’s goods” (pańskie dobro) is described in Dunin-Kozicka’s memoirs; 
in fact, the residents of Rachki near Tarashcha went beyond giving back what they seized, 
additionally agreeing to compensate through their work the value of the lord’s wheat and rye 
consumed in his absence.
269 As one Austrian intelligence officer pointed out, there was more 
than just fear of retaliation standing behind these manifestations of compliance. Commenting 
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on Hetman’s intention to have the estates of the squires sold to the peasantry, he wrote that 
“the peasant, being afraid of speedily losing the easily obtained land, himself pushed for the 
land purchase” in order to establish “a seemingly more secure form of land acquisition.”
270 
Difficult as it must have been for many peasants to part with the riches of the rich, their 
relinquishment could have been borne with less bitterness had the regime genuinely adhered 
to that plan and not set prohibitively high interest rates, making the ‘legitimate’ transfer 
through sale as good as unfeasible.
271  
 
Although less weighty than the restitution of property to their former owners, the 
requisitioning parties, the rifling for rifles and other arms, the ramrods and birches, even the 
insufficient sensitivity to the ‘Ukrainian-ness’ of the peasant all contributed their share to the 
upsurge of countryside violence. When seen together as parts of a complex, they betrayed the 
paramount ambition of the recently recreated State to force its way back into the village 
grown accustomed to the autonomous existence. It was in fact precisely this phenomenon, 
that crude intrusion of the far-away center into the hitherto neglected periphery which 
accounted in the final analysis for the resentment and subsequent resistance of the rural 
populace. Thus as if accentuating this profound opposition to the principle personified by the 
figure of Hetman, the 2,000-strong peasant delegation in Kiev resolved to counter the effects 
of the earlier khliboroby congress by openly disavowing Skoropadsky and his regime – well 
before its restorationist platform began to make itself felt elsewhere.
272 On a more modest 
scale but with the results all the more tangible because Kiev lacked the means to challenge 
them, similar acts of symbolic dethroning were reported from Ukraine’s many corners: in the 
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village of Brovki of the Skvira (ukr. Skvyra) district where the peasant assembly made it 
clear that they “will recognize no Hetman Skoropadsky and will not submit to any powers 
(vlady) of his”;
273 in the vicinity of Berdichev, where, according to the official communiqué, 
two volosti were living in a deliberate and determined denial of Hetman’s authority;
274 in 
Zvenigorodka and Yekaterinoslav districts, where the resurrected “Free Cossack” units were 
brazenly making a stand against the representatives of the “legitimate order” and its Varta, 
etc.
275 To Skoropadsky’s summoning to duty the peasant retorted with the language of rights; 
against his evocation of “civilizational values” he put up the bulwark of class antagonisms; 
with Hetman’s eulogies of order he remonstrated by dreaming of svoboda - that freedom, as 
he saw it, to live in a world without the lord and the publican. 
 
Before long the opposition to the state, declamatory at first, began to take a concrete form of 
armed confrontations with the troops of the occupying powers and the detachments of the 
newly organized Hetman Varta – often with casualties on both sides. In Lubny, stated the 
issue of Nova Rada from May 21, local population attempted to balk the German military 
from coming to collect the available stock of arms. This effort did not amount to much, the 
peasants finding themselves compelled to comply as soon as the guns at German disposal 
made their booming presence clear.
276 Three days later another German detachment ran into 
a stiffer resistance around Pogreby near Kremenchug, losing two dead and seven wounded as 
a result.
277 At the beginning of June the Austrians had some trouble with the villagers of 
                                                 
273 TsDAVO f 1216 o 1 d 72 l 525 
274 TsDAVO f 1216 o 1 d 72 ll 15-16 
275 PA Liasse XI Karton 152 Lage in der Ukraine Mitte April 1918, 30. April 1918; TsDAVO f 1216 o 1 d 96 ll 
1-2 
276 R 14373 Abschrift „Das Verhalten des deutschen Oberkommandos und der deutschen Behörden gegenüber 
den Ukrainern“, 14 Juni 1918 
277 TsDAVO f 1216 o 1 d 75 l 27  
  137
Okna in Kherson province, who, having defied the orders of the Austrian command, opened 
machine gun fire at the troops; the peasants ultimately yielded to the superior pressure, with 
their leader, a former sailor, opting for suicide in the face of victors’ questionable justice.
278 
Flaring up here and there, the instances of resistance bore an accidental and spontaneous 
character for the time being, since the peasants, amply supplied with arms, but removed from 
the major communication highways, could not abet their actions with the commensurate and 
far-reaching organization. That missing element – the talent for coordination and conspiracy 
– eventually came from the direction of the banned Left, transforming, once applied to 
proper circumstances, the short-lived sparks and pent-up steam into the serious work for 
grinding down the German-backed apparatus of State power.  
 
Part V: Birth of Insurgency 
 
Escaping in the nick of time from the closing ring of the Austro-German troops, Nestor 
Makhno with few of his comrades successfully crossed the Russian frontier and, after a long 
and circuitous journey through Rostov, Tsaritsyn, Saratov and Astrakhan, reached the capital 
of the Red Republic. Here, left to himself, he headed off straight to Kremlin hoping to meet 
the man who masterminded the Revolution. Whether it was his all-conquering naiveté which 
recognized no obstacles or the spirit of unmediated democracy that the Bolsheviks had not 
yet given up, Makhno made his way into the office of the Leader, who received him in the 
presence of the Party Secretary Iakov Sverdlov.  
 
                                                 
278 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v. 1, 171-172  
  138
In the course of the notable if partially apocryphal conversation, Makhno went on to 
elucidate to both Lenin and Sverdlov the major reason behind the failure of the Ukrainian 
peasantry to lend support to the retreating Soviet troops when they needed it most. For him it 
was as much a matter of tactical as of political choice.  
It should be known to you, he said, that the Red Guard groups and units, 
regardless of their numerical strength, were undertaking their offensives 
against the opponent along the railroad lines. A space of 10 to 15 versts from 
the roads was left vacant; it could contain either supporters of Revolution or 
counterrevolutionaries. In most cases the success of the operation depended 
on that. Only on the approaches to the key junctions, cities or villages, 
traversed by the railroad, did the Red Guard detachments assume front-line 
positions and made their sallies. Yet, neither the rear area nor the surrounding 
territory was properly explored. The offensive task of the Revolution suffered 
from that. By conducting it [the offensive – M.A.] in that manner the Red 
Guards could not appeal to the populace of the region before the 
counterrevolutionary forces would switch to the counteroffensive, compelling 
oftentimes the Red Guards to flee for tens of versts on end – flee again along 
the same railroads, inside the echelons. In consequence the village population 
did not even see them. And this is why they could not back them up…
279 
 
Not unjustifiably Makhno reversed the causality of the old postulate – namely that the 
collapse of the infrastructure and of other means of control tied the Bolsheviks to the tactics 
of the echelon war. Without challenging any of the practical consequences of the five-month 
struggle, he saw the echelon war as responsible for the disengagement of the countryside – 
and in fact, for the general mismanagement of the demographic resources – in the task of 
revolutionary defense.  
 
The Bolsheviks, especially those in the combat zone, agreed with Makhno – at least to the 
extent that from March onwards they did what they could (admittedly not much) to oppose 
the German rolling war machine with the obstruction of the muzhik war.
280 Recognizing the 
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necessity of mobilizing peasantry against the invading regular armies, Antonov-Ovseenko, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Republic’s forces in the south, charged Kharkov Telegraph 
worker Innokenty Kozhevnikov with the job of organizing and training partisan detachments 
within the Sumy, Lebedin, Akhtyrka, Gadiach, Zenkov and Bogodukhov districts of the 
country.
281 Simultaneously he sent a telegram to his northern colleague, the Western Front 
Commander Reinhold Berzin, whom he asked for the Ukrainian-speaking troops, whetted to 
cut deep into the enemy’s rear, causing havoc and inciting rebellion in the hinterland.
282 
Despite increasingly desperate situation of the Bolshevik “armies,” Antonov himself 
remained optimistic about the possibility of throwing the weight of peasantry onto the scales 
of the battle. “Ukraine shall engulf the invader in the flame of the great popular war,” he said 
addressing the delegates of the 2
nd All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. “Not one accomplice 
of the imperialists shall leave the Ukrainian soil alive.”
283 
 
The virulence of Antonov’s words could not belie the puny results of his efforts. The 100 
partisan cells allegedly founded by Kozhevnikov had about 1,500 members between them – a 
figure, which turned into a joke all talks of the popular vengeance à la Tolstoy.
284 The 
peasant did not want to fight and had little to fight for, espying in the activities of the 
disjoined detachments (such as those of Marusia Nikiforova) a source of great nuisance 
rather than an example worthy of emulation. Those peasant formations that did join the 
Bolsheviks – Makhno’s Gulai-Pole Regiment among them – proved to be of little value: they 
tended to stay close to their own villages, or, when venturing beyond their turf, to succumb 
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to the moody recalcitrance once the inexorable power of the German divisions became 
manifest to them.
285  
 
The lack of success in rousing the countryside under the banner of Revolution did not 
discredit the idea of the people’s war; on the contrary, it became the focus of discussion at 
the Bolshevik Conference in Taganrog whither the Soviet Ukrainian Government relocated 
in April of 1918. Prodded or provoked by their left S-R partners in power, the Ukrainian 
Bolshevik leaders had to decide what form to assume and what actions to undertake now that 
the loss of Ukraine seemed inevitable. Three positions crystallized in the course of the 
debates. The so-called Yekaterinoslav group, represented by the regional Party cell 
secretaries Emmanuil Kviring and Iakov Iakovlev (Epshtein), warned against the “flare-
throwing” (vspyshkopuskatel’stvo) in the style of the Socia,list Revolutionaries, but they 
refused to proffer any constructive alternative to it.
286 The iconoclastic Left, on the other 
hand, led by such Bolshevik firebrands as Georgy (Iuri) Piatakov, Andrei Bubnov and Iuri 
Kotsiubinsky, pushed for an immediate action, defining “the principal task of the party of the 
proletariat” to be “the organization of the armed uprising of the proletarian-peasant masses of 
Ukraine against the oppressors.”
287 More ambiguous was the stance of the Centralists, 
exemplified by the Chairman of the People’s Secretariat Nikolai Skrypnik. Without denying 
either the inevitability or the desirability of the “insurrectional rebellious movement,” 
Skrypnik’s theses placed emphasis on “the creation of the class-based party organizations” 
inside Ukraine, which in perspective could evolve into the operative nodes of the rebellious 
                                                 
285 the fate of Makhno’s detachment is an instructive example of that (Makhno, Spovid’ anarkhista, 229ff) 
286 Erde, 259  
287 See their resolution in Erde, 260-261  
  141
network.
288 Although Antonov, who observed those arguments from the distance, sided with 
the radicals on the left, the Party gave a marginal advantage to the views of Skypnik’s group, 
accepting their platform as the general guideline for its own development in the interim 
period between the forced exile and the projected return.
289  
 
The Left, however, did manage to prevail in one important aspect. Judging that the Tsikuka 
in pair with the People’s Secretariat became technically superannuated and politically 
superfluous, the Left successfully argued for their dismantlement; from the materials thus 
freed, they intended to build a more compact bureau with an unwieldy title: “All-Ukrainian 
Bureau for directing insurgent struggle against the German occupiers.” With four Bolsheviks, 
four Ukrainian Left S-Rs and one Left Ukranian Social Democrat on its board,
290 the 
“Insurgent Nine” (Povstancheskaia deviatka), as the Bureau came to be known, combined 
features of the revolutionary Government-in-Exile and the overarching Insurgency Staff, a 
body responsible for the logistical, tactical and strategic questions of the Ukrainian anti-
German Underground. At the 1
st Congress of the Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks) of 
Ukraine (CP(b)U)
291 held in Moscow in July of 1918, the Bureau was reorganized again, 
receiving a designation better suited to its true functions: All-Ukrainian Central Military 
Revolutionary Committee. By that time too the last vestiges of ambiguity, contained in the 
original Skypnik’s program, were discarded, leaving the space for the aboveboard Leftist 
formula: with its task circumscribed to “the organization of working masses” and “the 
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direction of the class struggle,” the Party had to assume the leading role in the future uprising, 
providing the rebels with the necessary expertise and equipping them with the lacking 
materiel.
292 
 
The coup that swept the Rada off the stage and brought Hetman to power terminated the 
quaint alliance between the German militarists and the non-Bolshevik Ukrainian Left, the 
Social-Democrats (USDRP) and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (UPSR) in particular. Now 
they were left to rummage through their political conscience searching for an answer to the 
question that the Bolsheviks themselves resolved with ease thanks to the preexisting clarity 
of their status. Each of the parties had to articulate their position towards the new regime and 
adopt a course of action in accordance with its temperament and ambition. Thus, although 
they condemned the coup as a deadly threat to the Ukrainian Statehood, the Social-
Democrats, as the more moderate of the former partners, opted for the constitutional means 
of resistance, pursuing the line “of organized political work” that was to culminate in the 
convocation of the Constitutional Assembly. At its Fifth Congress held in mid May of 1918 
the Party explicitly swore “to keep the proletariat from falling onto the path of anarchic 
struggle,” in advance exculpating itself from charges of mutinous intent. The more extreme 
wing of the Party tried to demur, yet, with its feeble voice drowning in the choir of 
conciliatory demands, it had to submit to the conservative resolution of the majority and 
desist from advocating active and violent insubordination to Hetman’s authority.
293  
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In contrast to the Social-Democrats, the critical mass of the Ukrainian S-Rs placed their 
principles above the necessity of preserving fractional unity. They too convoked a congress 
on the morrow of the coup (May 13-16), in the course of which the line of the future rift 
between the left and the right factions was etched out with exactness of a Damascus steel 
blade. The two opposing wings stepped out with their own resolutions, the rightists arguing 
for an ambiguous and innocuous-sounding “democratization of the political and social life of 
Ukraine” and the left demanding nothing short of the active struggle with the 
counterrevolution – “according to the socialist-revolutionary tradition.”
294 Although the right 
succeeded in getting its program voted for, the newly-elected Central Committee of the Party 
consisted almost exclusively of the committed leftists. That in itself was enough to take the 
force out of the rightist resolution, replaced a fortnight later by the “Platform of the Central 
Committee of the Ukrainian Party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.” Even more than the 
similarly worded Bolshevik proclamations of the period, the document represented a formal 
declaration of war to the Hetmanate, limning out the plan for the battles to follow:  
Aiming to launch a revolution…UPSR will on one hand – conduct a relentless 
and active agitation and fight in that direction, upsetting forces of reaction, its 
government, its military and socio-political basis at the center and local levels, 
grouping together all disorganizing partisan detachments, which actively 
defend the idea of land socialization [and] stand on guard for freedom… on 
the other hand [the Party will] at the same time carry on with the propaganda, 
preparation and organization of the revolutionary centers of the peasantry and 
working class… in order to topple through the joint and unanimous uprising 
in the center and localities … the reactionary government and pass the  power 
to the forces of democracy.
295 
With this decision to go back to the barricades the Ukrainian S-Rs found themselves 
brushing shoulders with their one-time Bolshevik adversaries. The repudiation of the 
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Hetman’s coup became therefore that crucible wherein the alliance between the two radical 
left organizations was forged and their resources pooled together to reach the shared aim.   
 
The situation on the ground – within the provincial interstices only mildly affected by the 
city-based Austro-German garrisons – mirrored the decisions made by the Bolsheviks in 
Taganrog and the Left S-Rs in Kiev. This connection was not necessarily causal, flowing 
unperturbed from top to bottom or from the center to the periphery; it was rather conjectural, 
owing as much to the ramifications of the Hetman’s coup and his incipient activity as to the 
predicament in which the radical Left suddenly found itself. For once, the change of 
government alienated a substantial part of the administrative corps, especially those who 
came in riding the revolutionary tide and whose existence depended on the continuation of 
the sanctioned decentralization – some would say, of “the legalized anarchy.” As a result, 
wrote Field Marshall Böhm Ermolli to the Austrian High Command (AOK) in Baden on 
May 16, “certain commissars, who feared losing their employment with the advent of the 
new Government, got carried away agitating against it (ließen sich zu Agitationen gegen 
dieselbe hinreißen).”
296 According to the ambassador Count Forgách, those of the 
commissars who wanted to express their resentment without attracting too much attention, 
could do so by simply keeping the peasantry uninformed about the events in Kiev – hardly an 
incredible feat given the state of infrastructure and news media.
297 Such forms of 
administrative resistance seemed not only widespread but methodical – to the point where 
the occupation authorities began to suspect a grand plot conceived to undermine their 
position. Mumm, a man otherwise keen on separating confirmed information from the 
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rumors, apprised the German Foreign Service of the three-month advance pay that the 
Ukrainian functionaries putatively received from the former Rada ministers “for the purposes 
of encouraging sabotage activities.”
298 Although the most obvious choice, the toppled 
Ukrainian Government did not exhaust the list of possible candidates for the role of the 
principal instigator, as the Germans and the Austrians let their imagination roam freely to the 
places where the yarns of conspiracy were thought to entwine in a single knot – in the 
direction of Moscow and then farther yet to London, Paris and Washington. 
  
The simple fact that conspiracies efface the traces of their tracks makes it hard to say where 
the guided administrative sabotage ended and the banal bureaucratic incompetence began. 
Moreover, the establishment of the activity directed at a deliberate disruption would not in 
itself reveal the limits of the conspiratorial network; neither does it always allow one to 
identify the network’s epicenter, especially since the participants were often kept in the dark 
about the designs and the whereabouts of the ‘superior will.’ The task of unraveling the 
narrative Gordian knot is further compounded by the existence of numerous competing 
accounts produced when the former partners from the anti-Hetman “Front Populaire” – to 
use an evocative if anachronistic analogy – turned against each other with more rancor than 
the Skoropadsky’s regime was ever deemed worthy of receiving. With such nearly 
insurmountable obstacles at hand, any meaningful statement bereft of self-doubt looks rather 
suspect and only a conjecture – hopefully, an intelligent one– gives proof of the highest 
attainable virtue – that of the historical verisimilitude.  
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Yet, by setting the bar lower – certainly below the illusory mark of “truth” – one could get a 
glimpse of the logistics involved in re-inscribing the peasantry back into the grand style 
politics and, in fact, in transforming it into a key instrument of the all-Russian political 
struggle. To this end it will prove instructive to look closer at three regions roughly 
corresponding to the major breeding grounds of the anti-Hetman activities in the summer 
months of 1918: the southern half of the Kiev province, which provided the stage for the 
large Zvenigorodka-Tarashcha peasant uprising, the central part of the Chernigov province, 
where the Nezhin (ukr. Nizhyn) partisans operated and the region of Yekaterinoslav, most 
closely associated with the name of Nestor Makhno.  
 
Notwithstanding the extent and the intensity of the uprising in Tarashcha and Zvenigorodka 
districts of the Kiev province, available materials do not liberate it from the enveloping aura 
of obscurity. In so far as the absence of a clear triggering order is concerned, it remained a 
spontaneous revolt, yet it would have been nipped in the bud without the prior work that 
went into organizing. The south, that is, Zvenigorodka and its environs, was predominantly 
the domain of the non-Bolshevik Ukrainian Left – or, to put it differently, of the 
“ideologically-loaded” functionaries, who won their posts from the Rada and kept them 
under Hetman. Thus, as mentioned earlier, Iurko Tiutiunnyk served as a demission 
commissioner of the district;
299 Ivan Kapulovsky, another key personality of the 
conspiratorial ring, became the District Military Commander (uezdnyi voinski nachal’nik) 
shortly before the coup.
300 Their activities unfolded under the protective umbrella of the 
District Commandant M. Pavlovsky, instructed in his turn to back them by Mykola Shynkar, 
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a notable Ukrainian S-R and the Commandant of the entire Kiev province.
301 Together they 
managed to build up a system of support and patronage, covering up each other’s deeds (or 
misdeeds) within the framework of impermeable officialdom.  
 
It was thus with the official blessing and under the Germans’ very nose that Kapulovsky, 
Tiutiunnyk, Shynkar and others had called for a conference of all left parties, Ukrainian and 
not, in order to articulate the stance with regards to Hetman and discuss the future of the 
Revolution. From of the ranks of the participants emerged a new organization with an 
allusive name of the “Young Ukraine,” encompassing fifteen Socialist-Revolutionaries and 
Ukrainian Social-Democrats. As a cultural association with the self-ascribed educational 
mission, it resurrected the old S-R paper Zvenihorodska Dumka and transformed it into the 
local mouthpiece of the anti-Hetman opposition.
302 Yet, as Kapulovsky pointed out in his 
recollections, its “cultural-educational” activities provided only the decorous shell to the task 
of creating peasant fighting brigades.
303  
 
During the months antecedent to the German occupation, Zvenigordka district was the home 
of the first, largest and organizationally most sophisticated “regiment” (kish) of the Free 
Cossacks. Barring Pavlovsky, all of the aforementioned conspirators played an outstanding 
role in the movement, especially Tiutiunnyk, whose contribution was recognized when he 
became the regiment’s elected commander (koshovoi).
304 Although disbanded, the Free 
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Cossack militia left in its wake a substantial pool of cadres familiar with the challenges of 
leadership and organization, a population accustomed to a para-military life and, of course, 
mounds of unregistered weapons dispersed across the land. These assets proving critical to 
the “Young Ukrainians,” they made sure to derive full advantage out of them before the new 
authorities got wind of their activities. Regularly bypassing the Germans, arms were being 
deposited on Tiutiunnyk’s writ to the designated storages, guarded on top of it by the wards 
long initiated into the insurgents’ secrets. To shield peasant households from the untoward 
curiosity of the German and Hetman search parties, Kapulovsky handed out official receipts 
testifying that the village in question is loyal and arms-free. Large stocks of firearms and 
ammunition were amassed in that manner; kept inside for a few weeks, the weapons quickly 
made their way back into the open when the conspirators, disguised as robbers, broke into 
Tiutiunnyk’s depots and cleaned them of their valuable content. That stratagem forced many 
of its participants to go underground, but Tiutiunnyk, who gained an alibi by informing his 
German superiors of the accident, came out blameless and retained his post till the very 
outbreak of the uprising.
305  
 
While the weapons were being collected, Kapulovsky and others journeyed to and fro the 
villages of the Zvenigorodka, Tarashcha, Uman and Kanev (ukr. Kaniv) districts, organizing 
their residents into separate ‘battalions’ under the pretext of peasant congresses. Altogether 
the conspirators churned out 18 of such “battalions” with a reported number of 25,000 armed 
partisans.
306 It seems unlikely that all of them or even the majority were privy to the military 
craft, yet the core of these detachments – or “bands” as they were dubbed in the official 
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sources – was professional enough, consisting as it most often did of the Great War 
veterans.
307 Between their private grievances and shared difficulties in transitioning to 
peaceful life a wide gamut of reasons existed which made the former front-line soldiers 
particularly susceptible to the rebels’ suasions. For one could have not escaped them that the 
landlord’s authority returned clothed in a gray German uniform with a Stahlhelm set squarely 
on a shaven head. In a sense, therefore, the future uprising combined the old duty of repelling 
the “Teuton invader” with the search of communal justice, accomplishing in one stroke the 
long-sought fusion of nationalist discourse and socialist agenda into a coherent whole.  
 
Given the illegal status of their party and the respectively greater need for secrecy, the 
Bolshevik activities were even harder to track. Working mostly within the Tarashcha district 
north of Zvenigorodka, they made a display of their achievements only after the fact – i.e. 
once the upheaval of the uprising brought to the surface the subterranean layers of 
clandestine life. The Bolsheviks had certainly much to be proud of, for when the signal was 
given, 14 villages of the Tarashcha district at once rose up in arms.
308 According to the 
canonic Soviet history, their operations in the region were directed by the underground Kiev 
Provincial Committee headed by a twenty-year old Nikolai Vrublevsky, one of the 
“Insurgent Nine” and, incidentally, not a Bolshevik but a Left Ukrainian Social-Democrat.
309 
In view of the profound commitment to remain silent about the deeds of the other, one could 
only surmise what types of rapports existed between the Bolsheviks in Tarashcha and the 
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Zvenigorodka plotters. Yet, what is clear is that the Bolshevik-armed peasants of Tarashcha 
openly challenged Hetman’s authority six days after their neighbors were provoked to do the 
same in Zvenigorodka. From that moment on, the question of whether the Tarashcha rebels 
acted in fulfillment of a certain preliminary agreement or in recognition of an opportune 
moment lost much of its practical value, as the population of the two districts shuttled back 
and forth from the role of the accomplices in the dispatches to Hetman’s administrators to 
that of the champions of the shared cause evoked by their opponents on the left.  
 
At one point the information about the Zvenigorodka underground became known to the 
authorities, who decided to apply the pressure of reprisals to force the conspirators to a 
premature stand.
310 On June 3
 these efforts reached their aim when the District Commandant 
turning to the population, urging them to an armed rebellion.
311 The response was powerful 
and immediate with more than 15,000 peasants going on the offensive against the Hetman’s 
punitive detachments around Lysianka, less than 20 miles north of Zvenigorodka.
312 
Considering the developments in the countryside, the Field Marshal Eichhorn resolved to 
cancel his trip to Odessa – where he was supposed to meet his Austrian counterpart Alfred 
Krauß – and stay closer to the main operational theater.
313 On June 9 Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador Forgách wrote of the heavy losses suffered by the Germans in their melees with 
the peasants, a note seconded by Mumm’s remark that “the affaire at Zvenigorodka is more 
serious than is officially admitted.”
314 On that same day, after forty-eight hours of fighting, 
the peasant units broke into Zvenigorodka and captured its entire German garrison. The 
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Germans speedily retorted, reclaiming the town on June 13 and arresting one of the rebels’ 
leaders, Levko Shevchenko, a former Tsarist pilot and a descendant of Ukraine’s national 
poet.
315 This setback allayed tensions in the region for a short time as the rebellion’s center 
of gravity shifted northeastward, to the region around the town of Stavishche (ukr. 
Stavyshche) in the Tarashcha district of the Kiev province.
316    
 
There the situation for the authorities took a turn for the worse almost at once. Arriving in 
well-formed groups from the surrounding villages, peasant rebels converged on Tarashcha, 
investing and seizing it on June 12, 1918. The retreating German and Hetman (“Officer”) 
units had to pass through the narrow road as the insurgents showered them with bullets, 
sowing more than just confusion in their ranks. In the course of five days, wrote Tarashcha 
district starosta, the Government troops lost 7 men near Ianishevka (ukr. Ianyshivka), another 
7 at Dengofovka and 15 at Cherepniano.
317 On the 19
th of June, acting on behalf of a 
mysterious “Head Military Revolutionary Staff” certain Fiodor Grebenko, an ensign of the 
Russian Imperial Army,
318 proclaimed himself the “Supreme Commander of all armed forces 
of partisan troops of Ukraine” and issued a mobilization order that matched the ambition of 
the title.
319 Peasants from the nearby Skvira districts began to flock to Tarashcha on their 
own impulsion or in response to Grebenko’s appeal
320 as he and his men, now a formidable 
body of 4,500 strong with 13 machine guns and a cannon were exporting the revolution back 
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to Zvenigorodka.
321 Counter-state activities having resumed there, by late June that district 
boasted as many as 30 thousand rebels, equipped with machine guns and even disposing of 
several captured artillery batteries. From its double epicenter, the uprising spread 
concentrically to Uman, Skvira, Kanev and parts of the Yelisavetgrad and Kremenchug 
districts, where the martial law was imposed with full powers delegated to the German 
military.
322 This was still a far cry from the type of a peasant war fancied by the planners, yet 
alarming enough to haunt such cool-headed and experienced German politicians as Theobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg with images of a near elemental violence, perpetrated by a peasant 
army of 200,000 strong, all amply armed and determined to terminate German presence in 
Ukraine.
323  
 
At the time when the Germans were concentrating their forces against the peasant insurgents 
in Tarashcha and Zvenigorodka, a ground for the new rebellion was being prepared in the 
Chernigov province. This area, overrun by the Bolsheviks in January of 1918, offered some 
of the most dramatic sights in the expressive landscape of the agrarian movement: manors 
ransacked, landlords banished or killed, property distributed in the spirit of the egalitarian 
radicalism.
324 Village squads, grown out of the peasant unrest, transformed the leveling 
impulse into a solid practice, leaving little to the vicissitudes of the public mood and 
remonstrations of the village well-to-do’s. Analogous in many ways to the Free Cossacks, a 
number of these units survived the arrival of the German troops to Ukraine by absconding 
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behind the thick screen of marches and groves.
325 Drawing these detachments out of their 
hiding places and subjecting them to a common plan seemed a natural venue to pursue for 
any anti-governmental organization found in the region – an undertaking that in theory 
should have not raised too many objections since the continued existence of those forest 
mavericks largely depended on the guidance and support from the outside.  
 
The Chernigov Bolsheviks must have thought along similar lines when they resolved to 
convoke an underground congress in the provincial capital with an aim of uniting all 
underground forces under the aegis of one agency. For a while the Provincial Revolutionary 
Committee, elected at the congress, filled the role of such unifying center. With its mission 
vaguely circumscribed to the consolidation and intensification of the revolutionary work, it 
acted as a lynchpin between the existing revolutionary committees as well as a progenitor of 
the new ones.
326 Since it was brought to life on a local initiative, the Committee persisted in a 
vacuum, modified but by the flair of its members to intuit the shape that the curvature of the 
general Party line was about to assume. 
  
This guessing game came to an end with the arrival of Nikolai Krapiviansky, a high-ranking 
officer of the Tsarist army and a native of the Chernigov province. Sent down south from 
Moscow by the “Insurgent Nine,” he held the mandate for sorting out the military aspects of 
the anticipated uprising.
327 Once in the town of Nezhin – where the Chernigov Bolsheviks 
established their informal headquarters – Krapiviansky proceeded by creating the Central 
Staff with a commanding competence extending as far as Priluky district of the neighboring 
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Poltava province. Beyond that pale the Staff was carrying out reconnoitering operations in 
the direction of Zolotonosha and Cherkassy, hoping to secure permanent ties with the local 
revolutionary cells and to win them ultimately over to the prospect of a synchronized 
action.
328  
 
While abandoning provincial and district revolutionary committees to the nitty-gritty details 
of the preparatory work, the Central Staff arrogated upon itself the right to keep the count of 
the available resources and to supervise the manner of their utilization. In the first order 
issued on June 19, Krapiviansky as the head of the Staff “proposed” (predlagaiu) that all 
revolutionary organizations within the domain of the staff’s competence send him the 
information concerning the quantity of weapons and ammunition on hand, size of the 
pecuniary means as well as the number of able-bodied insurgents ready to present themselves 
at the first call to arms.
329 Reminiscent of the user guides, the four orders that followed 
(Orders nr 2 to nr 5) instructed the revolutionary committees how to maintain “comradely 
discipline” among the rank-and-file, take a good care of the precious guns, attend to the all-
important questions of supply and, finally, recruit competent and trustworthy commanding 
officers.
330 Conspiratorial solicitude, keeping Krapiviansky’s Staff always on the move, 
complicated the relaying of orders to the underground cells, yet the four affiliate staffs, 
conveniently located along the perimeter of the Nezhin district, could always step forth and 
act as its proxies. Eventually, through the skillful use of the dedicated party cadres, the 
Central Staff obtained control over an extensive military network, encompassing in the 
Nezhin district alone a total force of 6 thousand registered peasants with 14 officers and 200 
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NCOs at their head.
331 As a sacristan primed to pull the bell ropes at the dawn before service, 
the Staff kept these men in the state of suspenseful expectancy, apprehensive of the ringing 
signal and the subsequent command to proceed with an all-out offensive without further ado.  
 
From July onward the operational centers of the insurgency began to incrementally increase 
the scope and the intensity of the anti-governmental activity in the region.  By releasing 
Order Nr 5 (mid July) the Central Staff spelled out the necessity of doing away with the 
undefined “enemies of the people,” an appeal powerful enough to provoke a campaign of 
terror against Hetman functionaries, Varta members, estate owners and the officers of the 
volunteer squads. Few notable attacks took place at Nosovka, Drozdovka and Verkievka, 
where the government troops, according to the figures provided by Bubnov, lost as many as 
113 men.
332 In this yet undeclared war the partisans of the Chernigov province had the 
support of the similarly structured insurgents from the 10-mile wide strip of land beyond the 
Ukrainian border, commonly referred to as the ‘neutral zone.’
333 Although their raids were 
largely confined to the region of Starodub and Novgorod-Seversk, the two districts adjacent 
to the frontier, they managed to divert the gaze of the administration away from the interior 
of the Chernigov province into that obscure area of questionable jurisdiction.
334 However 
small the actual damage caused by the attacks was, the region saw itself transformed into the 
zone of smoldering warfare, with the population gradually habituating itself both to the 
friable nature of authority as well as the eventuality of personal involvement in undermining 
it.  
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Drafted on July 17, Order nr 6 with an open call to arms might have thus found a troupe of 
well-rehearsed actors and an audience sympathetic as if comprised of the potential 
participants. Its practical value being deliberated over at the highest level of political 
responsibility, the right and the left wings of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party wrangled with 
each other as they cleft to their customary views: the right (Kviring and Iakovlev) stressed 
that the time is hardly ripe for any serious action whereas the left (Bubnov, Piatakov and 
Zatonsky) saw the uprising as long overdue. At the moment this fractious wavering seemed 
as inopportune as it was irrelevant, for the pressure, mounting underneath the strictures of 
conspiracy, was threatening to blow off the cover and expose the entire underground to the 
government countermeasures when it would be least prepared to defend itself. Eventually, 
with the smaller detachments prodding the revolutionary committees, and the revolutionary 
committees passing on this impatience further up to the Central Staff, CP(b)U made up its 
mind in the leftist sense, deciding to proceed with release of the order and fixing the 6
th of 
August as the date of the announcement.
335  
 
Krapiviansky, however, was not able to wait that long, taking the field with the 500-men 
detachment one day ahead of the plan. He came within a hair’s breadth to seizing the town of 
Nezhin and an adjacent train station, but, the resistance of local German garrison proving too 
strong and his ammunition running low, he had to beat a retreat.
336 The Germans, who had 
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reacted to the news of the uprising with the celerity that took the rebels by surprise, brought 
in the reinforcements and went in pursuit of Krapiviansky’s troops. Pressed by the 
overwhelming skill and numbers, Krapiviansky disbanded the Staff, leaving only 50 men in 
his entourage.
337 That put an effective end to managing the operational aspect of the uprising, 
yet the partisans showed themselves as capable of acting in isolation from the overarching 
plan as they were when guided by the center.  
 
Left to their own devices, the peasant insurgents were acting as the partisan detachments are 
expected to act, cutting off communication lines, waylaying smaller Varta units, and killing 
supporters of the regime while purveying their own cause to the population at large. Vitaly 
Primakov, hero of the winter battles rusticating with his mounted Red Cossacks in the 
confines of the neutral zone, shook off his abeyance and galloped straight to Novgorod-
Seversk (ukr. Novhorod-Siversky) on the Ukrainian side of the border. His force, growing 
from a few hundred to a few thousand mostly unarmed peasants, was checked at Vorobievka 
(ukr. Vorob’ivka) 25 miles north of the target.
338 Primakov turned back, yet the mission did 
not qualify as a failure for the smaller groups were splintering off the main body, spreading 
the massage of insubordination to the outlying villages. Another rebel formation of the ex-
tsarist officer Piavka, having ensnared the strategic stretch from Nezhin to Chernigov into the 
spiral of its serpentine movements, kept on eluding the German garrisons stationed there, 
while assailing and dispersing smaller columns dispatched without proper intelligence.
339 By 
mid August, according to the official press, the peasant uprising reigned in seven out of 
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fifteen districts of the province.
340 Although Chernigov itself together with the major towns 
remained under solid German control, they were being excised from the rest of the country 
so that for days on no one in Kiev knew with certainty their exact predicament.
341 Deriving 
advantage from this confusion, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks actually published the news, 
according to which not only Chernigov and Nezhin, but also Poltava were either taken or on 
the brink of falling into the rebels’ hands – a simple device of informational warfare which 
succeeded in planting a seed of doubt in the highest diplomatic circles of the Austro-German 
alliance.
342  
 
Similarly organized albeit by a different set of individuals, uprisings in the Kiev and 
Chernigov provinces followed a nearly identical narrative path, at the end of which their 
various protagonists saw themselves sharing the same terrain. After three weeks of heavy 
fighting the Germans managed to get the better of the rebels in the area of Tarashcha-
Zvenigorodka, holding on to Tarashcha against the rebel force of 4,000 strong on the night of 
June 30, and then meticulously working to squeeze the remaining bands out of the 
province.
343 Under superior pressure thousands of the insurgents accompanied by the 
refugees began to move towards Dnieper, crossing the river in early August at Tripol’e (ukr. 
Trypillia),
344 Rzhishev (ukr. Rzhyshchiv)
345 at its wide bend across from Pereiaslav
346 and 
through the fords leading to Zolotonosha. Once on the left bank, the groups were splintering 
into smaller units, which minimized their striking power but maximized their mobility and 
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raised the chances of reaching the northern border. Losing men and equipment to the 
relentless opponent, the rebels of Grebenko, Shynkar and others retorted by setting off 
uprisings in the areas of their passage; with four districts up in arms against the execrable 
regime, the region of Zolotonosha proved to be particularly receptive to the idea of emulating 
their neighbors’ example.
347 On August 12 at Goltva (ukr. Hovtva) and at Liutenka six days 
later (Poltava province) the retreating rebels, reduced to a few hundred stragglers, were 
dangerously close to being fully annihilated,
348 yet, making up with luck where the skill was 
lacking, they succeeded to break through the enemy rings and make their final sprint for 
safety. Their travails were finally over in the last week of August as the surviving core 
attained the border and the neutral zone beyond, which greeted them with an offer of rest and 
convalescence. There the rebels from Tarashcha and Zvenigorodka –led as before by their 
old and trusted commanders
349 - would persevere through the rest of the summer and the 
autumn only to reenter Ukraine under a modified guise when the armistice in the West threw 
into disarray the fate of Germany’s political creations on the opposite rim of the continent.  
 
Taking a sober view of their own predicament, the Nezhin rebels resolved to seek refuge in 
the unclaimed corners of the neutral zone. Compared to the retreat from Tarashcha, their own 
trek seemed less dramatic if only by virtue of being substantially shorter and laying across 
heavily-wooded areas of the northern Chernigovshchina. It was not a walk in a park either, 
since the German troops controlled the greater part of the province as well as the bridges 
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over the frontier river of Desna. With this in mind, many insurgents preferred to bury their 
weapons and travel light, hoping to be mistaken for the Russian POWs by the German 
patrols.
350 That trick worked well – albeit at a price of valuable equipment – as the groups of 
the partisans began to filter through the cordon, en masse or separately, arriving to the 
neutral zone towns of Pochep and Seredina Buda at the finishing stretch of their journey. The 
old “Insurgent Nine,” which in the meantime changed its name to the All-Ukrainian Central 
Military Revolutionary Committee and moved into the zone to be closer to the fray, was 
found there waiting for the tattered incomers; Nikolai Krapiviansky was also around, charged 
by the selfsame committee with the reorganization of the insurgents into battalions and 
regiments of the regular army mould.  
 
The line running obliquely down from Volhynia to the Donbass region split Ukraine in two 
with each half reflecting the character of the occupying power even more precisely than that 
of the individual population enclosed within. If the German-administered north could still 
muster up sufficient evidence of legality to substantiate hopes of eventual normalization, the 
south was a place of endemic disorder neatly conjoined with the arbitrariness of the Austro-
Hungarian military rule. Although Ukraine was believed to offer the Dual monarchy the 
“only hope”
  of emerging from its own dire supply situation,
351 nothing in the methods 
practiced by the Habsburg Army betrayed the desire to set the economic exploitation of the 
land upon a solid and reliable footing. On the contrary, they were colored by the imperative 
impatience of the High Command no less than by the demoralization of the rank-and-file and 
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as such were much better suited for provoking peasant backlash than for making Ukraine’s 
agrarian producers amenable to the demands of the starving burghers in Vienna, Prague or 
Budapest. “The peasantry [of the Yekaterinoslav province],” wrote one Ukrainian Left S-R, 
“…universally detested the Austrians” to the point where the hatred became an axis “around 
which united all strata of the village.”
352 The ruthlessness of requisitions fed into the 
smoldering discontent through the old resistance-reprisal cycle, producing a climate 
propitious to the growth of the insurgency yet highly deleterious for the rickety body of the 
occupying force.  
 
One of the first of such uprisings triggered by the insensitive and inconsistent policies of the 
Austro-Hungarian occupation regime took place in the Kanezh (ukr. Kanyzh) district of the 
Yekaterinoslav province and it was only after the twenty days of fighting that the Austrians 
managed to put it down.
353 Before it was over, cases of peasant unrest were registered in 
Verkhnedneprovsk district (beginning of June),
354 followed by the “peasant tumults” in the 
villages of Podolia
355 and the “growth of bands” in the Kherson (mid to late June)
356 
province. Different shades of intensity aside, these events constituted a uniform map of rural 
violence, striated, as if to break that general monotony, by the increasingly futile campaigns 
of pacification. 
 
Into the midst of this ever-mutinous countryside stepped Nestor Makhno, a “bandit” of 
notoriety whom even Wilhelm of Habsburg, an Austrian prince with Ukrainophilic 
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persuasions, wished to bring to his side.
357 His homecoming commenced, ironically enough, 
in the same place, where the Bolsheviks and the Left S-Rs were making their final 
preparations before releasing themselves from the chores of a progressively fictitious 
Ukrainian government – Taganrog. There, assembling in April in the headquarters of a local 
anarchist federation, he and his comrades resolved first of all to meet up again in their native 
Gulai-Pole either in late June or early July, just in time for the field work, when most of the 
villagers would be outdoors and hence open to hear “seditious” talks.
358 Furthermore, 
without losing precious time on lengthy deliberations, the small conference set up the tasks 
to be addressed by its participants upon reaching their destination. Foremost among these 
was the organization of the so-called “initiative groups (initsiativnye gruppy),” “of a purely 
fighting character,” with an average strength of 5 to 10 villagers. Those groups would then 
be used as instruments “merciless individual terror” conducted against the commanding 
officers of the Austro-German and Ukrainian troops as well as the landlords reemerging from 
depths of their exile in hopes of reclaiming lost property. With weapons in short supply and 
no external source of support in sight, the problem of equipping rural fighting brigades had to 
be solved locally – at the opponent’s expense.
359 If carried out with due diligence, the triple 
task – of forging fighting units from the body of the peasantry, of keeping the occupier 
permanently harassed by the effective terror attacks, and of gathering arms needed for the 
forthcoming struggle – held the promise of converting the rebels’ numerical advantage into a 
force sufficiently powerful to counter enemy’s better organization and his superior skill.  
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On his way back home, a journey that took more than two months to accomplish, Makhno 
passed by Moscow, where he was received by the principal figures of the young Soviet 
republic. One of those individuals was Vladimir Zatonsky, who as a member of the 
“Insurgent Nine” was personally involved in guiding revolutionary underground inside 
Hetman’s Ukraine. After a long interview Zatonsky provided Makhno with a false passport 
issued to a certain Ivan Shepel, a teacher and an officer. Describing the boons of the Kharkov 
region for the conspiratorial work, the Bolshevik official attempted to veer Makhno away 
from heading to the environs of Yekaterinoslav, but, witnessing his arguments bounce off 
Makhno’s firm resolve, he relented.
360 Yet, even with this concession from Zatonsky 
Makhno remained essentially a Soviet agent, dispatched like tens of other “francs-tireurs” 
(Freischärler) with false papers down south, where, as one Austrian diplomat claimed, “they 
are organized into bands with an aim of breaking the foreign dominion of the Central Powers 
in Ukraine.”
361 Equipped with those credentials Makhno must have had a place reserved for 
himself in the neutral zone, which he, hypothetically, could have taken up had his 
undertaking gone the way of the Zvenigorodka-Tarashcha and Nezhin rebels.  
 
It did not go that way, however, with Makhno and supporters being saved by the 
incompetence of the opposing forces and the scattered character of their initial anti-
governmental acts. Arriving in accordance with the plan in early July to his native Gulai-Pole 
region, Makhno set himself down to work as outlined in their Taganrog discussions. “Our 
first task, he wrote to his friends around that time, should consist in distributing our people in 
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such a manner that each hundred [sotne] (a separate segment of the village) would 
encompass a sufficient number of them.” 
On those people lies the responsibility for rallying around themselves the 
greatest possible number of energetic and brave peasants prepared for 
sacrifice. Next, from those groups they should pick out especially courageous 
peasants and together they should carry out attacks, in multiple places and 
preferably at the same time, against the estates of landlords and kulaks with a 
purpose of driving away both the owners and the German-Austrian guards 
that the latter summoned to their protection… If those attacks cannot be 
accomplished simultaneously in different places, they should be taking place, 
at the very least, with short intervals one after another and be repeated again. 
Attacks shall not have the character of a robbery.
362 
Everything, therefore, hinged on the constellation of the “initiative groups,” which 
functioned as kernels of greater formations – being in a way analogous to the revolutionary 
committees with an additional bonus of increased mobility. Organizationally simple, they 
soon sprouted in Gulai-Pole, Voskresenskoe (ukr. Voskresens’ke), Ternovka (ukr. Ternivka), 
Novo-Gupalovka (ukr. Novo-Hupalivka) and other villages of the Yekaterinoslav province, 
tagging Makhno’s halts in his unceasing flight from the anxiety-ridden authorities.
363  
 
Shortly afterwards, assemblies of armed peasants organized around small circles of 
committed Makhnovites began appearing before the manor houses, insisting on the 
immediate departure of their unwanted inhabitants and the disbandment of the troops sent to 
protect their lives and property. If a show of force fell short of dissolving the landlord’s 
obstinacy, as in the village of Ternovka some 80 miles away from Gulai-Pole, the reaction 
was often patterned on the pogroms of the not so remote past with the commensurably 
predictable results for all participating parties.
364 At the same time, as their fellow villagers 
were renegotiating the future of the land, the rural daredevils were laying ambushes on the 
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government units, Varta “hundreds” and the Austrian detachments arriving to the scene to 
address the problem of peasant unrest. Thus, an armed band from Voskresenskoe, named 
Makhnovsky after Makhno himself, descended on the passing “Germans” (Austrians most 
likely), dispersing them and killing an officer along with several soldiers.
365 Despite the 
ring’s appellation, Makhno was not directly involved in staging that attack – but he was in 
the whole series of others, carried out against Varta in the months of August and September 
with ingenuity indicative of his budding genius for the guerilla war.
366 Those acts, dotting the 
map of the Yekaterinoslav province with escalating frequency, did not correspond to a well-
thought-out plan, for the “initiative groups” remained tactically independent from each other, 
united but through their shared inspiration; the harm, however, caused to the regime both in 
material and propagandistic terms, was not made any less acute as a result. 
 
The response of the Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities was immediate, often brutal but 
ultimately ineffective. Sure enough, the punitive detachments, especially those consisting of 
the Magyars, showed great energy in instilling order in the quarantined areas touched by the 
spirit of mutiny – too great even, as the commanding officers were known to proceed without 
much regard for the actual guilt of the peasants lined up before the firing squads. On July 4, 
for example, the staff of the 5
th Hungarian Cavalry division stationed in Yekaterinoslav 
informed their superiors in the XII Corps about the execution of nine individuals – 
apparently all “Bolsheviks, robbers and murderers” through and through;
367 two weeks later 
the same unit executed 21 peasants, of whom “only” eleven were qualified in the above 
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fashion.
368 That summary trials of such nature led nowhere was understood by the Austrian 
functionaries themselves, at the very least by the more sensible among them. Referring 
specifically to the region around Yekaterinoslav, Dr. Johann Kavčič, a lieutenant of the 
Austrian army, wrote in his report on August 1 that “the enforced military law in 
combination with the punitive expeditions against the recalcitrant villages created a lot of 
bad blood in the population.”
369 As a result, maintained another official in the tone of polite 
understatement, “the mood of the peasants did not swing during the last month in our 
favor.”
370 
 
On the other hand, when not chastising the unquestionably guilty or those culpable only by 
association, the Austrian troops were evincing an unpardonable lack of initiative. “In their 
remaining time,” wrote Yekaterinoslav provincial starosta on June 29, 1918, “the troops left 
behind at certain points of the district conduct no reconnoitering whatsoever around the areas 
of their disposition.”
371 That negligence in performing one’s duties applied particularly to the 
units recruited from the Slavic parts of the Habsburg Empire with the Galicians being by far 
the worst in that regard. “There, where such troops are used for the pacification and the 
disarming [of the population – M.A.],” ambassador Forgách appraised his colleague in 
Odessa, “they go out of their way to let residents receive timely warnings, abetting the 
concealment of stocks of weapons.”
372 Linguistic and cultural affinities no doubt played their 
part in informing the Ukrainian, Czech and Slovak soldiers with an attitude of excessive 
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leniency; even more important, however, was the real and often openly professed sympathy 
to the plight of peasantry coupled with the fascination for the emancipatory cause of the 
Revolution. Ukraine, with its challenges and its opportunities, tested the ground on which the 
allegiance of the blue-mantled subjects of Emperor Charles stood; having found it all too 
brittle, it gave a good measure to the disintegrating tendencies of the army.  
 
Combining brutality with lassitude, the Austro-Hungarian army could not succeed in 
bringing order to the territories under its custody. Unsurprisingly, the peasant uprisings were 
still raging and bands – including that of Makhno – continued to grow in strength and 
number by the time the dissolution of the Habsburg military apparatus in Ukraine entered 
into its final and irrevocable phase. 
 
For all their differences due to geography, demographics or leadership, the rebels of the 
summer months as a whole bore little similarity to the reckless locomotive riders whom the 
Germans and the Austrians encountered on entering Ukraine. Thanks to the network of well-
situated underground revolutionary committees and the Makhnovite “initiative groups,” the 
insurgents acquired a direct access to the countryside with its untapped resources: villagers 
willing to share the rebel’s lot, weapons kept hitherto hidden from the search parties, and 
food that the Central Powers tried but failed to obtain. True enough, appeals to the 
population akin to Grebenko’s Order Nr 4 from June 19 or Order Nr 1 issued by the All-
Ukrainian Military Revolutionary Committee on August 6 could not have the impact of a 
genuine mobilization order that they purported to be.
373 However, they were not meant as a 
mere pose taking assertion either, flowery in form yet vacuous in content. The peasants 
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called to pick up arms and form battalions often did so – on a semi-voluntary basis – flocking 
to the banner of the partisans in numbers of which the earlier Red Guard leaders could only 
dream in their most ambitious plans.
374 The connections between the rebels and the rural 
population were still by and large informal, but they did yield respectable results through the 
skillful exploitation of grievances that the political parties came to share with the peasantry.  
 
The converse of this informality was that the peasant detachments, led more often than not 
by the former soldiers and capable, therefore, of “conducting proper operations against 
German troops,”
375 could “deflate” as fast as they “inflated,” vanishing in the amorphous 
rural mass without discernable trace. A German grain trader dispatched by his Hamburg boss 
to the Zvenigorodka district when it was still ablaze with the unrest, saw this faculty of the 
rebels to switch between roles as lying at the heart of the “partisan war,” a “genre” of warfare, 
calling for “the combat methods (Kampfmethoden) entirely different from those which 
proved valuable in the past four years.”
376 The German punitive expeditions tended to adopt 
the practice of meting out punishments to the entire villages all the more because the real 
opponent seemed both ineluctable and invisible. Yet, such course of action, as the Hamburg 
businessman pointed out, was largely counterproductive, as the peasants, visibly penitent but 
quietly murmuring that “our time will still come,” were taking to the forests, driven less by 
vengeance than by the desire to protect themselves from future reprisals.  
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What needs emphasizing here is that the “partisan war,” emerging in response to the superior 
force of an organized power, did not lose its relevance with the defeat of Germany and the 
subsequent withdrawal of its troops from the occupied territories. On the contrary, the two 
key elements cited in the above discussion – the voluntary basis of popular “conscription” 
(dobrovolcheskoe nachalo) and the flexibility (or interchangeability) of cadres – solidified 
into the sacred precepts of the revolutionary Red army. Identified with the cherished Marxist 
ideal of the “people in arms” (vooruzhennyi narod), they persisted for many months against 
the mounting pressure from the apologists of the more conventional – regular – style of war-
making and mass mobilization.  
 
Taking great pains in tracing the lineaments of the enemy’s real visage, the insurgents 
brought into sharp relief the anti-governmental sentiments of the peasantry. “[T]he 
mutineers,” reported one frightened teacher from the village of Smelianka of the 
Zvenigorodka district, “came out with an address, indicating that they are fighting not against 
the Germans, but only against the Russifying (russifikatroskogo) government of Hetman.”
377 
According to the official documents, the agitation was directed almost exclusively at “the 
existing regime” (protiv sushchestvuiushchego stroia) and the idea it epitomized; passed on 
through the spoken word and printed letter of “the former members of the abolished land 
committees, village teachers, sailors, [and] ensigns promoted from the semi-literate 
Cossacks-villagers,” this activity united those layers of the population, who saw their 
fortunes sink in the aftermath of the April coup.
378 In the light of this event the occupation 
itself seemed no more than a secondary source of discontent, its principal motivation 
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resulting from “the lack of confidence in Hetman” and the repeal of the Rada’s Land Law.
379 
The relationship between the Ukrainian State and the Austro-German military became thus 
unexpectedly inversed, for, however burdensome and exacting the latter might have been, 
their actions unfolded within stringent limits, bedecking like a semitransparent screen the 
unmistakable signs of the native entourage with its determined desire of the ci-devants to 
condemn the Revolution as History’s nightmarish aberration.  
 
Consequently, the popular ire, suppressed until now by fear, turned against the local 
supporters of the Hetmanate. “We shall wipe off all the katsaps!” an old Zvenigorodka rebel 
thundered in Tiutiunnyk’s presence, his rusty saber brandished high in the air.
380 Exhibiting 
but a limited ethnic identification, that derogatory term for the Russians (katsap) denoted, as 
Tiutiunnyk freely admitted, a composite category from “the punitive troopers, police [and] 
administration.”
381 In contrast to the Germans regarded with admiration and treated with 
esteem even in captivity, the latter could not expect to be given quarter by the victors. On 
June 30, for example, the rebels of Tarashcha slaughtered eighty officers of the Varta who 
refused to abjure their loyalty oath to the regime.
382 Two weeks later the “peasant throng” 
from the Volhynian village of Moshchanitsa attacked the Varta, killing few and taking the 
rest as prisoners. “The officers were bullied and tortured,” wrote the starosta of the province. 
“The head of the volost Varta Mindak was severely beaten and received heavy wounds. 
Several times the peasants led them to the execution spot and only the unexpected arrival of 
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the Germans and mounted Varta saved them.”
383 They were lucky in a certain sense, at least 
in comparison to their colleagues from the neighboring Starokonstantinov district (including 
the head of the district Varta), murdered in the last week of July by the rebellious peasants of 
the Avratin and Bazaliia volosts.
384 This targeted terror was effective enough to cause 
difficulties with the recruitment into the Varta; it became a byword with such a sinister 
repute that even the most staunch supporters of the regime thought it better to remain under 
the shade of anonymity than face the risks of public lynching.
385  
 
Still, staying quiet indoors while the storm was raging outside could not guarantee that one 
would get away unscathed. The rebels launched a veritable hunt against internal enemies, 
real or potential – or simply against the individuals whose revolutionary record might have 
been tarnished in one way or another: “kulaks” (khliboroby), informants, former officers, etc. 
Piotr Tocheny, one of the participants of the August battles in Nezhin district, recalled how 
the insurgents executed “some of the kulaks (kulach’ia) and the officers” – leaving, however, 
women alive – when the Germans forced them out of the village of Verkievka. Ensconcing in 
the forest, they killed a few more “kulaks-spies” brought along with their leader, a member 
of the local “Khliboroby Union”, Pavlushka.
386 The fate of a certain K. from Lysianka, near 
Zvenigorodka, was no less exemplary in its tragic end; son of a member of the 3
rd State 
Duma, he was seen helping a punitive detachment sent down to tackle the problem of peasant 
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disobedience. That collaboration branded him as a traitor in the eyes of the neighbors, who 
vented out their hatred for K. by murdering him along with his entire family.
387   
 
This target-specific violence, equated with “the general massacre of intelligentsia and 
supporters of the existing regime” by the state bureaucrats,
388 exposed the paradoxical nature 
of the stability that Skoropadsky’s government prided itself on bringing. Built at the expense 
of one group for the benefit of another, it only intensified the internal antagonisms which 
were tearing the social body apart. Arriving in the wake of a rapid and radical turnabout, the 
Hetmanate offered a restorationist model of order, combining discourses of paternalism and 
privilege with rabid anti-Bolshevism and becoming, in essence, the first crypto-fascist 
regime in Europe months before Horthy in Hungary inaugurated the trend. As the regime’s 
negation, the peasant unrest attempted to exact retribution upon those whose culpability was 
palpably established through their involvement in and capitalization on that vision – the 
“former people” made doubly former by succumbing to the temptation of Skoropadsky’s 
brief hiatus. Although temporary unsuccessful in eliminating the regime and its servitors, the 
rebels resuscitated the spirit of civil war in the fullest sense of the word – as a fight to the 
death of class against class militated for with lucidity of a Lenin and practiced with the 
sanguinary unscrupulousness of a Muraviev.  
 
Skoropadsky had given this war an additional impetus and provided it with a retroactive 
justification, which was turned to account in November 1918 when the peasants resumed 
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their attacks on the “agents of state power” abandoned to themselves by their German 
protectors.  
 
Yet, while reinserting the civil war dynamic back into the political rhythm of the day, the 
summer uprisings were not a mere sequel to the old show of the echelon war. They drew the 
countryside into the grand contest, opening new fronts and breaking new grounds on which 
the multi-dimensional struggle could now unfold. Its scope had changed and so did its 
composition, as the mostly city-based – if not city-oriented – radical Left began to work hand 
in hand with the peasantry, shedding its urban trappings along the way. With the shift in the 
center of gravity to the countryside, the old tactic of power conquest by small groups of 
armed revolutionaries – really an expression of the militarized party politics
389 – was 
abandoned in favor of a fully-fledged partisan war with thousands of peasants participating. 
This transition from parties to partisans meant that the period of disintegration was 
superceded and that the first important steps leading to the consolidation of authority were 
being undertaken. Subjected to the narrow regional confines and gestating among men wary 
of any “old-regime” discipline, this inchoate authority had naturally a long way to go before 
evolving into a bureaucratic abstraction; instead, it expressed itself in the form of a primal 
obedience to a charismatic figure, a practice surviving expediency of the moment. This 
proved of paramount significance, since those “band leaders” (Bandenführer) of the official 
communiqués and the atamans of subsequent lore would soon become the central feature of 
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Ukraine’s complex landscape and the indispensable ally of the Bolsheviks in their endeavor 
to fill the void left in the wake of the German departure.   
 
Post Scriptum  
In the second half of September, with only one week between them, two watershed events 
occurred, proffering a symbolic closure to the developments of the past months. The neutral 
zone, for some time the major destination area for many discomfited Ukrainian insurgents, 
became the scene of a spirited activity undertaken to impute upon the zone’s newcomers 
appearance of a proper army. The task, technically supervised by the Ukrainian Bolsheviks 
with their shop set up nearby, was entrusted to the same old rebels, who had been with other 
insurgents through all the ordeals of the retreat and whose authority for that reason seemed 
beyond any doubt.  
 
Released on the 22
nd of September, the Order Nr 6 formally recognized the results of their 
efforts. Scattered across a 500-mile narrow stretch, of varying strength and quality, disjointed 
insurgent groups were to be assembled into two divisions, christened inconspicuously the 
First and the Second Soviet Ukrainian divisions.
390 The former of the two was placed under 
the command of Krapiviansky, flush with honors and already oblivious of the earlier 
misadventures. Vladimir Aussem, an old Bolshevik and a former member of a deceased 
Tsikuka, received the command over the 2
nd, by and large skeletal, division. Whether this 
arrangement was harking back to the hybrid nature of the force aborning, or, on the contrary, 
whether it intimated at the program of overcoming the insurgency by dint of collaborative 
effort was not clear from the Order itself. This point, which would become increasingly more 
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important with the passage of time, was overshadowed by the urgencies of logistics for the 
time being, as those present on the ground were stirring themselves up in a nearly euphoric 
commotion in foretaste of return.  
 
Far in the south, on the external edge of the Dnieper’s great bent, Makhno and his comrades 
were making a name for themselves as audacious raiders of the Austro-German outposts and 
merciless exterminators of Hetman’s domestic supporters. Ineluctable as always, he appeared 
where no one thought he would dare to appear – first in Marfopol, where he destroyed a 
police platoon,
391 then in his native Gulai-Pole, taking the Austrians stationed there by 
complete surprise, capturing most of them and then, in a gesture of eccentric generosity for 
which he would become soon famous, releasing them all, having presented each with fifty 
rubles and a bottle of vodka to boot.
392 His popularity grew as did his numbers – going from 
the order of few individuals to tens and finally into the hundreds. When another local 
celebrity sailor Shchus’ joined up with Makhno, bolstering him with his own men, repute and 
experience, Makhno evolved into a serious threat for the authorities, who began assembling 
substantial forces lest the ‘bandits’ roam unpunished.  
 
Sometime in late September, at the end of their remarkable run of successes, Makhno, 
Shchus’ and hundreds of other peasant rebels (three quarters of whom were without arms) 
found themselves surrounded in Dibrivka forest by a large Austrian detachment. The 
prospects of surviving, let alone of a breakthrough, seemed bleak and even Shchus’, 
courageous and resolute as a rule, let the despair get the better of him. Makhno, however, in 
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ostentatious defiance of dolorous realities, remained cheerful, devising plans of attack and 
exhorting his comrades to follow his lead. He aimed at nothing short than his enemy’s utter 
rout, astir with vengeance and aglow from excitement.  
 
Seeing him act and hearing him talk, men around him – including Shchus’ – felt as if 
electrified, ready to slough their doldrums and make a determined lunge for victory. It was at 
that point that Makhno’s comrades, the fellowship of the equals thus far, approached him 
with a key announcement. “From now be our Little Father, our Bat’ko,” they said. “Lead us 
thither where you alone know.”
393 Next morning, before the sunbeams could betray the 
furtive movements of the sylvan hostages, Makhno struck with every available man, 
breaking through the Varta cordon, reaching the village and then turning back to hit the 
Austrians from the rear. Outnumbered and outgunned, the law-defying desperadoes carried 
the day absolutely, dispersing the Austrians and shoving their “kulak” allies into the waters 
of the Volchaia river. Although over forty huts were set alight by the fleeing side, the 
sentiment of unhindered jubilation reigned among the peasants. They gathered around 
Makhno, now rapt in some inflammatory speech, and chanted in unison – as did his 
lieutenants on the eve of the battle: “Be our bat’ko, free us from the tyrants’ yoke!”
394 Before 
long the new honorific title rang in all neighboring villages, replacing Makhno his given 
name and gaining in a powerful mystic of its own.  
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Marking the birth of Makhno’s legend, the moment signaled the advent of great insurgent 
atamans, capable not only of surviving the onslaught of the state, but also of challenging its 
organized power and of assuming some of its functions in its absence.  
 
With the partisans poised to enter Ukraine from the north and the insurgents gnawing the 
regime from the inside, two leading participants of the pending Bolshevik campaign arrived 
on the stage. Seizing on the great opportunity presented by the German Revolution, they 
would meet up in the interior of the country and create in the act of fusion the Red Army of 
the Soviet Ukraine.  
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“Petliura ide na Hetmana”: Anti-Hetman Uprising and the Ukrainian Revolution 
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Standard histories of the Russian revolution begin with February and October 1917 in 
Petersburg, then segue into the Civil war beginning in the Volga in the summer of 1918 and 
expanding to involve the fight with Kolchak in the east, Denikin and Wrangel in the south, 
Mannerheim in the northeast. Peasant uprisings are not ignored (including Makhno’s coming 
role in the defeat of Denikin), though the greatest attention is given to the Siberian uprisings 
and the Antonovshchina that follow the defeat of the Whites. Central Europe and its own 
revolution appear only with the Polish invasion of 1920 and with Bolshevik dreams of a 
successful German revolution, and fears that its failure would doom them. This unified 
narrative, centered around the Russian revolution of 1917 and its fate through the final 
Bolshevik victory in 1921, does not leave room for a distinct Ukrainian revolution. This 
chapter’s close analysis of the Ukrainian November helps us see the distinctiveness of the 
Ukrainian process, for Ukraine was the place where the Russian revolution of October 1917 
and the Central European revolution of November 1918 came together. In Ukraine, the 
Central European revolution was not an external event, but an integral part of the 
revolutionary process with Galicians fighting with “Russian Ukrainians”, Poles pursuing 
their national dreams, German and Austrian troops providing arms to all sides, and 
distinctively all-Russian political parties and movements seeking to maneuver in the unique 
complexity of the Ukrainian revolution. 
 
Part I: On the Eve 
From the moment of its rather histrionic inception, Hetman’s regime had its destiny 
intimately tied to the outcome of Ludendorff’s gamble in the West. Its ability to survive the 
crisis of the summer 1918 only reflected the relatively advantageous position of the Germans  
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in the global conflict and their continued will to keep the gains of the Brest-Litovsk to 
themselves. Similarly, its vitiation in the late fall of 1918, more farcical than tragic, stood in 
a direct relationship to the defeats, suffered by the armies of the Central Powers in France, 
Italy and the Balkans.  
 
The German Soldier in Ukraine began to betray his all-too human weaknesses – to a 
perspicacious eye, to be sure. Following the visit of the German army barrack in Kiev in 
October of 1918, Vsevolod Petriv, the future minister of defense of the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic (or Ukrainian National Republic – the UNR), had an opportunity to remark on the 
growing hostility and misunderstanding between the sergeants and the privates, subordinated 
to them. “Secretly from other officers, he claimed, [sergeants] were expressing fears that the 
rank-and-file would soon stop obeying them, held, as they are, by a mere hope of home-
coming.”
1 Many openly described regime in Kiev as a puppet of the German reaction, 
necessary evil that needs to be tolerated for the time being. Otherwise, “the war weariness… 
the desire of rest at all price and the pining for the homeland – such were the principle 
characteristics of the German army mood in Ukraine.”
2 
 
On a concrete level, the war fatigue manifested itself in the increased frequency of 
insubordination, especially among the units that were culled out to be transported to the 
Western Front. The first egregious case of disobedience took place in the late September, 
when a unit in Kiev, fully boarded and on the brink of a seemingly inevitable departure, took 
control over the train and refused to budge any further. The train had to be subsequently 
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cordoned off with machine guns and the refractory soldiers were compelled into surrender.
3 
It must be admitted for the sake of fairness that the German Army remained a functioning 
and relatively monolithic body; despite all odds, the Revolution, as one contemporary 
asserted, “did not take them in.”
4 Yet, its offensive spirit, the bravura that donned its 
reputation petered out into the air of the Ukrainian yellowish autumn.  
 
Corrosive developments of the far more dramatic character had overtaken the Austro-
Hungarian Army during the last months of the Great War. Comprised of eight infantry and 
two cavalry divisions – about ninety-three thousand soldiers altogether
5 – the Imperial and 
Royal Ukrainian Contingent literally began to crumble under the combined duress of the 
news from without and mutinies within. As early as of August 28, the entire 20th Rifle 
regiment revolted in protest against its transfer to the Italian front – and had to be forcibly 
disarmed.
6 Particularly peremptory were the Hungarian troops, whose conduct compelled 
Army Command “Ost” to order the speedy evacuation of the Yekaterinoslav province.
7 
Turkey’s approaching surrender and the anticipation of the Allied landing on the Black Sea 
littoral divested the continued participation in the war of all practical sense – such was at 
least the widespread reaction among the servicemen and younger officers upon receiving the 
news of yet another debacle. What was intended to be a measured and organized retreat from 
the occupied territories by the last week of October took the form of an improvised flight.  
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An observer of those days would likely be startled by the celerity with which the 
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Army proceeded – the fact that hardly jibes with the 
painful perseverance of the Empire through the years of the European slaughter.
8 On October 
29
th, the Ukrainian municipal government of Odessa was accosted by the delegation of 
soldiers and low-ranking officers from the 76 Infantry regiment, a predominantly Hungarian 
unit.
9 Ostensibly incensed by the arrears in payment, the delegates, nonetheless, demanded to 
be sent back home, being placated only when concessions were granted. Zitkovszky, the 
Imperial council in Odessa reported on the similar scene in the quarters of the Army 
Command – the Hungarian 6
th Hussar Regiment appealed for “an evacuation without delay,” 
elucidating it, quite significantly, by the minatory developments to which their Fatherland, 
Hungary presumably, found itself exposed.
10 Within two days the spirit of insubordination 
spread to other units of the 2
nd Cavalry Division, forcing the commanding personnel of the 
Army “Ost” to abandon Odessa in the direction of Winnitsa.
11 The journey of the Army top 
brass looked more like an exodus and some, including Field Marshal Lieutenant von Böltz, 
the former commandant of the Odessa military district, never managed to reach their 
destination. Traveling alongside the mutinous troops, emaciated and powerless, he shot 
himself dead in the vicinity of the Razdelnaia (ukr.Rozdil’na) station under the 
circumstances which had grown only more occult with the passage of time.
12 
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It is fair to say that the order of Alfred Krauß, the nominal commander of the Army “Ost,” to 
commence the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Ukraine proffered but a formal 
articulation of the fait accompli – that decision being taken, rather characteristically, on the 
same day (November 7
th) that Zitkovszky laconically informed his superiors in Kiev and 
Vienna: “All the remaining parts of the XVII and XXV Corps which had not yet left Ukraine 
are in the full uprising; Bolshevik sentiments reign.”
13 The departure – if that word is deemed 
suitable to the disorderly commotion of the soldierly masses – was accompanied by acts of 
violence, directed equally at the officers and the local populace. Emil Prinz Fürstenberg, the 
Habsburg diplomat in Kiev, did not fail to remark, that, with the officers either apprehended 
or chased away, men of the 5
th Rifle Regiment, easily yielded to the temptation of making an 
easy profit at the expense of the civilians.
14 Writing in her diary on the 5
th of November, 
Elżbieta z Zaleskich Dorożyńska confirmed the verity of Fürstenberg’s incriminations, in her 
role as a victim to be sure: “The soldiers, infested with Bolshevism, retreat and plunder just 
as during the best Bolshevik hours. [They] desolated the pear orchard, took the cereal; 
destroyed the entire estate; furniture, those pitiful remnants that were returned by the 
peasants, was reduced to splinters.”
15 Frustration with the moment, fatigue with the war 
strangely coupled with the simultaneous habituation to its bellicose solutions – that usual 
litany of factors must have certainly contributed to the misconduct of the army; but so did the 
complete break-down of communication between the units and the Army Command.
16 
Stranded in the Steppes of the southern Ukraine, abandoned in the decrepit railroad stations, 
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deprived of all external guidance, the soldiers of the moribund Danube Monarchy saw the 
monster of the peasant revolt arising before their eyes. Akin to the ten thousand of Anabasis, 
yet without the benefit of Xenophon’s pathos, they had to extricate themselves from the 
hostile territory and find their way home. 
 
The situation was further aggravated by the sheer financial inability of the successor states to 
defray the costs of transportation. To pay for their return trip, all too often the rank-and-file 
had no other recourse but to sell their uniforms and weapons,
17 nullifying the rather 
unimpressive results of the eight-month long efforts at disarming the populace. The reports 
of the district elders, sent in early November to Kiev, are riddled with images of the soldiers 
purchasing their passage with the appurtenances of the non-existing Army – a splendid 
testimony of the powerless solicitude plaguing Ukrainian Authorities. “The Austrians on 
their way home, read the typical telegram to Akkerman from the head of Hetman’s Varta in 
Volhynia, abandon, sell the state property, arms and machine guns…” 
18 Medium size 
railroad stations – Rovno, Dubno, Radzivilov (ukr. Radyvyliv) – suddenly became sites of 
the thriving arms trade, attracting inhabitants of nearby towns and villages alike.
19       
 
Such “casual” treatment of state property could hardly be reduced to mere acts of individual 
dereliction – substantial part of the responsibility should be attributed to the Army Command 
in Odessa and, indirectly, the Army High Command (AOK) in Baden. Caught by the speedy 
disintegration of the Army, unwilling or unable to maintain order and to nip mutinies in the 
bud, commanding officers in Odessa, Zhmerinka (XXV Korps) and Yekaterinoslav (XVII 
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Korps) simply left the entire military inventory in the hands of local authorities and the 
Germans – putatively “against receipt.”
20 Yet, as Graf von Spannocchi, the Imperial and 
Royal military plenipotentiary acrimoniously remarked in his memorandum, “… the Army 
Commando ‘Ost’ did not demonstrate sufficient care for the … salvaging … of the rich… 
military stock,” forsaking therefore all possibility even of its partial recovery.
21 Its value 
appraised somewhat conservatively between 2 and 3 billion German Marks,
22 the property 
left behind was seen by the retreating troops as a legitimate compensation that would cover 
their expenses and enable them to reach their destination; Spannocchi went on to assert that, 
once the support from the Ministry of Finance was no longer forthcoming, the Army 
Command left the property lie idle with a deliberate, albeit implicit intention of letting the 
Army men avail of the resources in the manner they knew best.
23 
 
The Ukrainian population had certainly profited from the distress of the retreating Army, 
purchasing, purloining and, wherever possible, coercing the soldiers into surrendering their 
weaponry. Given the demoralization of the Austrians,
24 the task of coming into possession of 
the army inventory – which, weapons aside, included grain, vegetables, flour, straw, clothes, 
rubber, leather wares, etc
25 - did not seem to raise insuperable obstacles. What cannot 
however be ignored is the fact that the nominally sovereign Ukrainian State, whose officials 
were explicitly entrusted with keeping an eye over the property of the Habsburg Army, failed 
so dismally to turn the situation to its advantage, or even to recognize the possibility of such 
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action. That passivity of the State appears all the more astounding – and instructive – against 
the alacrity, with which its subjects were arming themselves. To what end? For the purposes 
of protecting themselves, as was averred by the members of the Jewish squad (druzhina) in 
Kiev’s Podol?
26 Out of the relatively innocuous admission that the State had failed to provide 
for the necessary defense of its citizens, or, what appeared more likely, in order to forestall 
the prospect of being caught by surprise once the social war breaks out? In any event, 
“lacking faith in the firmness of regime” as the Bundist Moshe (Moses) Rafes put it,
27 all the 
nameless inhabitants of Skoropadsky’s Ukraine were only expediting its imminent collapse.  
 
Inefficacious and weak as it was, the regime in Kiev was certainly conscious of the parlous 
situation in which it found itself once the defeat of Central Powers became inevitable. To 
prevent the eruption of the civil disorder, tantamount in the parlance of the time with the 
advent of “Bolshevism,” Skoropadsky’s government appealed to Berlin and Vienna with a 
plea of postponing the withdrawal of occupying forces from Ukraine – “until the efforts of 
the current regime would…succeed in establishing sufficient armed forces of its own…”
28 
Through its emissaries in Paris, Washington and Jassy (Iaşi) in particular (Romania 
technically being neutral), Hetman’s Foreign Ministry attempted to establish rapports with 
the Entente with a double intention of soliciting its permission for the continued German 
presence and of expediting the arrival of the victorious troops to replace the flagging and 
exhausted armies of the German-Austrian bloc.
29 Similar steps in the direction of reaching an 
understanding with Wilson on the issue of German troops were taken by private 
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organizations – namely, by the Union of the Agriculturalists, the association of Industrialists 
Protofis as well as the conclave of the Russian political Émigrés with a cumbersome name 
“Assembly of the members of the legislative chambers.”
30  
 
In the course of the few weeks preceding the outbreak of an uprising, Skoropadsky’s 
government feverishly sought to augment its scanty military means through the politics of 
unabashed class favoritism. Although its previous project at creating a guard unit, recruited 
exclusively from the sons of wealthy peasants (the Serdiuk division) fell short of 
expectations,
31 on October 16, 1918 the regime announced the resurrection of an ancient 
Cossack Host – “…in all of the places of its historical existence in Ukraine, founding its 
pillars upon the rebirth of the chivalrous Cossack traditions that our history preserved for us 
from the bygone days of … Ukraine’s struggle for its freedom…”
32 Written in the language 
that was at once populist and paternalistic, the Universal postulated the establishment of 
eight Cossack settlements (Kosh), each consisting of several regiments. Led by the Cossack 
atamants, these regiments would draw its personnel from the certified scions of the Cossack 
families; under certain conditions exceptions could be made to other orthodox subjects of the 
Ukrainian State.
33 Despite the fact that the newly established institution was subordinated 
directly to the persona of Hetman, it revealed an aspiration to devolve defense 
responsibilities from Kiev to the periphery, and simultaneously to concentrate means of 
defense within the reputedly conservative, pro-government elements of the social body. 
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Simultaneously, the regime endeavored to tap the resources of the unemployed Russian 
officers, dawdling idly “between the restaurants and the cabarets”
 in provincial capitals and 
mestechkos.
34 To that end, it had created the so-called “Special Corps” with an aim of 
parrying possible attack from the north – or, “of fighting the anarchy in the frontier zone,” in 
the language of Hetman’s officials.
35 The feature that rendered this military formation 
distinct from all other units of the Ukrainian Army laid in its overt appeal to the “anti-
Bolshevik” forces, who were otherwise unwilling to serve under the banner of the Ukrainian 
State and Ukrainian Sovereignty; operating according to the principles of the Imperial 
Russian army, clothed in its uniform and subjected to its ranking system, the Corps would be 
intentionally sequestered from the Ukrainian regular troops, lest the contact proves 
detrimental to its far from unquestionable loyalty.
36 However consistent with the new 
national politics of the Hetmanate, that project with its stentorian, “Great Russian” overtones 
stemmed to no small degree from the sheer desperation of the regime, which had neither 
succeeded in becoming an embodiment of the nation, nor in striking felicitous bargain with 
one of its key classes.   
 
Not that it had greater fortune in courting the apologists of Russia “One and Indivisible”; the 
officers of the former Tsarist army preferred either to persevere through the hardships or to 
join forces of Denikin in Kuban. Few privately financed druzhinas (squads) came into being 
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as well – those led by colonel Sviatopolk-Mirskyi, generals Kirpichev, Rubanov and others.
37 
Small and often at loggerheads with each other, they would, ironically enough, be among the 
last defenders of Skoropadsky’s state, the uncanny witnesses of its ignominious collapse.  
 
The erosion of the Hetman’s authority, engendered by the approaching defeat of Germany 
and its allies, manifested itself not only in the aforementioned proliferation of the para-
military officer squads, the growing inability to keep the immense traffic of men, arms and 
goods under benevolent surveillance of the State or in the numerous instances of 
insubordination within the institutions nominally subordinated to Skoropadsky’s government. 
On the level of reception, so to speak, the process of political and administrative 
“rarefaction” was accompanied by the widespread sense of uncertainty and insecurity. 
Reports containing hardly credible information permeated diplomatic correspondences of the 
highest order and were often taken at their face value. On October 18
th Hauschild, the 
General Council of the Wilhelmine Kaiserreich in Moscow apprised his colleagues in Kiev 
that the Soviet government had amassed a force of ten thousand strong on the border with 
Ukraine;
38 three days later that unit, dangerously skulking behind the screens of official 
politics, grew into the army of 40,000 volunteers, definitely poised to march on Kiev;
39 
Antonov-Ovseenko, the person who probably knew the actual state of affairs better than 
anybody else, placed the combined strength of the two Insurgent regiments at 3,500 men.
40 
Zitkovszky, an otherwise reliable and conscientious source, presents an altogether eccentric 
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figure of 250,000 in ascertaining the size of the Denikin’s force,
41 magnifying its real 
numbers by the factor of eight.
42  
 
Such consistent proclivity to dwell in the realm of tendentious, phantasmagoric data, 
reflected more than a failure of the intelligence as an epiphenomenon of an ubiquitous 
institutional deterioration. Having communicated to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs the information, derived from the “Ukrainian-national parties,” Emil 
Fürstenberg recognized that “the depicted situation, by no means free of hyperboles… 
characterizes after all the reigning sentiments inside the national circles…” Adverting to the 
dangerous proximity of the two Don Army Corps, he describes them to be products of “the 
lively fantasy of the local Publikum, overly susceptible to the alarmist news” (“…der 
lebhaften Phantasie der für Alarmnachrichten überempfindlichen hiesigen Oeffentlichkeit 
entsprungen…”).
43 The charged environment of an impending clash produced quasi-
apocalyptical expectations, granting herewith the authorization to lurid, sensationalist rumors 
– rumors, in fact, that looked too implausible to be untrue. 
 
Kiev, the city beset by fears of immanent Bolshevik invasion, relieved by hopes of the 
salutary Entente intervention, was growing oblivious of the distinction between the facts and 
hearsays. A coup appeared all the more likely that the Germans were turning deaf ear to the 
Ukrainian affairs – the principle question being: who will dare the strike first? A war of 
words, the prefatory sparring between the Nationlists and “the Great Russians” ensued, with 
one side incriminating the other plans to subvert current mode of government. Dmytro 
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Dontsov, inspired or incensed by the descent of the “Muscovite” politicians from the north, 
by the proliferation of recruitment agencies, exhorting population to embrace the idea of 
Imperial restoration, even posited the day of the putsch – the fateful 7
th of November.
44 On 
18
th of October he entered in his diary: “The rumors of the coup d’état by the monarchists are 
not subsiding. The Russians are becoming ever more impetuous…”
45 The date of an 
anticipated “monarchist” action arrived without much commotion, precipitating no sigh of 
relief however. A certain mysterious Russian General suddenly entered public imagination. 
Sent by Denikin himself,
46 he was putatively charged to coordinate activities of secret officer 
organizations with an ultimate objective of throwing them into the fray of the battle when the 
opportune moment would come.
47 The mystery surrounding Denikin’s emissary acquired 
qualitatively new dimension, when on the 13
th of November Golos Kieva (“The Voice of 
Kiev”) published an order, attributed to Denikin himself (to the great astonishment). “On this 
day,” so the order went, “I take the command over all armed forces… All officers, found on 
the territory of the former Russia, are declared mobilized.”
48 The Austrian chargé d’affaires 
echoed this “order” in his weekly account of Ukrainian events, supplementing it with new, 
admittedly picturesque and entertaining details – namely, that Denikin decided to move his 
headquarters to Kiev and that Hetman as a result would have to content himself with a 
position of a mere Corps Commander – Lieutenant General, presumably.
49 How Hetman 
agreed to such capitis deminutio, mused the diplomat, still remains an unresolved riddle. 
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The “Great Russians” attempted to reciprocate in kind, thought with less success. Most of the 
information, concerning antigovernment activities of the “National forces” – the Ukrainian 
National Union in particular – originated in the province, accentuating, therefore, the depth 
of the urban-rural divide that was to play such a crucial rule in the dynamic of subsequent 
events.
50 Against the urban landscapes of Kiev or Odessa, putatively dominated by the forces 
of restoration, was juxtaposed Ukrainian village, whose population had shown itself 
dangerously receptive to the ideas of Vynnychenko and his followers. The rumors of the 
uprising, planned by the National Union ultimately reached Hetman’s Ministry of Interior, 
and Vynnychenko, fearing the arrest, went to see Skoropadsky to assure him of his loyalty to 
the regime and of his admiration for the persona of Hetman.
51 That visit seemed to have 
acted as a poultice on Hetman’s overexerted nerves – if provisionally so – but the press 
remained unconvinced and continued to treat the reading public with unambiguous 
insinuations of the forthcoming cataclysms.  
 
What in that unremitting circulation of rumors was the result of “oversensitive imagination” 
and what should be seen as a carefully-staged provocation is impossible to ascertain and, for 
that matter, secondary to the conspicuous willingness in lending attentive ear to the oft-
unsubstantiated information. One, of course, could immediately advert to the failure of the 
news agencies in maintaining control over the distribution of the reputedly reliable data. 
“These are all grapevine news” wrote a contemporary, “for we are cut off from the world: 
                                                 
50 Dichotomies, metonymically related to the aforementioned City-Village divide abound; to that latter one 
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Kistakovsky’s intention]…” (Vynnychenko, 423)  
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neither railroads, nor mail, nor telegraphs or telephones, nothing functions.”
52 Mysterious 
doppelgänger of an approbated fact under normal circumstances, the rumor transformed 
itself into an exclusive ersatz in the absence of anything else. In Kiev, moreover, it served to 
fabricate an atmosphere of suspicion, evolving into the motive force behind the acts. Hetman 
and his entourage, Generals and the bevy of “imperially-minded” officers, Ukrainian 
socialists and their Galician instructors – all were taking part in a complex game, trying to 
outwit each other, to execute the counter-strike before the strike, the counter-putsch before 
the putsch. “You know,” Skoropadsky confided his fears on the eve of the November events, 
“they – the “genuine Ukrainians” (“shchyrye”) – wanted to arrest me the other day, but I told 
them, that it would not be worth an effort, since the disturbances would only grow in strength 
as a result.”
53 On November 15 all the heightened anxieties of political actors converged in a 
single point: Hetman issued his famous Charter, proclaiming unity with Russia on the federal 
basis
 and simultaneously, the members of the newly-established Directorate declared his 
government to be deposed.  
 
But what about the provinces? How was the country-side affected by the German 
misfortunes in the Argonne Forest and the Austrian on the banks of Piave River? Which 
informative misinformation conditioned decisions of the peasants and which – of the 
landholders? Did the experience of the summer 1918 and the brutal suppression of the 
Tarashcha-Zvenigorodka uprising convince the population in the hinterland of the inefficacy 
of an armed struggle against the resolute authority – fear that was shared by many a member 
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of the Ukrainian National Union?
54 Despite continued requisitioning and punitive raids, 
peasantry, however, remained highly receptive to the vicissitudes of the regime; by no means 
reconciled with the return of former landowners, the villagers were living in anticipation of 
an suitable moment to “right the wrongs” they had suffered under the politics of the 
Hetmanate. Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, remembering ostensibly tranquil and warm autumn days 
in Volhynia, unmistakably recognized the weightiness of the situation:  
…and yet, despite all these charms, we were not – I remember that well – 
beguiled even for a minute by their illusory and calm safety… Our eyes were 
accustomed to seeing through. The face, smiling in the moment of our arrival, 
would turn into a growling grimace behind our backs. Some peasant women 
said: ‘When I see that the lord (pan – M.A.) passes through the village, I start 
bleeding inside.’ Others added: ‘I had tasted the hour of freedom –we do not 
need more. Now we know what to do.’
55   
 
The peasants quaffed with relish words of the National-minded propagandists, still, as 
Zitkovszky observed in his memorandum to Burian, the Imperial and Royal Minister of the 
Foreign Affairs, they evince preference “not only for the Nationalists (“Nationalukrainer”) 
but rather… for everyone, who would promise them landed estates, as soon as possible 
against [the wishes] of the despised current government of the land magnates.”
56  
 
That this government, buttressed otherwise by the strength of German-Austrian arms, would 
be taken down as a “theatrical decoration”
57 the moment one of the partners loses the mettle 
to defend it was a truism that needed little justification. Commenting on the impending 
removal of the Austrian XII Corps from the Yekaterinoslav province, Berchem, the legation 
council of the German Foreign Ministry, marked with heavy premonition: “… the evacuated 
                                                 
54 Skrukwa, 343 
55 Kossak, Pożoga, p 117 
56  PA Karton 153 d 1 
57 Kossak, Pożoga, p 120  
  195
districts would become undoubtedly the focal point of the Bolshevik bands and revolutionary 
disorder, which would thus render the maintenance of order in the German-occupied 
territories all the more difficult.”
58 And so it was indeed, “when the Austrians were gone, the 
bands started to raise their heads up again”
59 for the collapse of the Austrian army sent an 
immediate signal of regime’s fatal internal weakness. The soldiers, as was indicated above, 
were not only unwittingly encouraging growth of the peasant militancy – by selling or 
exchanging weapons – but were often consciously exhorting villagers to action – by 
spreading proclamations or inciting discussions in “the sprit of definite Bolshevism.”
60  
 
Unsurprisingly, a series of peasant uprisings broke out in the southern, Austrian-occupied, 
part of Ukraine – or, better put, the peasant militancy entered a qualitatively new stage, for 
the land was blighted by the smoldering civil war through the entirety of the Hetmanate’s 
existence. Now, with his harvesting duties behind him (the great Feast of the Intercession of 
the Theotokos, Pokrov, symbolizing the end of the harvesting season and the beginning of 
winter took place on the 1
st (14
th) of October), denizen of a village in Yekaterinoslav 
province or in Podolia could consider taking up his gun and joining one of the errant bands – 
in the name of the revolutionary justice as he comprehended it. Makhno, for instance, active 
again since his return from Moscow in July of 1918, broke out of the encirclement and 
defeated a large Austrian punitive expedition in late September of 1918.
61 Encouraged by 
that success and buttressed by the good will of local peasants, by now bat’ko Makho declared 
an ambitious offensive against “1) German-Austrian-Hetman armed counter-revolution 2) 
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the Cossack formations of the White Don 3) the Drozdov’s unit [coming] from the direction 
of Berdiansk and 4) the troops of the kulaks and landlords, led by the agents of general Tillo 
[arriving] from the direction of Crimea.”
62 On the 16
th of October, his army, 200 strong with 
four machine guns defeated Hetman’s Varta and entered Makhno’s native village, Guliai-
Pole.
63 Ten days later, having allegedly suffered a setback at the hands of the Austrians, “the 
remnants” of his band somehow counted 500 well-armed men.
64 In reality, of course, 
Makhno’s resources were, by comparison to those of Hetman, practically inexhaustible, with 
every village within the purview of his actions constituting something akin to thae reserve 
army.  
 
Around that time another figure began claiming leadership in the peasant antigovernment 
movement – Nikifor (Nychypir) Grigoriev. Having already established his reputation during 
the turbulent winter of 1918, he receded from the forefront of history, ensconcing into the 
comfortable position of Hetman’s Colonel. Yet, sometime in the last weeks of September he 
proceeded to organize a rogue force of 120 daredevils from the village of Verbliuzhka in the 
Cherson province,
65 which was destined to become the core of his multitudinous army. 
Taking advantage of the decomposition that was steadily ruining Austro-Hungarian 
occupation Army, Grigoriev managed not only to conduct a series of raids against sundry 
representatives of authority, but to establish functioning contacts with numerous peasant 
armed bands of the South-western Ukraine, succeeding, it seems, in becoming the nominal 
commander of these disjointed units. It is questionable, whether he had nearly six thousand 
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men under his command by the time of the Uprising,
66 yet that he and his likes had 
eliminated traces of Hetman’s presence from the country-side of Khersonshchina remains 
beyond doubt. 
  
In October of 1918 Makhno and Grigoriev were two peasant guerilla leaders among many, 
showing perhaps greater promise than the rest. The enigmatic bandit Kudla (alternatively 
referred to as Piotr Ivanovich Golik or Petrovski), mentioned for the last time on July 31, 
1918
67 and since then considered to be dead, suddenly reappeared, yet not in his native 
Kanev district on the Right bank of Dnepr, but rather “somewhere in the Poltava province.”
68 
That territory, in fact, became one of the centers of the Insurgent activities, not least due to 
the fact that many participants of the ill-fated Tarashcha-Zvenigorodka uprising found their 
refuge in villages of the Left-Bank Ukraine; the old bands, added provincial starosta Noga, 
were augmented by the new ones, bands counting up to 100 men, as was the case in the 
Vasilkov (ukr. Vasyl’kiv) volost on the eastern border of the province.
69 In the German-held 
Right Bank Ukraine, away from the Russian frontier and the southern Ukrainian steppe, most 
of the antigovernment activity originally took the form of an agitation in favor of an uprising 
against the regime, rather than uprising itself;
70 large-scale assaults, however, did take place, 
if not directly against the German troops, then against members of the despised Varta.
71 
Danilo Terpilo from the small town of Tripol’e south of Kiev, the future ataman Zeleny, was 
certainly responsible for some of these deeds; more cautious than his South Ukrainian 
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counterparts and still seeking refuge in the thickets of the Dnepr luxuriating flora, Zeleny 
nonetheless enlarged the original coterie of 10 to a rebel detachment of 180 strong in the 
month of October alone;
72 bristling with hatred for the regime and its regional epigones, they 
were poised to reemerge from the tenebrous forests into the light of an open power struggle. 
 
Before proceeding any further, it may prove instructive to emphasize certain parallels 
between the Ukrainian situation on the brink of the anti-Hetman Uprising and that of Russia 
before the Bolshevik coup – if only perfunctorily so. Conditions that rendered it possible for 
Lenin to take up power, lying derelict on the street were all reproduced in Ukraine with 
rather befuddling precision. First, the relentless demoralization and dissolution of the armed 
forces, represented in Ukraine by the troops of the Central Powers, signified that the regime 
had lost its privileged position in maintaining internal order of the state. Concomitant with 
this was the dissipation of the last traces of the regime’s legitimacy even among those classes 
– landlords and wealthy peasants in particular – that greeted news of Skoropadsky’s coup 
with unmistakable glee. That the Hetman no longer exercised much power began to manifest 
itself in the profusion of paramilitary squads and unfurling conspiracies; his inability to 
preclude the coup of the Nationalists, despite possessing full knowledge of the ongoing 
preparations
73 – so redolent of Kerensky’s as he was facing the prospect of the inevitable 
Bolshevik takeover – further contributed to the sense of political transience. Into those 
glaring gaps in the political structure of the Hetmanate entered the armed peasant, long 
aggrieved by Skoropadsky’s reactionary land politics; the November Uprising, therefore, just 
as the opening salvos of “Aurora” one year and a week before that, took place against the 
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background of the incipient peasant jacquerie. Rather than bringing about collapse of 
Skoropadsky’s state, members of the Directorate had simply performed funereal rites over its 
body, long defunct to the fateful ignorance of its remaining partisans.
74    
 
Part II: Tale of the Uprising: Rashomon principle 
 
First, a minor “lyrical-philosophical” digression:  
 
Although but an illusion, persistence of one, internally consistent narrative is approbated 
with less dissent in the time of civic peace. The establishment of “events,” “incontrovertible 
facts,” “paramount developments” and the subsequent concatenation of “hundred visions and 
revisions” into the story of unambiguous becoming could well be foisted upon the populace 
by unabashed use of force, but could also creep into the spirits (from the outset receptive, as 
one knows, to experiencing “time” as progression of causes and effects) by means far less 
violent and all the more effective. The famous dictum of the liberal society in the state of 
halcyon accord with itself, one that enjoins its members to “agree to disagree” accomplishes 
exactly that: a smooth integration of competing worldviews into a common story, wherein 
the “discord” itself, the vaunted pluralism ossifies into the vertebra of yet another meta-
narrative.  
 
On the other hand, the eruption of the civil strife renders the task of monovocal narration 
close to impossible. The internal war, in particular when it eviscerations the social body with 
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perverse creativity, dividing it along the geographical, social, generational or even gender 
lines, represents more than the categorical rejection of a mere possibility of consensus; a 
watershed event, it proffers its participants not only the opportunity to seize the future, but to 
define the past, to discover it in fact, obfuscated hitherto by the systematic sabotage of the 
opponents. That struggle for the past, manifesting itself in an uncanny profusion of 
historically-minded subjectivities and a fortiori historically-oriented accounts of the present, 
engenders the split of the narrative nucleus into constituent, yet qualitative distinct elements 
– each claiming to be the pole of the new organization.  
   
Ukraine, from November 1918 on fully in the throes of the declared Civil War, exemplifies 
the complexity of this polyphonic situation. With the outbreak of hostilities, Skoropadsky 
had not only lost control over the land, but was equally divested of whatever privilege he 
possessed in disseminating information and thus in warranting the continuous passage from 
the past into the present. The difficulty, however, emerging from the proliferation of 
accounts, none more legitimate than the rest and all illegitimate to a commensurate extent, 
shall not be resolved by an imposition of a single storyline – all the less so that this 
contrivance of unity occludes the aforementioned key feature of the internecine conflict. 
Instead, one could attempt to overcome chaos of the age without creating the false sense of 
order by employing the narrative technique of Kurosawa’s Rashomon, that is, by recounting 
the story of the Uprising from three different perpectives: that of the nationalists (and, as a 
corollary, of the sparse supporters of the Hetman’s regime), that of the Germans, and finally, 
that of the armed peasantry. 
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The story of the armed conflict between the Ukrainian National Union on one hand and the 
Hetman forces on the other is probably least difficult to recount due on one hand to the 
relatively limited scope of operations and on the other to the articulate garrulousness of its 
participants. It is a tale, after all, of a military coup that Vynnychenko, Mykyta Shapoval, 
Symon Petliura and the number of officers of the Ukrainian army (col. Vasil Tiutiunik and 
gen. Oleksandr Osets’ky in particular) began to prepare once Hetman declared his intention 
to build a new, reputedly pro-Russian ministerial cabinet (October 19).
75 While 
Vynnychenko and Shapoval were trying at once to create an impression of their loyalty to the 
regime and to convince more hesitant members of the Socialist-Federalist party to support 
the anti-Hetman coup,
76 the military was infiltrating the “nationally-conscious” units of the 
Hetman Army with an aim of probing their readiness to fight and die for “the independent 
Ukraine.” One counted on the participation of the Railroad guard (zaliznycha viiskova varta), 
formed under the auspices of gen. Osets’kyi, the so-called Black Sea regiment 
(Chornomors’kii Kosh), stationed in Berdichev, the Zaporozhian division (Zaporizhska 
dyviziia) with the elements of the disbanded Gray division (Sirozhupannyky) on the eastern 
frontier of the Ukrainian state and, above all, on the recently recreated Sich Riflement 
regiment in Belaia Tserkov under the command of col. Evhen Konovalets.
77 They were all 
indeed created within the last few months as heralds of the Ukrainian national consciousness 
– and in that manner they stood in marked contrast to the eight territorial Corps of the 
Hetmanate, which in their core remained but the slightly modified and renamed units of the 
old Imperial Army.
78 The Sich Riflemen, the 1,500-strong body, consisted, of course, largely 
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of the Galicians – the fact that, despite the exemplary discipline of the unit, high level of 
literacy and the indisputable commitment to the national idea (as they understood it) was not 
of an unmitigated boon to the future Ukrainian Directorate.
79 The defeat of the Austro-
Hungarian empire appearing more certain every day, the Council, or, Rada of the Galician 
Sich Riflemen opted nonetheless to stay within the “Great Ukraine,” maintaining that “Kiev 
is more important than Lviv and that the transfer of one part of the regiment could lead to the 
situation, whereby Kiev is not taken and Lviv is not kept.”
80 Even though the available forces 
even under most auspicious circumstances could not have exceeded five thousand troops, the 
Ukrainian National Union decided to proceed with the revolt. On the 13
th of November 
representatives of the composite parties elected the 5-member Directorate (Vynnychenko, 
Petliura, F. Shwets, A. Makarenko and P. Andrievs’kyi) and on the 15
th, now safely settled in 
Belaia Tserkov under protection of the Sich Riflemen, the Directorate issued its famous 
Appeal,
81 disarmed the Varta and commenced its movement in the direction of Kiev.  
 
Two days later colonel of the Zaporozhian division Petro Bolbochan
82 arrested the entire 
staff of the division and took power in the city Kharkov, opening thereby another theater of 
military operations.
83 On the morning of the 18
th in the vicinity of Motovilovka (ukr. 
Motovylivka) one of the battalions of the Sich Riflemen met with the Hetman forces, 
comprised of the volunteer officer squad of Sviatopolk-Mirski (“Great-Russian” in its 
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composition) and the Ukrainian Guard Serdiuk regiment; the Galicians defeated their 
opponents so thoroughly that several days later the bulk of the Serdiuk division switched 
sides and joined the insurgents.
84 With those debacles – the loss of Kharkov and the 
subsequent occupation of Poltava, defeat at Motovilovka, the defection of the Guards to the 
side of the enemy, etc – Hetman’s state was reduced to Kiev, its environs and few centers at 
the intersections of major railroads.
85 Skoropadsky’s armed forces – consisting almost 
exclusively of the private officer squads, 3-4,000  men altogether – relinquished last 
trappings of the national Ukrainian army, as became evident from the appointment of the 
general F. Keller, a Russian nationalist (“ganz grossrussisch gesinnter General”)
86 and a 
staunch monarchist, to the position of the Supreme Commander with quasi-dictatorial 
prerogatives. At the same time, the number of the insurgents was growing exponentially, 
thanks to the influx of the peasants from the nearby villages. By the 21
st of November the 
regiment of the Sich riflemen was upgraded into a division; fortnight later а 50,000 strong 
Siege Corps of the Sich Riflemen was established that now included, besides the original 
Galician unit, the expanded Black Sea Division (formerly a regiment) and two peasant 
“Dnieper (ukr. Dnipro) divisions,” led by the atamans Zeleny and Oleksandr Danchenko 
respectively
87; all in all, the Galicians comprised now about three percent of the original Sich 
Riflemen.
88 In Novorossiia too, Ataman Grigoriev announced his allegiance to the 
Directorate and together with the partisan formation, dubbed in its newly acquired 
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“staidness” the Kherson Division, entered into the Southern Army Group of the Ukrainian 
People’s Republic, headed by general Grekov.
89 
 
“The Hetmanate was only waiting for a minor push to founder…[and] Kiev could have fallen 
two or three weeks sooner,” thought retrospectively Vsevolod Petriv.
90 Nonetheless, 
Skoropadsky held out till the middle of December. Rather than pressing forth to certain 
victory during the first week of the Uprising, forces of the Directorate floundered desultorily 
on the threshold of the “golden-headed” Kiev. Such indecisive circumspection shown by the 
troops of the Directorate, standing in such striking foil with their original élan could be 
exhaustively explained by one factor – the fear of German reprisals.   
 
That fear was anything but exaggerated, for, after all, against the few thousand that the 
Nationalists could originally rally to their cause, the Germans possessed an Army of over 20 
divisions, well-armed and still relatively well-supplied.
91 The Army Group “Kiev” was 
certainly the master of the situation, in comparison to which the spats and melees between 
the forces of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic and those loyal to Hetman looked petty and 
theatrical – an impressed strengthened by the fact that those skirmishes were taking place 
with an implicit permission of the German High Command. The Army controlled all the 
major cities and towns in the Northern, Central and Eastern parts of the country as well as the 
main railroads that it intended to retain at all costs – such at least was the meaning of the 
order issued by Kirchbach and the High Command in the immediate wake of the 
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Directorate’s coup (Nov. 15
th);
92 and although news of the revolution at home and the growth 
of the Soldiers’ Soviets was undermining the fighting abilities of the German soldiers, the 
officers still commanded authority among their men – exploiting, it seems, the feeling that 
without their expertise the entirety of the Army would be stranded in Ukraine and ultimately 
engulfed by the tsunami of revolution.
93   
 
Yet, despite the efforts of the High Command, the Army proved itself unable to remain 
monolithic in the face of the rebellious countryside. Stationed in all major railroad centers, 
the disjointed units of the German Army Group “Kiev” had to come up with the improvised 
solutions to the problems presented by the situation independently of the center. “Our 
connection with the center in Kiev becomes broken from time to time,” so began the German 
officer as Osyp Nazaruk was asking him to grant the Ukrainian troops an access to the 
ammunition depots in the village of Popel’nia, near Zhytomir.  
“Besides there is a infighting taking place up there between us, as you may 
know. For that reason we ourselves need to decide our position in the 
localities. As for your uprising, forgive me for saying this, but we do not 
know, if yours isn’t the most ordinary mutiny of the bandits, although you 
dub it ‘national’.”
94  
This skepticism concerning the nature of the Uprising aside, the German units in the 
province tended to assume “favorable neutrality” vis-à-vis the Directorate, above all during 
the first few days of the uprising, when the representatives of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic 
still exhibited necessary degree of ‘stateliness’ – so reckoned in the eyes of the officers and 
the soviets alike.
95 The agreement between the representatives of the Sich Riflemen and the 
German garrison in Belaia Tserkov, stipulating the non-involvement of the German soldiers 
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in the pending power struggle in exchange for the assistance in transporting German troops 
out of Ukraine,
96 set an early important precedent for the similarly worded concords with the 
plethora of other, isolated and home-sick, units of the German Army. 
 
All too often, however, neutrality remained but a formal word with no practical significance. 
The soldiers’ soviets, sympathetic to the revolutionary rhetoric of the insurgents, would often 
succumb to the temptation of assisting those latter in their conflict with the “Reaction.” An 
outstanding example of such support had taken place in Kharkov, where Bolbochan executed 
a coup with a connivance of the local garrison.
97 It is however rather characteristic that in 
Kharkov the said garrison remained all-powerful
98, forcing Bolbochan to evacuate the city 
once the soviet grew convinced that his reactionary politics would not warrant them a safe 
passage home.
99 They continued, nonetheless, to supply the insurgents with arms and 
ammunition, which proved crucial in the subsequent operations against Poltava and 
Chernigov.
100 On more than few occasions the German garrisons joined the ranks of the 
rebels.
101 
 
It seems that the task of remaining aloof in the unfolding struggle between the Petliurovsty – 
as the troops formally bound to the Directorate came to be known – and the motley 
concoction of a force (Voluneer squads, Varta, remnants of the territorial Corps) loyal to 
Skoropadsky’s regime was substantially easier in the province than in Kiev. Whereas the 
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German garrisons in Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav or Zhytomir could pretend to indwell the 
world untouched by the revolutionary developments in their environs, soldiers of the XXVII 
Corps and the Great Soldiers’ Soviet found themselves under the double duress from the 
Hetman Government and the Entente powers. Although the Soviet in Kiev expressly 
confirmed its desire to stay outside the “internal political conflict,”
102 the need to keep order 
within Kiev itself – “in the interests of the German troops”
103 themselves - gave 
Skoropdasky’s government enough leeway to start pressing the latter into the quagmire of 
the domestic war. Having recognized the value that the order possessed in the eyes of the 
Germans, Adrianov, the Kiev provincial starosta, composed on Nov 21 an appeal to the 
Soldiers’ Soviet wherein he intentionally accentuated the purely destructive essence of the 
Uprising:  
If in the action of the Sich riflemen one could discern certain political 
coloration, which in the light of decision undertaken by the Germany army 
hinders them from taking the side of the truly legitimate authority, then … the 
looting and murders, currently perpetrated in districts by the licentious and 
inebriated bands of peasants left without supervision on their own 
[emphasis is mine], could not be classified under the rubric of a  political 
uprising, having as an aim the  
reconstitution of another regime on the Ukrainian soil…
104 
 
When on Nov 23
rd a group of fifty strong suddenly appeared in the Podol district of Kiev and 
disarmed Hetman’s Varta, Adrianov’s words acquired an unpleasantly physical manifestation; 
even though no one interrogated the provenance of the gang, one automatically presumed it 
to be the van of the advancing Directorate troops.
105 Frequent news of German units being 
stopped and disarmed on their way home only further contributed to the growing solicitude 
of the German soldiers in Kiev. 
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On the 22
nd of November, a man with “a mysterious name” – Emile Hennot – claiming to 
represent Entente powers in Ukraine released a declaration, whereby Germany was enjoined 
to “preclude any infringement upon the cause of restoring order and reorganizing Russia”;
106 
as a consequence, the German Army stationed in Ukraine was charged with a hardly 
concealed task of suppressing the nationalist revolt.
107 Whether Hennot possessed any 
credentials of Entente’s plenipotentiary at all was doubtful,
108 but in those heady day one 
prudently decided to trust him – lest the recalcitrance in executing his will (or that of Entente) 
would lead to “an invasion from out of Rhine” or the imposition of a “hunger blockade,” as 
Major Jarosch, the chairman of the Soldiers’ Soviet in Kiev expressed it in his conversation 
with Osyp Nazaruk.
109 Combined, Hennot’s injunctions and the unremitting implorations of 
the Hetman’s government temporarily produced the desired effect: on Nov 25
th a small 
German force moved against “bands threatening Kiev,”
110 which had wisely avoided the 
battle.
111 A day later, however, troops of the XXVII Corps faced the regular troops of the 
Republicans, the Sich Riflemen namely; even if ultimately successful, the Germans were 
impressed by the performance of their opponent.
112 Following that incident, soldiers began 
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revealing “growing reluctance… to fight Petliura’s followers”
113, the development that 
constrained the Great Soldiers’ Soviet and the High Command to seek diplomatic modus 
vivendi with the representatives of the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic. According to the final 
draft of the agreement, parties involved established a demilitarized zone around Kiev; the 
few squads at the Hetman’s disposal were to retire into city, whereas the republican troops 
were required to move 20 kilometers westward of the besieged capital; the Germans, 
responsible for defending the population of Kiev, were given the right of using Ukrainian 
railroads without any hindrance from the newly established local authorities.
114 With 
Germans having thus tacitly recognized gains previously made by the Directorate, it became 
but a matter of time before Hetman would be abandoned to countenance his own doom. To 
be sure, the agony of the regime lasted yet another two weeks, but nothing, not even the 
lachrymose appeals of Skoropadsky’s Foreign Minister Afanasiev to governments in Berlin 
and Paris
115 could have altered its fate. When on December 12 a new agreement was signed 
in Kazatin (ukr. Kazatyn), whereby the Germans promised to desist from all further 
resistance to the troops of the Ukrainian People,
116 “everybody realized,” as Denikin 
apodictically wrote, “that the end had arrived.”
117  
  
On the surface level “the issue [of the anti-Hetman uprising – M.A.] was settled by the 
Germans.”
118 Yet, the decision to forsake Hetman was anything but the result of the internal 
power struggle between the Soviet and the High Command; it stemmed rather from the 
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apprehension, dread indeed, conceived at the sight of the “Bolshevik-anarchist” popular 
unrest.
119 That fear only grew in force insomuch as the strength of Army Group Kiev was 
diminishing and the demoralization of units, hitherto disciplined and obedient, began 
reaching distressing proportions. Daily assaults on the German trains, the chilling stories of 
the strayed soldiers being robbed, mutilated and killed by the rebellious peasants, the loss of 
communication with Berlin and finally, the seemingly incontrovertible evidence of Entente’s 
reluctance to become involved in the Ukrainian affairs conjured up the stygian perspective of 
a complete annihilation. The Directorate was certainly aware of those fears, aware of the 
hatred – “the primeval hatred and the thirst for vengeance, only the Slav is capable of 
feeling” as one contemporary put it
120 - and used it barefacedly as its most valuable trump 
card in the dealings with the Germans. Thus Osyp Nazaruk recalled not without relish having 
to mention the proximity of “bandit Shabelnik” in order to preclude local German garrison 
from abandoning their outpost and leaving the nearby ammunition stores in the hands of 
Hetmans supporters. The name of Shabelnik, true bugaboo of small German detachments, 
strewn across Ukraine, had its effect, for not only the guard in Popelnia (ukr. Popil’nia) 
(where the depot was located) “but also the crews in Khvastov and possibly in neighboring 
[towns]” were alarmed lest they be attacked unprepared.
121 
 
The story of Shabelnik had an almost anecdotal quality, but the frequent allusions by the 
members of the Directorate to the capacity of the “peasant masses” of turning violent and 
destructive unless the Germans stay neutral were only too substantial and grave.
122 This was 
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more than an example of diplomatic blackmail. Uncertain of its own strength, the parallel 
government of Vynnychenko tried to create an impression that it alone possessed enough 
authority to keep riotous peasants under control. In this respect, the text of the agreement, 
signed in Kazatin, is revealing, for in exchange for Kiev, still held by Hetman, it obliged the 
“Ukrainian-republican Directorate” to assist the evacuation of the remaining German troops 
by all possible means. “The reciprocal relationships between the German and Ukrainian 
troops,” the text solemnly declares, “should be determined by the respective higher military 
authorities in the spirit of friendly cooperation (im Sinne eines freundschaftlichen 
Verhältnisses).”
123 In other words, desperate to leave the land that threatened to devour them, 
Germans yielded to the simple principle that any government, however objectionable its 
agenda may be, is preferable to chaos.  
 
Nonetheless, neither this agreement, nor the previous one, drawn and signed on Nov 28
th, 
could have done much to stench the wave of peasant aggression against the Germans. The 
very opportunity of fighting the German, broached by the anti-Hetman insurrection, as 
Nazaruk freely concedes, constituted one of the sources of popularity that the Directorate 
initially enjoyed.
124 Conciliatory appeals of the Ukrainian People’s Republic to “the soldiers 
of the liberated German nation”
125 proliferated side by side with excoriating, minatory 
ultimatums, similar to those that the ataman Grigoriev, technically acting on behalf of the 
Directorate, sent to the Soldiers’ Soviet of Nikolaev (Mykolaiv):  
In the name of the proletarian troops, commanded by me, and also in the 
name of the People that rose up against the bourgeoisie, I declare that you are 
not democrats but traitors of Russia. If in the course of four days you do not 
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leave Nikolaev and Dolinskaia, not one of you would see your homeland 
again; at the first provocation you will be annihilated as flies, without leaving 
a trace, as flies.
126 
 
Overwhelmed by such verbal barrage, the Germans thought it prudent not to try their luck 
and left the city without any resistance to the self-styled “ataman of Kherson and Taurida.”  
 
Not all members of the rapidly dwindling German army in Ukraine were fortunate enough to 
leave the land relatively unscathed – far from it. Friedrich Shrader, well-known German 
orientalist, left a unique account of the journey through Ukraine that he had to undertake in 
December of 1918. Reaching Nikolaev on Dec 18 – incidentally retaken by the Germans – he 
and the thirty odd civilians boarded a train that carried units of the 15 Infantry division 
towards Brest-Litovsk. On the way he encountered German soldiers who had been disarmed 
by the roaming bands. “Their courage is broken,” Schrader wrote of the soldiers that arrived 
from Yekaterinoslav. “Thirst for life, the burning longing for home grappled them. This is 
the tragedy of the German Army in the South East.”
127 His own trial – his and that of the 
civilians and soldiers traveling along – came on December 27, as the train, inching forth 
towards Kiev, reached Fundukleevka junction, 40 miles to the north of Yelisavetgrad. There, 
in the vicinity “made for an ambush,”
128 the company found itself enveloped by hundreds of 
petliurovtsy dressed “in the yellow gray Cossack frocks.” 
129 Their demand to surrender all 
available weapons was met shortly after the soviet had taken a vote. As if to emphasize the 
depth of dejection, Schrader thought it apposite to remark: “Some frightened spirits among 
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the Germans remind their comrades to give away everything and to conceal nothing. For it 
was announced, that anyone, who retains weapons and ammunition, would be shot by the 
Ukrainians.”
130 One of the leaders of the petliurovtsy approached the disarmed Germans, 
mare astride, looking “more like a gang boss in his sheepskin, yet, with his tall fur cap akin 
to the commander of regular troops.”
131  
  
Their tribulations were hardly over at that point. Few miles further down the road, the train 
of disarmed and crestfallen Germans was stopped again and all the civilians were ordered out 
and goaded into the last wagon. There, shivering from cold, fear and hunger, one realized 
that their collective fate was about to be decided. With no signs of hope divulged by the surly 
Ukrainian guard, Schrader wrote, he and other alleged representatives of the German Capital, 
were biding farewell to their lives.
132 They were, however, salvaged by the courage of one 
Swedish nurse, who blandished her way to the Commandant. From that latter she managed to 
obtain a promise that he would protect the hostages, “if he is capable of it.”
133 He was indeed, 
but at a high price: the innocently named “custom revision” turned out to be but a mere 
euphemism for the renewed plunder. That did not seem to have mattered much, since the 
travelers were grateful to have come alive from that “true Nibelung abode, where murder and 
cruel guile reign.”
134   
 
To say that the German authorities were unpleasantly surprised by the relentless assaults on 
the returning troops even after the Directorate installed itself in Kiev is a grotesque 
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understatement. When a large detachment of the German soldiers reached the station of 
Goloby “without any provision and almost without any clothing on,”
135 Berchem issued his 
strident protest in Vynnychenko’s presence, warning that if those attacks would continue, he 
“would have to renounce any responsibility for the future stance of the [German] troops and 
would have to consider undertaking further steps.”
136 The righteous indignation of the chargé 
d’affaires and his threats, by all means empty, were misplaced, since the Directorate was 
hardly ever in the position of imposing its will on armed peasant formations; it bore only 
partial responsibility for the authorization of the peasant violence, providing the peasant 
more with a pretext than a cause of action. Conversely, one could question, together with the 
Polish historian Włodimierz Mędrzecki, the extent to which armed countryside proved 
beneficial to the advancement of the Nationalist agenda.
137 In the light of subsequent events, 
in fact, it is tempting to say that the popular revolt was at the root of the Directorate’s 
ultimate undoing.  
 
What was the mechanism that set the countryside ablaze and how did members of the 
Directorate managed to convince first the Germans and then themselves that the peasant 
masses were decidedly on their side? As was shown above, Ukrainian province was already a 
witness to the scenes of sanguinary confrontations between variegated representatives of the 
formal authority – Germans, Hetman troops, self-defense squads, organized by solicitous 
squires – and the errant peasant bands. Issued on the first day of the uprising, Petliura’s 
Universal to the Ukrainian People with its summon to arms, was somewhat redundant; yet, 
the Universal was used by the peasants, even if retrospectively, as a justification for the 
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onslaught on the most despised embodiment of Skoropadsky’s ancien regime – the landlord. 
That “Petliura is marching on Hetman” (‘Petliura ide na Het’mana’) or that “Petliura is 
calling up against the Germans” was often all one needed to know about the reality of the 
anti-Hetman insurgency to feel the urge of partaking in it.
138 In his report to the director of 
the State Varta Akkerman, Kiev provincial starosta captured the simple and simultaneously 
efficacious proceedings of the rural revolt:  
It has been established that on the road Romanovka-Mikhailovka all is quiet; 
there are … no troops of Petliura, yet he declared mobilization in all of 
Belgorodskaia volost; male population from 20 to 35 years of age is being 
called up, but de facto not more than a half responds… the populace expect 
Petliura’s arrival and is ready to join up with his bands at any moment; there 
is even a possibility of an unauthorized action (samochinnoe vystuplenie)
139 
Such “unauthorized actions” brought into relief the nature of peasant self-mobilization. 
Caught by the spreading conflagration of the peasant jacquerie, the government of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic found itself compelled to appropriate slogans of the rural 
insurrection, confirming the impression among its opponents of being fundamentally 
“Bolshevik” in its core.
140    
 
Vynnychenko correctly regarded the surge in the peasant “unsanctioned” participation as an 
example of the so-called Petliurovshchina, albeit he anachronistically discerns in that 
phenomenon manifestations of Petliura’s own dictatorial ambitions.
141 In November and 
December of 1918, Symon Petliura represented an opportunity to avange the social wrongs 
of Skoropadsky’s order; he was a slogan and “a myth” in Bulgakov’s phrase, splicing 
together sundry parts of the land through the informal willingness of the rebels to see 
                                                 
138 Vynnychenko, 439 
139TsDAVO f 1216 o 1 d 72 l 622 
140 Denikin, v 4, 354; Vynnychenko’s belated remorse of not being adequately “soviet” and “Bolshevik” is 
known well enough.  
141 Vynnychenko, 438-441  
  216
themselves and be seen as “Petliura’s boys” (petliurovtsy) – and so, as indicated above, 
without any substantive prodding from the Directorate. Thus, on November 30, Hetman’s 
Varta spotted in the vicinity of Darnitsa (ukr. Darnytsia) a group of 50-60 men who razed an 
estate of a local landowner under the pretense of being “petliurovtsy.” A few days before that 
– on November 21 – another group of local peasants perpetrated a similar deed, except that 
in their case the aim of declaring oneself petliurovtsy consisted in murdering the volost 
alderman (golova).
142 The comportment of a 30-person strong band, operating in the 
Novomoskovsk (ukr. Novomoskovs’k) district, articulated the meaning of early 
Petliurovshchina with clarity bordering on cynicism; still as nameless “marauders,” they 
distinguished themselves by laying waste to the mansion of some Bergman; yet, the attack on 
the outpost of local Varta was preceded by the timely declaration of loyalty to Petliura - an 
operation at political “camouflaging” all the more luring that its execution brought no change 
to the band’s complete autonomy.
143  
 
In the environs of Kiev, however, the peasant militants were acting within the framework of 
the inchoate Republican army, ultimately as a part of the Siege Corps. “Masses of the 
Ukrainian insurgents flocked to us from all sides,” wrote Nazaruk in his recollections;
144 
converging in Belaia Tserkov, the peasants more often than not tended to bring along their 
own weapons, providently buried under the ground in the aftermath of the summer 
debacles.
145 Initially, the officers of the mutinous Republic, Galicians by and large, tried to 
inform them with some semblance of the regular army, dividing the newly arrived into 
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companies and regiments
146 and even providing some of the luckier ones with few available 
military uniforms.
147 Yet, as the numbers of the rural insurrectionists grew first into 
thousands and later into tens of thousands, the problem of keeping order became simply 
intractable. With only a thin patina of proper military organization, detachments of armed 
peasants were essentially left to their devices, fully responsible for the procurement of 
provender and ammunition.
148     
 
Under those circumstances peasant para-military formations, embodied by their atamans, 
retained complete operational – and a fortiori political – independence from their nominal 
superiors in Belaia Tserkov or in Winnitsa. Ataman Grigoriev represents a classical example 
of a peasant warlord, who, despite his formal affiliation with the Directorate pursued his own 
agenda right up to the moment of his defection to the Bolsheviks; given his importance for 
the forthcoming months, the story of his evolution is best left for the subsequent chapter. 
Case of Zeleny is no less interesting, especially in the light of his geographic proximity to the 
centers of the Directorate’s power. Hiding in the forests of the southern Kievshchina, he 
reemerged in the second half of November to take control over Tripol’e, Rzhishchev and 
Obukhov (ukr. Obukhiv), while the local German garrison – so read one of the dispatches to 
Skoropadsky’s ministry of the Interior – looked away with conspicuous indifference.
149 The 
mastery over his native turf thus assured, Zeleny moved north in the direction of Borispol 
with an alleged intention of severing communication between Kiev and Poltava.
150 
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Meanwhile his force – 1,500 well-armed men – became recognized as the 1
st Dnieper 
Division and that of his lieutenant Danchenko as the 2
nd Dnieper Division. Reckoned as a 
part of Evhen Konovalets’ Corps, Zeleny’s men were stimulated as much by the visions of 
the Soviet power as by the perspective of loot in the event of Kiev’s fall; when refused the 
entrance into the vanquished capital, Zeleny hoisted the flag of mutiny and without further 
ado declared himself on the side of the Communists.
151 
 
The superficiality of the formal rapports established between the Republicans in Belaia 
Tserkov and the entire motley slew of local atamans was reflected in the diverse nature of 
their political strivings. It was clear, though not always admitted by the Directorate, that, as 
one anonymous agent of Shulgin’s AZBUKA put it, “the peasantry will not be swayed by 
[mere] reclamations of sovereignty (samostiinymi lozungami).”
152 On the contrary, the 
countryside operated under the vague amalgam of ideas and practices alternatively 
designated by their adversaries as “Bolshevism” or “Anarchism”; Schrader called it 
“nationalist Bolshevism,” an alleged “contradictio in adjecto,” which, nonetheless, 
manifested a certain political truth.
153 Other observers, equally hostile to the Ukrainian 
Republicans and their self-mobilized rural allies, cognized the inherent tension within the 
“movement,” prophesying, quite correctly, the triumph of the “Bolshevik tendencies” over 
the “Nationalist elements” – that triumph expressing itself either in the collapse of the 
Directorate or its subsequent radicalization in the direction of the extreme left.
154  
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That phrase – peasant “Bolshevism” – should be treated with utmost circumspection if to 
avoid grafting upon it features of a coherent ideology. The problem in defining the politics of 
peasant militancy stems from its allegedly inconsistent, desultory, apolitical character – for, 
bereft of the apposite terminology, the carriers of urban culture, our main purveyors of 
observations, were inclined to misconceive peasant actions and thus to associate them either 
with impervious irrationality or with the aboveboard and brutal practicality. “In the vicinity 
of Poltava district” stated the provincial starosta in his telephone exchange with the Deputy 
Director of the State Varta “one notices the formation of the robber gangs of the fairly 
significant size, possessing nothing in common with the political movement, but striving to 
benefit from the opportune moment for looting in the district all the same.”
155 At once cause 
and consequence of the state collapse, this opportunism of the otherwise “platform-less” 
peasantry became the axis around which the revolt in the province, as experienced by diverse 
types of rusticating urbanites (former zemstvo members, squires, large landowners, etc) had 
been understood and subsequently narrated. Commenting on two raids by peasant “brigands” 
that took place in early November around Starokonstantinov, Kossak-Szczucka had given 
this narrative its most laconic form: “The two assaults, though devoid of the political 
background, inaugurated days of crisis for our environs. From that moment on, misfortunes 
upon misfortunes befell us – like a runaway horse.”
156  
 
Although often distorted by class-based prejudice, the oft-repeated affirmations of the 
supposedly apolitical essence of peasant insurrections betoken, nonetheless, the 
quintessential fact of the peasant political life – namely, the staunch denial of the urban 
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politics, of the rules it established for the execution of political moves and of the language it 
proffered for their justification. It is precisely that denial that reveals itself in the persistence 
with which authorities designated peasant troops as “bands.” The provenance of documents 
may well change, the language remains invariable – “die Banden” of the German reports 
became bandy and shaiki in the affidavits to Skoropadsky’s Ministry of Interior; respectively, 
the uprising was often qualified as the “mere bandits’ riot” (zvychajnyi bunt banditiv).
157 The 
use of the term signified more than readiness to violate limits of legality, delineated by the 
rapidly expiring Hetman’s regime; the Directorate’s regular troops, after all, were also 
culpable of committing treason and thus of transgressing the law, yet the epithet of a “band” 
was hardly ever applied to them.
158 Rather, rhetorical functions aside, the notion of a “band” 
mirrored the essentially improvised and self-reliant character of the armed peasant 
organizations, the absence of any higher authority, responsible for coordinating activities of 
the rebels – the phenomenon closely related with the “elemental,” or, to use another much-
abused term, “anarcho-syndicalist” vision of the Soviet democracy.  
 
While the pillaging of the estates, burning of the mansions, assaults on representatives of the 
central, city-based, authority seemed to have divulged naked opportunism of the rural 
insurgents, the cruelty of the bands invoked the specter of bestial irrationality, inherent in the 
popular revolt. Examples abound; “in dozens male colonists [in the area of Aleksandrovsk - 
M.A.] are murdered, shot, hacked to pieces, decapitated and hanged by the local Russian 
populace,” stated the report of the District Committee of the Black Sea Germans, submitted 
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to the Association of the German Settlement and Migration in Berlin;
159  Kossack-Szczucka 
graphically described the tragic fate of the local notables and their families from some small 
hamlet in the vicinity of Avratin.  
The three men, the woman and the child were tortured in the most frightening 
manner for hours on; their skin flayed, piece by piece and without their toes 
and heels, walking on bleeding stumps instead of feet they were driven across 
the snow, as their tormenters were cutting off their remaining members. The 
dolorous cadavers… were thrown off in the woods … where they remained 
for few days before being found by the relatives.
160  
As he was waiting to encounter formidable “colonel Malishevs’kyi,” Nazaruk was reminded 
of the rumor that the said ataman “likes to carry around his belt the recently severed head.”
161 
The head was not flaunted this time and the peasant leader actually happened to be “a 
cultured and experienced person” – but that hardly changes the point. Real or imagined, the 
acts of violence were meant to be seen and talked about – they had to appear spectacular. No 
doubt emanating from the morbid exhilaration of being unfettered by the Revolution and its 
karamazovian imperatives, signifying to no small extent the collapse of norms and the 
subsequent Dionysian relish in license, the ostentatious cruelty functioned as the reservoir of 
“bad repute.”  Spearheading the advance of the peasant troops, their alleged penchant for 
torture and brutality was supposed to precipitate the flight of the “aliens” – landlords by and 
large – from the land, sparing them the necessity of actual violence.   
  
Immensely complex by themselves, the themes, raised in the preceding discussion – the 
apolitical (or, anti-political?) nature of peasant uprisings, proliferation of disjointed and 
autonomous gangs, freshly severed heads and other gruesome details of peasant vengeance – 
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all tropologically constitute what one could call peasant or “folk bolshevism.” An oddly 
consistent system, it bedizened in the drapes of the modern revolutionary language the 
ancient dream of the Muzhitskoe Tsarstvo, the kingdom of the muzhik, the world without the 
prison, knout and the noose. According to this vision, the land, forests and rivers – all the 
resources of the nen’ka Ukraina – were to belong to the cultivator, subordinate only to his 
own conscience and the will of his immediate community (expressed either through skhod, or 
the local rada, that is, the soviet); in this environment, the clout of the city, that epitome of 
the central power with its foreignness, its violence, its unrequited absorption of money and 
men – was to be reduced to minimum, the city itself ultimately starved to death. The 
“national moment” was either entirely absent (as Denikin would have it)
162 or subservient to 
social issues, the language, that “muzhyts’ka mova” (the “muzhiks’ tongue”) serving only to 
accentuate the divide between the economic oppressor and the economically oppressed. 
Admittedly, the union between the nationalist Republicans in Belaia Tserkov and the 
“peasant masses” was anything but adventitious, for the Appeal to the citizens of Ukraine, 
made public on the 15
th of November, provided the uprising in the countryside both with the 
pretext and legitimacy. Yet, that confluence of interests was at best transient, maintained for 
as long as the leaders of peasant armies – Makhno, Zeleny, Grigoriev and the bevy of lesser 
atamans – standing in an infinitely closer relationship with their men than Vynnychenko or 
even Petliura could ever hope to attain, bethought it apposite and opportune to fight under 
Directorate’s yellow-blue banner.  
 
Before proceeding to the conclusion, it may be enlightening to “sublate” the artifice of the 
tripartite narrative division, introduced above. A brief look at the events in the ill-starred 
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Yekaterinoslav and its immediate environs offers an occasion to splice narratives back 
together in order to see how the various actors – Hetman’s forces, urban self-defense, 
Germans, Directorate’s army and the peasants – operated under constrains of the “real-time” 
mode (so to speak).  
 
Part III: Yekaterinoslav, city thrice besieged 
 
The population of Yekaterinoslav, a great commercial center and a capital of an Austrian-
occupied province, started to feel the breeze of the imminent changes sometime in the mid 
October 1918. The XII Corps of the Imperial and Royal Army, a unit hitherto marked by “the 
exceptional correctness,”
163  suddenly succumbed to the same disintegrating forces that were 
tearing empire asunder: news of the German defeats precipitated unalloyed mirth among the 
Czechs and the Poles, as well as the Hungarian officers of the “younger generations,” while 
causing sincere distress in the ranks of the “Austrian Germans” (die Deutschösterreicher) 
and all those who identified themselves “in the first place as the servants of the dynasty” – 
the remaining part of the Hungarians presumably.
164 The collapsing discipline led, on 
October 25, the Army Command “Ost” in Odessa to order the evacuation of the province.
165  
 
The departure of the Austro-Hungarian troops, at first surprisingly orderly – especially in 
comparison to the mayhem in Odessa – was accompanied by the simultaneous arrival of the 
German troops, retrieved from the other theaters of war. That, combined with the declaration 
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of the stage of siege in the second week of November seemed to have brought about 
temporary amelioration, as the most riotous elements of the former XII Corps were quickly 
neutralized and dismissed; significantly, a number of Austrian officers announced their 
intention to enter into the service of the German Army; few even endeavored to find 
employment in Hetman’s Varta and the inchoate self-defense squads.
166 This relative 
tranquility was but the lull before the storm, for the city and the outlying countryside were 
clearly arming themselves to be soon engaged in the Hobbesian struggle of all against all. 
Thus, Hetman with the German half-hearted connivance could rely on the forces of the VIII 
territorial Corps, consisting, however, exclusively of the officer cadres – about 600 men 
grosso modo – as well as the squad of the Denikin-oriented Russian officers.
167 The Jewish 
self-defense organization emerged, abetted through the unrestrained selling of guns, horses, 
military apparel and even armed cars by the Austrians,
168 - all this taking place despite an 
explicit ban on arms trade, decreed by the provincial starosta Chernikov; the German 
diplomatic and military authorities, having recognized the futility of such steps, attempted to 
divert the flow of unclaimed weaponry into the hands of the German colonists, menaced by 
the peasant “banditry.”
169 This effort had only partially succeeded due to the 
“incomprehensible” hindrances from the soldiers’ soviet, as the German Council in 
Yekaterinoslav Weideman ruefully admitted in his bi-monthly report.
170 
 
The violence broke out the very moment the last train with the remaining Austro-Hungarian 
soldiers rolled westward away (November 19). By that time, Germans had limited their 
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duties exclusively to guarding railroads, train station and the bridge across Dnieper, for their 
own immediate departure was no longer matter of doubt.
171 Hetman’s fateful Manifesto, 
retorted right away by the Directorate’s summon to arms split the VIII Corps into the “Great 
Russians” and the “Ukrainians”
172; the former, under the nominal command of the Corps 
General Vasilchenko joined the officer squads and, now about 2000 strong,
173 took over the 
post, the State bank, the Duma building, albeit only temporarily, and the city prison, from 
which the Germans had already improvidently released about 600 common criminals.
174 
Simultaneously a powerful worker movement divested Chernikov of all practical importance; 
the general strike culminated in the election of a certain Vasiliy Osipov, self-proclaimed 
Socialist, to the position of a mayor. Publicly disavowing any affiliation with the Bolsheviks, 
Osipov’s worker self-administration came to an understanding with the supporters of the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic, interchangeably referred to as either “Petliurovtsy” or the 
“Free Cossacks”
175 by analogy with the improvised troops of the late Central Rada. The 
leader of the latter, captain Vorobiev, (having ukrainized his last name into Gorobets),
176 
declared himself to be the Directorate’s representative in the city and thus the supreme 
commander of all Yekaterinoslav-based troops.
177 On the night of Nov 20
th the Free 
Cossacks succeeded in taking hold of the train station, and disarming the Varta.
178  
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While the city was being carved into the spheres of influence, the countryside grew 
simultaneously more distant and yet dangerously near. No one knew exactly what was taking 
place there, except that the land was periodically scoured by bands, “plundering, burning and 
murdering” without encountering any impediment on their way (after all, “the Ogre does 
what ogres can”).
179 First as an abstraction, albeit a frightening one, Makhno, the ataman of 
“the particularly sinister group” as one report rather flatteringly described him,
180 had routed 
small Austrian and German detachments to find himself menacingly abutting the left-bank 
rims of Yekaterinoslav. Both the local Bolsheviks, by now masters of the left-bank part of 
the city, as well as the “Free Cossacks” of Gorobets thought it expedient to bring Makhno to 
their side
181 and sent their emissaries to his makeshift “staff.” Makhno temporized, however, 
aware that the time was working to his advantage.   
 
By early December the confusion of the situation in the city was perfectly captured by the 
following dispatch to Denikin’s Information Bureau:  
The city is divided into five districts. The upper part is tenaciously held by the 
volunteer squads; area around the municipal Duma is in the hands of the 
Jewish self-defense. The ring of the Germans follows further. The volunteers, 
self-defense, and the Germans are enveloped by the troops loyal to Petliura. 
Finally, the whole city is surrounded by the Bolsheviks and the 
Makhnovites.
182 
 
That truly emblematic stalemate was soon disrupted by renewed outbursts of hostility. 
Goaded by Makhno’s agitators, the more radically-inclined group of the Petliurovtsy 
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attacked positions of the VIII Corps and forced those latter to seek refuge in the barracks.
183 
Foreseeing sanguinary reprisals, the officers of the beleaguered corps, about 1000 strong, left 
the city on December 10
th in the tenebrous silence of the night.
184 With Yekaterinoslav 
formally in their possession, the nationalists, nevertheless, had very little reason to celebrate, 
haunted as they were by the looming threat of Makhnovshchina. 
 
Concluding remarks  
 
Writing in the last week of October, Dr. E. Jenny, scholar of Eastern Europe and a self-
avowed ukrainophile, pondered over the viability of the Ukrainian statehood. That Kiev had 
by default evolved into a “counter-pole” to Moscow – the red capital epitomizing “social 
upheaval, economic communism, absolutism of the mob (“ochlokraitscher Absolutismus”) 
[and] world revolution” – in itself could not warrant continuing existence of the new polity; 
essential to the success of the project was the well-developed national consciousness and that 
appeared to be sadly lacking. “The low people (“das niedere Volk”) became indifferent to 
the national idea and feel only their economic disadvantage and social oppression; 
[meanwhile] the upper estate had grown almost completely estranged from the people 
(“Volkstum”).” The lamentable inability of the peasantry to identify itself with the nation 
coupled with the centrality of the socio-economic grievances rendered it not only all too 
susceptible to the ideas of “agrarian communism,” but in fact inimical to the very notion of 
the state (“staatsfeindlichen”). The only alternative to the Moscow-imported Bolshevism 
and the home-grown anarchism, Jenny concluded, could be found in the reconstitution of 
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Russia, the process wherein Ukraine would be given the role of a nucleus without having to 
sacrifice its autonomy.
185 
 
It took only a few odd weeks before one saw the full import of Jenny’s sibylline words. The 
Hetmanate fell down like a house of cards, yet the instigators of its collapse, the Nationalists, 
did not find themselves in a much better predicament. Their error stemmed from the fact that 
they had attempted to build the new state or usurp the old one by relying on forces 
responsible for its erosion. To the hundreds of thousands of peasants, who rose up in arms 
against the execrable rule of the “Great Russian reaction,” the uprising signified final 
emancipation from the callousness of the centralized authority; what they offered in its stead 
was the weak, consultative body of the village soviet, tuned in staunch defiance of the 
external world to servicing local needs. The centrifugal tendencies, inherent in the peasant 
military and political participation were not lost to the contemporaries; “having begun under 
the banner of the [Ukrainian] Sovereignty, the uprising metamorphosed into the solid 
Bolshevik movement,” claimed the dispatch to Denikin’s General Staff;
186 when asked to 
ascertain who the major beneficiaries of Hetman’s downfall were, Aleksandr Kotletsov, a 
refugee from Kiev and an informant at the High Command of the Volunteer Army, retorted 
without a hint of hesitation – “Bolsheviks” – alluding to the unrestrained land seizures and 
the spread of the peasant self-rule in the countryside.
187  
 
Yet, it would be completely amiss to judge “peasant Bolshevism” as the triumph of anarchy 
and disorder. What was at stake was not the destruction of authority per se as the reversal of 
                                                 
185 PAAA R 14387  
186 GARF f r-446 o 2, d 43, l 259-260 
187 GARF f Р-446 o 2, d 45, l 45-50  
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power relations between the city and the countryside. Of momentous importance, that shift in 
the center of political gravity was reflected in the unconditional failure of the Hetman’s 
urban “praetorian guards”
188 to keep their high-ranking Kievan client in power; it found its 
most poignant symbolic expression on the evening of December 14, when Kiev saw itself 
vanquished by the Ukrainian village. On that day, wrote Petriv, “the black earth flushed 
away the outlandish silt.”
189 No longer were the destinies of Ukraine decided in the 
metropolitan areas; they were replaced by a plethora of small railroad junctions, housing 
Ukraine’s most powerful atamans: Znamenka, Guliai-Pole, Tripol’e, Lozovaia…  
 
In the wake of Kiev’s fall, however, one thought relatively little about those “ruffians with 
arms and armies,” being instead engrossed by the impending arrival of the new government. 
For the next few days the order was maintained and the plunder averted, albeit with some 
difficulty.
190 Then again, the Germans had specifically allowed only the “trained 
(“ausgebildete”) troops” to enter into the conquered capital, placing the maximum number 
allowed at 15,000.
191 The Directorate had no choice but to comply with those injunctions. 
Garnering together all the regular troops it could muster, the Directorate moved into Kiev on 
Dec 19 amidst pomp and jubilation (for some at least it was a festive occasion). German 
military observers, dawdling diplomats of the deceased Austro-Hungarian Empire and mere 
gawkers in civilian clothing were left unduly impressed by the show. “The troops of the 
Directorate which had entered Kiev and which are said to consist of the East Galician 
                                                 
188 Тhe phrase was used by Manuilski in his interview to Pravda, Dec. 5 (TsDAHO f 5 o 1 d 151 ll 65-69) 
189 Petriv, v. 4, p 116 
190 KA Karton 723 Fürstenberg an Ludwig Freiherrn von Flotow, Kiev, Dec 22 1918 
191 AdR Karton 720, PAAA R 14388  
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regiments… evinced immaculate discipline...”
192 wrote Austrian legation councilor von Duré; 
Fürstenberg seconded him, stating that “by and by the republican Military makes not bad of 
an impression, occasionally even a rightly impeccable one (“recht strammen”).”
193 Himself a 
witness, Bulgakov immortalized the parade in his White Guard with the following 
description: 
In blue greatcoats and blue-topped astrakhan caps set at a jaunty angle the 
Galicians marched past. Slanting forward between bared sabers two blue and 
yellow standards glided along behind a large brass band and after the 
standards, rhythmically stamping the crystalline snow, rank on rank of men 
marched jauntily along dressed in good, sound German cloth. After the first 
battalion ambled a body of men in long black cloaks belted at the waist with 
ropes, with German steel helmets on their heads, and the brown thicket of 
bayonets crept on parade like a bristling swarm.  
 
In uncountable force marched the ragged gray regiments of Sich riflemen and 
battalion on battalion of haidamak regimens; prancing high in the gaps 
between them rode the dashing regimental, battalion and company 
commanders. Bold, brassy, confident marches blared out like nuggets of gold 
in a bright, flashing stream. 
194 
 
Meretricious without being motley, spry yet disciplined – so remembered the urban populace 
Petliura’s “uncountable forces” on the day they poured into the city.  
 
It could have hardly occurred to anyone at that point that the multitudinous peasant division 
of ataman Zeleny had encamped on the western outskirts of the city like the pechenegs and 
the cumans in the days of yore. The villagers, who had performed indispensable services 
during the siege of Kiev, were looking forward to remunerating themselves at the expense of 
the city dwellers; many had brought their carts along to carry away the well-earned booty 
                                                 
192 AdR Karton 720 Lage in der Ukraina, von Duré (Reg.-Rat), Kiev 
193  AdR Karton 720, Fürstenberg an Ludwig Freiherrn von Flotow, Kiev, Dec 22 1918 
194  Mikhail Bulgakov, The White Guard, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971), 
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back to their hamlets.
195 Against their expectations, however, Zelenovtsy were kept at bay in 
Sviatoshino, separated from the center by the ring of German patrols. Sorely disappointed, 
aggrieved indeed by the unrequited desire at avenging the injuries they had suffered at the 
hands of the city, the peasant insurgent lost confidence in the regime, whose advent was 
being feted few miles away. The Directorate had instantaneously acquired trappings of the 
“bourgeois” government, no less iniquitous than the toppled Hetmanate.  
 
For now Zeleny had to bid his time, yet his mind seemed to have been already set against the 
People’s Republic. With tens of thousands supporting him and his likes, the outcome of the 
forthcoming struggle would have left few in doubt.   
                                                 
195   AdR Karton 720, Fürstenberg an Ludwig Freiherrn von Flotow, Kiev, Dec 22 1918  
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Chapter III 
 
Between Bolsheviks and Atamans 
 
And it was not the Russian government 
that was chasing us out of Ukraine, but 
our own people, without whom and 
against whom, let me repeat myself, the 
Russian Soviet troops could have not 
occupied even one district of our 
territory.
1  
 Volodymyr  Vynnychenko 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Vynnychenko, p 485   
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“Makhno and Grigoriev – black scum, maddened froth of the muzhik anarchy, riot and 
gloom,” so wrote Evgeniy Trifonov (Brazhnev), a writer who shared a modicum of Babel’s 
talent and an fullness of his fate.
2 These words were penned down in the early thirties when 
forgetfulness and discriminatory remembering ossified into the measure of personal 
dependability, but in 1919 that seasoned revolutionary and high-ranking commissar of the 
Ukrainian Front knew very well that, for all their antic ways Makhno and Grigoriev 
exemplified the panache of the Revolution, the brutal spontaneity of its fighting spirit. The 
two, after all, basked in the rays of encomia on the pages of the Kharkov’s Izvestiia. “Send 
the regards of the 3
rd Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party to the Red Army Soldiers 
who fight for the Soviet Power…Long Live the Transdnieperian Division!” exploded the 
salvos of its booming lines, feting that most willful of a unit, one that had provided an 
organizational asylum to Ukraine’s great atamans.
3  
 
Eccentric as its commanders may have been, the Transdnieperian Soviet Division was 
certainly not unusual. In its composition and the practices employed by its ‘officers’ and 
rank-and-file, it reflected the nature of collaboration between the Bolshevik party and the 
armed Ukrainian countryside. “Soviet troops in Ukraine,” an investigator from the Ukrainian 
Peoples’ Commissariat of Military Affairs had tersely observed, “consisted by and large 
(about 90%) of the partisan detachments and insurgent troops, to which the Headquarters of 
the Front had hastily communicated a superficial form (vneshniaia forma) of regular units, 
but who had essentially remained partisans and insurgents with all their virtues and 
                                                 
2 E.Brazhnev-Trifonov, Kalenaia tropa (Moscow: Moskovskoe tovarishchestvo pisatelei, 1934), 179  
3 IVRKPU March 3, 1919 nr 59   
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considerable shortcomings.”
4 So was it indeed, yet the continuing reliance of the regime in 
Kharkov on the resources of the Ukrainian insurgency – a phenomenon much bemoaned and 
searchingly panned by the subsequent commentators of the Bolshevik retreat – stemmed 
from a certain ‘logic of events’ and a confining necessity of the political moment rather than 
a suggested slapdash and precipitous work on the part of the Ukrainian Front or of its 
commander, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko. The army, it must be admitted, was conceived in 
sin with an all too active participation of the Ukrainian rebel chiefs still months before the 
anti-Hetman uprising. With the frontier of Skoropadsky’s ephemeral state once crossed, the 
temptation to employ forces of the domestic rural condottieri acquired the dimension of 
strategic exigency: close to their native terrains, the atamans were the true purveyors of men 
and materiel. Short of its own regular troops, the Party had given in; yet, whatever 
reservation Kharkov may have originally born, it soon turned into euphoria as the war maps, 
like the tarot cards of the fortune-teller, seemed to prophesy victory and eternal life for the 
Soviet Ukraine while ringing the funeral tocsin to the authority of the ‘bourgeois-national’ 
Ukrainian People’s Republic (reduced by April of 1919, in Vynnychenko’s caustic 
expression, to a Gypsy encampment in wretched Volhynia
 ).
5 This chapter endeavors to 
present exactly that – a synthetic account of the Bolshevik experiments with the partisans in 
the pre-November days, of their encounter with the Ukrainian systemic rebellion and of the 
Red Army’s growing identification with the atamanshchina; in short, it narrates the story of 
the temporary symbiosis between Party and warlords, allowing itself an occasional hint in the 
direction of the fateful rupture to come.  
 
                                                 
4 RGASPI f 71 o 34 d 568 l 3 
5 Vynnychenko, 536-537  
  235
Part I: Modest Beginnings of the Ukrainian Soviet Army (September 1918 – December 
1919) 
Historiographical tradition or common prejudice holds that decisions pertaining to the lives 
of the ‘greatest numbers’ be taken at the corresponding levels of political responsibility. By 
that token, the army of the Soviet Ukraine appears to owe its existence most of all to the 
forceful prose of one Antonov, one Zatonsky or one Piatakov, working in the dingy 
provincial town of Kursk (although not as provincial and dingy as, say, Sudzha) to overcome 
the stubborn resistance of callous voenspetsy in Serpukhov, embodied by Vatsetis. Such a 
narrative, centered on various expressions of epistolary flair (telegrams, dispatches and 
Antonov’s ‘lachrymose’ entreaties, chelobitnye being the major source of support and 
inspiration), could have boasted some degree of comprehensiveness had the infrastructural 
collapse and the civic sabotage of the young Soviet republic not vitiated to the extreme its 
fledgling administrative muscles; the cabled words, quite simply, no longer sufficed to 
arrange armed men in columns and force them to march. The Civil War, in a certain sense, 
had thus reinstated part of the lost immediacy to the art of governance, phenomenon of which 
the ambulatory Trotsky embowered in his armed train was the best evidence.
6 This fact alone, 
it would seem, makes it all the more apposite to commence at the altitude of local politics 
and to recount the story of the Ukrainian front from the periphery inward – or from the 
ground up.  
 
                                                 
6 This idea should not be bypassed cavalierly; politics did revert back to the immediacy proper to the 
‘charismatic regimes,’ just as the Declarative Art, or the poetry of declamation had entered into a period of 
efflorescence – assuredly the result of aesthetics, inaugurated by the Revolution, it responded too to the 
changed rapports between the governing and the governed that the collapse of the bureaucratic invisible state 
had engendered; just as the presence of Nicholas II in Mogilev was unnecessary and ultimately deleterious, so 
was the visibility of Trotsky and the audibility of Mayakovsky indispensable and advantageous.    
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The exigency to think ‘local’ brings the scholar to the thin strip of no-man’s land between the 
German-occupied Ukraine and the Soviet Russia – to the territory, known as the ‘neutral 
zone.’ The origin of the Zone remains rather unclear – Vladimir Aussem, the future 
commander of the 2
nd Insurgent Division and the temporary head of Antonov’s Staff, 
recalled that the strip ‘was not established by an act of a definite kind.’
7 Another participant 
of those events, Sergei Petrikovskiy (Petrenko), the head of staff of the 1
st Insurgent Division, 
gainsays him in his memoirs by adverting to an enigatic ‘special accord.’
8 The German 
Political Archive does indeed contain a telegram dated May 8
th with a text of an agreement 
anent the Zone, concluded and signed in its turn on May 4
th of 1918.
9 It stipulated the 
conditions under which the demarcation between the two negotiating agents could be set up: 
namely, the creation of ‘neutral zone ten kilometers wide which none of the parties would be 
allowed to traverse.’ The German line (of the Ukrainian frontier, of course) was to run north 
from Sudzha, Liubimovka, Korenevo, Ryl’sk, while the Soviet border followed the line south 
of Mazepovka, Stepanowka, Nizhnaia Grunia, cutting the railroad-line Korenewo-L’gov at 
the midpoint, Sipylevka, Kremianoe, Malaia Loknia etc.
10 The corridor formed was to be 
free of all infractions; no foodstuff requisitioning was allowed, patrols were to keep 
themselves at the distance indicated, and even planes were beholden to circumvent that 
luminal stretch of land. One hoped, naively without a doubt, that the kilometers intercalated 
                                                 
7 RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 79; V. Aussem, „K istorii povstanchestwa na Ukraine,” Letopis Revolutsii, v. 5 
(1926): 8  
8 Sergei Petrikovsky-Petrenko “Neitral’na zona’ Chernihivshchyny vlitku 1918 roku” in Borot’ba za peremohu 
Radians’koi vlady na Chernihivshchyni, ed. A. Levenko (Chernihiv: Oblvydav, 1958), 120.  
9 PAAA R 14370 
10 The text only defines the borders in Kursk province; in the North, that is, in Mogilev and Chernigov 
provinces, the Soviet border was supposed to pass through Chechersk, Kamianka, Khmelevka, Birino, 
Ostrushki, Yesman’; the Ukrainian line was designed to lay through Shelukhovka, Robchik, Khomutovka, 
Khutor-Mikhailovskiy, Glukhov. (Bozhko, O.I. “Povstan’ska Armiia Ukrainy (Osin’ 1918 r.): Stvorennia, 
Organizacijna Struktura, Sklad,” Ukrains’kyi istorichnyi zhurnal 4 (2009): 109.   
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between the new polities of Bolshevik Russia and Skoropadsky’s Ukraine would allay 
present tensions and preempt future hostilities once and for all.  
 
The ideal encapsulated in the treaty had shown itself to be a sham before long. The form and 
the utilization of the Neutral zone were determined not in Berlin, Moscow or Kiev, but in the 
Zone and its adjacent regions; never steady, its width varied greatly, reaching forty 
kilometers in the vicinity of Oboian’ and shrinking to about ten around Ryl’sk;
11 neither was 
it stable, as the townships would pass from one statehood to another in order to lapse at the 
end to the status of political non-affiliation –Starodub in the former Chernigov province was 
subject to such vicissitudes in early September as were multiple villages of the Novgorod-
Seversk district.
12 Likewise, the border troops stationed there could rarely find a legitimate 
excuse not to procure ‘all the necessities of life’ at the expense of the local population – the 
trespassing was the order of the day and skirmishes, often with fatalities, were not 
uncommon.
13 The populace paid back in kind – by creating armed self-defense units or by 
hiring others to fight on its behalf, a relatively easy task, for both weaponry and errant 
francs-tireurs were in abundant supply.  
 
Of greatest importance to the future was the fact that the Neutral Zone with its ambiguous 
status evolved into a kind of refuge for the numerous “bands disavowing all authority” (ne 
priznaiushchie nikakoi vlasti bandy), as one contemporary document puts it.
14 These were by 
                                                 
11 RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 79; Adams presents similar figures – from 6 to 25 miles (Adams, 19); the oft-
repeated interval of 5-15 km does not seem to correspond to the real situation.  
12 TsDAGO f 5 o 1 d 151, l. 8 
13 RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 79; Petrikovskiy-Petrenko, “Neitral’na zona,” 120; Aussem, “K istorii 
povstanchestva,” 8-9  
14 TsDAGO f 5 o 1 d 151, l. 8  
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and large disjoined armed groups, fragments of the Red Guard units, routed by the Germans 
in the earlier engagements, and as little aware of the central Ukrainian Bolshevik authorities 
as the latter were of them. These partisans, frontier once crossed, would not as a rule disperse 
among the local villages, but, on the contrary, would ensconce as a unit. In his recollections, 
Aussem gives a list of some of the most notable partisan conglomerations (or of those that 
fell within the ken of Bolshevik knowledge):  the ‘battalion’ of “comrade Mikhaldyka” 
around Unecha (about 200-300 men), ‘battalion’ of Svistunov around Glukhov, ‘battalion’ of 
Mikhailovsky in the vicinity of Korocha, unanimous associations clustered around Kulaga 
(150 men), Rozoreny Khutory (200 men), Oboian’ (up to 300 men), etc.
15 The majority of 
the armed detachments consisted of the inhabitants of the Chernigov, Kiev and Kharkov 
provinces, although some ‘recruited’ denizens from the Zone itself.
16 Deserters from the Red 
Army, that ready-made material for the organized banditry, cut frequent figures in these 
unclaimed corners as well – they too were almost exclusively of Ukrainian stock, just as 
eager to return to their native lands as they were loath to fight for the Soviet Republic on the 
hills of the remote Urals.
17    
 
Spilling over Ukraine’s frontiers, great peasant jacqueries of summer 1918 precipitated 
another wave of armed refuges. Thus, among the first large groups reaching the Neutral Zone 
in the aftermath of the uprising was a 400-men detachment of Fiodor Grebenko, settled, 
according to some sources, in the vicinity of the Zernovo junction (modern Sumy oblast in 
                                                 
15 Aussem, “K istorii povstanchestva,” 9 
16 Petrikovsky-Petrenko, “Neitral’na zona,” 122-123; RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280, l 107.  
17 Aussem, “K istorii povstanchestva,” 9; RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 100-101; the companies of mobilized 
Ukrainians were apparently leaving lines of the anti-Czechoslovak Eastern Front en mass, as un-fractured 
entities; how they reached Russo-Ukrainian frontier – issue of great suspense – is not known to me.   
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Ukraine),
18 according to others, near the township of Korenevo, about 80 miles west of 
Kursk.
19 In late August – so claim subsequent official histories - Grebenko’s insurgents 
coalesced with a worker squad from the Kiev area, whose obstinate yet popular bat’ko Vasily 
Bozhenko would soon assume the informal functions of commander and provider of the 
Tarashcha rebels.
20 From about the same time dates the arrival of the Nikolai Krapiviansky, 
the supreme commander of the Nezhin rebels and the expert in the art of partisan warfare to 
be reckoned with; for the sake of completeness one needs to mention Nikolai Shchors, a 23-
year old youth, who had graduated from a Tsarist ensign into an organizer of the peasant 
guerilla in the Novozybkov uezd of the Chernigov province. 
 
The Ukrainian Bolsheviks were very quick to recognize the potential of the Neutral Zone; the 
All-Ukrainian Central Military-Revolutionary Committee,
21 assuming the functions of the 
earlier Insurgent Revolutionary People’s Secretariat (the famed Council of ‘nine’ – 
povstancheseskaia ‘deviatka’) moved to the region in the wake of the 1
st Congress of the 
CP(b)U in July of 1918.
22 Its headquarters were first in the small town of Seredina-Buda (ukr. 
Seredyna-Buda), currently on the Russian-Ukrainian frontier; later the Committee relocated 
                                                 
18 Aussem, op. cit., p. 8 
19 The former is maintained by Petrikovsky-Petrenko (Petrikovsky-Petrenko, “Neitral’na zona”, 115), whereas 
all official histories cleave pertinaciously to Soldatskoe as the final destination of the tarashchantsy (Istoriia 
pokhodov i boevykh deistvii 131-go Tarashchanskogo polka (1925), 8; the anonymous manuscript in RGVA f 
1417 o 1 d 280 l 78); neither does the date of their arrival remain uncontested – the same Petrikovsky affirms 
that the Tarashcha insurgents reached the Neutral Zone in the “first half of August”; the German detachments 
sent after the insurgents register their presence on the soil of the Ukrainian State till at least as late as August 
18
th 1918 (TsDAVO f 1216 o 1 d 75 l 125). It seems likely that the party of the partisans had reached the 
Neutral Zone sometime after August 20– there they stayed for a week or two before being transferred for the 
reorganization to the Kursk province.  
20 Istoriia 131-go Tarashchanskogo polka 44 Kievskoy divizii (Zhitomir: Izdanie Politicheskogo Otdela 44-i 
Kievskoi Strelkovoi Divizii, 1928 p. 16); RGVA f 1470 o 1 d 280 l 112 
21 Its members were Vladimir Aussem, Iuriy Kotsiubinskiy, Iuriy Piatakov, Vladimir Zatonskiy and Andrei 
Bubnov, the chairman – professional revolutionaries of stature and experience.    
22 RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 51  
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itself to the railroad junction of Zernovo.
23 If at the outset it preoccupied itself largely with 
the organization of local Revolutionary Committees (revkomy) aiming to provide 
organizational guidance and material assistance to the peasant rebels, from late August 
onwards – once the futility of an open confrontation with the occupying forces became 
manifest – its energies were unsparingly channeled towards the task of informing partisans 
stationed in the Zone with some degree of structure. A three-tiered nexus of informal 
rapports came into being, the Committee preferring to act upon the unruly body of armed 
ruffians through mediation of their commanders; few of those were outsiders, such as Gustav 
Barabash (‘Barabashev’), a Croatian officer and a future head of staff of the 2
nd Insurgent 
Division; though native of Ukraine and veteran of the earlier struggles with Rada and the 
Germans, Vitaly Primakov could certainly pass for an outsider as well in his quality of a 
fully-fledged Red Army officer. Accompanied by his “hundred” of the Red Cossacks, he was 
dispatched to the Neutral Zone not only to proffer lessons in horse-riding to the tattered 
footmen, but to provide the neighboring Military-Revolutionary Committee with the 
necessary protection, lest some unscrupulous partisan leader would treat the emissaries of the 
International Revolution with less than condign respect.
24 The majority, however, were 
seasoned partisans themselves, flesh and blood of their men, veritable “field commanders” as 
one could dub them using the media parlance of today: the refractory ‘Red Colonel’ Nikolai 
Krapiviansky;
25 the “unsung” hero of the Tarashcha-Zvenigorodka uprising, former ensign of 
the Tsarist Army Fiodor Gribenko (or Grebenko); ‘bat’ko’ Vasily Bozhenko, native of 
                                                 
23 Bozhko, “Povstan’ska armiia Ukrainy,” 111.  
24 ibid., 111; incidentally, in August and September of 1918 the ‘hundred’ of Primakov (actually, there were 
about 180 men in the unit) was the only regular unit at the disposal of the Committee.  
25 The sobriquet ‘Red Colonel’ or simply ‘Colonel’ was used by all warring parties – the Austro-Germans (PA 
X Russland Liasse XI Karton 153 d 1), the Volunteers (GARF f R-6497 o 1 d 4, etc) and the Reds, of course 
(TsDAGO f 57 o 2 d 76, ll 88-89).   
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Tarashcha district and a one-time carpenter in Kiev;
26 V. Balias; Kazimir Kviatek (Kazimierz 
Kwiatek), son of a Warsaw railroad worker and a long-standing companion of Shchors;
27 and, 
of course, Nikolai Shchors himself, that Gilgamesh of the Civil War and the “Ukrainian 
Chapaev,” personage so legendary that neither conditions of his birth nor the circumstances 
of his death could be espied in limpid light through the unctuous mist of Soviet hagiography.      
 
The gathering of the disjointed rebel detachments into the units of the future Ukrainian army 
unfolded in accordance with the principles of the “small war.” Appointed to the defined 
segments within the Neutral Zone, all of the aforementioned ‘field commanders’ – Bozhenko, 
Shchors, Primakov and others – would start invariably by setting up a ‘staff’ in some village 
and then proceed by sending small parties in search of armed vagabonds. Mikhail 
Demchenko, the organizer of the 6
th Korocha Regiment, commenced exactly in that manner: 
having encountered on his way to Zaiach’e a group of men commanded by the frontovik 
Grigoriy Molchanov,
28 he settled down in the village and asked Molchanov to establish 
contact with another local partisan chief, Besedin.
29 Zaiach’e had soon evolved into a center 
of gravity around which concentrated other chieftains and their men – assemblage large 
enough to claim for itself the name of the regiment sometime in September of 1918.
30 This 
‘re-organization’, however, was very limited in its extent for the inner structure of formations, 
constituting newly-formed – and ‘numbered’ – regiments remained unaltered: more often 
than not the leaders and the bat’ki would simply acquire a parallel title of kombat 
                                                 
26 Istoriia 131-go Tarashchanskogo polka 44 Kievskoy divizii, 16; RGVA f 1470 o 1 d 280 l 112 
27 Istoriia 130-go Bogunskogo polka 44-y Kiewskoy Strelkovoy Divizii (Zhitomir: Izdanie Politicheskogo otdela, 
1928), 5 
28 M. Demchenko, Shestoi povstancheskii (Moscow: Voen. Izd-vo, 1964), 25 
29 ibid., 34 
30 Bozhko, 112  
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(‘commander of the battalion) or that of kompolk (‘regimental commander’). On occasions 
the commander would be elected by the soldiers, or ‘appointed’ from above – in recognition 
of the relative clout exercised by a given leader among his men (Balias, the first commander 
of the Tarashcha regiment, is the case in point).
31 Elected – or at least approbated - were the 
candidates to the position of a military commissar as well as the members of the regimental 
Revolutionary tribunals; even the designation of the military formations that the partisans 
deemed worthy of themselves and of their ambitions tended to emerge in the course of the 
general discussion: most named their units after their leaders (Mikhailov’s battalion, 
squadron of Sakharov), locations where they were formed (6
th Korocha Regiment, 9
th 
Insurgent Oboian’ Regiment, etc) or provenances of the partisans (Tarashcha Regiment, 1
st 
and 2
nd Sumy battalions). Some, however, did not content themselves with such jejune 
cognomens, preferring something declarative, bombastic, revolutionary – the Fourth 
Undefeatable Plastun Hundred, for instance.
32 Whether by chance or by a deeply-felt affinity 
with the deeds of the 17
th Cossack ataman, the men of the 1
st Insurgent Regiment, formed 
and led by Shchors, quarried a name with which they would enter into the annals of history – 
the Regiment of Bogun, Bogunskiy polk.
33          
  
It was indeed an antic army in the making. True to their partisan origins, men acquiesced 
only to the authority of their elders, circumscribed formally and informally, as in the times of 
                                                 
31 Istoriia pokhodovo i boevykh deistviy 131-go Tarashchanskogo polka; there is still some controversy about 
the first commander of the Tarashcha regiment; a later chronicle of the unit (1928) bestows upon ‘comrade 
Baron’ (the leading figure of the anarchist organization ‘Nabat’? Possibly) that privilege (Istoriia 131-go 
Tarashchanskogo…,  17) – foibles of memory, or fruits of political injunction?  
32 RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 111.  
33 Istoriia 130-go Bogunskogo polka …, 14; RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 103; in connection with this name other 
neologisms came into being – boguntsy, term, used in reference to the rank and file of the regiment and the 
division and Boguniia, almost a proper name, designation of the land, the Geistesreich, an ethos that survives 
the departed and saturates the newly-arrived ones.   
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the Cossack host, by the soldiers’ Soviet. Unabashedly, they would harass German patrols on 
the other side of the frontier – much to the annoyance of the Central Military-Revolutionary 
Committee. Shchors seemed to have made those razzias into a daily – or rather, nightly – 
affair, the struggle apparently being marked by “the guerilla-reconnoitering character,” as the 
official history almost apologetically adduces.
34 Their real objective, nonetheless, was more 
banal - and vital. “At the beginning of September of 1918,” recalled Demcheko in his 
fictionalized memoirs, “the regiment passed, so to speak, to the regime of self-service...  
... now we were compelled to undertake minor sallies against  the bases of the 
Germans and the Haidamaks [Hetman’s ‘policing force’ in the language of their 
opponents – M.A.]. Although officially this was done without the knowledge of the 
Staff, the commander of the regiment himself (Iakov Kisel’ – M.A.) thought that 
the intention of the center to form an Insurrectional army had failed and, since 
Kursk had forgotten us all, began to accustom himself to the idea of аn autonomous 
action...
35 
Trivial pillage, or, as they were known in the language of military bureaucracy, ‘arbitrary 
requisitions’ (samochinnye rekvizitsii) became the major source of supply, acquiring, in fact, 
pestilential proportions once the insurgents of the Neutral Zone met the ataman-led 
insurgents of Ukraine.  
 
Semi-autonomous vis-à-vis the external world, the partisans jealously guarded the right to 
regulate their internal affairs. That such matters which could arise between men and their 
commanders were mediated by anything but а stature was almost a truism; the syllogism “I 
will knock your block off (‘mordu nab’iu”) if you dare to disobey me,” widely applied by 
Grigoriev to instill discipline into his army,
36 found fervent apologists among the first 
                                                 
34 Istoriia 130-go Bogunskogo polka...14-15 
35 Demchenko, p 49; Demchenko, however, is mistaken on two accounts: the Provisional Ukrainian Soviet 
Government with its first headquarters in Kursk, was only established in the late November of 1918; neither the 
‘autonomy’ of actions was a sudden discovery – for it had never been abandoned.  
36 RGVA f 25860 o 1 d 557 l 5  
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insurgents of the inchoate Ukrainian army. Ostracism,
37 mauling and flogging were widely 
practiced by Shchors, bat’ko Bozhenko and their minions for the entire duration of the 
campaign.
38 Neither was one all too dainty to pull a trigger and call it execution as the 
following episode sometime in October of 1918 suggests:  
Krapiviansky ordered to build a floating bridge in three days but since the 
pantoons were not available, one decided to use rafts, put boards one on top the 
other to enable the transportation of the artillery... Local populace had to be 
mobilized and in three days the task was accomplished... An order was given to 
start the crossing. But here a ‘misunderstanding’ took place. One unit, consisting 
of the Novgorod-Severski fellows, refused to budge... This was Primakov’s 
regiment. The commander of the battery together with the artillerymen ‘went on 
strike’ as well... Piatakov and Krapiaviansky arrived to the scene. With the first 
objection raised, Krapiviansky killed on the spot the commander of the battery 
and one more partisan. Confrontation flared up between Primakov and 
Krapiviansky, but, fortunately, everything was quickly settled. Primakov, having 
received an order from Krapiviansky, began to prepare for the crossing.
39 
 
Krapiviansky was a thug but so were his colleagues, and this volatile mélange of Old 
Testament patriarchy and mafia-like rascality gave the partisans their eccentric morality and 
shaped their ethos.  
 
Non-statutory they may be, these methods of countering refractory behavior were bringing 
certain fruits, for the regiments were growing in numbers (if not in quality), so much so that 
on September 22
nd the Central Military Revolutionary Committee issued the so-called Order 
Nr 6 that brought the Ukrainian Army into official existence – for some, at least.
40 Signed by 
                                                 
37 RGVA f 999 o 1 d 4 l 5 
38 RGVA f 167 o 1 d 39 l 22 
39 N. Tocheny, “Krasnye partizany na Nezhinschine” 76; similar episode with Krapiviansky occurred in August 
of 1918, when, still a nominal leader of the Nezhin rebels, he shot the commander of a detachment for failing to 
carry out his order; partisans, observing this, made an attempt to protest, but, encountering the blandishing 
rhetoric of the Communists present there, allowed their anger to quickly peter out (ibid., p. 70).  
40 TsDAVO f 2 o 1 d 104 l 10; according to Oleh Bozhko, the term “Ukrainian Insurgent Army” was utilized 
within the closed-circuit administration of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks three days after the release of the Order Nr 
6 (Bozhko, “Povstan’ska armiia Ukrainy,” 112-115); Vatsetis in Serpukhov could not have been bothered with  
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Aussem, Bubnov and Piatakov, the Order served to fulfill two functions. First, it recognized 
the fait accompli, namely, the successful establishment of the four regiments that would 
hitherto be known collectively as the 1
st Insurgent Division. Primakov, Balias, Shchors and 
Kisel’ all became regimental commanders, subordinated to Krapivianski and his head of 
Staff, Sergei Petrikovskiy (Petrenko). Stationed between Surazh and Glukhov, the unit stood 
facing Chernigovshchina as if to rile and inspire its rank and file with the visions of the 
proximate home. 
 
Most importantly, by issuing that order, the Military Revolutionary Committee attempted to 
set the ground for the articulation of formal rules which it intended to follow in creating the 
2
nd Insurgent division, spread, according to the plan, along the eastern border of Ukraine 
from Glukhov down south to Kupiansk (almost 300 miles). Symptomatically, the division 
was to be headed not by some experienced rogue of Krapiviansky’s mould, but by a member 
of the Committee itself – Vladimir Aussem.
41 Almost simultaneously with Order Nr 6, the 
Committee issued a decree, prohibiting further autonomous and unsanctioned formation of 
the troops.
42 This injunction appeared to have engendered mixed results and reactions; 
Krapivianskiy, for instance, proceeded with a minor purge in his unit in order to strengthen 
his position and that of his Nezhin cronies (known as the ‘Nezhin company,’ but the 
formalism of the designation is beguiling).
43 The eviction of the ‘arbitrarily mobilized’ 
soldiers (samochinno mobilizovannye liudi), that is, of the volunteers from the Neutral Zone, 
                                                                                                                                                       
such peccadilloes. For him the “Soviet Army of Ukraine” had to be born again – sometime in late December it 
seems (Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v 3, 57).    
41 for the duration of its formation, it would seem; Aussem, however, was not a Bolshevik of an arm-chaired 
type (who was? ), having been baptized by fire in the earlier Ukrainian campaign.  
42 N. Tochony, “Krasnye partizany na Nezhinshchine,” 76 
43 Lokotosh, the second commander of the Division, was particularly vociferous about Krapiviansky’s flagrant 
cronyism (RGVA f 999 o 1 d 10, l 2)  
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in full accoutrement as it were, precipitated a rebellion among the non-Nezhin partisans
44 - 
the conflict would not subside untill the removal of Krapiviansky two months later. 
Commanders with less talent for overt intrigue but with the commensurate thirst for self-
aggrandizement preferred simply to ignore instructions from their local Military 
Revolutionary Committees as they kept on building their private armies from the neighboring 
populace. And although complaints were voiced to Moscow and Pochep (where the Staff of 
the 1
st Division and the all-Ukrainian Military Revolutionary Committee were temporarily 
located) compelling the Center to interject and remind involved parties of the extent of their 
prerogatives,
45 these admonitions could only be of limited use and effect. 
 
All in all, in those autumn months the hold of the Party over the Ukrainian insurgents 
remained at best precarious. When on October 25, Moscow, being neither too sympathetic 
with the homesickness of the partisans nor convinced of the sufficient weakness of the 
German arms, - when that Moscow decided to incorporate troops of the Neutral Zone into 
the Reserve Army in Orel with a prospect of employing them against Krasnov’s Don 
Cossacks,
46 the two divisions began to shrink at an alarming rate. Thus, Krapivianskiy’s unit, 
having swelled to almost 7000 bayonets by late October, lost over a half of its men in less 
than one week;
47 the changes in the yet unformed 2
nd Division must have been more dramatic 
                                                 
44 RGVA f 1417 o 1 d 280 l 106.  
45 TsDAGO f 5 d 151 ll 22-23; the resolution of the telegram from Pochep dated October 30, 1918 reads: 
“Inform that the Insurgents do not have a right to conduct mobilization without knowledge and approbation of 
the higher organs of authority.”  
46 It is difficult to say what the original intentions of Moscow with regard to that pied assemblage of All-
Ukrainian Insurrection had been; Istoriia 130-go Bogunskogo Polka claims that the idea of transferring Bogun 
regiment to the Don front came to preempt further provocations of the German authorities on the Russian-
Ukrainian border (Istoriia 130-go Bogunskogo Polka, 15); Shchors was growing too foolhardy and dangerous 
for his own good and Moscow was understandably reluctant to throw away peaceful rapports with Germany for 
the ambitions of one unaffiliated field commander.  
47 Bozhko, “Povstan’ska armiia Ukrainy,”124  
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– from about 3000 men (that is, with the inclusion of Primakov’s Red Cossacks and Kisel’s 
6
th Regiment) to 500.
48 “I repeat,” stormed Zatonsky in a telegram to Lenin and Stalin, 
“Ukraine isn’t a springboard nor are the divisions chess figures… Throwing them into the 
fight with the Cossacks means to destroy them completely.”
49 The idea of fighting on the 
banks of Don and Donets was all the more unbearable in that it violated the implicit contract 
between the field commanders and the Party – namely, an exchange of brawn and expertise 
for the arms, clothing, native leadership and a ticket home.  
    
Germany’s surrender salvaged the situation, exposing the occupied East to the flurry of 
renewed political turmoil. All of a sudden Ukraine became topical again and one had 
discovered that the land, in Zatonsky’s remark, is “not only densely populated by the 
followers of the Hetman or Petliura, but by common workers and peasants as well as German 
soldiers, who consider themselves to be citizens of the German Socialist Republic.”
50 The 
Ukrainian Bolshevik Party, lulling uncertainly on the periphery of Russia and History, now 
threw itself into the feverish work hoping to resume the interrupted progress of Revolution. 
Within two weeks of the Armistice the all-Ukrainian Central Military-Revolutionary Council 
was transformed into the Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of Ukraine – but 
not before it issued a strange and unrealizable directive to all insurgent forces within Ukraine 
and the Neutral zone, exhorting them to a full-scale offensive against “the counter-
revolutionary bands.”
51 On November 17, Antonov, Zatonsky, Piatakov and Stalin with 
                                                 
48 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 12 
49 TsDAGO f 57 o 2 d 150 l 39 
50 TsDAGO f 57 o 2 d 150 ll 39-41 
51 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 17  
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Vatsetis’ blessing founded the Ukrainian Revolutionary Military Council in Kursk,
52 setting 
the grounds for the subsequent “rivalry of competences” between the military and ‘civil’ 
authorities in Ukraine, a power cleft that would plague the functioning of the Bolshevik 
administration until the dissolution of the Ukrainian Front. Of the original four, Piatakov 
quickly recognized the impossibility of working simultaneously in the Military 
Revolutionary Council and the Ukrainian Government and opted for the latter. Stalin was 
soon recalled to Moscow to resume his work there as a member of the newly established 
Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense under Lenin’s direction.  
 
It should be remarked that Stalin’s sojourn in Kursk, although brief, was by no means 
episodic. In the persona of Stalin, the Ukrainian Military Revolutionary Council acquired a 
committed lobbyist, a stubborn tolkach in Moscow and an active apologist of the cause.
53 
Zatonsky and especially Antonov frequently sought Stalin’s intercession with the ‘highest 
instances” as they pleaded for more money, clothing and ammunition. Stalin was 
instrumental in organizing Antonov’s meetings with Lenin, Trotsky and Vatsetis when the 
former betook himself to Moscow. Of greater and more lasting importance was the arrival of 
Stalin’s Tsaritsyn colleagues in Kursk, twenty persons altogether, among whom one could 
easily recognize figures of Klement Voroshylov and Efim Shchadenko; Ivan Lokotosh (the 
future commander of the 1
st Insurgent Division), Nikolai Bobyrev (at first commander of the 
brigade and then of the 2
nd Insurgent Division) and Aleksandr Belenkovich (organizer of the 
Reserve units and subsequently commander of the 1
st Cavalry division) were found in that 
                                                 
52 ibid, v 3, 14 
53 ibid., v 3, 38  
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group as well, exporting attitudes, experiences and practices from the beleaguered “Red 
Verdun” to the plains of Ukraine.  
 
  Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the methods used by the Revolutionary Military Council, its 
recalcitrant independence jibed all too suggestively with those of the notorious “Tsaritsyn 
gang,” as Trotsky’s derisorily labeled Stalin’s coterie.
54 Preoccupied as they were by the 
developments in Don and Caucasus, the People’s Commissariat of Military Affairs and the 
Staff relegated Ukrainian troops to an ancillary role, at best as the supporting right wing in 
the planned offensive against ataman Krasnov.
55 Kursk, however, proceeded as if a march on 
Kharkov and Kiev were in the offing. Although greatly incensed and discouraged by the 
reluctance of Serpukhov to recognize the significance of the “Ukrainian tasks,”
56 Antonov, 
nonetheless, refused to subordinate himself either to Glagolev, the nominal head of the 
Reserve Army, or to Kozhevnikov, commander of a large partisan detachment destined for 
the Southern Front. His sole concern were the troops in the Neutral Zon. In his efforts in 
fielding the “autonomous Army” of the Soviet Ukraine
57 Antonov was seconded by the 
‘separatist’ activities of Piatakov’s government, forcing even Lenin into a kind of irksome 
“temporary compromise.”
58    
 
The position of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks could have perhaps been somewhat softened and 
the rapport of productive interdependence with Moscow inaugurated, had, paradoxically 
                                                 
54 It may be useful to recall that the term of ‘partizanshchina’ was applied with enviable consistency by Trotsky 
when describing Stalin’s conduct of Tsaritsyn’s defense.  
55 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 22  
56 ibid., 51 
57 TsDAGO f 57 o 2 d 150 ll 39-41 
58 Adams, 64  
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enough, their demands for regular troops from the heart of Russia and for the steady supply 
of military ammunition and apparel been seriously heeded. Of the regiments and divisions 
promised, Antonov ruefully admitted, by early December the Ukrainian Soviet Army
59 
received only some pitiful crumbs: “2 batteries (from Moscow), the infantry hundred of 
Iashvilli,
60 one echelon from Kozhevnikov’s troops (up to 500 men), of which one third 
unarmed,
61 the 4
th requisitioning Cavalry regiment with only one squadron fully formed… 
and a ‘hundred’ (up to 60 men) of Belenkovich (from Tsaritsyn).”
62 In essence, therefore, 
Antonov was left with the same two insurgent divisions, “4000 strong each, poorly supplied, 
poorly organized, poorly disciplined …spread along the 300-verst stretch”
63 – and, more 
importantly, unwilling to dawdle on the side while the Party Grands quibbled over the 
questions of strategy. Prodded by a mixture of audacity and impatience, often unaware of the 
fatidic events in the Central Europe, yet intuitively conscious of the malaise that was ruining 
the body of the German Army, they began to move westward and southward, across the Zone 
toward the frontiers of the crumbling Skoropadsky’s state. These were not the hit-and-run 
attacks of former days, akin to the temerarious raids of Primakov and Cherniak on 
Vorobievka in September of 1918, or to the fumbled melee around Starodub in the month 
                                                 
59 In view of creating its own regular fighting force, on November 30
th the Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Government of Ukraine decreed the foundation of the  Ukrainian Soviet Army; Vatsetis, however, persisted on 
calling it, as before, the “Army Group of the Kursk Direction” – one would suppose, unconsciously (Antonov-
Ovseenko, v 3, 57). Neither were the insurgents themselves aware of their changed status – as could be 
construed from the plaintive telegraphic exchange of Piatakov with Antonov’s new head of Staff, Aussem 
(TsDAVO f 2 o 1 d 104 l 6)  
60 Soon to lose all signs of military efficacy (Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 52) 
61 Kozhevnikov’s entire force of some 5,000 strong was soon diverted to the needs of the Southern front.  
62 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v 3, 42 
63 ibid., v 3 26; on the December 8
th he gave a more detailed picture of these troops: “These units comprise up 
to 8 thousand armed men, dispersed among 20 differed groups and ‘regiments’ from the railroad line Briansk-
Gomel…through Miropol’e, Bogatoe, Belenikhino junction, Ol’khovatka II, Kozinka, Urazovo junction, 
Vendelewka, N[ovaia] Aleksandrovka; they have up to 20 poorly exploited guns and few hundred cavalry 
men.” (RGVA f 103 o 1 d 507 l 28)  
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October,
64 but methodical advances into territories abandoned by the occupying forces. 
Ryl’sk was taken on the 22
nd of November, part of the German garrison apparently 
announcing the intention of a joint struggle; Sudzha fell the next day.
65 On the 25 November, 
Gomel
66 was surrendered by the German XX Division to the partisan forces on a mere hope 
that the new masters would expedite evacuation of the old ones.
67 To the south, one of the 
Sumy battalions had at first disarmed a garrison in Vol’fino and subsequently proceeded to 
Vorozhba, where it was balked by enemy fire. The maneuver of the 5
th Regiment of the 2
nd 
Division against Glukhov ended with a tactical defeat for the attackers,
68 yet a strategic 
victory for the Bolsheviks: following the incident, the German Soldiers’ Soviet sent 
delegates to the insurgents themselves, declaring solidarity with their cause and willingness 
to cede the town into their hands.
69 Less promising was the venture of the 6
th Korocha 
regiment against Belgorod: lacking proper arms, wrapped in gray military coats, yellow 
peasant sheepskin jackets and tawdry rags of all kinds, shod “in bast shoes, felt boots, 
women’s footwear, [and] galoshes,”
70 that meretricious army crawled in the direction of the 
city only to cower back at the sound of the artillery cannonade.
71 These operations, 
undertaken without official blessing, alarmed the Bolsheviks in Kursk as much as they did 
the Germans; having found themselves suddenly overtaken by events the former had to act 
along with some convincing determination, lest they lose once and for all whatever power to 
act that they still possessed.  
                                                 
64 Bozhko, “Povstan’ska armiia Ukrainy,” 120 
65 M.V. Koval and Iu. V. Teliachiy, Volodymyr Zatons’kyi: narys zhyttia I diial’nosti (1888-1938) (Ternopil’: 
Zbruch, 2008), 76 
66 Now in Belarus, in 1918 Gomel formally belonged to the Ukrainian State.  
67 PAAA 14388 
68 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 52; losses suffered by the 5
th Regiment were so high that the unit had to be 
disbanded 
69 TsDAGO f 5 o 1 d 151 ll 57-58 
70 Demchenko, 65 
71 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 29   
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In late November and early December the dialectic at work, evolving on one hand from the 
“statist” tendencies of the Communist Party, even in its peripheral form, and the proclivity to 
improvisation of the local power holders on the other, began to manifest itself with particular 
clarity. The Bolsheviks, of course, wanted to create a reliable fighting force, a veritable 
regular army – but that required time, one resource that all parties so fatally lacked. To be 
sure, within the stint of few weeks, the Military Revolutionary Council could still subject 
grumbling soldiers to days of strenuous training;
72 dismiss Krapiviansky and few other 
partisan leaders with a history of disobedience and put less refractory figures in their place; 
bring in the expertise of the few military specialists, felicitously found in the area;
73 
proscribe regimental and divisional commanders from appointing their own commissars;
74 
and even pillory the most flagrant cases of marauding. Yet, “to expel the spirit of the 
partisan”
75 from the army – of that feat neither Antonov, nor any of his associates from 
Tsaritsyn were capable. Troops, put together by the field commanders, could only exist as 
their extension or as an embodiment of a principle born out of the guerilla war; their leaders 
had replaced the non-existing state in many a vital way, feeding, leading, clothing old 
comrades-in-arms and recruiting the new ones – and for that very reason proving themselves 
equally indispensable to their alleged superiors in the Party as to the ordinary partisans. 
 
Antonov assuredly understood this, and, while sincerely wishing to impart upon that rickety 
crowd, known as the Army of the Soviet Ukraine, some semblance of conformity and 
                                                 
72 ibid., v. 3, 35 
73 RGVA f 103 o 1 d 512 l 14 
74 Koval’ and Teliachyy, 80-81 
75 Lokotosh’s expression, RGVA f 999 o 1 d 10 l 2  
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coherence, he let other itinerant bands join in ‘wholesale’ and fundamentally unaltered. Such 
was the story of a certain Ryndin, whose unit of 1,500-strong, ‘discovered’ in mid December 
of 1918 in the area of Valuiki, had simply been rechristened into the 10
th Regiment of a non-
existing 3
rd Soviet Ukrainian Division; in the subsequent distribution of titles, Ryndin 
received, quite naturally, that of its commander.
76 Similarly, with no true administrative 
apparatus to buttress proper mobilization, Antonov had to relegate the task of screening the 
“prodigious influx of volunteers”
77 to the partisans themselves, or rather to their leaders. The 
latter willingly obliged, for, habituated to the role of revolutionary demiurges, they were 
churning out one battalion after another, spreading thereby their fame and extending their 
clout within that tumble-weed and diaphanous empire, result of an informal medium, struck 
between bespectacled revolutionaries and hirsute “little fathers.”  
 
Fourteen odd thousand bayonets, thirteen hundred cavalry, one hundred and thirty-nine 
machine guns and twenty cannons plus a six thousand throng of unarmed men – such were 
the official battle counts for the Ukrainian Soviet Army by December 24, 1918.
78 These 
numbers give the impression of uniformity or at least of comparability, concealing the fact of 
a mosaic-like and makeshift nature of the Bolshevik troops. Unlikely personages indeed 
found themselves harnessed together under a common collar: old-time terrorists, professional 
partisans, unemployed officers of a defunct army and, of course, bandits, akin to some 
Sakharov, “a puny sailor of a listless type”
79 with a talent for landed piracy, or to a 
Cheredniak, who blended illimitable love for lucre and an unallayed hatred for the Germans. 
                                                 
76 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v 3, 45-46 
77 ibid., v 3, 67 
78 RGVA f 6 o 4 d 60 
79 Antonov-Ovseenko, v 3, 48-49  
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Yet, whatever their origins, politics or level of conscientiousness may be, by Christmas of 
1918 they found themselves irreversibly drawn into the mire of the Ukrainian struggle, rifle 
in hand, saber on the side and the banner of Revolution unfurled under the clear hibernal sky.   
 
Part II: “Ukrainian October” 
 
The offensive of the Soviet Ukrainian Army commenced ad hoc, without any meticulous 
directive or a sonorous declaration preceding it. As indicated, the partisans, neatly distributed 
on paper among battalions and regiments, began taking control of villages and towns in the 
Neutral Zone without any official sanctioning from above and often with a subdued 
assistance from the sympathizing Germans. Whatever resistance they encountered at first 
came from the demoralized Varta and a few officer volunteer brigades that remained loyal to 
Skoropadsky. These, however, quickly disappeared from the plane of action. In essence, the 
first few weeks of fighting represented a struggle for the unclaimed space, an effort to profit 
from the German abstention from power, ultimately a competition between the supporters of 
Petliura and the Red divisions for the vacated square miles. Iampol’, Ryl’sk, Korenevo, 
Sudzha were all taken without much bloodshed (the last of the enumerated towns being 
incidentally chosen as a temporary seat of the newly formed Ukrainian Bolshevik 
government). Upon hearing about those developments, Vatsetis was beside himself; he 
fulminated, denounced, threatened that the demarcation line be respected; in vain, for the 
troops had long crossed their Rubicon and there was no force, as Antonov judiciously 
remarked, capable of turning them back.
80 Moscow and Serpukhov simply had to accept the 
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fait accompli, as did their Ukrainian comrades, now endeavoring to derive greatest profit by 
collaborating with the over-enthusiastic “revolutionary elements.” 
 
And they did, for, the resistance of the border troops once overcome, the march of the Soviet 
Army became nothing short of triumphant. Belgorod fell on December 20 to the same 6
th 
Korocha Regiment, which had thereby avenged its earlier discomfiture.
81 The much lionized 
Zaporozhian corps of Petro Bolbochan was soundly beaten by a substantially smaller 2
nd 
Insurgent Division and was forced to abandon Kharkov on the dawn of the coming year. 
There, in the new capital of the new Soviet Republic, the Army of the Soviet Ukraine was 
transformed into the Ukrainian Front (January 4,
 1919), although Vatsetis, true to his time-
proven habit, refused at first to recognize the legitimacy of that action.
82 It mattered little, 
however, for the pursuit of Bolbochan’s battered army continued until Poltava and farther 
and shortly after that erstwhile hero of the recently proclaimed Ukrainian People’s Republic 
was put under arrest by Petliura’s ataman Omelian Volokh – not for the last time, as it turned 
out.
83 Soon, the entire Left Bank was in the hands of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, or, to be 
more precise, in the hands of the partisan detachments, subcontracted by the regime in 
Kharkov to fight for the cause of the Revolution.  
 
While the 2
nd Insurgent division was making short work of Bolbochan’s Zaporozhians, the 1
st 
Insurgent division was breaking its way to the afflicted capital of the Directorate. It was a 
veritable homecoming for these men and many would have probably preferred to stay behind 
if not for the allure of the great prize ahead. Their patience and perseverance were rewarded 
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and on February 6, 1919 Kiev opened its gates to the partisans of the Shchors’ brigade. 
Having rested there for eleven days, as the official chronicle claims,
84 the 1
st division 
advanced into Northern Podolia and Volhynia, where in tandem with the 2
nd Division and the 
group of Belenkovich (collectively known “Army Group of the Kiev direction” under the 
command of Sergey Matsiletskiy), it took Berdichev (March 7), Uman (March 13), Zhitomir 
(March 14) and Zhmerinka (March 19), cutting the territory controlled by the UNR in two. 
Despite temporary reverse around Berdichev (last week of March), the Army Group, soon to 
be renamed into the 1
st Ukrainian Soviet Army (Antonov’s order from April 15
th, 1919) 
resumed its offensive, reaching the left bank of Dniester just before the outbreak of the 
Grigoriev uprising.  
 
In the south, the hero of the Russian October and the former Commissar of the Maritime 
Affairs Pavel Dybenko was sent forth with his “Special Detachment” (Osobyy otriad, a few 
hundred men and an armored train) to establish contacts with the insurgents of the 
Yekaterinoslav region and, in particular, with the long-standing ally of the Bolsheviks, 
bat’ko Makhno.
85 The latter, his attempt to take Yekaterinoslav on New Year’s Eve fumbled 
by the prematurely festive infusions of moonshine, succeeded finally in occupying 
Aleksandrovsk (January 25, 1919),
86 Novomoskovsk and Pologi (ukr. Polohy) (February 6, 
1919). Of even greater strategic significance was the defection of ataman Grigoriev with his 
troops to the Soviet side. All three, Dybenko, Makhno and Grigoriev, brought their units 
together into a loose organization known as the Transdnieperian (Zadneprovskaia) division 
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(Antonov’s order N 17 from February 18
th, 1919
87 and Skachko’s confirmation a day later
88) 
under the nominal command of Dybenko. Disjointed, these potentates of the south Ukrainian 
steppes faced different kind of enemies than the troops led by Matsiletskiy, Shchors or 
Bozhenko; Makhno found himself operating against the White divisions of General Mai-
Maevski and the Kuban Cossacks of Shkuro in Donbass (April 1919), Dybenko fought with 
success against the so-called Azov-Crimean Volunteer Army, an uninspired and insignificant 
assemblage of local anti-Bolshevik officers, whereas Grigoriev had to confront allegedly 
undefeatable Entente troops. To him ultimately belongs the credit of scoring the most 
impressive victories of the entire Ukrainian undertaking, for his much feared opponent, about 
25,000 strong or even more, scudded back to the safety of their ships at the mere sight of his 
rustic army; the only case of resistance came from a few valiant but doomed Greek battalions. 
First Kherson (March 9) was taken, then Nikolaev (March 14), where several thousand 
disoriented German soldiers were still waiting for their turn to go back to the Fatherland. The 
fall of Odessa on April 6 with its immense deposits of war materiel stood as the incredible 
culmination of a vertiginous campaign. It was there, on the Black Sea littoral, that the 
gestating Versailles system, built on the smug sense of global impregnability, suffered its 
first setback, minor enough to be almost invisible, yet no less symptomatic and portentous.  
 
By early May 1919 Bolsheviks had all the reasons to congratulate themselves on their 
achievements. Most of Ukraine was, nominally at least, under their control, and, in fact, at 
several points the Ukrainian Soviet Army had reached the frontiers of the former empire. 
Having learnt from the fiasco in Ukraine the extent of the demoralization both at home and in 
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the army, France resolutely withdrew from all future direct participation in the ‘Russian 
affairs,’ preferring to act hitherto through the Volunteers and the newly born allied border 
states. Crimean whites, never an opponent to be seriously reckoned with, were cornered in 
the hilly promontory of Kerch before being salvaged by Denikin. As for the Directorate, its 
situation was best described by a ditty, whose derisory tone bore an unselfconsciously 
ominous resemblance to a funereal dirge: 
Гей висока Директорія 
Де е твоя територія? 
У вагоні Директорія, 
Під вагоном територія! 
 
(Hey, High Directorate 
Where is your territory? 
In the railroad car is the Directorate, 
Under the car is the territory!) 
 
The force of the Bolsheviks, having evolved from the puny two divisions into three armies of 
about sixty thousand bayonets and five thousand cavalry,
89 was strong enough evidence that 
the intentions of Antonov or Rakovsky to transform a Ukrainian undertaking into a Central-
European crusade stemmed from past experience and well-founded prognostication.  
  
Yet, military history alone, even when recounted with the meticulousness of Antonov or 
Kakurin, fails to account for the exchanges of considerable swaths of territory and the 
dramatic growth of the Soviet armies; after all, the engagements that had taken place were 
neither too dogged nor particularly sanguinary, the 2
nd Division, for instance, suffering in the 
                                                 
89 RGVA f 6 o 4 d 92 l 180; given the high incidence of desertion, proper to all armies of the Civil War, these 
figures could be but very approximate; nonetheless, in appraising the strength of the Soviet arms in Ukraine, 
one also needs to consider units transferred from the Ukrainian front to the anti-Denikin, i.e. Southern Front – 
about 8,000 bayonets, 3,000 cavalry and 2 armored trains all together (RGVA f 6 o 4 d 92 l 180rev); Antonov’s 
estimate of 70,000 men – men, of course, not tantamount with either ‘bayonets’ or ‘sabers’ for many would be 
dragging behind unarmed – appears to err on the side of caution if anything else.  
  259
month of February a total loss of 250 men from its overall personnel of 12,200.
90 The most 
important battles of the entire campaign were not those fought over some bridgehead on a 
river bank or a strategically important railroad junction, but those that had men’s spirits at 
stake – in other words, the struggle implicated loyalties of the armed Ukrainian insurgency 
and those of the atamans as its most visible manifestation. In that crucial domain the 
Bolsheviks scored their most resounding victories, (even if they proved short-lived and 
ultimately deleterious), whereas the UNR saw its fortunes sink into the abyss of a near-
biblical disconsolation.  
 
But why? How could the Vynnychenko government, which positioned itself so gleefully as 
the spearhead of the anti-Hetman mass movement, find itself abandoned by those on whose 
behalf it allegedly spoke? Most of the major memoirists of the UNR era – from the closeted 
Bolshevik sympathizer Vynnychenko and the social-revolutionary Pavlo Khrystiuk to the 
moderate nationalists from Galicia of the Osyp Nazaruk’s or Matviy Stakhiv’s type – agree 
in the bout of collective crise de la foi, so remarkable and disarming in its candor: internal 
politics of the UNR itself, and more immediately, the comportment of the professional 
military men, the fakhivtsi, are at the root of the fatal alienation. These latter, exemplified 
first and foremost by Evhen Konovalets, the commander of the Siege Corps of the Sich 
Riflemen in Kiev, Petro Bolbochan, head of the Zaporozhian division, stationed in Kharkov, 
and even Petliura himself – more through his Weltanschauung than his ‘relevant work 
experience’ – had always been suspicious of the improvised peasant formations and of their 
                                                 
90 Of these, 174 were either killed in action or died later from wounds; a sign of low battle intensity could be 
gauged from a figure of 4 bullets used by an average soldier of the 2
nd Division per day; or from 5 shells fired 
by a gun daily in the same month of February (figures calculated on the basis of data available in RGVA f 6 o 4 
d 92 l 48).  
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staunchly independent leaders. With Skoropadsky gone once and for all, the fakhivtsi began 
treating their amateurish allies as altogether unnecessary, hazardous indeed – to the fledgling 
state, to the civic order and, less expressly but more pertinently, to their caste and their 
privileges. From the very instant of the Republic’s promising birth, as the steady columns of 
the Galicians were marching down the streets of Kiev in celebration of their victory, 
Konovalets, Bolbochan, Oskilko and other General-governors of old in all but name,
91 
commenced working towards subordinating the insurgents to the strictures of the decreed 
army hierarchy or eliminating them altogether.  
 
Thus, on December 31, 1918 the newly-established Ministry of the Military Affairs of the 
UNR issued an order, obliging all the commanders to receive agents of the so-called Control-
Informational Department of the High Command of the UNR (“Kontrol’no-informatsiynyy 
viddil), whereupon these agents, hybrids of political commissars and army inspectors, were 
to ascertain loyalties and to pass on corresponding recommendations to their higher-ups.
92 A 
day later a directive appeared, signed by Petliura and the Head of the General Staff, Otaman 
Oleksandr Osets’kyy, according to which all units were placed under the authority of one of 
the four generals, incumbent upon their location; the freelance bands were debonairly 
ordered to dissolve (“niiakykh neshtatnych chastyn istnuvaty ne povynno”)
93 – as the 
                                                 
91 It is upon this precedence of the military authorities over the civil institutions that Vynnychenko bestows the 
name of atamanshchina (otamanshchyna in Ukrainian) (Vynnychenko, 474ff). This confusion stems from a 
simple fact that the title otaman in the army of UNR was as much a formal designation corresponding to the 
title of the general as an informal sobriquet akin to a Russian vozhd’. In Vynnychenko’s terminology, therefore, 
otamanshchyna adverts less to the militarization of the countryside than to the advent of the military 
dictatorship, or, rather, of the oligarchy, comparable to many postcolonial regimes of the Third World.  
92 V. Sidak, T. Ostashko and T. Vrons’ka, Polkovnyk Petro Bolbochan: trahediia ukrains’kogo derzhavnyka 
(Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), 42  
93 TsDAVO f 1075 o 2 d 8 ll 1-3  
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notorious Dnieper Division of Zeleny was to discover on January 6, 1919.
94 Furthermore, 
with an eye on restoring the mobilizational apparatus of the moribund state and on 
strengthening their own position vis-à-vis the self-organized bodies of armed peasantry, the 
colonels in power attempted to employ and win sympathies of the officers of the former 
Russian imperial army, that is, of the individuals with very questionable ‘revolutionary 
credentials’ in the judgment of the radicalized masses.
95 All these measures and decrees, 
designed to build a disciplined fighting force, yet carried out precipitously and half-heartedly, 
planted more than a seed of doubt in the minds of the atamans and cast more than a shadow 
of suspicion upon the intentions of the new regime in Kiev. To the former, brought into the 
limelight of history by the exigencies of the social revolt, the reintroduction of discipline, the 
forgotten language of commands, quarried from the ruins of the ancien regime, the gold-
epauletted public with their cloying ‘elegant manners’ which began to whiz about erstwhile 
heroes of the anti-Hetman uprising – all that reeked of reaction and counter-revolution. To 
the dismay of the Ukrainian Left, neither Konovalets, nor Bolbochan, nor any of their likes 
were hastening to repudiate such an unseemly reputation.  
 
In fact, both of the aforementioned figures had done their best to accentuate their enmity 
towards parties of the far Left, reneging on their platforms and restricting their clout on the 
shape of the Directorate’s politics. Thus, the Revolutionary Committee, created by the 
Ukrainian Social-democrats to fill in the power vacuum of the Hetmanate’s last days, and, in 
perspective, to provide a kernel for the future municipal and national government, saw itself 
                                                 
94 V. Sidak, T. Ostashko, T. Vrons’ka, p. 42 
95 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski,  v.3, 101; V. Sidak, T. Ostashko, T. Vrons’ka, 47  
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divested of all power once Konovalets with the Sich Riflemen entered into Kiev.
96 Although 
formally all authority rested with the Ukrainian National Union – the organization that 
sparked the revolt – de facto the city was ruled by the Galicians, less by the ‘soldierly 
masses’ than by the Strilets’ka Rada, a council of the junior officers, and, naturally, by 
Konovalets himself.
97 Despite the Directorate’s repeated assurances that it represented but a 
“provisionary authority [called forth by the] revolutionary hour” abetting the advent of a true 
dictatorship of the productive classes (peasantry and proletariat) in accordance with the so-
called ‘laboring principle’ (trudovyy printsip),
98 Konovalets placed a ban on all “agitation 
against the existing state order” without so much as troubling himself with more precise 
definition of such an activity.
99 In practice, this supplied the Sichovyki with an excuse to 
inaugurate the hunt on the elements deemed ‘Bolshevik,’ forcing, in Khrystiuk’s recollection, 
the communists and the Ukrainian Left Socialist Revolutionaries back into the 
underground.
100 Under the pretext of protecting armed forces from the nefarious influence of 
socialist propaganda, Galicians ravaged the Central Bureau of the Professional Workers 
Unions, expropriating and subsequently burning all available books, leaflets, registration 
cards, organizational archives, etc; before the end of the year the attack was repeated at least 
twice.
101 To preempt the possibility of a strike and to cower the ‘radicals’ into submission, 
Konovalets appeared to have sanctioned – surreptitiously – the shooting of the few local 
communists.
102 Later, with the Bolshevik forces thumping heavily on the threshold of the 
                                                 
96 M. Rafes, Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine, 108 
97 P. Khrystiuk, v. 4, 26; the same Khrystiuk reports that Vynnychenko had once proclaimed the will of the 
Siege Corps of the Sich Riflemen to be “the highest and the sanctified law.”  
98 Declarations from December 9 and December 261918; Text of the later declaration could be found in 
Vynnychenko, 465-470 and in Khrystiuk, v 4, 15-18 
99 Khrystiuk, v. 4, 24  
100 ibid, v. 4, 44 
101 Khrystiuk, v. 4, 25; Rafes, Dva goda…, 117  
102 Rafes, Dva goda…, 117  
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capital, the Riflemen decided to put an end to the on-going spectacle of the Socialist 
democracy by furnishing the land with a dictator, be it either Vynnychenko or Petliura; the 
two had refused that dubious honor, unwilling to be shouldering the burden of the 
Directorate’s misrule while remaining entirely at the mercy of the ‘praetorian guard’ and 
their parvenu leader.
103  
 
The interaction of Konovalets’ Sich Riflemen with the so-called Labor Congress (Trudovyy 
Kongres) is instructive in many regards. Evoked in the Directorate’s early addresses as an 
organ with the power to settle all questions of “social, economic and political life of the 
Republic,”
104 it was scheduled to convene on January 22, 1919 and henceforth to act in the 
stead of the Directorate itself. Characteristically, the deputies were to be elected from the 
three social strata (curia) –peasantry, urban proletariat and the “soldiers of the people’s 
army” (voiaki narodnoi armii), i.e. rural insurgents – as the rest of the population, the 
propertied classes, saw its right to political participation revoked.
105 Yet, under pressure 
from Galician officers, “soldiers,” that is, the most radical part of the armed countryside, 
were being struck off the voting lists and replaced with an ambiguous category of the ‘toiling 
intelligentsia’.
106 Moreover, in view of the impending Act of Unification (Akt zluky) with the 
Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR), the Congress had to receive a delegation of 
sixty-five deputies from Galicia – again, hardly without the hints from the Strilets’ka Rada; 
each endowed with a voting right, the delegates were rendered all the more significant by the 
                                                 
103 One must remember that Konovalets was 27 years of age at that time.  
104 Vynnychenko, 469 
105 ibid., 468; the text of the declaration reads: “the non-laboring classes, exploiting classes, which live and 
luxuriate off the work of the laboring classes… do not have a voting right in taking charge of the state 
(poriadkuvanniu derzhavaiu)”; the real and symbolic radicalism of this step is not to be missed, for the only 
other state that had dared to bereave the propertied layer of its political rights, as Rafes keenly observed, was 
Bolshevik Russia (Rafes, Dva goda…, 117) 
106 Khrystiuk, v. 4, 58  
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fact that of the 528 non-Galician representatives
107 only about 340 arrived.
108 The 
progressive domestication of that predominantly peasant assembly was accomplished with a 
carefully staged saber-rattling and a well-groomed rumor that the sichovyki could waylay the 
Congress at any moment with an aim of dissolving it. The possibility was probably never 
seriously considered,
109 but obstreperously and ostentatiously discussed, soldierly parleys 
ultimately flourishing around the question: “Shall we simply disperse the Congress, or shall 
we fish out those farthest to the left and forewarn the rest lest they turn to the left?”
110 The 
deputies had taken the cue as they were supposed to, avoiding thus any ill-advised thrusts in 
the forbidden direction. Having conveniently forgotten the lofty standing bestowed upon it 
by earlier proclamations, the Congress expressed its unequivocal opposition to all forms of 
“class dictatorship,” confirmed its unflagging allegiance to the Directorate and finally 
pronounced itself adjourned. Prudently ignored, the resolution of the “social, economic and 
political questions” was left therefore to the vagaries of the wartime.
111 
 
In fairness to him, Konovalets still preferred to communicate his will through covert 
intimidation, resorting to the use of open violence only under extraordinary circumstances, 
but such subtlety was cast aside by Konovalets’ peer in Kharkov, Petro Bolbochan. A former 
captain of the Russian Imperial Army, that “elegant gentleman of old-fashioned views”
112 
managed to become a veritable boogeyman of the Left for all successive generations to come 
                                                 
107 proportionally, peasantry was supposed to exercise the dominating presence, claiming 377 seats out of 528; 
despite the vocal protests from the Bund, requesting that at least a third of all seats be reserved to the workers, 
these latter obtained only 118 seats; ‘toiling intelligentsia’ received the rest, i.e. 33 seats.  
108 Skrukwa, 368 
109 Nazaruk, himself closely linked with the Sich Riflemen, does report a meeting of their Rada, in the course of 
which the possible dissolution of the Congress was discussed (Nazaruk, 108) 
110 Vynnychenko, 502 
111 The resolution of the Congress signed on January 28, its last day in session, is found in Khrystiuk, v. 4, 66-
67 
112 Nazaruk, 117  
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– largely in consequence of his heavy-handed efforts at ridding the land of the ‘revolutionary 
contagion.’ With Skoropadsky’s authority at once eliminated, he proceeded by declaring all 
political gatherings of either soviet or monarchist persuasion (sic!) illegal.
113 These words 
were duly matched by actions. First Bolbochan arrested members of the Poltava 
Revolutionary Committee, consigning its chairman and a revolutionary with an enviable 
record, Mykola Shynkar, into the care of the firing squad; according to Khrystiuk’s dramatic 
report, Shynkar, already wounded, succeeded in making an escape.
114 On December 1, 
Bolbochan curtly dispersed the Workers’ Congress, convoked by the local Mensheviks, 
arresting and apparently executing some of its leading participants.
115 A similar fate befell 
the Peasant Congress in Poltava (Congress of Selians’ka Spilka), the only distinctive feature 
stemming from Bolbochan’s extensive use of birch rods, that preferred device of the tsarist 
avuncular well-wishers.
116 In the meantime he surrounded himself with an entourage of the 
discredited ci-devants, Aleksandr Lignau, Skoropadsky’s commander of the VII Corps, being 
perhaps the most obvious example.
117 Ultimately, fearing that further acts of a similar kind 
would destabilize the situation and endanger their home-coming, the reputedly neutral 
Germans stepped in and put Bolbochan and his staff under temporary arrest – to sober him 
up, so to speak.
118 The scandal was soon resolved and the high-ranking detainees were 
released, yet the reputation of the Directorate on the Left Bank was tarred beyond recovery.   
 
                                                 
113 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 79  
114 Khrystiuk, v. 4, 25 
115 Antonov-Ovseenko, v. 3, 80, Vynnychenko, 452-453 
116 Vynnychenko, 453 
117 Sidak et al, 45; Lignau, formerly a deputy war minister in Skoropadsky’s government, was actually arrested 
by Bolbochan on the day of the coup (November 19, 1918) (PAAA 14387); his confinement, a histrionic pose, 
assumed for the sake of decency, did not last long.  
118 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 80  
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Further examples of the pronounced rightist tilt of the Directorate’s military could be easily 
proffered, but it would be redundant. The objective of the above record, so faithfully 
reproduced by the Ukrainian émigré literature, is to recall the two-folded nature of the events 
bedecked by an all-encompassing category of the ‘Anti-Hetman Uprising.’ What the Sich 
Riflemen endeavored to carry out with one powerful strike as they were leaving their 
barracks on the high noon of November 16, and what the Zaparozhian Division succeeded in 
executing on November 19 in Kharkov was a putsch, conceived, refined and led by 
professional soldiers. In the countryside, however, the Address of the Directorate had 
engendered – or inspired – a veritable peasant jacquerie, the extent and the violence of which 
had frightened many a member of the Ukrainian National Union out of their wits. 
Immediately the clock of historical fate began to chime towards that hour when the two 
elements, one embodied in the putsch, the other in jacquerie, had to collide. This was the 
conflict of views on the revolution and its objectives, a struggle over the form that the future 
state was to assume and over the principles to be employed in the process of reconstitution. 
A pattern, vexingly familiar to all scholars of the Civil War, resurfaced here in Ukraine in its 
own particular hue: on the one hand officers, trusting Skoropadsky’s ousted functionaries 
more than their own soldiers,
119 sought to reestablish order, at the core of which would be 
national sovereignty (the “Galician” platform) or, at least, an affirmation of a certain social 
status quo (ideals of those steeped in the traditions of a Russian Imperial Officer Corps).
120 
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120 Interactions between the Galician and the “Naddniprian’tsy (Ukrainian officers from the Russian Empire), 
and especially of their visions on the Ukrainian statehood, await to be explored; an interesting observation, 
however, was made by A.V. Ganin, the author of the recent comprehensive reference work on the destinies of 
the Russian General Staff officers during the Civil War: of the 430 that served in the Ukrainian Armed Forces – 
either under Hetman or the Directorate – more than half (218) ultimately finished in one of the Russian White 
Armies whereas only 76 (that is, less than 18%) joined the ranks of the Reds (A. Ganin, Korpus ofitserov 
General’nogo shtaba Grazhdanskoi voiny 1921-1922 (Moscow: Russkii put’, 2010), 129-130). Putting the 
important question of the representativity aside and ignoring the fact of a one-time mass defection in November  
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On the other hand, multifarious, disorganized, armed peasant insurgency, a throng mostly 
nameless but otherwise represented by innumerable bat’ki, atamans and party radicals, 
thought the Revolution far from accomplished. Nationally uninformed (natsional’no 
nеosvidomleni) in the appraisal of the Galician Nazaruk,
121 the armed peasantry couched its 
anxiety at retaining both the property and the power gained in the course of the recent 
turmoil in the pro-Bolshevik and anti-imperialist language of the class struggle. To the 
Western “parliamentarism” it opposed the slogan of Soviet power (vlada Rad) and the ideals 
of the bourgeois-liberal democracy it countered with the imperatives of the class-based 
dictatorship.  
 
Anti-historical as it may be, in the end one is tempted to state that the Directorate was 
doomed – if not to a precipitous demise, to the fatality of choice. Having toppled 
Skoropadsky’s government with the forces created under the auspices of the overthrown 
regime,
122 the UNR inherited perforce, albeit under substantially modified form, the attitudes 
and practices of its predecessor, namely, its reliance on the military cadres, a narrow, 
conventionally liberal understanding of the national sovereignty and a steady, yet 
unmistakable gravitation towards social conservatism. Derzhavne budivnytstvo, the “state 
construction” was not a mere shibboleth of the hour, but a central preoccupation of the civil 
authorities in Kiev, a field of strenuous application and a focus of converging hopes. 
Although not merely adventitious, the link of the Directorate with the country-side insurgents 
                                                                                                                                                       
of 1919, one could timidly assume that a substantial part of the non-Galician Ukrainian officers espoused less a 
nationalist than a restorationist program of their Great Russian colleagues.  
121 Nazaruk, 135; as for the Galicians, they were judged as “politically unenlightened” (politychna 
neosvichenost’) by none other than Vynnychenko (Vynnychenko, 475)  
122 We shall recall that the entirety of the Hetman’s army with the exception ofthe VIII and VI Corps, (stationed 
in Ekaterinoslav and Poltava, respectively) had joined the Directorate in the course of the coup.   
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was of a highly equivocal, tenuous nature. Foreboding great challenges ahead, German and 
Austrian officials had shown themselves particularly prismatic, anxiously pointing out at the 
growing social radicalism of the ‘masses’ on the background of an otherwise lukewarm 
reception of the nationalist slogans. Indeed, the weekly communiqués of Berchem, Meissner 
or Fürstenberg to their superiors in Berlin and Vienna have an uncanny air of a well-
constructed suspense novel, progressing with every throb of a line to the dramatic crescendo:  
 
From November 24, 1918:  
…Petliura knows very well, that he brings into the movement not only nationalist, 
but also bolshevist and anarchist elements as well as the country-side 
proletariat…
123 
 
December 1, 1918:  
The minister of Internal Affairs (Kistiakovsky – M.A.)…had provided the evidence 
that the anarchist character of the Uprising in contrast to the nationalist one is 
becoming ever more prominent…
124 
 
December 11, 1918: 
The Directorate must without a doubt introduce measures of the most radical 
nature into its program in order to win over the popular masses (Volksmassen) and 
widen the basis of the uprising.
125  
 
Day after Hetman’s fall, December 15, 1918: 
Whether the leaders would be able to keep popular masses, peasants in particular, 
in check for some time (auf die Dauer), appears rather questionable, since the 
elements of indisputably bolshevist character had joined the movement in a hope of 
coming back to power.
126 
 
December 24, 1918 
Vynnychenko admits that the position of the current regime is gravely challenged 
by the menace of Bolshevism and that [this menace] stems more from within than 
from without.
127  
 
And, finally, communiqué sent on the day of Kiev’s fall, February 6, 1919: 
                                                 
123 AdR Karton 720, Fürstenberg an Flotow, Die National ukrianische Aufstandsbewegung, Kiew, am 1. 
Dezember 1918.  
124 AdR Karton 720, Fürstenberg an Flotow, am 8. Dezember 1918, Kiew 
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Dezember 1918 
126 PAAA R 14388 Telegramm, Berchem, 15.12.18, Kiew 
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The entire movement projects a thoroughgoing bolshevist character (einen 
durchaus bolschewistischen Charakter)… The national moment retreats entirely 
(tritt … völlig zurück) behind the craving of the masses for plunder and self-
enrichment.
128  
 
That same story fleshes itself out in the chronological concatenation of the resolutions of 
the multiple peasant congresses that were taking place in the wake of the Directorate’s 
victory. The new government received initially a limited approbation on the condition 
that it: a) “accepts the position of the toiling classes”, b) sanctions the establishment of 
the “local organs of power,” c) subjects officers and generals of the former Hetman’s 
Army to most stringent penalty (decisions of the Peasant Congress in Kiev, ratified on 
the December 24); soon, however, the tone of resolutions evolved to the categorical 
repudiation of the Directorate with an ultimatum-like impetration of surrendering all 
prerogatives to the local soviets in the due course of twenty-four hours (resolution taken 
by the Executive committee of the All-Ukrainian Soviet of the Peasant Deputies on the 
15
th of January).
129 The UNR had failed to carry out the radical program in its full and, as 
Makhno affirmed at one of the village gatherings, “the revolutionary insurgency will not 
brook replacing it (the program) with the tasks of the Directorate.”
130 In the final analysis, 
therefore, the alliance between the Nationalists and the Peasant Insurgents was a simple 
marriage of convenience, maintained for as long as Hetman was around. The divorce 
proceedings, pursued with equal determination by all sides involved, commenced 
immediately afterwards.  
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130 Makhno, Spovid’ anarkhista, 578  
  270
In the political realm, that process, activated by the comportment of the right-wing 
nationalist military and the increasingly peremptory demands of the Insurgents translated 
itself in the split of the Ukrainian Left, whereupon its radical fraction left the Directorate in 
favor of cooperating with the Bolshevik Provisional Government in Kharkov; the non-
Ukrainian Left Parties, with the possible exception of Poale Zion, had done it practically 
‘wholesale.’ The unity of the Ukrainian Socialist-Democratic Party, under serious strain ever 
since December of 1918, came formally to an end at the VI Party Congress (January 12-14, 
1919) which resulted in the emergence of the strongly pro-Soviet Independent Socialist-
Democrats (nezalezhniki)
131; on the contrary, the Socialists Revolutionaries, divided into the 
Right (the so-called SR of the Central current, tsentral’noi techii) and the Left faction (also 
known as the Borot’bisty, the Borotbists)
132 since May 1918, discovered a new modus 
vivendi by adapting platform of the Soviet power.
133 The Borotbists went further – together 
with the Independent S-Ds, the party strewed Ukraine with scads of insurrectional 
revolutionary committees, in order “to impute organized political form onto elementary 
dissatisfaction of the masses,”
134 that is, to capitalize on the present political moment and to 
secure for itself a place of honor in the impending division of spoils.  
 
For, in all frankness, having decided in January of 1919 to throw down the gauntlet in front 
of the Directorate, the Central Committee of the Borotbist Party could only be seen as a 
latecomer. The land was continuously ravaged by the epidemics of mutinies and uprisings, 
which had fatally weakened the Republic’s frail body. It must be said that the distinction 
                                                 
131 Khrystiuk, v. 4, 49-56 
132 Chapter 2 will hopefully render the vermiculated history of the Ukrainian Left less complex.   
133 Khrystiuk, v. 4, 74, See the resolution of the Ukrainian S-Rs of the Central current, especially point 2. 
134 Ibid., v. 4, 75  
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between the two – that is, between an uprising (vosstanie, povstannia) of the alleged civil 
populace and a mutiny in some unit – is nearly impossible to establish, for once because the 
Revolution and the Civil War, after destroying the old army, apparatus of mobilization and 
the concomitant notions of discipline and subordination, had brought about a recompense in 
the form of a highly militarized, well-armed and pathologically alert society; one could thus 
speak of a certain convergence, eradicating the line between properly civil and military 
domains. Then again, all forms of popular resentment, within the army or outside its 
institutional boundaries, presuppose both a period of relative peace preceding the outbreak of 
violence and some degree of support lent to that agent against whom the revolt is directed; in 
other words, a government, which finds itself challenged by the mutineers or rebels should at 
least be seen as potentially legitimate either before or during events in questions. Neither 
conditions were present; Ukraine, the boiling cauldron enkindled by the unceasing fire since 
the mid-Autumn of 1918 had hardly furnished the UNR an opportunity at firmly establishing 
its authority. A group of 4,000 outraged peasants, who, upon arriving in Kharkov to discover 
that they were called to arms by the Directorate, had marched straight to the building of the 
Soviet, proclaiming their commitment to “stand and fight for the power of the soviets”;
135 
many, more than we could ever hope to know, never fancied a thought of serving “the 
bourgeois chauvinist Ukrainian Republic.” Repudiation, therefore, of Hetman’s authority had 
merely been turned into the rejection of the Directorate’s. What could be concluded is that 
the populace was pouncing upon the levers of political reconstitution (and disintegration), 
with overt mutinies, desertions, refusals to carry out orders, unsanctioned establishment of 
the local organs of power and the disarmament of the police being manifestation of the same 
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aspiration and of the same process, habitually parceled into distinct categories by the 
bureaucrats without the state.   
 
Let the habitual line be reiterated, if only for the sake of the narration: Ukraine, on both 
banks of the Dnieper River, was shaken by uprisings. Particularly active were the residents of 
the old ‘rebel districts’ – Zvenigorodka, Tarashcha, Skvira, Obukhov, Tripol’e, Pereiaslav. In 
Zolotonosha, the peasants had established a revolutionary staff, disarmed few batallions of 
the Black Sea division stationed nearby and began building up troops of their own – adhering 
to the class-lines, according to Khrystiuk.
136 The insurgents, led by Anton Bogunsky, a youth 
of barely 19 years of age and a self-proclaimed communist,
137 entered into contact with the 
Commander of the Ukrainian Front whose official blessing augured the birth of the 1
st 
Zolotonosha Regiment, the core of the future Bogunsky’s brigade.
138 The Izium district of 
the Kharkov province saw the advent of some Chaplin and a certain Sablin, both left S-R’s, 
just as their colleague from Kupiansk, Ryndin.
139 Rebels around Konotop in Poltava province 
united around the figure of Grigory Bibik, a railwayman best remembered for the sonorous 
title he bestowed upon his retinue: “the flying unit of the Konotop combat revolutionary 
squad for the defense of the Moscow-Kiev-Voronezh (MKV) railroad.”
140 All of them had 
expressed their intention to serve under the banner of the International Revolution and all had 
their requests granted. With an order issued on January 30
th, Antonov had refashioned the 
insurgents of the Poltava and Kharkov regions into the 9
th, 10
th, 11
th and 12
th infantry and the 
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3
rd cavalry regiments.
141 As the front line moved westward, the uprisings began inundating 
the knolls of Podolia, Volhynian forests and the steppes of the Northern Black Sea shore.  
 
Proskurov rose up in rebellion on February 14; the insurrection was brutally suppressed 
whereupon the city became the scene of the largest Jewish pogrom of the whole war with 
hundreds if not thousands slain.
142 Uman and Gaisin districts were soon lost to the rebels; in 
the latter district, as the Soviet dispatch from the February 25 claims, “even the small 
villages ha[d] revolutionary committees.”
143 In the eastern Volhynia volunteers organized a 
regiment; by mid March of 1919, that unit under the generic designation of the Volhynian 
regiment, was fighting alongside the Bogun and Tarashcha regiments of Shchors and bat’ko 
Bozhenko.
144 To the south, in the realm of ataman Grigoriev – of whose own dealings with 
the Ukrainian Bolsheviks more will be said shortly – operated a whole slew of lesser 
insurgent atamans: Maksim Kozyrev, a one-time sergeant-major (feldfebel’) of the Tsarist 
army and the organizer of what would be known as the 15
th Regiment;
145 ataman Kachura 
from Chigirin, an NCO of the German war, who, despite his “lacking refinement” (malaia 
intelligentnost’)
146 managed to haggle out for himself a commanding post in the Red Army 
(naturally, of the so-called ‘Chigirin regiment’); Kozubsky, another former railroad 
employee from the Golta junction of Kherson province (present-day Pervomaisk in Mykolaiv 
(Nikolaev) oblast) operating along the railroad stretch Voznesensk-Cherkassy
147 who would 
join forces with Grigoriev’s refractory subordinate, Tkachenko under the aegis of the 2
nd 
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Soviet Ukrainian division.
148 A local curio was ataman Popov, who, possessing a force of 
400 infantry and 175 cavalry, fancied himself the supreme commander (glavkoverkh) of the 
“Southern Soviet Army.” He too, however, had shown himself willing to be courted by 
Antonov. Hailing Popov and his assemblage of men as the “valiant soldiers of the Red 
Khersonshchina,” Antonov, the real chief officer of the Ukrainian Front, remarked with 
perfect bonhomie: “You should not be addressing yourself with the title of supreme 
commander – it is rather amusing (eto zabavno).”
149  
 
Under the nominal command of Kharkov, the insurgents were thrown into the fray – to battle 
the so-called “army” of the UNR, or whatever had remained of it after the first months of 
fighting. Admittedly there was not much, for the units raised in the course of the anti-Hetman 
revolt or mobilized in the forthcoming weeks were deserting Vynnychenko’s government en 
masse. “The Ukrainian troops,” reported Berchem on New Year’s Eve, “in their 
overwhelming majority would not budge to fight the Bolsheviks”
150 – on the contrary, many 
had actively strove to conjoin their alleged opponent. On December 14, 1918, for instance, 
the entire garrison of Glukhov went over to the Bolsheviks’ side – and so, having actually 
successfully repelled the attack of the red partisans.
151 Neither did the 600 petliurovtsy 
around Gorodnia have to be told twice before deciding to throw their lot with the 1
st Soviet 
Ukrainian division (December 30, 1918).
152 The Taras Shevchenko Regiment, stationed in 
Sosnitsa, had done the same
153 - its imposing commander, a bearded, weapon-bedizened 
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sailor with the tellingly expressive surname of Zhivoderov (or Zhivoder, that is, “flayer” in 
Russian) had asked Antonov to let the regiment retain both its name and its current 
composition. Antonov courteously obliged.
154 As winter turned into spring, an army group of 
Petliura’s ataman (colonel) Paliy, body of 15 000 strong, had shriveled into non-existence.
155 
Having refused to advance against Makhno, the Akhtyrka regiment was speedily disarmed. 
That unwillingness to fight the Bolsheviks accompanied by cases of mass defection spread 
further – to the Nalivaykovka regiment, the 1
st Vynnychenko regiment, 14
th Balta regiment, 
10
th Novograd-Volynsk cavalry regiment, 9
th Odessa regiment, 1
st Cherniakov regiment and 
many others. “The commanding officers are compelled to conceal from their troops the real 
reason for fighting the Reds; the soldiers are being told that the rank and file of the Soviet 
army consists of the Jews, Chinese, Turks, etc,” claimed the soviet report from the 15
th of 
February.
156 That method was clearly of a limited efficacy and all of the listed units had to be 
ultimately broken up – when necessary, by the force of the Galicians. Yet, even that 
praetorian guard of the Ukrainian national revolution was not immune to the Bolshevik 
malaise, as was evinced by the intention of the Sich riflemen to negotiate with the Soviet 
military authorities on their own – that is, without the know-it-all intermediaries from the 
Vynnychenko-Petliura camp.
157 
 
The Directorate had run into great difficulties trying to keep its newly assembled troops 
together; the problem was rendered all the more insuperable by the continuing practice of 
territorial mobilization, whereby regiments would be constituted of men recruited from the 
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same locality. These units tended to whittle away within the few weeks of being called up, 
making off with whatever arms and clothing that the Ukrainian ghost state endeavored to 
procure. Thus, of the 300 residents of the Staro-Konstantinov district mobilized in January of 
1919 to form the so-called “battalion of death” (kurin’ smerti) only 180 reached their final 
destination of Rovno, the rest having euphemistically ‘gone home’ (razolshlis’ po 
domam).
158 Two new regiments in Belaia Tserkov had to be struck off the strategic maps of 
the Ukrainian Army Staff when their fictitiousness became undeniably real (mid February 
1919).
159 Peasants drafted from the Iampol (ukr. Iampil’) district of the Podolian province 
had followed the suit of other deserters except that their ultimate destination was not some 
home village one languished for but the bivouacs of the Soviet Ukrainian troops.
160 Well-
informed of such disintegrating tendencies within the UNR army and of the irrefutable 
gravitation of the Ukrainian peasantry towards the Bolsheviks, V. Tkachuk, a departmental 
head in the Army Group of the Kiev Direction, submitted a memorandum on February 27
 to 
Glagolev, the senior officer of Antonov’s Staff, in which he presented Petliura’s mobilization 
efforts as a development to welcome and rejoice at. “All of the [newly recruited soldiers] 
would anyway switch sides in our favor,” he blithely concluded.
161 The Bolsheviks may have 
exaggerated the gravity of the situation in which the Directorate wallowed, but they 
rightfully knew themselves to be by far the stronger of the two, for the traffic of defection, 
that demographic gradient of ideological predilection, clearly pointed in one direction only – 
                                                 
158 ibid., v. 3, 258 
159 RGVA f 6 o 4 d 381 ll 3-5 
160 IVRKPU nr 59 March 4
th, 1919  
161 RGVA f 167 o 1 d 15 l 19  
  277
towards the east, where the rubicund and obsidian flags were undulating freely on the 
wind.
162   
  
Turning their back on the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the great atamans were approaching 
the finishing stage in their parleys with the government in Kharkov. A novel character on the 
picturesque horizon of the Ukrainian affairs, ataman Struk from the Gornostaypol’ (ukr. 
Hornostaipil’) volost on the southern fringe of the Pripyat Marshes abandoned Petliura for 
the Soviets when these latter landed ashore on the right bank of the Dnieper.
163 A former 
teacher according to some testimonies, trained agitator according to the others,
164 that scion 
of a well-to-do peasant family possessed enough acumen to make himself useful to all the 
regimes, kaleidoscopically succeeding one another. His impressive political resume would 
later include services to Denikin, Piłsudski and Savinkov; now, however, in February of 
1919 he acted in the guise of a Red officer when he and his comrades from Ivankov (20 
miles west of Gornostaypol’), hurriedly renamed into the 20
th Communist Regiment, were 
transferred southward to cauterize their rupture with the UNR by the fire of battle.   
 
A vital player of the November revolt, an embodiment indeed of the peasant victory over the 
forces of urban reaction, ataman Zeleny could not forgive the Directorate the opprobrium of 
being kept outside the limits of the vanquished capital. Vynnychenko and Petliura, on the 
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contrary, thought that Zeleny was encamped uncomfortably close to their seat of power and 
that one would assuredly better serve the republic by removing the ataman and his burly men 
farther to the west, preferably to Galicia to assist their hard-pressed compatriots.
165 The order 
to board the train destined for Lviv ultimately proved counterproductive, for Zeleny, far from 
executing the directive of the Chief Otoman, brought his ‘Dnieper Division’ back to 
Obukhov and Tripol’e where most of his men resided. Soon thereafter, in mid January a 
gathering of peasants in Grigorievka (ukr. Hrihor’ivka), presenting itself proudly as the 
regional congress, selected a revolutionary committee and appointed Zeleny to be the ataman 
of the makeshift peasant army.
166 On the 8
th of February he sent his emissaries to Antonov’s 
ambulatory staff to deliberate over the conditions of his collaboration with the Bolsheviks.
167 
These negotiations dragged on for weeks and were ultimately fruitless, yet even then the 
editorial board of the Kievskiy Kommunist felt confident enough to write at the beginning of 
March that “ataman Zeleny … supports the Soviet power and maintains contact with the 
Soviet Army.”
168    
 
Perhaps the greatest loss that the army of the UNR had suffered, an occurrence that had 
justly left the most profound impression on contemporaries, took place when ataman 
Grigoriev with his multifarious and multitudinous troops swore loyalty to the Soviet Ukraine. 
Veritable milestone of the entire campaign, that volte-face had probably been inspired by the 
efforts of the Ukrainian politicians to strike a note of accord with the Entente powers. If 
earlier the UNR government still had enough bravado left to admonish victorious Western 
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allies for infringing on the sovereignty of Ukraine, by January it had turned to them as a 
beggar, cadging Entente representatives for help against the rapidly advancing Bolsheviks. 
Arriving in Odessa on January 20, Osyp Nazaruk and Serhii Ostapenko were treated by the 
French military authorities with unconcealed disdain – as the capitulating emissaries from the 
unrecognized government of a non-existing people.
169 Stipulations of the treaty, signed by 
general d’Anselme  and the officers of his staff on one hand and by the generals Grekov (ukr. 
Hrekiv) and Matveev (ukr. Matviiv) on the other corresponded to the tone of the discussion: 
on the condition of expurgating its government of all the “bolshevik” elements (that is, 
Vynnychenko and Chekovs’koy primarily), Ukraine was to enter into the Entente-sponsored 
anti-Soviet military alliance, surrender the command of its own forces over to the officers of 
the Allied and the Volunteer Armies and formally concede to the de facto occupation of the 
Black Sea shore by the Entente troops.
170 So much for treasured Ukrainian independence.  
 
It is difficult to ascertain how concerned Grigoriev was with the subtleties of the threatened 
national sovereignty. To him and his subordinates the presence of the Entente bore too strong 
a resemblance to the earlier Austro-German occupation and its violently anti-Bolshevik 
rhetoric (and policies) could only be seen as a preface to the return of the vengeful 
“reaction.” On few occasions he attempted to solicit Petliura into permitting him to launch an 
attack on the French, Greek, Polish and German forces in the area – in order to jostle that 
polyglot army into the sea once and for all.
171 Fearing, however, that the beleaguered 
Republic may soon face the war on another front, Petliura ordered the tempestuous ataman to 
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hold his breath. Grigoriev was not discouraged; that strange man, who combined Bonapartist 
megalomania, Panslavic nationalism, populist sentimentality with revolutionary commitment, 
simply started to look for another patron and he quickly found one in the persona of Antonov. 
Initially covert, his ties with the Bolsheviks became evident when he occupied Znamenka 
and sent his troops eastward – to Yelizavetgrad and thence to Dybenko.
172 This union was 
formally consummated on the 18 of February, when Grigoriev’s ‘Cherson division,’ about 
11,000 strong, was transformed into the 1
st Brigade of the Transdnieperian Division
173 and 
withal two of Ukraine’s greatest warlords, Makhno and Grigoriev, found themselves working 
under the auspices of the same organization.   
 
A question begging to be asked: in the end of an admittedly long day, who had risked staying 
behind the Directorate? No precise answer is available, neither should it be hoped for, as 
minds of men, macerating in the sanguineous marinade of the civil strife habitually leave 
accounting affairs in the state of desuetude. Kakurin, nevertheless, endeavored to produce a 
diagram, according to which of the 25,000 men constituting the army of the UNR,
174 by 
March 1
st 1919 only 12 % (i.e. 3000) could be considered reliable, the rest having either 
deserted, defected or mutinied
175 - with all due respect, that figure could only be treated as 
that of impression than of precision. More useful, it would seem, are the testimonies which 
portray the Sich Riflemen as the exclusive hope of the vagabond Ukrainian government. 
“The East-Ukrainian troops are not dependable (ist… kein Verlaß), reported Fürstenberg on 
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the 26
th of January, “and last weeks had proven again how inapplicable this material is for 
the employment against Soviet troops. As soon as they are transported to the front, they 
commence to negotiate with their adversary, ending in fraternization. As a result of that, the 
Directorate is supported solely (stützt sich … lediglich auf) by the Galician contingents, 
which are dispatched here at the fastest possible tempo.”
176 Moisei Rafes repeats this almost 
verbatim: “At the time when the units mobilized in Ukraine one after another were going 
over to the side of the Bolsheviks, the Galicians remained faithful to the Directorate until the 
end.”
177 Finally, Antonov, who had all the reasons to accentuate the difficulty of the task 
imparted upon him by the Revolution, confessed that “only the Galician detachments or 
those that disposed of substantive Galician cadres preserved some fighting efficiency 
(boesposobnost’).”
178 The Wheel of Fortune had thus run a full cycle and the Directorate 
landed in a situation not dissimilar to the pre-November days: in a crummy provincial town, 
amidst the chagrin of desultory disputes, with its present and its future buttressed by the 
thinning rows of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty’s former subjects.    
   
Indirectly, the alienation of the UNR government both from the people that it purported to 
represent and from the forces of the armed insurgency that it was supposed to have harnessed 
manifested itself in a difficult, if not tragic predicament, in which the Galician Sich Riflemen 
were caught. In their allegiance to the Directorate they had very quickly arrogated upon 
themselves punitive functions once the peasants refused either to surrender the arms or to 
recognize the power of the Directorate. Thus, in January 1919 Galicians were used in 
bringing back some sense to the inhabitants of the Tripol’e when those had injudiciously 
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decided to establish the Soviet and elect the Revolutionary Committee with Zeleny at its 
head.
179 Simultaneously the Riflemen took part in the suppression of an uprising in the area 
of Zolotonosha, where they had managed to score a tactical victory but suffer an indelible 
moral defeat.
180 Exhausted and traumatized, they fared worse militarily attempting to 
liquidate the ‘Bolshevik’ uprising around Korostyshev (not too far from Zhytomir).
181 Their 
opponents – the peasants who took up arms against the Directorate, or, more precisely, who 
had simply declined to put them down as the limited goal, the overthrow of the Hetman, was 
reached – paid back in the same coin. “Spell-bound by the Bolshevik propaganda, wrote 
Nazaruk of the days preceding the fall of Kiev, villagers began to view the Sich Riflemen as 
the ‘lords’ (pans’kim) army, which fights in the landowners’ interests! The wounded 
Sichovyki, which crawled to the peasant houses, were not even given water.”
182 That 
animosity towards the Galicians survived, so it seems, the early thrill of the peasants’ 
romance with the Bolsheviks. When asked, for instance, who his opponents are, a certain 
ataman Shevchenko promptly responded, “Landowners, Jews and the Turks.” Upon catching 
his interlocutor’s surprised expression, the ataman casually explained, “Turks – that’s in our 
language (tse po nashomu). In yours – Galicians, or, what’s their name, Austrians.”
183 What 
was planned as a crusade against the Romanov, Great Russian or Bolshevik tyranny turned 
into a bona fide internecine domestic war with the Ukrainians (however they may have 
defined themselves) battling other Ukrainians, the chromatic interplay of Red and Black 
proving no less national that that of the Yellow-Blue.
184 The Directorate’s failure to keep 
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Ukraine unified, therefore, was Galicia’s failure to become Ukrainian Piedmont and Galician 
Riflemen - to welter in the aura of Garibaldi’s Red Shirts.  
 
 
Part III: a tentative portrait of partizanshchina 
 
In the contest over the loyalties, the Directorate was out-paced, out-matched and check-
mated by the Bolsheviks in all spheres and on all accounts. The rapid diminution of the 
Directorate’s military potential was accompanied by the precipitous, avalanche-like growth 
of the Bolshevik troops. Elemental in fact seemed the advance of the partisans to the 
contemporaries – hence the profusion of the torrential metaphors, that pandemonium of the 
violent gales, destructive conflagrations, all-absorbing eddies brought into the gaze of the 
contemplating posterity. “The blizzard was already approaching.” recalled Nazaruk, “From 
the eastern and southern direction loomed Bolshevik forces. One cannot say ‘armies,’ only – 
forces.”
185  
 
What was startling was the multifaceted nature of these forces, the possibility of cohabitation 
and cooperation between individuals with differing visions of the Revolution; after all, the 
Party had not yet construed Bolshevism into a calcified administrative practice – nor had the 
insurgents invented their proverbial ‘third way’ in opposition to the ‘magisterial’ Red or 
White currents.  Troops formed still in the Neutral Zone contained probably the largest 
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number of the Communists, оr at least the best-organized party cells – so one is led to believe. 
Alliance with Makhno brought into the army “anarchist elements” – a political concoction 
beggaring an easy definition due to the emphasis of its apologists on the spontaneous ‘praxis 
of Revolution.’ The defection of Zeleny, Grigoriev, Struk and other atamans, previously 
connected with the UNR, spiced up the communist-anarchist amalgam with a plethora of 
representatives from the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian Left Parties, the Borotbists and the 
Independent Social-Democrats in particular. Their role in the functioning of the Kharkov 
government may have been marginal, yet, protected by organized bodies of armed men, their 
presence in the local affairs seemed powerful and permanent.  
 
Later, in attempting to explain the outbreak of mutinies among their tessellated troops, the 
Soviet authorities thought it adequate to advert to the machinations of the former Petliura 
officers (Grigoriev for instance), who had not abjured their nefarious opinions even when 
surrounded by the virtuous Bolsheviks; equally Manichean and unapologetically revanchist 
nationalist literature of today arrives at a similar conclusion, dividing the Ukrainian army by 
a lethargic legerdemain into the “heart-bleeding patriots” (again Grigoriev) and a suggestive 
group of “callous foreigners.” The reality is, naturally, simultaneously more complex and 
simple. For all their diversity, the units of the Soviet Ukraine, partisans from the Neutral 
Zone, rebellious Volhynian peasants, ataman-led troops in the Cherson province, Insurgents 
of the Left Bank regions, shared much in common: a certain affinity of practices, true 
“consubstantiality” of human matter, finally, a psychological and spiritual kinship of their 
leaders. In short, what the Bolshevik troops in the first half of 1919 embodied was exactly  
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that nexus of attitudes which one designated as either partizanshchina, or, more pointedly 
inimical, as atamanshchina.
186 
  
The phenomenon of Partizanshchina, the ‘partisan-style warfare,’ was less concerned with 
the tactical saliencies of the war as with the rapports of armed men with each other, their 
commanders and the outside world.
187 The unconditional obedience of the oath-bound 
recruits was cast aside and replaced by a vague form of soldierly democracy. The idea of 
“comradely discipline” (tovarishcheskaia distsiplina), which in the opinion of Valeriy 
Mezhlauk, the People’s Commissar of Military Affairs,
188 favorably distinguished Ukrainian 
forces from those of the Soviet Russia,
189 seemed to have been applied almost literally. 
“Merciless measures are being taken against the misdemeanors, debauchery, gambling in 
accordance with the resolutions made by the Red Army soldiers themselves,” so reads the 
early March report on the 15
th Ukrainian Insurgent regiment.
190 The power of the rank and 
file to mete out punishments to the malefactors, institutionally expressed in the advent of 
regimental tribunals, was closely linked with the capacity to choose and dismiss their own 
commanders; previously described as an integral part of the partisan ethos, this practice was 
only reinforced as the troops from the Neutral zone came into contact with the partisans of 
Makhno and the rebels of Bogunsky. Among the Makhnovites, in particular, deliberations 
                                                 
186 In the context of this discussion I prefer the term partizanshchina; it seems more specific, crisper, easier to 
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play the rule of some rural caudillo, limited in his authority by the cohort of close associates.      
187 Tactically, the conduct of the war had little to do with the conventional understanding of the guerilla warfare 
with its endless hit-and-run attacks or ability of the ‘soldiers’ to merge effortlessly into the local populace; true 
guerilla war represents a response to the presence of a better-armed and better-organized opponent – in the first 
half of 1919 the Soviets were clearer the stronger of all the protagonists. It is only later, when Ukraine again 
was set alight by the blaze of anti-Bolshevik peasant uprisings that the war-making became truly guerilla-like.  
188 Such was the state of affairs in the Ukrainian Soviet Government that there were two People’s Commissars 
of Military Affairs at the same time – the aforementioned Mezhlauk and, of course, Nikolai Podvoisky.  
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and voting were taking place practically on all levels. Referring specifically to the artillery 
branch of the Makhno army, a Soviet military inspector averred: “In order to be elected one 
is not required to possess any relevant experience, the only condition being a modicum of 
knowledge of the gunner’s craft (artilleriyskogo dela).”
191 Implicit in that was the rejection 
of the ‘deadpan professionalism,’ an old habit stemming from the widespread distrust of the 
military specialists (voenspetsy) and the academy-nurtured officers from the pre-World War 
period.  
 
Generally speaking, the adherence to the principle of the ‘comradely discipline’ and the 
insistence of the common soldiers on having their officers elected (vybornoe nachalo) 
allowed the ordinary rank-and-file to infiltrate areas of sheer strategic and tactical expertise; 
to put it differently, the persistence on executing commands out of the “awareness of the 
revolutionary duty”
192 had stripped the art of war-making of all alleged political neutrality. 
The need for transparency became paramount, as could be espied from the comportment of 
Bogunsky’s partisans, so overkeen on knowing exactly “against whom and to what end they 
need[ed] to fight.”
193 Assemblies (sobraniia) of soldiers
194, a penchant born in the euphoric 
March of 1917 and sanctified by now as a revolutionary tradition, acquired trappings of a 
primitive parliament, where military directives issued from above, recommendations 
proffered by members of the personnel and, significantly, critical questions of the ‘present 
political moment’ were all discussed and debated in the same breath. The oft flaunted image 
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194 Documents seem to indicate that the English word miting was generally reserved to the affairs organized by 
the officials from the outside; Russian sobranie, on the contrary, refers to the spontaneous and hence 
unsanctioned gathering of men, brought together by the feeling of shared urgency.    
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of the Makhnovites lying supine as they expatiate upon their next move could have been 
reproduced with the same staged exactitude in all troops of the Soviet Ukraine, regardless of 
their provenance and the potential to be subsequently transformed into regular army units.  
 
Undoubtedly, the partisans would have not developed the same sense of inner autonomy and 
would have certainly shown greater alacrity in accepting injunctions from the Center without 
first subjecting it to some prefatory censure, had the fledgling state succeeded in establishing 
a working supply system, rendering thus partisans materially dependent upon itself; one does 
not, after all, bite the feeding hand. Alas, this was not the case for the Bolsheviks were never 
in position of consistently providing the Army with the necessities of life and war. “On 
March 25,” the People’s Commissar of Justice Aleksandr Khmelnitskiy informed Nikolai 
Podvoisky, “… a delegation from the Volhynian regiment arrived, complaining about the 
absence of boots, clothing, equipment, bullets, [and] cannon shells,”
195 and that grievance 
reverberated with commensurate force and poignancy among the troops of Makhno,
196 
partisans of the Tarashcha regiment
197 and Grigoriev’s subordinates.
198 In the course of six 
months, the artillery battalion (divizion) of Bogunsky’s obtained 39 sets of underwear, 33 
pairs of trousers, 39 shirts, 39 service caps and 24 pairs of boots – laughingly little to meet 
the needs of few hundred men.
199 Having described how inadequate the work of the rear 
organizations was in supplying the 1
st Ukrainian Soviet army, an agent of the Highest 
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Military Inspectorate thought it appropriate to append that all other armies of the Ukrainian 
front find themselves in an equal state of neglect and dereliction.
200 
 
Men of the Ukrainian Army were therefore entirely on their own in matters of provisioning. 
As a result, the old and reviled custom of “arbitrary requisitioning” – samochinnye rekvizitsii 
– became by now so thoroughly engrained that one inadvertently began speaking of the fully-
fledged “predatory instincts” (grabitel’skie instinkty) of the insurgents.
201 In the best of cases, 
clothing and footwear were brought along by the partisans themselves; more often than not it 
had been simply ‘expropriated’ from the local peasants, or obtained in the battle, fact leading 
to the emergence of the Red Army soldiers, outfit in the uniforms of the Hetman, UNR or 
Galician armies.
202 Weapons as a rule were also seized from the populace or from the 
opponent. As a result, the soldiers, accoutered with rifles of all models (Russian Mosin rifles, 
old Berdan rifles, Italian, Austrian, German and even Japanese models), sometimes with a 
revolver and a dagger jutting out of the belt looked tawdrier and more pirate-like than ever 
before.
203 Questions abounded: how could this bevy of men come into possession of proper 
ammunition, piebald as the origin of their weaponry was? Who could warrant an equitable 
distribution of the captured spoils of war between all the sundry clamoring detachments?
204 
By what miracle of an argument would one wean the insurgents from the idea that the objects 
snatched form the hands of the discomfited adversary represented their inalienable 
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204 Although short of rifles, troops of the 1
st Ukrainian Soviet Army had an over-supply of the machine guns; 
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property?
205 All said, the self-supply was a typical Catch-22 story, reinforcing itself by the 
very infrastructural quandaries it had created.  
     
Likewise, due to the extreme weakness of the soviet administrative apparatus, the Ukrainian 
insurgents could proceed almost unimpeded in procuring the most important war material – 
able-bodied men; the convention of ‘arbitrary requisitioning’ found thus its complement in 
the practice of ‘arbitrary mobilization’ (samochinnaia mobilizatsiia). Divisional and 
regimental commanders had their own ‘mobilizational departments’ set up, responsible for 
bringing in new recruits into the ranks of their swelling armies.
206 Always short of equipment, 
they were never too loath to let the POWs with arms serve alongside the often-unarmed 
Soviet soldier. Most, however, had their departed replaced thanks to the never-ending stream 
of the volunteers from the nearby villages; these tended to arrive in large parties,
207 
depending, of course, on the size of the represented settlement. Conditioned to no small 
extent by the traditional forms of peasant organization, this phenomenon of arriving en masse 
discloses nonetheless the nature of the ‘voluntary recruitments,’ its highly qualified character 
being perhaps best encapsulated in the following Makhnovite resolution:  
After prolonged discussions… one is asked to vote either for the compulsory or 
for the voluntary mobilizations. As a result, the congress arrives to an 
agreement, that mobilization should not be compulsory (prinuditel’naia), i.e. 
based on the principle of exerting pressure from above by violence and orders, 
but obligatory (obiazatel’naia) in the sense that each peasant, capable of 
bearing arms, should on his own recognize his duty in joining the ranks of the 
insurgents and in protecting the interests of the entire toiling people of Ukraine 
[emphasis is that of the original document – M.A.].
208  
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Regardless of how sincere the atamans-turned-commanders were when declaring their 
allegiance to the principle of the voluntary recruitment, by mixture of cooption, cajoling and 
coercion they had managed to keep their armies always on the rise. Towards mid April, 
Grigoriev’s original three regiments were supplemented by another two (4
th Partisan and 5
th 
Tiligul Regiments),
209 augmenting his total force to about 16,000 men (from 10,000 at the 
time of his joining the Bolsheviks).
210 More impressive yet were the growth figures of the 
Makhno troops – from three thousand in mid February
211 to 16,000 by late April
212 - 
although given the mobility of the maknovites and the high turn-over rate that latter number 
represented more an average potential than the actual strength of the Makhno’s forces.
213  
 
Between the partisans intent on preserving their rights and the Center bent on transforming 
them into “an obedient and malleable weapon of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government”
214 
there stood a figure of the ataman, bat’ko, commander with a direct mandate from his own 
men and a transcendent one from the invisible inchoate state. To the former he was a caring 
and a just father figure, a connoisseur of the mass psychology, eloquent as far the folk’s 
idiom was concerned, cultured, but not to the point of appearing inaccessible; conversant 
with the world, he was crafty enough to manipulate it to the advantage of his subalterns. Like 
Bozhenko he knew how to combine blandishment with blackmail in order to assure that the 
insurgents received proper and timely medical treatment;
215 in the manner of Grigoriev, he 
never blanched before stopping provision-carrying transports to rip up their goods-laden 
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bellies and disembowel their fatty contents among the inebriated soldiers or the covetous 
local dwellers. The size of the commanded detachment permitting, an ataman’s rapports with 
his subordinates tended to remain unmediated and personal; detailed, disarmingly attentive 
lest a name be omitted and a Red Army man bereft of his well-merited allowance, orders of 
sailor Zhivoderov, commander of the Taras Shevchenko Regiment, unwittingly remind one 
of a small-scale manorial lord than an emissary of a revolution with universal pretensions.
216 
Of course, with larger units – those of the Transdnieperian brigades (Makhno and Grigoriev) 
or of the 1
st Insurgent Division (Shchors) – this immediacy was sacrificed to the strength of 
numbers; yet, a degree of informality had still been maintained, either by creating a system 
of lesser bat’ki underneath a greater one or by devising a remunerative and retributive code, 
sufficiently idiosyncratic to let the will and the voice of the commander be recognized 
without much ambivalence.
217  
 
A surrogate father to his troops endowed with a right to reward and punish, the ataman was a 
real dilemma for the Bolsheviks who had subcontracted him and to whom he had technically 
owed allegiance. Insubordinate, stubborn, too full of initiative for his own good – rarely did 
the official portraits of the Red Army commanders in those days deviate from that farrago of 
epithets. “The regiment would blindly, unfailingly go there where bat’ko would lead them,” 
so wrote Antonov of Bozhenko
218 – and they did, often to the considerable annoyance of the 
Bolsheviks. Grigoriev’s great offensive in the direction of Odessa – an undertaking that had 
earned him most flattering accolades – took place without any prodding from the Bolsheviks; 
on the contrary, having been suspicious of Grigoriev from the moment of encounter, 
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Antonov and Skachko (commander of the Army Group of the Kharkov direction) wanted to 
engage him on the fronts of lesser importance,
219 but the great warlord, the “ataman of 
Taurida and Kherson region,” had confounded them and their plans. Similarly, the insurgents 
would often not budge unless the order from the Center had been countersigned by their own 
commander. Shchors, for instance, piqued by the attempts at replacing him with some 
‘reliable Soviet worker,’ kept a regiment of his 1
st Division motionless in Vinnitsa despite 
clear directive to relocate; the conflict smoldered for a day and a half, at the height of the 
UNR counter-offensive, until Shchors was officially reaffirmed in his position – and thus 
strengthened in his subsequent dealings with the representatives of the formal power.
220    
 
Herein lay exactly the radix of the troubles with that bevy of refractory and self-important 
bearers of the Revolution’s crimson standard – in that jealousy with which they guarded their 
turf and their privileges against a possible intruder, however imposing his credentials may 
have been. Political commissars were either altogether absent or brooked for as long as they 
confined themselves to purely “demonstrative” roles of no practical import.
221 Otherwise, 
when the enthusiasm in applying ‘revolutionary discipline’ to the partisan half-brigands 
proved excessive, the commissars ran the risks of facing serious reprisals; occurrences of 
their being beaten by the Red Army soldiers, goaded on by their commanders, were not 
uncommon,
222 as were not the direct threats to their lives all that exceptional.
223 Fiodor 
Dybenko, in fact, brother of the celebrated Pavel and himself the senior officer of the 
mysterious 4
th Insurgent Division did not shirk from waging an informal and sanguinary war 
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against all who had questioned his regime of military misrule in Lugansk; his adversarial 
group included, besides the habitual political workers and the CheKa, certain unsuspecting 
soldiers from the neighboring Southern Front.
224 Dybenko’s methods, however, were 
outlandish even by the standards of that aberrant campaign and most of the atamans – the 
real warlords – defended their domains with greater judiciousness and lesser truculence. 
Most representative, perhaps, is the behavior of Bogunsky in Zolotonosha district, who, 
while allowing communist Executive Committees to exist, ensured that the key positions in 
the local Military Revolutionary Committees were firmly held by ‘his men.’
225 
  
The Bolsheviks were often scandalized by the conduct of the troops and their leaders, but 
their responses at first were limited to somewhat rotary and innocuous admonitions in the 
name of order and decency.
226 It is unlikely however that they could have proceeded with 
drastic measures at that time, dependent as they were on the insurgents. After all, adherence 
of the Ukrainian Soviet Government to the atamans was a military and infrastructural 
necessity, with declarations of ideological affinity with the ‘self-organizing masses’ 
representing but a discursive hide, considered long outmoded and even harmful by its 
Russian counterpart. Then again, despite numerous entreaties from Antonov’s staff, the 
Center in Serpukhov had never seriously considered the possibility of sending regular army 
troops from the heart of Russia to Ukraine, further strengthening the link of the Ukrainian 
Bolsheviks with those Vatsetsis and his voenspetsy despised most – the partisan amateurs.
227  
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The Party knew it well - partizanshchina, although a term of opprobrium, denoted a 
condition which could not have been avoided. Having repudiated the very principles upon 
which Skoropadsky and the UNR endeavored to realize their national projects, the peasant 
uprising brought in their stead not a reign of license (as many hostile observers would have 
it), but a constellation of fixed revolutionary committees and mobile armed units, coalescing 
together into the regime of renewable revolution. The Ukrainian Red Army, that extension 
and expulsion of the militarized folk, organized into seemingly manipulable detachments, 
constituted an evolved and an active piece within the structure, embodying the rural protest 
in its syncopated, muted and assembled form. Its core consisted of the alert and relatively 
articulate men, concerned less with property in itself, long since seized, divided and re-
divided with irrevocable determination, as with the social and political conditions that would 
warrant retention thereof; in the clamor for “Land and Freedom” the stress inevitably fell on 
the latter. More importantly, that army of subcontracted atamans possessed infrastructural 
means (weapons, control over local Military Revolutionary Councils, etc.) and considerable 
reserves of popular appeal to substantiate their claim as the wards of the Revolution when 
they descried a danger looming over it. Although technically subordinated to the Ukrainian 
Front, Red commanders of Makhno’s or Bogunsky’s persuasion could transform their 
relatively small regiments into multitudinous masses without any external prodding, letting 
the Jack of the peasant unrest loose out of its rather rickety and yielding box – to the great 
disconcertion of the authorities. 
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Apprehensive of their vulnerability, the Bolsheviks had daunting tasks indeed to accomplish. 
First, civil government capable of inspiring minimal respect from the populace had to be 
restored; partisans, those self-styled children of February and October, needed to be 
disciplined into soldiers; finally, an enormous cultural gap, not to say outright aversion, 
separating political workers from the rank and file had to be eliminated if the Party were to 
secure a place in the spirit of those it called to action and sacrifice. Only so Partizanshchina 
might have been overcome – and that ultimately at the cost of alienating multiple Bolshevik 
allies, who had played such a pivotal role in the spectacular conquest of Ukraine. “There will 
be a struggle between one part of the army and another” – an apocalyptic rumor, so strange 
in its sibylline simplicity, was spreading across the ranks of the Volhynian regiment.
228 The 
weight of its own pluralism was growing unbearable to the Revolution. 
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Chapter IV 
Front against Government: the End of the Bolshevik-Ataman Alliance   
 
All those multiple bands, operating on 
vast expanses in the course of many 
weeks, present, in reality, a relatively 
insignificant force that could be easily 
overcome. The whole trouble is that, our 
Red Army is to a known extent flesh and 
blood [plot’iu ot ploti] of the very same 
partisan troops [author’s emphasis]. 
 
  Nikolai Podvoisky
1  
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Riveted as they were by the vision of the worldwide revolution, the Bolsheviks never lost 
sight of a more immediate and, it could be claimed, paramount assignment: the need to 
recreate the state, which they had helped to destroy. On the abstract level, this state had been 
conceived as an element of the historical dialectics, which would result in the stateless and 
classless society at some barely cognizable future; in practical terms, however, revamping 
the state’s listless tentacles was certainly the ultimate end, for it alone – the unquestioned 
control over the machinery of supply and mobilization – held the key to victory in the 
struggle of the determined yet naked and dispossessed contenders. Self-evident to an extent, 
it was this realization, more than the grace of their thought-constructions, which had given 
the Bolsheviks  a sense of confident superiority – and that not only over their ‘inveterate 
allies’ of the Social-Revolutionary or Anarchist leanings, but also, significantly enough, over 
the paradigmatic ‘etatists’ and ‘restorationists,’ the derzhavniki akin to Denikin and 
Kolchak.
2  
 
The shared notion that the Revolution needed to bring forth the Revolutionary State was not, 
however, accompanied by a consensus regarding the means whereby that task was to be 
accomplished. Where was the power to reside – in the center or on the peripheries? Which 
forces were to assume the leading role and which subsidiary? How far could the 
collaboration of the Bolsheviks with other representatives of the radical left go? Could the 
proverbial masses be left to themselves and permitted to act in the spirit of the ‘revolutionary 
creativity’ without the tutelage of organized political agents? These questions provoked no 
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singular response from the practitioners of Bolshevik politics for reasons which probably had 
so much to do with their inexperience as with the loss of the monastic-like discipline in the 
wake of the October coup and the precipitous swelling of the party numbers. Neither straight 
nor unbroken, the path to the post-1921 settlement resembled more a labyrinth created out of 
a plethora of improvised intersections. Rather than solving the problems of state-building 
raised by the Empire’s demise, the war had only brought them into the clearing’s revealing 
light, imparted them an articulate form, so to speak, under which they would persist and be 
treated in the subsequent years.    
 
The Ukrainian story in the first half of 1919 provides a concrete example of the confusion 
and inconsistency of the Bolsheviks’ state-building projects. Drawn deeper into Ukrainian 
affairs by the unanticipated celerity of the Soviet advance, the Party had to confront the 
highly politicized countryside, which, albeit initially sympathetic to the government in 
Kharkov, cleaved to the scads of its own home-grown notions of what Bolshevism was said 
to entail. As was shown in the previous chapter, the populace, applying arms with which it 
had been amply supplied to buttress its convictions, became the primordial agent of civil 
struggle in the widest sense of the word, the ubiquitous interpreters of the Revolution’s 
message. Such autonomy of the local players, itself an indispensable factor in the early 
victories of the Bolshevik arms, placed the mettle of the Party under great strain: the latter 
had to decide how much of its own legitimacy it was ready to compromise for the sake of 
retaining the essential initiative in organizing the new polity.  
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This chapter, therefore, investigates the politics of state-building between the collapse of the 
Hetmanate and Denikin’s summer offensive by focusing on the question of the Army’s 
organization; this demarche seems almost tautological in its nature, for, let it be stressed 
again, in Ukraine, more perhaps than anywhere else, the functioning state meant control over 
the use of arms – if not necessarily the fact of their physical possession (efforts at extracting 
them having proved too risky). Although the land may have seemed prone to succumb to 
anyone with enough courage to lead the insurrection (as Bubnov thought in March of 1919
3), 
internally it was hardly an amorphous mass, inhabited by the conveniently enthusiastic and 
pliant population. Militarization, fragmentation and concomitant self-organization of the 
fragments around rural revolutionary committees (revkomy), party cells and, of course, the 
atamans, each with a more or less clear idea of how the war was to be conducted and what it 
was being fought over – that political reality of atamanshchina par excellence compelled 
many Ukrainian Bolsheviks to abandon the illusion of building a one-party centralist state 
with a regular military force always at its disposal. The heated arguments between the 
proponents of the partisan war and its adversaries, reverberating across all possible domains 
of political life, were reflected in the field-camps as the jarring noise of partisans’ 
disaffection with the Center grew dangerously audible. In that respect, the account presented 
below strives to refute the oft-repeated scheme, according to which the ideologically uniform 
Bolsheviks endeavored to profit callously from the ‘revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses’ 
by usurping their conquests when the opportunity arose;
4 on the contrary, the emphasis needs 
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to be placed not only on the interactions between the Bolsheviks and non-Bolshevik forces 
(both, to be sure, highly problematic categories), but also on the infighting within the Party 
itself, the struggle between institutions purporting to harbor the only vision of a legitimate 
order. The narrative climax of this chapter, Grigoriev’s mutiny, would thus be presented as 
an event, occurring exactly at the moment when the suspense of ambiguities became 
unbearable for all actors involved: the Front, the ‘civil’ government in Kharkov, Ukrainian 
Left parties, local Bolsheviks, Moscow emissaries, CheKa agents, regimental commissars 
and finally the rank-and-file soldiers. The mutiny served thus as an unforeseen yet necessary 
crisis, which transformed the confused scuffle of people and ideas into the regular war with 
properly drawn battle-lines.  
 
Part 1: Imperialists and Regionalists 
Reflecting on the failures of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, Vladimir Iudovski, the chairman of 
the Ukrainian High Military Inspection, remarked that “in approaching the task of liberating 
Ukraine, the center …did not prepare itself for the problems [ahead]… either on the level of 
general politics (obshchepoliticheskom), or even in the military sense.” According to him, the 
government of the RSFSR had to be severely censured for having left Kharkov and the 
Ukrainian Bolsheviks to their own devices – letting them thus welter in the state of the 
samostiinost’ (‘autonomy’).
5 The reliance on local forces, the fateful alliance with “Grigoriev, 
Makhno and their likes’ led to the ultimate military disaster suffered at the hands of the less 
numerous yet organizationally superior Volunteer Army.  
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Fair as this retrospective assessment may be in general, it ignores that the fact that the Party, 
especially its Ukrainian branch, did work towards producing a blue-print for subsequent state 
building weeks before the German Revolution made such an endeavor possible. Having 
congregated in Moscow on October 17
th, 1918, the delegates of the Second Congress of the 
Ukrainian Bolsheviks (CP(b)U) spent the next five days arguing about the role and the 
involvement of the Communist Party in creating an Army, directing local revolutionary 
committees, fostering forces of insurgency in the interior and possible negotiating with the 
non-Bolshevik Left movements. Symptomatically, the central debate of the Congress was the 
proper response to a seemingly trifling military occurrence, reported in a somewhat 
perfunctory and formulaic manner by the chief of Staff of the 1
st Insurgent division Sergei 
Petrikovsky (Petrenko).
6 Passing to the delegates ‘words of greeting’ from the partisans of 
the Neutral Zone, Petrikovskii mentioned the seizure of Starodub, a small town halfway 
between Briansk and Gomel recently abandoned by its German garrison. What was supposed 
to inspire a cheering ovation met instead with a harsh remonstrance from the chairman, 
Emmanuil Kviring, who did not fail to note that said action took place without the necessary 
approval of the so-called Foreign Bureau (Zagranbiuro) of the CP(b)U, and amounted 
therefore to a flagrant infraction of Party discipline.  
 
The discussion flared up again the next morning, for the question of tactics, invoked 
immediately by what came to be known as the Starodub incident, was tangled up with 
considerations of a strategic nature, and even more important with the question of supreme 
command. The latent Party split between Left and Right factions came to the surface with 
                                                 
6 Vtoroi s’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii (bol’shevikov) Ukriany: Protokoly, 34; although Petrikovsky’s report is 
absent from the protocols, both its tone and its content could be conjectured with relative ease from the 
subsequent discussion.   
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sharpness reminiscent of the Brest-Litovsk days. Proceeding to equate the propensity of 
Ukrainian troops for autonomous operations with their treasonable tendency to recalcitrance, 
Kviring, leader and champion of the Right, concluded by describing “the partisan-style war 
(partizanstvo, or, more derisively, partizanshchina)” as politically hopeless, ‘bereft of 
prospects’ (besperspektivnykh),
7 a skein of confused offensives “under the banner of 
meaningless (nichego ne znachushchikh) minor confrontations.”
8 Its military inefficiency 
having been sufficiently demonstrated by the ruinous failure of the Nezhin uprising in 
August of 1918, partizanshchina, that is, reliance on ground peasant forces and their 
impulsive leaders, was still seen with approval by members of the Central Military-
Revolutionary Committee, Piatakov and Bubnov in particular. Such continued support from 
high-standing Party functionaries combined with their precipitous release of the famed 
“Order Number One”
9 was dubbed by another eminent rightist, Iakov Iakovlev (Epshtein), as 
‘adventurism,’ comportment worthy only of left SRs
10 an accusation too grave to be passed 
over in silence.  
 
Both Piatakov and Bubnov defended their position aggressively. Piatakov, the more suave of 
the two, interpreted the actions of Krapivianskii’s troops around Nezhin not as a military 
failure, but as a test of the efficiency of the “partisan apparatus”
11 – that is, of the 
underground counter-state, groomed to replace the government. Seen from that perspective, 
actions of the partisan troops were successful. “From that struggle… we emerged … not 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 42 
8 Ibid., 51 
9 See Chapter 2  
10 Vtoroi s’ezd…, 39 
11 ibid., 63  
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weaker, but stronger,” Bubnov seconded his colleague.
12 That armed engagement, the Left 
continued, was far from being detrimental and unpromising: hit-and-run methods of the 
partisan war deepened the demoralization of the more powerful enemy, i.e. the Austrian-
German occupying forces, rendering it more susceptible to revolutionary propaganda 
(Piatakov);
13 the political autonomy of the local leaders and the unbridled violence of the 
troops brought the reality of the Civil War into the village, engendering thus the much-
anticipated class demarcation (razgranichenie) and partition (razdel) in that seemingly 
monolithic segment of social life (Bubnov).
14 “We assert,” Piatakov told the Congress, “that 
the partisan war, waged until the present moment, will be conducted further, regardless of 
our resolutions.”
15 The duty of the Party consisted thus in informing the ‘elemental 
movement’ (stikhiinoe dvizhenie) of the peasantry with the necessary degree of organization.  
 
The implications of this debate were simple yet profound. The Rightist insistence on the need 
of transforming the partisan detachments both in the interior of Ukraine and in the Neutral 
Zone into a disciplined part of a regular Russian Red Army (Epshtein)
16 stemmed from the 
conviction that victory in war could only be achieved on the Southern Front, that is, in the 
struggle against Krasnov’s Don and Denikin’s Kuban. Aptly encapsulated by the formula “to 
Kiev through Rostov,”
17 the strategy espoused by Kviring & Company was at once centralist 
and imperial, centered on Moscow and shaped in the form of a symettrical unperturbed 
pyramid. The Right faction saw Ukraine only through the prism of all-Russian interests, as a 
                                                 
12 ibid., 102 
13 ibid., 125 
14 ibid., 47 
15 ibid., 128 
16 ibid., 142 
17 phrase coined by Lev Kamenev, who was present at the Congress as a plenipotentiary of the Russian 
Bolshevik party; ibid., 43   
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secondary springboard abetting the theater of the real fight; their own belonging to the 
Ukrainian branch of the Communist Party was purely instrumental, for they were as 
unwilling to act on their own accord as they were loath to cooperate with the non-Bolshevik 
revolutionary left. This vision underpinned their key pragmatic proposal regarding the 
distribution of power on the local level, namely a call to draft Military-Revolutionary 
committees exclusively from the pool of Communists while making them fully accountable 
to the respective regional Party organizations.
18  
 
The Left, on the contrary, advocated an autonomist and regional strategy for both winning 
the war and spreading the revolution. Since in a peasant country such as Ukraine “it was 
impossible to centralize … the partisan war in its initial stages,”
19 the image of a local 
revolutionary committee as that of a agent-less transmission belt for directives moving from 
top to bottom was a hopeless dream; no political order could compel the insurgents on the 
border (to say nothing of those in the interior of Ukraine) to abandon their domestic tasks and 
bolt off for the Don to fight Krasnov. Granting the want of other options, Piatakov’s faction 
believed that the Bolsheviks needed to throw more tinder into the smoldering fire of the 
domestic war, bring it to the new level of intensity, harass and harry the occupying forces in 
sight.
20 Ukraine could not wait for the resolution of Russian problems and therefore required 
a separate treatment even if in perspective the victory of the revolutionary forces in Kiev 
would pave the way to the suppression of the ‘counter-revolution’ in Rostov: reversing the 
formula of the Right, one was exhorted to reach Rostov via Kiev. Of course, the recognition 
of the greater operational latitude, bestowed upon the revkomy, the readiness to negotiate 
                                                 
18 ibid., 157 
19 ibid., 70 
20 See Bubnov’s resolution, Vtoroi s’ezd… 180-182  
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with the forces on the ground (however unorthodox they might be) and the exclusion of 
Ukraine from the strategic to-do list of the Russian planners meant a thoroughgoing change 
of the Ukrainian Communist Party itself, a transition from a formal redundancy to the vague 
anticipation of what would come to be called national Bolshevism. Yet that much no one was 
either ready or willing to admit.  
 
Skillfully exploiting the debacle of the August uprising to discredit their opponents, the Right 
ultimately carried the day. The Central Committee, previously dominated by the Left 
Bolsheviks was reelected to give advantage to Kviring and his followers. The Resolution, 
composed and presented by Iakovlev (Epshtein), was accepted by the majority of 77 
delegates against 40 dissenters.
21 Concluding that the platform adopted by the previous 
Central Committee was mistaken and its organizational ability unsatisfactory,
22 the 
Resolution reaffirmed the allegiance of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to their  Russian 
counterpart and declared the unity of the Soviet Ukraine with the RSFSR to be the “general 
aim” of the continuing struggle.
23 Partizanshchina as a principle of war-making was 
denounced in favor of “organized, disciplined, fighting military units,” making up a force 
that could be reliably transferred within the ring of fronts of the ‘besieged’ Soviet republic. 
The proposal to enlist only Communists for revolutionary committees and thus to work 
towards concentrating all power in the hands of the Party also found its way into the final 
version of the Congress Resolution.
24 Similarly, all possible work with other parties of Soviet 
leanings had to be reduced to the bare minimum, i.e., occasional agreements of a ‘technical 
                                                 
21 ibid., 159 
22 ibid., 167 
23 ibid., 168 
24 ibid., 170  
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character’. Acting in the anti-pluralist spirit of the party-mindedness, the Ukrainian 
Bolsheviks stressed the inadmissibility of a lasting collaboration with the non-Communist 
Left.
25 
 
Part II: In Ukraine 
The victory of the Right at the Second Congress of the CP(b)U, so complete in its 
appearance, must have been rendered easier by the simple fact that the delegates met in 
Moscow, all too proximate to the seat of the Russian Bolsheviks for one to act and think with 
the modicum of autonomy and yet too remote from Ukraine to preserve the sense of local 
possibilities. For, after all, the Right pleaded for an immediate hegemony in the land to be 
conquered by the bayonets of an entirely spectral force.
26 That said, the internal situation in 
Ukraine in the wake of the Nezhin Uprising was such that the underground party cells and 
the communist revkoms experienced great difficulties corresponding with each other let 
alone with the Central Committee or the All-Ukrainian Military-Revolutionary Committee. 
Characteristically, dispatches and reports from the regions, heard on the second day of the 
proceedings, painted a dolorous picture of the ubiquitous devastation (razgrom), 
communication break-down, diminution in membership, treason, lethargy and insufficiency 
of the propagandist work. The key Chernigov organization, for example, had lost almost two-
thirds of its personnel and saw itself excised from four of the seven provincial districts with 
which it had hitherto maintained ties;
27 situation in Kiev may have been slightly better, but, 
in Kviring’s own admission, of the 14 military-revolutionary committees, operational in the 
                                                 
25 ibid., 171 
26 One shall not forget what happened to the partisan divisions of the Neutral Zone when Moscow attempted to 
use them against Krasnov; as a result of such an improvident decision, that semblance of a force began to look 
more like a semblance than a force (see Chapter 3) 
27 Vtoroi s’ezd, 22  
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province before the fateful August, three were irredeemably lost.
28 Poltava province, where 
the insurgents of the Zvenigordka and Tarashcha had given their last battles, suffered similar 
fate, for the directive to commence the uprising caught most of the organizations fully off 
guard.
29 On the other hand, although they had avoided the wreckage of the defeat, party 
organizations and the revolutionary committees in the Right Bank Ukraine were in the 
chronic want of cadres – so much so, in fact, that the collaboration with the ‘other left’ 
became a plain matter of survival. Province said to be “backward in the revolutionary sense”, 
Volhynia was bedecked with a network of revkoms, under whose aegis Bolsheviks, Left SRs 
and the anarchists cooperated with the single-mindedness of shared passion (if not 
conviction).
30 In Kherson, “the Left SRs [were] invited [to attend meetings of the party 
committees – M.A.] … as employees of the revkomy”
31; in Odessa the SRs did not wait to be 
invited, for they themselves volunteered to proffer assistance.
32 Local cells, working 
underground in the atmosphere of virtual isolation, exiled to their puny isles of resistance, 
were gradually inuring themselves to the practice of acting at their own initiative. 
 
It was not long before reality introduced sobering correctives to the Resolutions, taken at the 
Second Congress of the CP(b)U. That the Party was too weak to force history in the desired 
direction became manifest when the Ukrainian Insurgent divisions, lately marked out for the 
needs of the Southern Front, commenced advancing towards Ukraine “in defiance of the 
Supreme Command directives” as Antonov readily admitted;
33 the verity of this statement 
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29 ibid., 21-22 
30 ibid., 25 
31 ibid., 26 
32 ibid., 27 
33 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 4, 327  
  308
would not be compromised if one extends the queue of agents whose will was thus defied by 
appending to it the entire cohort of the Right Ukrainian Bolsheviks, Moscow, Sovnarkom 
and even Lenin and Trotsky, too concerned with other affairs to arrest their thought on 
Ukraine for any prolonged period of time. The Army – hardly an army in the conventional 
sense, but the expelled excrescence of the Ukrainian insurgency – grew almost ten-fold as it 
was bringing vast stretches of land under nominal Bolshevik control.
34 That growth of course 
came entirely from the immense ‘inventory’ of the Ukrainian rebellion: arms, men, organized 
in semi-stable formations, local revolutionary committees that spurted up, generously doused 
by the blood of the Hetman’s immolated functionaries – all were being assimilated with 
remarkable facility and almost naïve confidence into the body of the victorious Revolution. 
Fought “less with the machine guns and cannons and more with proclamations and military 
music,”
 35 the war was thus implicating the regime, whose troops were reputedly from 
beyond the northern border, in the scads of disjointed organs of local authority, abetted in 
their claims over the vacated political space by the preferential indifference of the German 
Army.   
 
Generally speaking, local revolutionary committees (revkoms), comprising in toto the 
immense Leviathan of the Insurgent Apparatus (povstancheskii apparat) and, in perspective, 
the scaffolding of the nascent polity, could be divided into three categories, both in 
accordance to their origins and political character. Some, concentrated mostly in Chernigov 
and Kharkov provinces, were brought into existence by the Ukrainian Soviet troops 
themselves, whose task seemed all the more legitimate that the soldiers in those core 
                                                 
34 the account of this growth is given with some detain in the previous chapter.  
35 Vladimir Zatonsky, “K voprosu ob organizatsii Vremenogo Raboche-Krest’ianskogo Pravitel’stva Ukrainy,” 
Letopis’ Revoliutsii, v. 1 (1925), 147  
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divisions came predominantly from these very regions. If only formally, the volost and 
village revkomy, established in the first two months (December 1918 – January 1919) by the 
passing Red Army units, consisted exclusively of the Communists – or of those, who 
declared themselves to be such.
36 A second class of the revkoms emerged within the vague 
zone of the porous and permanently labile front line: here examples of Zeleny with his 
revolutionary government set Tripol’e or that of Bogunsky in Pereiaslav come immediately 
to mind. As in Poltava, city occupied and held for few days by the insurgents of Mykola 
Shynkar,
37 the military revolutionary committees were as likely to be composed of the 
Ukrainian SRs and social-democrats as of the Bolsheviks, the only limit to their political will 
set, as indicated, by the nearness of the armed detachments from the Neutral Zone. A third 
group of the insurgent revkoms consisted of the organs of revolutionary power, situated too 
far from the Front to become a part of the Soviet Ukraine in any real sense. Typical, for 
example, were the institutions in Derazhna and Medzhibozh of the Letichev uezd in Podolia; 
there, having pronounced themselves for the power of the Soviets and against the Directorate, 
peasants created veritable village republics, bent on chasing away local Polish landlords and 
divvying up their possessions.
38 Nominal allies of the Communists in Kharkov, these 
Volhynian and Podolian revkoms indwelled a strange space between the ruin of the UNR and 
the erection of the Bolshevik Ukraine, accustoming themselves accordingly to the 
predicament of independent isolation.  
 
                                                 
36 Grazhdanskaia Voina na Ukraine¸ v. 1, b. 1, 575  
37 ibid., 463, 515  
38 ibid., 522-523; Kossak-Szczucka’s memoirs Pożoga sheds light on the Polish perspective of the intermittent 
war with the Medzhibozh peasant republic   
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In order to address “problems of growth” and thus to confront the consequences of their own 
unexpected success, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks had to abandon cautious postulates, which 
restricted Ukraine and the Party to the ancillary parts of the greater Russian whole. 
Considering the chaos, precipitated by the multitude and diversity of the local organizations, 
disheartened furthermore by the indeterminate and contradictory instructions from the Center 
(meaning Moscow and the Russian Communist Party), Piatakov and Zatonsky constructed a 
spirited argument militating for greater regional autonomy and sent it duly over to Stalin. 
“What one needs,” they wrote in November of 1918, “is such an organ of Soviet power, 
which … would be an actual (deistvitel’nym) center of the soviet work in Ukraine… and 
which would concentrate in its hands … an extremely difficult and complex task of restoring 
the Soviet power on the local level (na mestakh).”
39 Situated advantageously to recognize 
priority of the political considerations over the strategic ones,
40 the new power center would 
be more than a tactical mean of ending interdepartmental infighting or a shield of parrying 
off harmful interjections from the changeable Serpukhov (Vatsetis’ headquarters); regardless 
of the designation that it might eventually bear – the Provisionary Government or the 
Territorial (kraevoi) Revkom – the proposed institution had to be strong enough to command 
authority over its own armed forces, the formally distinct Red Army of Ukraine,
41 and over 
the territory, still to be won. Constantly courting the danger of incurring reprimand from “the 
old man” in Moscow, as Stalin informed them,
42 the Young Turks of the CP(b)U, by now “in 
touching harmony” with Kviring’s men, proceeded from words to deeds and announced the 
birth of the Ukrainian Bolshevik government in Sudzha, the first town of note taken by the 
                                                 
39 Zatonsky, “K voprosu ob organizatsii Vremenogo Raboche-Krest’ianskogo Pravitel’stva Ukrainy,” 143 
40 ibid., 143 
41 ibid., 144-145 
42 ibid., 142  
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Soviet arms (November 28
th, 1918).
43 Incidentally, in his correspondence with Vatsetis, the 
“old man” Lenin had found this to be a superb idea, which had a merit of “depriving the 
chauvinists of Ukraine… of the possibility of regarding the movement of our units as an [act 
of] occupation.”
44 One is left to ponder only whether the grand planner of the Revolution 
would have so readily blessed the projects of his Ukrainian comrades had it been clear to him 
with what celerity the form of the besought autonomy would gain the corresponding content.  
 
The government brought thus to life (necessarily albeit indirectly) by the Insurgency and 
insurgents had adopted on the surface a favorable view of the ‘local initiative’ in spreading 
out the Soviet power. A week before the Provisionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government 
was declared, the Military Revolutionary Council of the Kursk Direction – the Headquarters 
of the Ukrainian Front in its embryonic form as it were – issued a directive to the rebel forces 
of Ukraine, recommending them (predlagaetsia) to coordinate their operations with the 
movement of the Soviet troops (navstrechu nashemu dvizheniiu, literally, ‘towards our 
movement’).
45 In one of its earliest appeals to the population, the Central Committee of the 
Ukrainian Bolsheviks (dominated, it must be recalled, by the Moscow-oriented Right faction) 
expressed its support for the insurgency and insurgent methods of struggle in simple terms of 
unequivocal power:  
Workers, peasants and soldiers!... do not tarry for a minute in the cause (v 
dele) of organizing your revolutionary forces, in the cause of struggle for the 
Soviet power; elect revolutionary communist Soviets. Create organized, 
disciplined red workers’ and peasants’ regiments for the defense of the 
Soviets. Take into your hands the cause [delo] [of fighting] the White 
                                                 
43 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v.1 b.1, 456-458; V. Aussem, K istorii povstanchestva na Ukraine (o 
dvukh partizanskikh diviziiakh), LR 1926 v 5, 12 
44 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v. 1 b1., 458-459 
45 ibid., 444-445  
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Guardists. No one can handle this business [dela ne … sdelaet] better than you 
could. Take power into your hands…
46  
 
During the winter months of 1918-19 proclamations of the similar content were faithfully 
reproduced by the regional party committees as well. “Peasants,” read the leaflet of the 
Kharkov Committee of the CP(b)U, “mobilize [your] forces, arm the poor, assist neighboring 
villages in overthrowing their lords too.”
47 Communists of Poltava seconded this message 
sometime in early January 1919 with the following words: “Comrades!... Organize you own 
troops, organize military-revolutionary committees, organize Soviets of the workers’ and 
peasants’ deputies.”
48 All of these manifestos, including, to be sure, the paradigmatic address 
of the Central Committee cited above, aimed at the audience on the other side of the 
‘frontline’, beyond the reach of its formal authority – a feature that inspired a cynical reading 
in accordance with which the Bolsheviks had ‘merely’ exploited the ‘popular enthusiasm’ to 
the end of gaining power and winning the empire. The view, conveniently verified by the 
centripetal tendencies within the post-revolutionary Soviet system (and, even more so, 
buttressed by the liberal habit of expatiating upon the incurably illiberal nature of the 
Bolshevism) makes light of the fundamental affinity between rebellion and state building, a 
political conjunction, the assertion of which would seem axiomatic to most of the Bolsheviks 
at the time. Hence the simultaneous exhortation to destruction (‘struggle’, ‘overthrowing’) 
and creation (‘organize’, ‘elect’, ‘mobilize’), evincing but faint indications of the future 
conflict as the word pairing rebellion-state building (or, equally, destruction-creation, and, 
on a more practical level, fragmentation-centralization) began to shed its inner identity and 
divaricate into two separate and mutually incompatible phenomena. In late 1918, however, 
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the dilemmas and temptations confronting any clandestine insurrectional organization in the 
aftermath of the successful take-over of the public powers were still inscribed in the alphabet 
of ambiguities and alternatives rather than the signs of the relentless dialectics – even when 
seen through the allegedly etatist lens of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party. 
 
Nevertheless, what could not be denied was that while inciting the populace on the 
adversarial embankment to proceed with the rebellion and self-organization, the top ranking 
Ukrainian Bolsheviks wanted above all to have a reliable force at their disposal – that is, a 
force, which would be disinclined to exercise its autonomy in an unsanctioned manner. This 
assertion did not imply an automatic disavowal of the Insurgency with its politics and 
specific war-making practices – not least because any hasty attempt at bringing the partisans 
under the unchallenged control of Kharkov would have spelled an even more precipitous end 
to the selfsame regime. That the progression from the Insurgency had to be a slow one was 
taken for granted by the Party; this abstract unity of the CP(b)U, however, proved precarious 
once practical questions began to thump peremptorily at the doors of the newly-decreed 
agencies. How exactly and by whose intercession the insurgents were to be transformed into 
a regular army, what structural elements of the partizanstvo could be regarded as useful for 
the armed forces of the Soviet Ukraine, which political practices had to be retained in order 
to allay the sores of the imminent metamorphosis – solutions were as varied as were 
institutions, created to handle above issues. In the end of the day, however, opinions and 
wills appeared to have crystallized around two poles of power - the government in Kharkov 
and the Front. Striding far beyond the bureaucratic scuffle of overlapping competences into 
the debate over the role of Ukraine for the Revolution, this confrontation represented a  
  314
transposition of the Right-Left divide from the relatively pacific environment of the 
Congress’ proceedings into the circumstances of the war.  
 
Part III: Government and the Front 
The Provisional Government of Soviet Ukraine was very slowly beginning to deal with 
army-related affairs, setting-up various institutions with, as Iudovsky put it in February 1919, 
generally “a haphazard character” (sluchainyi kharakter).
49 True, its opening session in 
Sudzha (November 28
th 1918) saw the establishment of the Military Department (Voennyi 
otdel, or Veonotdel), which was entrusted to the exemplary Rightist – Fedor Sergeev, better 
known under his revolutionary nom de guerre Artem.
50 A month later, a three-member 
Military board (Voennaia kollegiia) was created under the auspices of the Voenotdel; 
presided over by the same Artem, it was charged with administering “all cases, pertaining to 
the organization and management of the Ukrainian Red Army.”
51 The board soon had to 
make space for an All-Ukrainian Staff, often referred to, mistakenly but tellingly, as the 
General Staff and the Central Supply Administration (TsUS). In principle, the two were 
supposed to bring order to the manner of employing Ukraine’s human and material resources; 
the Staff proceeded to divide Ukraine into provincial (gubkomy) and uezd commissariats 
(uezdkomy),
52 which, if only on paper, kept records of men and horses. Arming, feeding and 
clothing fell upon the shoulders of the TsUS; yet, with Ukraine’s productive capacities at full 
stall, the inchoate Supply Administration faced the near-impossible task of locating and 
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watching over ammunition depots. Needless to say, that required the presence of an armed 
police and the agency had none.   
 
All the same, it was not until late January that the Government abandoned its early haphazard 
experimentation and began working in a more or less consistent manner. The starting point 
was the arrival of six men from Moscow (Vladimir Iudovsky and Adolf Ioffe among them), 
each with a distinguished service in the Russian Higher Military Inspection and 
commendations from its chairman Nikolai Podvoisky;
53 this commission proceeded 
immediately with the establishment of an analogous institution in Kharkov.
54 Although its 
professed raison d’etre was limited to “carrying out military plans of the government in the 
center and localities,”
55 in practice the Ukrainian High Military Inspection functioned as a 
real institution where policies were conceived and honed. Taking over the prerogatives of the 
“formless Military board,”
56 the Inspection abolished at the All-Ukrainian Staff, placing in its 
stead two large District Military commissariats with centers in Kharkov and Kiev 
respectively (between January 25 and 28
 1919 and March 12, respectively).
57 Simultaneously, 
a through reshuffling within the provincial and uezd commissariats was conducted with a 
view to delimiting the extent of their administrative competence. According to new 
stipulations, the provincial commissariats were entrusted with the task of providing political 
guidance to the uezd commissariats, the latter thus occupying themselves with concrete 
problems of counting and accounting – that is, with keeping demographic figures of “men, 
horses [and] carriages” up-to-date. Given the rudimentary nature of the state apparatus at 
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hand, realistically that book-keeping exercise translated into locating all nearby officers and 
under-officers and imposing some control over their mobility.
58 Conscious of the possible 
counter-revolutionary leanings among the commanding men of the former Imperial Army, 
Kharkov, nonetheless, could no longer be contented with the role of the class gaoler, seeking 
out the means of employing military cadres “in harmony with their knowledge and abilities” 
within the framework of an emerging army. 
   
So wrote Nikolai Podvoisky,
59 man, whose own arrival to Ukraine, presaged by the activity 
of his colleagues and subordinates in the interior of the High Military Inspection, gave the 
germinating system of army management appearance of completeness. Published shortly 
before, a small brochure entitled Experience of the Military-Revolutionary Tactics provides a 
certain insight into Podvoisky’s thinking and ambitions. There he reasoned that the 
Revolutionary forces, divested of the technological resources of their ‘bourgeois adversaries’, 
would in their turn prove stronger of the two in spirit (dukh)
60 and in numbers.
61 In Russia 
alone, he asserted, “we could always count on the contingent of 7 million men,”
62 disposed 
with hardihood, speed and determination, the like of which the world had witnessed only at 
the time of Völkerwanderung – “when millions of ‘barbarians’ broke and ‘dissolved’ 
(‘razlagalis’’) Roman legions,” he clarified inadvertently echoing Blok.
63 Listing 
imperceptibly on the side of a lyrical vagary, this metaphor lost none of its pertinence, for the 
envisioned degree of mobilization presupposed conversion of the entire land into an 
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impenetrable “armed camp.”
64 The local populace, overtaken by the sentiment of 
“communist patriotism”
 65 at the sight of its own nationals fighting under the standard of the 
Soviet power,
66 could thus be expected to carry direct organizational and material costs of 
the Revolutionary war. A nexus of communes, carefully earmarked to service units of the 
same provenance, would arise to work under the “guidance and control of the center [and] in 
accordance to its plans.”
67 In the end, the absence of true fronts and the checkered nature of 
the combat zones, characteristic of the Civil War, would imbue this invisible field of 
scattered relations with properties of a nerve system, generating the blood, bone and muscle 
of the future socialist state.  
 
In practice, Podvoisky showed himself every mite an apologist of centralism as his writing 
might have intimated. On the very day of his appointment as People’s Commissar of Military 
Affairs (February 17
th, 1919) – significantly, not instead of, but alongside with Valery 
Mezhlauk, the previous Commissar
68 – Podvoisky issued an appeal, in which, after duly 
acknowledging the contribution of the “heroic partisan troops,” he stated the need for a 
unified, “disciplined and conscientious (soznatel’nuiu)” Army.
69 “All irregular units, all 
insurgent troops,” ran the lines of Podvoisky’s inaugural statement, “have to join the ranks of 
the Regular Red Army. No autonomous unit, which does not abide by [the principles of] the 
                                                 
64 ibid., 11 
65 ibid., 12 
66 ibid., 4 
67 ibid., 13 
68 Ministerial functions having been distributed with a view of maintaining balance between the Right and the 
Left factions, Mezhlauk’s otherwise quant stay in office served as a reminder that the Party was still far from 
being united.  
69 Podvoisky, Zashchita Sotsialisticheskogo otechestva, 3; the adjective soznatel’nyi, undoubtedly one of the 
central words of the Revolution and the war, could be equally translated as ‘conscious’ (as in ‘class-conscious’) 
or even ‘informed.’  
  318
common discipline of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Army, should exist.”
70 That such an army 
did not yet exist – that fact hardly troubled the new People’s Commissar. He approached his 
task in full confidence that the local commissariats, purged and pruned by military 
inspections, would soon make a reality of his plans, even if the present moment seemed 
anything but ripe for their fulfillment.  
 
These plans, modest at first, were rapidly gaining in ambition and scope. On February 21
st 
Podvoisky’s Commissariat consented to using the cadres of the regular 3
rd International 
Division, hastily sent from the RSFSR, as a nucleus for the projected 3
rd and 4
th Ukrainian 
Rifle divisions and one cavalry divisions; in addition, the Commissar promised to deliver to 
the Front twenty four reserve battalions, six light artillery, two howitzer, one heavy batteries 
and five cavalry squadrons.
71 The long-term program, presented two weeks later at the 3
rd 
All-Ukrainian Congress of the Soviets,
72 assumed that the compulsory military service could 
be reintroduced and proper mobilization be carried out – at first within the boundaries of the 
Kharkov Military District and then over  the remaining territory of Ukraine. The intention, as 
the report to delegates of the Congress read, was to create additional seven infantry and two 
cavalry divisions, bringing the total strength of the Ukrainian Red Army to the astounding 
625 thousand soldiers and 250 thousand horses
73; of those, about 400 thousand men were 
reserved for the immediate needs of the Front.
74 Partisan detachments from the Neutral Zone, 
troops of Makhno, Grigoriev and dozens of other ‘field commanders,’ puny in comparison to 
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71 Antonov-Ovseenko,Zapiski, v. 4, 121-122 
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rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, which had 
taken place immediately before the Congress of the Soviets  
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the forces that the Commissariat of Military Affairs wanted to bring to Kharkov’s cause, 
would thus be simply swept away, or rather, flooded over by the waves of the arriving young 
recruits.  
 
This stupendous mass of humans and beasts would inevitably pose the problem of supply if it 
were ever to surge from the bleak ordre de bataille of Podvoisky’s design onto the fields – 
bleak or otherwise – of actual struggle. The commissar was certainly not wanting in 
decisiveness when commandeering “all goods fit for military purposes” without paying much 
regards in whose hands that property may currently be held.
75 Shortly before his arrival, the 
Government abolished the Central Supply Administration, conferring its functions to the 
special division in the Ukrainian Commissariat for Food Supplies (Narkomprod). Although 
endowed with greater latitude than its predecessor, the said organization could only act with 
an explicit support from the Army since the bulk of the procurement troops had to be culled 
from the battle-line units.
76 This formal curtailment of Kharkov’s prerogatives reflected 
fairly well the reality of the Center’s limited suzerainty over the autonomous and semi-
autonomous partisan detachments. All the same, on February 22
nd the Izvestiia of the 
Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of Ukraine announced the establishment of 
the Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Red Army,
77 bringing to the daylight 
Kharkov’s resolve at seizing the regulatory levers of provender-providing. Accountable to 
(albeit not controlled by) the Commissariat of the Military Affairs, that body of three men 
could theoretically supervise all industrial enterprises, even if their involvement with the 
material needs of the army were of limited nature; moreover, the Decree had enabled the 
                                                 
75 Podvoisky, Zashchita Sotsialisticheskogo otechestva, Order N 51, 5 
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Commission to employ factories specializing in non-military production for the military 
purposes in case the former thought their participation indispensable. Symptomatically, the 
newly-instituted agency was sanctioned to exercise its authority not only in relation to 
production, preservation and inventory-keeping of the military goods, but also in the sphere 
of allocation thereof; considering that the usage and the distribution of the spoils of war had 
previously (prudently if not providently) been treated as the reserve of the army itself, such 
extension of competences represented a clean break with previous practices and a signal 
precedent for the forthcoming policy-setting pronouncements. To strengthen the position of 
the Commission (and consequently of the Bolshevik government in Kharkov) vis-à-vis the 
forces, unaccustomed to heeding injunctions of the outsiders, its ample faculties were further 
augmented to include the right of mobilizing “technical forces of Ukraine” as well as the 
power of apprehending anyone deemed obstructionist to the realization of the Commission’s 
resolutions. Most important, however, was the permission to make one’s presence permanent 
– equipped in this manner with a capacity of organizing its local organs and appointing the 
plenipotentiaries, the Commission could function to ice-break the glacier of the atamans’ 
habitual indiscipline in order to make their troops more amenable to the instructions from the 
Center.  
 
In its effort to infiltrate the partisans, the Kharkov government relied more explicitly on the 
figure of a political commissar than the agents of the Extraordinary Supply Commission. For 
a while it was not clear to whom the commissar owed loyalty, for although legislated into 
existence by the Bureau of Military Commissars and hence beholden to its political chief  
  321
Artiom,
78 he was obliged to abide by the rules, composed and confirmed within the Political 
department of the Front.
79 The administrative overlap, however, did not hinder the 
transformed Commissariat of the Military Affairs from treating political education and 
surveillance as a constituent part of its regulatory empire. According to the statute, 
promulgated on February 12
th 1919, the Political department of the Commissariat arrogated 
full responsibility for the managerial (delovoi) and political activity of the military 
commissars.
80 A slightly more nuanced memorandum, designed to lend the second lease on 
life to Artiom’s by now derelict Bureau, stipulated that all appointments, dismissals or 
transfers of the commissars should receive preliminary approbation from the Commissariat 
of the Military Affairs in order to be valid. The same document granted the right of the 
‘motivated withdrawal’ (motivirovannogo otvoda) to the High Military Inspection,
 81 that 
latter having essentially evolved into a combat brigade of Podvoisky’s ‘war ministry.’ 
 
Ostensibly, the Ukrainian commissar mirrored its Russian homologue: enjoined to “study 
commanding officers lest the possibility of treason arises,” to “supervise political and moral 
upbringing of the Red Army soldiers” and to “maintain living ties (zhivuiu sviaz’) with local 
party organizations,”
82 he was extolled as an embodiment of Revolution, of its justice, spirit 
and its probity. A quintessential distinction from the Russian prototype, a point of difference, 
                                                 
78 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v.1 b. 1, 457 
79 ibid., v. 1 b. 1, 534-536; when in December 1918 the Head of Staff of the 1
st Division asked the newly 
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80 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v. 1 b. 1, 621  
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82 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v. 1 b. 1, 535  
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the far-reaching implications of which would announce themselves under multiple guises in 
the subsequent discussion, resulted from the human material that the Ukrainian commissar 
was bound to observe, instruct and monitor. Whereas in RSFSR – so it would seem – the 
political commissar emerged to fence dangerous lunges from the employed officer corps, 
thought to be predominantly right-wing and counter-revolutionary (at least in the early days), 
in Ukraine men holding this position grappled with the ‘excesses’ of the Revolutionary 
armies, transgressions, which would stand out as incidents of levoeserovshchina (sympathy 
or affinity with Left S-R principles and praxis) or outright anarkhiia (anarchism or anarchy). 
The firebrand visionary whipping wavering masses into deed-begetting frenzy was bypassed 
in favor of a staid drill instructor, expected if not to tame his feral clientele than to persevere 
till the process of normalization would commence in earnest.  
The civil government in Kharkov, troubled at first by indecision within its ranks, and 
suffering simultaneously from disbelief in its own success, gradually attempted to seize 
ultimate control and supervision over all army-related matters. For all their talk about the 
unprecedented character of the experiments conducted with so much clamor and pride, the 
Bolsheviks of Podvoisky’s or Rakovosky’s type wanted an army subservient to the state in 
the most bourgeois-conventional sense of the word; it was, in fact, with regards to Podvoisky 
that Adolf Ioffe noted: “he… gets involved with the creation of the regular army even too 
much.”
83 What this entailed was the extermination of partizanshchina and everything it came 
to be associated with – the autonomy of the commanders and their men, their penchant for 
self-supply, the fluidity of the rank-and-file, the reliance on the country-side and, on a 
slightly more abstract level, the untamed sense of soldiers’ entitlement to their own 
revolutionary discourse. A system of the military commissariats, distributed with growing 
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density as one descended down to the level of a uezd, had to keep watch over the changing 
demographic potential of the population, and assume full responsibility for the mobilization 
of the reserves; by the same token, the supply commissariats (prodkomy), tied at once to 
Shlikhter’s Commissariat of Food Supply (Narkomprod)  as well Podvoisky’s Military 
Commissariat, aspired to become sole intermediaries of the state’s supply policies, weaning 
the troops away from the harmful habit of retaining all captured booty without due 
consideration for the ‘starving city’ or ‘famished Russia’. Finally, the institution of political 
commissars arose to purge the ordinary soldiers of their left SR or anarchist tendencies and 
attune them to the serpentine curves of the Party line.  
 
Kharkov was surprised to encounter greatest resistance from ‘one of its own’ – the 
association of military-administrative agencies, commonly referred to as the ‘Ukrainian 
Front’. At the highest plane that entity included the small peregrinating field staff organized 
by Antonov, the static Staff directed by the kadrovik Vasiliy Glagolev and the Revolutionary 
Military Council (RMC), which at one time or another accommodated such prominent 
leftists as Iuriy Kotsiubinsky and Andrei Bubnov. Immediately underneath stood the 
commanders and staffs of the three Army groups, these having gradually crystallized in 
response to emerging strategic needs sometime between the months of January and April of 
1919.
84 The areas of contact with the insurgents, rising from the ground, usually occurred 
                                                 
84 The first among those Army groups – that of Kharkov Direction – had been culled from the general ‘army 
mass’ on January 13 – i.e. nine days after the establishment of the Ukrainian Front itself (for the respective 
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Army Group of the Kiev direction, commanded by the former military commissar of the Poltava province 
Sergei Matsiletsky, was ordered into existence by Antonov on February 15
th, 1919 (Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, 
v. 3, 265); Nikolai Khudiakov, former captain of the Tsarist Army, became the commander of the Army Group 
of the Odessa direction in the last week of March (Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 295); from April 15
th  
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one or two rungs below – at the order of a division (Grigoriev), brigade (Makhno), or a 
regiment (Shchors, Bozhenko and uncountable slew of lesser atamans).Unlike in the political 
sphere, there was no visible fissure; on the contrary, Antonov and his entourage had merged 
smoothly with the rebellion whose resources they were so keen on harnessing. The Front 
ultimately assimilated the perspective of the partisans into its conception of the army and of 
the role that it would play in making the state and carrying the Revolution.  
      
The evolution of the Front, although dwelt upon at some length in the previous chapter, calls 
for further discussion. It needs to be noted that the much bemoaned parallelism of 
competences resulted from decisions taken, as it were, during the ‘pre-historical’ period of 
the history of the Soviet Ukraine. The Front, let it be recalled, owed little to the shifting 
fortunes of the struggle for the political supremacy of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party; a by-
product of contingency and pragmatism, it represented an amalgam of two distinct military 
bodies – the Reserve Army in Orel and Antonov’s staff in Kursk.
85 It became known, 
somewhat oddly, as the Army Group of the Kursk Direction.
86 The Army Group managed to 
retain its autonomy vis-à-vis Ukrainian affairs, partially because Vatsetis’ half-hearted 
attempt to throw Antonov’s embryonic organization into the Don quagmire sheltered them 
from the effects of the rightists’ victory at the Second Congress of CP(b)U. Notwithstanding 
the criticism which the newly-elected Central Committee of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks had 
unleashed upon their predecessors, the staff in Kursk and their emissaries in the Neutral Zone 
                                                                                                                                                       
onward, the Group Armies of the Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa directions were remade into 1
st, 2
nd and 3
rd 
Ukrainian Soviet Armies respecitively (Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 4, 129).  
85 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v. 1, b. 1, 388, 444, 449 
86 The designation, in fact, might have been chosen deliberately in order to conceal the veritable purpose of the 
Staff (see Antonov’s letter to Lenin on November 22
nd, 1918 in Grazhdanskaia Voina na Ukraine, v. 1, b. 1, 
449) – that said, it must be remembered that the Bolsheviks themselves were wanting in confidence as to the 
ends of the aforementioned agency.   
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had fixed their eyes upon Ukraine, lest they let the initiative in guiding and goading the 
Uprising be irrevocably lost to the forces of Vynnychenko’s National Union.  
 
The hour for reclaiming Ukraine having struck suddently, it was unsurprising that the men 
around Antonov had shown themselves better prepared to tackle the task than either the 
Foreign Bureau (Zagranbiuro) or the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee; they 
possessed both experience in organizing their own – ‘domestic’ – insurgents and sufficient 
pluck to exploit that experience under the uncertain yet promising circumstances of the 
Ukrainian rebellion. The Staff put itself to work without delay, setting up departments, which 
were destined to give a semblance of shared organization to the expanding ranks of pro-
Soviet partisans. Within two months (late November 1918 – late January 1919), the Staff of 
the Army Group of the Kursk direction (renamed into the Staff of the Ukrainian Front with 
the establishment of the latter on January 4, 1919) and the Revolutionary Military Council of 
the Front (created on November 17, 1918) laid the foundations for the Political Department 
of the RMC, the Administration of the Chief of Procurement, the Revolutionary Military 
Tribunal as well as the Administration of the Inspector of Artillery.
87 Of the four, the first 
were of particular importance as they covered regulatory functions in the domains which the 
government in Kharkov would later consider its prerogative. To put it differently, while the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Government slumbered in infancy, the front hastened to take charge 
over the disjointed units of the Ukrainian rebels, setting up a subsequent confrontation with 
the civil authority.  
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All these departmental permutations were substantiated by a real, direct and necessary 
engagement of Antonov’s men with the rebels. Initially as the order supported by the 
‘Austro-Germans’ precipitously collapsed, all Antonov could wish for were “the few 
divisions from Central Russia,” who alone would “consolidate the Soviet Power in 
Ukraine.”
88 More specifically, he had counted on Vatsetis’ generous promises, which 
included, among other things, transfers of the Moscow worker division, the 43
rd worker 
regiment, the 2
nd Orel brigade (or a cavalry division), two armored trains and a 5000-strong 
band from the Urals, led by a seasoned guerilla Innokenty Kozhevnikov.
89 In the end, 
however, Serpukhov gave none of that, conceding but three regiments from the 9
th Rifle 
division to the needs of the Ukrainian Front, and those only temporarily.
90 Deprived thus of 
any meaningful assistance from the Center, the Staff of the Ukrainian Front had no other 
option but to rely on local formations and on the willingness of these irregulars to behave as 
an accountable fighting force.  
  
Left to face the “elemental wave of the self-generating partisan troops,”
91 the RMC of the 
Front, its Staff and Antonov personally had donned upon themselves the mantle of the 
revolutionary stewards, attending to the phenomenon that was perceived as the dawn of the 
‘Ukrainian October.’
92 This role entailed a plethora of functions; unobtrusively, the RMC 
would name and number a rebellious unit, blessing it in this manner into official existence; it 
would preside over the displacements of the troops and give further directions, lest they lose 
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a sense of strategic coherence; busy with grouping and regrouping the arriving mass of the 
volunteers, the commander of the Ukrainian Front could on occasion issue a threatening 
statement, proclaiming those who refused to join the Soviet Ukrainian troops “enemies of the 
Soviet Ukraine”
93. Sure enough, few of the most cantankerous and refractory rebel leaders 
were, as a popular euphemism of the time would have it, speedily ‘dispatched to the 
Headquarters of the General Dukhonin’ – i.e. executed without much regard for the due 
process; the case of Sakharov and a group of the Left S-R’s, who ventured to take over the 
soviet in Valiuki (or who were provoked into committing this malfeasance), meriting with 
their bungled effort swift and lethal revolutionary retribution, was a much-discussed affair, 
but no more than that.
94 Otherwise, during the first few months (December 1918 – March 
1919), the Front did not tamper extensively with the internal affairs of the troops, trusting 
that the negotiated compromise with their commanders would ultimately bring greater 
rewards than the rush attempt at restructuring and subordinating; in exchange for fealty, the 
insurgent atamans expected to retain former clout over their men if not over their turf – even 
if as technical appointees of the Bolshevik center.  
 
Negotiations with the Ukrainian atamans involved invariably and exclusively representatives 
from the Front, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government in Kharkov hovering about as a 
typeset abstraction on the gauzy ticker-tape of the telegraph correspondence. Characteristic 
in many respects were the parleys with Grigoriev, conducted in the last days of January 
1919.
95 After some hesitation the self-styled ‘ataman of Khersonshchina and Taurida’ sent a 
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telegram to Aleksandrovsk, in which he manifested to divulge his ‘platform’ unless the 
‘kadets’ (the Volunteers of the White Army) had already taken hold of the city.
96 Finding 
himself on the receiving end of the exchange, Commander of the Kharkov Army Group 
Vladimir Aussem authorized the Head of Staff of the 1
st Insurgent Division Sergei 
Petrikovsky (Petrenko) to carry on further discussions with Grigoriev, once the hurdle of the 
formal acknowledgement of Kharkov’s supreme authority had been overcome.
97 The ensuing 
telephone conversation between Petrikovsky and Grigoriev pitted blandishment against 
imperiousness; the Bolshevik delegate, intuiting ataman’s party leanings, took the risk of 
misinforming his interlocutor of the alleged left S-R presence in the government, to whose 
defense Grigoriev was about to bring his multitudinous troops. To sweeten the bitter pill of 
the submission and to ease the transition into the ranks of the Ukrainian Red Army, 
Petrikovsky thought it politic to add: “Compromises and contacts will be established 
subsequently in the party centers upon (reaching) the agreement between the Bolsheviks and 
the S-R’s.” The warlord, after a habitually boastful description of his exploits, deigned to 
concede:   
I would like to regard our unification, or, rather my unification with you [as a 
unification] of a strategic nature (operativnym). I accept your conditions [and] 
recognize your supreme command, but with the caveat that the question of the 
ultimate unification of the High Command would depend on [the decisions of] 
our and your centers; I think that your Command and our Command would 
come to terms (sgovoriat’sia), for we are not arguing about power because the 
power should belong to the people (narodu) through its delegates 
(izbrannikov) … your supreme power and our supreme power is [but a] 
provisionary revolutionary [power]. Permanent power will be created neither 
by us nor by you, but by the people.
98 
Petrikovsky indeed preferred not to argue about power, taking whatever he could from the 
power-greedy and ambitious man. The words, uttered by the ataman, were a far cry from the 
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type of a solemn oath that one expects to hear on a similar occasion – but they sufficed. 
Always a diplomat, the Bolshevik plenipotentiary said nothing about the necessity of 
reforming his troops or of subsequent migration of political workers from Kharkov – in short, 
nothing that may have alarmed Grigoriev to the creeping infringement on his authority – 
letting instead the chief of the South Ukrainian partisans dwell upon the strategic promises 
and exigencies of the region.
99 The concluding words were now of little import, for the 
ataman had already made up his mind to sever his ties with his sometime ally and thereupon 
to strike at the UNR troops of ataman Kotik stationed at Znamenka.
100 Soon afterwards he 
contacted Antonov, reiterating his willingness to collaborate with the Bolshevik Ukrainian 
Front, the four conditions for such collaboration being:  
First, [one needs] to leave all of our organizations inviolable; second, to leave 
all arms, provisions and equipment at disposal as well; third – to let us keep 
our positions and titles; fourth – our struggle on the side of the Soviet power 
needs to be immunized from all kind of intervention into the internal affairs of 
our territories [and] troops as well as [from investigations into divisions of] 
spoils, seized by us in battle.
101 
 
Visibly embarrassed by the demands of his overweening new subordinate, Antonov, the man 
endowed with the highest military authority in the land, nevertheless agreed, charging the 
ataman (rechristened into Brigade commander) with the care for his old troops and 
approbating his right – albeit indirectly – to form the new ones (“at the discretion of the  
commander”). 
102 
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Imitating such scenario in essence if not in specifics, negotiations between the insurgents and 
the Bolshevik military authorities were taking place all over Ukraine. Makhno, ever since 
November 1918 de facto partner of the Bolsheviks, had finally been reached by the armored 
train N 8 with Fiodor Dybenko aboard, who brought him an offer of a formal alliance; bat'ko 
did not linger with an affirmative reply. Insurgents, who had taken Cherkassy in February, 
were similarly courted by the Commander of the Ukrainian Front,
103 bent as he was on 
augmenting the inchoate Ukrainian Red Army (as well as his own authority, this needs not be 
forgotten). Likewise, ataman Anton Bogunsky from Zolotonosha or the ‘Supreme 
commander of the Southern Soviet Army’ ataman Popov from the vicinity of Tiraspol found 
too strong the temptation of adding the enticingly reductionist Bolshevik commanding title, 
succumbing to its charm in their own turn. The results of the parleys were understandably 
different, the degree of submission to Antonov’s Headquarters, or, conversely, the measure 
of autonomy left to the rebels being determined by the strength of the insurgents in question, 
popularity of the leaders among the soldiers and the locals or their proximity to the centers of 
the Bolshevik power (Kiev, Kharkov, perhaps Yekaterinoslav).
104 All the same, to the extent 
that other Bolshevik authorities were absent, the Front became the underwriter of sorts, 
guaranteeing the inviolability of power balance, which was established between the distant 
monopolist of the abstract violence (the Bolshevik state) and its rough-and-ready worldly 
practitioners. More than a mere mediator with the proverbial Center, the Front acquired the 
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function of the Center itself – and Antonov – that of a High Judge, graced with Solomonic 
wisdom and impeccable revolutionary consciousness.
105   
 
Invested with such a function, the Front evolved into the main defender of the Insurgents and 
their cause in the face of the increasingly censorious attitude from the Center. Early in March 
of 1919, with a string of undeniable successes backing him up, Aussem rose from his seat to 
rebuke the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks for their initial skepticism and the 
liberal usage of the unseemly epithet ‘bandits’ in reference to the 1
st Bogun Regiment.
106 
Quite to the contrary, men around Antonov – Aussem among others – did their outmost to 
prop up an image of insurgents as unbesmirched either by stains of aboveboard criminality or 
by blemishes of ideological heterodoxy. When the Government in Kharkov pointed its 
accusatory finger in Makhno’s direction, inculpating him and his troops instances of robbery 
and wanton killing, Pavel Dybenko, Makhno’s boss and protector, retorted by quoting the 
peasant bat’ko himself:  
We were and are exterminating banditry at its roots. Even if something of the 
kind occurs, it is being perpetrated by the provocateurs, who entered the ranks 
of the insurgent army with an express purpose [of committing 
malfeasance]…Punitive expedition is only necessary so that one could see for 
oneself that the lie, reported to you, is a lie.
107  
 
Months later, on the very eve of the fateful May events, Antonov denied any connection of 
Makhno with the pogromists, left SRs or any of the ‘unadulterated’ “bandit elements,” who 
may have jumped on the bandwagon of the Revolution while its overworked coachman 
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inauspiciously dozed off.
108 At about the same time, Commander of the Ukrainian Front 
authoritatively described Grigoriev and his troops as constituting “our reliable reserve” 
despite the rumors of Grigoriev’s deceitfulness, which kept on stubbornly cropping up from 
the incredulous quarters of the Kharkov-sent agents.
109  
 
Nowhere was the Front’s defense of the insurgent-based army more dogged and the rift 
between its representatives and the civil government in Kharkov more pronounced as in the 
realm of supply. In the non-productive environment of the Civil War, the discretionary 
powers over the remaining inventory of arms, clothing and fuel was ultimately and intimately 
tied to the issue of the state authority par excellence and in that respect no agreement 
between Rakovsky’s Sovnarkom and Antonov’s Revvoensovet seemed attainable. The 
striving of the Soviet Ukrainian government to establish itself at the heart of a well-
functioning distribution system – either on its own, or with a dint of assistance from the 
analogous administrative body of the RSFSR
110 - encountered staunch resistance of the self-
supplying Ukrainian troops. “I cannot accomplish anything,” lachrymosely reported M. 
Maizel, head of the accounting commission to the ill-famed Transdnieprian division:  
Dybenko… unflinchingly lays hand on all military property. He despoiled all 
storehouses. The Department of the Military Procurement orders boots, yet, 
before they are even ready, armed men from Dybenko’s staff come and take 
everything away. Dybenko himself seized all journals in the supply 
department of the Provincial Military Commissariat (Gubvoenkoma) and now 
he demands that everything, preserved in the supply department, be 
surrendered to him.
111 
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However brazen, Dybenko’s comportment had to be tacitly tolerated, the practice of treating 
“all captured [booty] as their own possession”
112 (in Podvoisky’s assessment) drilling too 
deep of a hole in the psyche of the Insurgents to be wrangled out of it with justifiable ease. In 
his penitent speech before the delegates of the 3
rd Congress of the KP(b)U, Aleksandr 
Shlikhter, the commissar of the Food Supply, grounded the inefficiency of his ministerial 
branch in the worn-out soil of Army’s non-cooperation and obstructionism. “It is unknown to 
us how much bread we possess…”, he said, “because everything finds itself at the disposal 
of … the armed units…, [which] treat the spoils as military loot without ever letting 
procurement agents to see what those spoils actually contain.”
113 These complains from the 
Ukrainian center kept on mounting, reaching the ear of Vatsetis in Serpukhov, who pointedly 
suggested Antonov to refrain from asking for supplies and to focus instead on transferring 
“enormous military stock” kept hitherto by the tight-fisted partisans into the hands of the 
nascent rear (tylovye) organizations.
114 
  
Herein lay the bone of contention, and the exasperation of Podvoisky’s and Shlikhter’s men 
with the insurgents loath to give up their booty barely measured up to the profound 
disenchantment of the Front relative to the Government’s ability in meeting subsistence 
needs of the army. Conceding the formal ‘correctness’ of the Narkomprod’s position, 
Antonov riposted with an emphatic ‘but’: “... without its own procurement organs, with its 
hopes placed squarely on the Commissariat of Food Supply, our army would have not lasted 
even a day.”
115 To drive that point home, Antonov divulged the puny content of the state 
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deliveries that the Army Group of the Kiev Direction – 1
st and 2
nd Ukrainian Divisions, 
Belenkovich’s brigade plus few smaller auxiliary units, i.e., a crowd of 50,000 men and 
10,000 horses – obtained in the period from early March to mid-April of 1919:  
Grain – 2086 poods,
116 flour – 21400 poods, groats – 10050, baked bread – 
671 poods, meat – 522 poods, salo [pork cured slabs] – 254 poods, legumes – 
500 poods, soap – 645 poods, hay – 1750 poods, straw – 807 poods, pomace, 
bran, horse biscuits (konskie galety) – 4600 poods. 
117   
 
Taking those figures and converting them into something slightly more comprehensible, one 
arrives to an average soldier’s diet of less than 4 grams of meat or over 5 grams of baked 
goods per diem. Notwithstanding these numbers, more absurd than dramatic, the image of an 
insurgent, delineated by the emissaries of the Higher Military Inspection, and then retouched 
and corrected by a skilled hand of the political commissar, differed remarkably little from 
unit to unit. “Neither uniforms, nor underwear is available – many did not change [their 
clothing] for more than a month,” stated the report on the 1
st Voznesensk Regiment
118; “there 
are no boots, no uniforms and equipment, no bullets nor artillery shells” (Volhynian 
regiment)
119; “provisioning of the army is highly unsatisfactory” (Grigoriev’s 1
st 
Transdnieprian brigade)
120; “uniforms are deplorable (skvernoe), which leads to frequent 
misunderstandings among the soldiers” (4
th Nezhin Regiment).
121 Speaking on behalf of the 
entire Ukrainian Army, Reinhold Berzin, man sent by Vatsetis to Antonov’s staff, felt 
compelled to admit: “The principal hindrance [in the construction of the Army – M.A.] was 
and is the lack of rifles, uniforms...”
122 Swathed pell-mell, shod if lucky, the insurgent of the 
Ukrainian Front knew well what options loomed behind Podvoisky’s sparse words, to wit, 
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that “the supply is supported exclusively by the armed forces”
123 – pertinacious adherence to 
one’s own region (case of Bogunsky and Grigoriev to some extent), within the cozy circle of 
one’s kith and if not, allowing for bat’ko’s ambition, wanderlust or even a faith in 
international revolution, a steady west-bound progression, marked by a minor plunder here 
and a major pogrom there, a trail rippled with bloody misdemeanors, wrecking havoc to the 
possibility of a modus vivendi between the passing troops, sedentary locals and the 
transposed communists.   
 
For the Front the root of the problem could have not been clearer. “Narkomvoem,” wrote 
Antonov as he reflected retrospectively on the accomplishments and omissions of the 
Bolsheviks in Ukraine, “created in Ukraine an impossible situation for the Ukrainian Front – 
the parallelism of organs (above all those involved with the supply system) complicated and 
confused the task [of Army reorganization – M.A.].”
124 Verbal agreements between 
Podvoisky and Antonov seemed to be of little value, for, as Antonov averred, the reservoirs 
of equipment and outfit found in Ukraine, whittled away among the numerous claimants in 
the rear (tyloviki) – “state bureaucrats (uchrezhdentsy), home guard, Narkomvoen’s own 
formations.”
125 Podvoisky’s ambitious plans, seen first with a degree of incredulity, were 
provoking growing concern as more resources were drifting away towards their fulfillment 
under the greedy gaze of the disadvantaged front-line troops. “I insist on providing in the 
first place for the needs of the field units,” fulminated the Front Commander in his dispatch 
to the People’s Commissar of the Military Affairs on March 9
th, 1919.
126 The latter, 
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unperturbed by Antonov’s repeated admonitions, continued along the path of institutional 
autonomy, attending to the establishment of the new “5
th Division”
127 (early May 1919) and 
“6
th Division,” even though formations under that very name already existed for quite some 
time (Grigoriev, incidentally, being the commander of the original ‘6
th Division’). “Antonov 
and Podvoisky are in the state of war with each other”
128 – this assessment, submitted by 
Antonov’s last Chief of Staff, summed up the situation precisely. 
 
Antonov certainly struck an off key note when he reduced the conflict with Podvoisky to the 
“insufficient delineation of competences” between Narkomvoen and the Ukrainian army 
command.
129 In his mind, peaceful coexistence or a productive collaboration with the 
‘civvies’ from Kharkov could have transpired only on Front’s own terms, that is, in the 
circumstances of Government’s faithful submission (and unswerving commitment) to the 
Army and its demands. Pasting together his thoughts into a practical maxim, the Ukrainian 
Front Commander appealed to Trotsky: “If the rear (tyl) is not working for the front, there 
will be no regular army.”
130 To guarantee the preeminent position of the Front in the public 
affairs, Antonov’s first idea was to advocate greater decentralization than his comrades in the 
Ukrainian Sovnarkom were willing to accept.
131 The fate of the Russian Imperial Army, 
debilitated by permanent procurement jams, offered a scenario, which was both cautionary 
and instructive, its moral lessons, in Antonov’s profound belief, containing the key to solving 
many a problem of the Ukrainian Front itself: 
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The chaos [razrukha] in the system of military supply [during the First World 
War]… resulted from the fact that the bureaucratic districts, into which the 
country was broken up, were perfectly disconnected with the fronts… We 
cannot repeat this error. In the present moment the entire territory of 
Ukraine has to be divided not into districts, but into fronts, with parts of 
the rear being distributed with the view of servicing [v otnoshenie 
obsluzhivaniia] the nearest front. 
132  
 
That proposal, amounting to the tacit recognition of conquests, made by the insurgent 
atamans in the winter flurry of 1918-1919, was discarded when the shells of Grigoriev’s 
rebellious troops tore gaping holes in the overstrained fabric of the Bolshevik order. Antonov 
recoiled from his earlier decentralist position in the opposite direction, expatiating upon the 
need of a new, all-powerful Revolutionary Military Council, which, by subsuming all 
competing military organs (including the Commissariat of the Military Affairs), would 
accomplish at last the long-awaited fusion (sliianie) of the rear with the Front.
133 That 
cardinal change of mind did not, however, affect his deep-rooted sympathy with the 
Insurgency and its plight. In contrast to Podvoisky and, by extension, to Rakovsky and his 
cabinet, he trusted the well-meaning resourcefulness of the partisans and their leaders, and 
continued to do so right into late twenties.
134 Forgotten were the days when Antonov had to 
plea for the transfer of few more ‘Great Russian units’, apprehensive as he previously was of 
the wayward partisans; long overcome, these reservations (albeit attuned to the spirit of 
orthodoxy, upheld at the 2
nd Congress of CP(b)U) had given way to the conviction that “in 
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building regular Red Army, one should rely precisely on them,”
135 a blueprint for securing 
the friable body of expedient alliance with the scaffolding of the enduring content.     
 
These were hardly empty words, designed to lull the partisan troops into the sense of 
anesthetic security before visiting upon them a sudden coup de grace, terrible and effectual 
in proportion to the weight thrown onto the scales of the battle. Well informed of the 
changing moods within its heterogeneous Army, the Front was prepared to negotiate with the 
insurgents beyond the pale of the necessary and permissible stipulated by Kharkov. Shortage 
of weaponry rather than an ideological affinity made the principle of volunteer-based 
mobilization (dobrovolchestvo) – one of the key tenets of the Insurgency
136 – seem almost 
virtuous in the eyes of the Bolshevik military officials. What men in arms needed, in the 
appraisal of the Ukrainian command, were the specialists of various stripes and colors – 
sophisticated field engineers, experts of the cannon craft, deft horse-riders, seasoned 
machine-gunners, etc; the Front’s instructions to Narkomvoen, enjoining it to concentrate its 
efforts on locating and mobilizing the NCO and lower officers of the former Tsarist Army 
were motivated precisely by those considerations. Otherwise, Antonov and his Staff had little 
doubt that the Ukrainian village would not stint in buttressing their cause, faith best captured 
by Babin’s imperative recommendation “to lean upon local units (mestnye chasti)” when 
carrying out urgent mobilizations.
137 This advice found perfect listeners at the Front 
Headquarter all the more so that the latter, always alacritous to expostulate with the ongoing 
‘arbitrary drafts’, not only kept on tolerating pet mobilization departments scattered among 
all self-respecting rebel detachments, but learned to imitate its enterprising subalterns by 
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conducting recruitments of its own – in flagrant disregard of Narkomvoen and its district 
Commissariats. Typical in this respect was comportment of V. Tkachuk, the head of the 
Operation Department of the 1
st Army; plenipotentiary of the said formation, he was 
dispatched to rural Podolia in mid April 1919 with an assignment of ascertaining popular 
mood and churning fresh battalions from the village volunteers.
138 Needless to say, the 
Command preferred adjusting the widespread albeit unrecognized practice within the 
institutional framework to the provoking of the troops by inundating them with the recruits 
from unfamiliar lands and of unfamiliar persuasions;
139 it was ready to act in that manner 
even if such mobilizations (and a fortiori behavior of the Front) were unfailingly judged as 
“extremely pernicious” (pagubnym) in the reports, submitted to the Higher Military 
Inspection or any other affiliated governmental agency.
140  
 
In the similar vein, the stance assumed by the Front toward the Ukrainian CheKa perfectly 
tallied with its intention at propitiating the insurgents. The Extraordinary Commission in 
Ukraine (VUCheKa) did not merely chafe politically irascible troops, cleft to autonomous 
existence with sinews of most powerful and volatile jealousy; constantly tampering with the 
affairs of the Army, “roistering in the trains [and] embittering local populace” in Berzin’s 
version,
141 the CheKa quickly aligned itself among the most notorious symbols of foreign 
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domination.
142 A demand to suspend activities of CheKa without delay by replacing it with 
the democratically elected Military Revolutionary Tribunal constituted one of the key points 
of the resolution, passed by the Revolutionary Military Council of Guliai-Pole on March 7
th 
1919.
143 Autocratic by nature –a petty tyrant and martinet in the rendition of some – ataman 
Grigoriev found little value in suchlike refinements of the revolutionary politics, sending 
Rakovsky a warning on March 13
th that he would impose a “military regime” (voennuiu 
vlast’) in the occupied provinces if local Extraordinary Commission persists in “sticking its 
nose where it does not belong” (suiutsia tuda kuda im ne nuzhno).
144  The atamans in 
Bolshevik service were certainly not too squeamish about putting their threats into action, 
dispersions (razgon) of neighboring CheKa’s soon becoming an occurrence of high 
frequency and broad extent, strange sport of sorts. Fiodor Dybenko, commander of the 4
th 
Partisan Rifle Division (thereafter known as the 42
nd Division), whose reputation for 
troublemaking outmatched even that of his notorious brother Pavel, disabled Lugansk 
Extraordinary Commission in February 1919, although only temporarily and not without 
consequences for himself;
145 Grigoriev’s troops apparently had done away with the CheKa in 
Znamenka “on several occasions” as they were passing through that town;
146 in the last week 
of March, a 120-strong CheKa unit stationed in Belaia Tserkov was disarmed by the Red 
Army soldiers with a connivance, startlingly enough, of certain Litvin, a local employee of 
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the Higher Military Inspection;
147 even Vasily Bozhenko, the legendary commander second 
only to Shchors in the Bolshevik roster of immortalized heroes, felt the impulsion to go and 
“finish off”(dlia raspravy) Kiev CheKa when he received the news of his wife’s sudden 
death. “She was killed by the CheKa. Immediately send the telegram ordering inquire into 
details of her death… otherwise I will not endure this (ne perezhivu),” reported Tarashcha 
bat’ko as the thin ice of official jargon broke into an oppressive bellowing of a mournful 
husband.
148 “It took our most responsible (otvetstvenneishim) comrades (Zatonsky it seems) a 
great deal of effort before they managed to pacify the raging bat’ko,” Antonov added with a 
still palpable relief in his rather matter-of-fact recollections.
149  
 
As varied and unique as the reasons for resenting the CheKa might have been, the Command 
of the Ukrainian Soviet Army approached this institution as if it were a universal malady that 
required a country-wide treatment. Thus, describing the Ukrainian Extraordinary 
Commission as a malign ‘state within a state,’ Antonov proposed to break up its centralized 
administrative apparatus and transfer remaining acting CheKas to the jurisdiction either of 
the local Executive Committees or special departments carved out within the Front.
150 
Nikolai Vishnevetski, one of the founding members of the Revolutionary Military Council of 
the Ukrainian Front and a Political Commissar of the 2
nd Ukrainian Soviet Army, voiced an 
opinion that was more in the spirit of the rough-and-ready radicalism of the rebels: instead of 
targeting its head (in Antonov’s style), he recommended excising the CheKa’s limbs by 
abolishing its uezd-level bodies. Removed from local affairs – such was his thinking – the 
                                                 
147 RGVA f 25860 o 1 d 148 ll 6-7 
148 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 4, 163 
149 ibid., v. 4, 164; RGVA f 103 o 1 d 31 l 23 
150 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 4, 152-154  
  342
Extraordinary Commission would be rendered innocuous and hence ‘bearable.’
151 This 
solution – dismissed as “counterrevolutionary” by a contrite Antonov in his Stalinist era 
confession (1933) – found a reflection in an April telegram from Anatoli Skachko to the 
Ukrainian Front Commander, a note short in form but far-reaching in its effects. Persuaded 
that local CheKa’s “are egging on (provotsiruiut) Makhnovite troops
152 and the populace 
towards a rebellion against soviet power,” the then chief of the 2
nd Ukrainian Army insisted 
on “the eradication of all uezd- and front-level commissions with the sole retention of the 
provincial [ones] as well as the delegation of all tasks associated with the counter-
revolutionary struggle (peredacha… bor’by s kontrrevoliutsiei) … into the hands of special 
military branches, answerable to the Army Commanders.” The telegram concluded:  
In case of refusal I would be compelled to carry out this measure within the 
limits of my army on my own authority, and then one could hang me for being 
a mutineer, for I would rather be hanged than see all conquests of the Red 
Army reduced to zilch [svoditsia na net] due to the stupidity and tactlessness 
of some petty jackasses and dolts, who had obtained out of the blue the right 
to consider themselves the vigilant eye of proletarian power.
153 
 
The Army commander was most obviously preaching to the choir; assured of his boss’ 
unanimity and protection, Skachko did not run a great risk of being strung up for his 
“mutineer” acts, all the less so since his previous – and successful – endeavor at disarming 
detachments of the Extraordinary Commission (in March of 1919)
154 – went entirely 
unpunished.  
The Front’s relative lenience toward the insurgents and staunch opposition to the Cheka 
prefigured the left ‘heterodoxy’ that Antonov and his Staff began to advocate in the name of 
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their troops. The Commander’s appearance at the Third Congress of the CP(b)U was highly 
significant. Having listened to the quarrels of Kviring, Averin, Piatakov and others, Antonov 
stepped up to the dais and plainly, “in soldierlike fashion,” explained the needs and 
sentiments of his subordinates: 
…it is necessary to maintain [in the ranks of] the Red Army complete unity of 
the front and complete unity within its political aspirations. This is necessary 
above all as a guarantee of our victory. I had been involved in practical work 
rather than political infighting (politicheskimi raspriami) or fractional parleys 
and I have to say, that our army and those enormous layers (gromadnye sloi) 
from which it emerged are strangers (chuzhdy tomu) to what is taking 
place here in the audience… Here [one hears] the superficially factual, but 
the main, the fundamental thing which I have not perceived is… that striving 
toward the reorganization of one’s own life, dreamt about by the masses in the 
wake of revolutionary storms …
155 
 
The message furtively reproached the Right for their principled opposition to the partisan 
detachments and insensitivity to their political feelings.
156 The veiled critique proved of little 
avail. True, the alliance of the military with the Bolshevik Left did succeed in voting the 
predominantly rightist Central Committee out of the office – for “abjuring from [the task of] 
practical preparation of the momentous armed uprising of the worker and peasant masses”.
157 
Yet, the repeated insistence of the Left on bringing non-Bolshevik socialist parties into the 
revolutionary forces – a demand militated for by the impatient insurgents outside the hall of 
the Congress – was voted down again, as any “consensus with such petit-bourgeois parties as 
the right SRs, Mensheviks, left SRs, independent (i.e. independent social-democrats, 
nezalezhniki) Ukrainian social-democrats and others” was judged unacceptable.
158  
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Antonov continued to believe that the road to dominating the minds of the ataman-led units 
was paved in compromise with their political ‘representatives.’ The Eight Congress of the 
Russian Communist Party pronounced faulty the dogmatic self-isolation pursued by their 
Ukrainian comrades.
159 Encouraged, Antonov explained in a note to Lenin on April 17
th 1919,  
“The Ukrainian Army, which has been built not solely by the communists but also by the 
Ukrainian SRs, Left SRs [and] the anarchists, does not easily yield to the exigencies of 
discipline, has not yet disposed itself of the partisan, insurgent spirit and hence cannot be 
counted on a whole as a fully reliable support by us.” Anyone acting in deliberate denial of 
these facts would be courting a disaster and therefore, Antonov quickly proceeded to argue 
that one had no choice but to allow representatives of the Ukrainian SRs and the Independent 
social-democrats to enter Rakovsky’s government in Kharkov.
160 The next day Lenin 
telegramed Rakovsky, blessing a possible cooptation of the Ukrainian Left Socialist 
Revolutionaries
161 (incidentally renamed in March of 1919 into the Ukrainian Party of the 
Socialist Revolutionaries (Communists)
162). At the same time, in “On the state organization 
of Ukraine”, Lenin proposed an all-Ukrainian Revkom with a “solid Bolshevik majority”, but 
including representatives from the borotbisty.
163  
 
Before proceeding any further, the two competing visions of the state-making, discernable in 
the deeds of the Front and the counter-deeds of the government, need to be recapitulated. 
Both creative agents, it seems, accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine with its own 
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interests, distinct from – albeit harmonious with – those of the Soviet Russia (Rakovsky’s 
circle having done so with greater reservations and more overtly as a temporary measure than 
the Front, peu importe). That, of course, did not mean that the Russian presence stopped 
being paramount in the conduct of Ukrainian affairs. On the contrary, in its state-building 
undertaking, the government was constantly harking back to what became known as “the 
Russian experience” (rossiiski opyt), appropriating solutions issued from it for the simple 
reason that Ukraine, it was commonly held, found itself “in the stage that to a great extent 
resemble[d] the first period of the soviet power in Russia.”
164 Certain modifications 
notwithstanding, Kharkov attempted to import wholesale institutions and practices that the 
North had forged sometime ago. Constitution, adopted at the Third Congress of the CP(b)U, 
designs of forced communalization, elaborated by Meshcheriakov’s Land Commissariat 
(Narkomzem), efforts at grounding politics of provisioning in the principles of class 
discrimination (setting up of the Committees of Poor Peasants in villages, Provincial Supply 
Committees in cities, etc) were faithfully replicating the established pattern even if the major 
imitators doused liberal praises upon the virtues of regional sensitivity and circumspection. 
Unexceptionally, the soldered activities of Narkomvoen and Higher Military Inspection 
aimed at converting the armed Insurgency into the Red Army of the Russian mold. “The 
principle of volunteering (dobrovol’chestvo),” Povdoisky informed his listeners in the lecture 
on the general state of affairs in Ukraine, “on which our [Ukrainian] Red Army was based so 
far, has to be replaced with compulsory mobilization.”
165 More specifically, he wrote few 
weeks later, the new army was to be made out of “the Russian military units and [the recruits 
from] the industrial centers of Ukraine” – in that manner only could the fateful dependence 
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on the militarized countryside be overcome and thus the ground for the productive 
cooperation between the Soviet Ukraine and RSFSR be established.
 166 At this point the 
jigsaw puzzle, parceled into government proposals, communiqués to and fro Kharkov, 
projects fulfilled or foiled, begins to yield a coherent picture of the desired Ukraine: the land, 
wrung from the grip of the headstrong partisans and delivered (by administrative means 
preferably) into the dulcet embrace of the Party and, in theory, proletariat, was primed to 
become a centralized, civilian and a city-ruled state, conscientiously channeling its produce 
and arms, stray and hitherto unclaimed, to the common victory in the war of Russian 
succession.  
 
In contrast to Kharkov, the Front thought that any provocation of the insurgents would not 
only be impractical, but, given the powerful, organic link of the latter with the surrounding 
population, likely lethal. “[Grigoriev] and his army are of the same mold as the middle 
peasantry (srednee krest’iantvo) of the Aleksandria uezd that begot them,” wrote Antonov to 
Rakovsky less then a week before the uprising. “He has enormous sway over the given uezd 
as its native who fought restlessly against the oppressors of the local villagers (mestnogo 
selianstva); he augmented his influence by surrounding himself with the most powerful 
people from different volosti.”
167 By absorbing atamans with their fluctuating retinues – 
without altering their substance, since means of pulverization and digestion were not 
accounted for in the absorption process – the Front extended a formal recognition to the 
principle that was supposed to animate Ukraine’s political life. Sequestered into zones of 
interests (‘operational zones’ in the army jargon), administered dictatorially by the military 
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(according to ‘the wartime demands’), with its locus of power situated in the countryside, 
Ukraine resembled less a bounded territorial entity than a loose confederation of pulsating 
peasant autonomies and wandering regiments. In that reticulation of insurgent fiefdoms, the 
Command played the role of a cementing body, a repository of authority founded to no small 
extent upon the charisma of the Front Commander. “Antonov is popular at the Front,” wrote 
his Chief of Staff as he was criticizing otherwise deleterious activities of Narkovoen and 
CheKa.
168 Involved more than anybody else in securing the alliance with the partisans, 
Antonov traveled all over Ukraine, accompanied by his own ‘field staff’ as a medieval 
potentate of yore, haranguing in front of the troops, deliberating with their leaders, bullying 
them when possible and blandishing when necessary. Although he was certainly not casting 
himself as a military dictator – the armed rebels remaining as apprehensive of the ‘foreign’ 
appointees (spetsy) from the Front Headquarters as they were of any other intruder – the 
Commander regarded government envoys with suspicion consistent with his position of a 
‘head ataman,’
169 helping thereby to allay their undue impact and to maintain for a while the 
fragile modus vivendi with the insurgents. In short, the form of the statehood was to result 
from the negotiation, just as the revolutionary strategy ultimately was, its spearhead pointing 
not south-eastward, to Donbass or Kuban, but at Romania and Hungary, that multi-chamber 
heart of the European Civil War.  
 
Part IV: Moscow and Road to Mutiny 
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Even with these seemingly irreconcilable differences in sight, the showdown between the 
Front and the Government – a clash between ‘military’ and ‘civil’ authorities, centered 
around the figure of Grigoriev – was anything, but a foregone conclusion.  Hidden in the 
evasive contingencies of the irreversible time, the event nonetheless had precursors, 
producing a suggestive din not to be lost on an attentive listener. A poignant first movement 
to what was to occur in early May of 1919 had in fact been composed in Dybenko’s quarters, 
when that shipless sailor from the Baltic sea gained control over Yekaterinoslav and the 
contiguous steppe region (late January 1919). His authoritarian behavior coupled with the 
alleged disregard for the decrees of the Yekaterinoslav Provincial Executive Committee 
compelled its Chairman, Vasily Averin, to file a complaint with a long list of grave and 
disparaging accusations. The crimes imputed to the commander of the Transdnieprian 
division went far and wide – he was said to have seized depots with military apparel, exacted 
boots later reportedly sold at the market, appropriated “30,000(sic!) coal-laden carts” etc;
170 
seen from their aggregate effects, Dybenko’s activities “killed all economic life” and 
“disorganized Soviet [administrative] apparatus” in Yekaterinoslav.
171 Addressing the 
audience of the Third Congress of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, Averin unambiguously hinted 
at Dybenko’s anarchist and left SR sympathies (“stoit na pozitsii anarkho-
levoeserovskoi”),
172 for only an apostate from the Bolshevik orthodoxy could “patronize 
anarchist and ‘bandit’ Makhno.”
173 “There is no place for [Dybenko] not only in the 
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presidium [of the Congress], but in our ranks as well,” concluded Averin’s thought his 
colleague from the Poltava province Iakov Drobnis.
174  
 
The delegates of the Congress did not have to be told twice what exactly was at stake here. 
Speaking on the fifth day of the proceedings, Abram Kamensky, the head of the inquiry 
commission, situated the conflict within the context of “not fully (ne vpolne) crystallized 
rapports between the civil and military authority” unfolding under conditions of “perfectly 
(sovershenno) unformed [local] soviet apparatus.”
175 Dybenko, Kamensky further argued, 
might have been justified in monopolizing instruments of power in the region attached to the 
vague front-line zone, the Party, however, possessed neither the technical expertise nor the 
goodwill of impartiality to ascertain conclusively the validity of this claim.
176 Instead, 
another commission was called into existence, comprised of the representatives from the 
“central soviet government” (that is, Moscow and Serpukhov) and the commanding officers 
of the Ukrainian front. A group of men, led by Antonov and Berzin reached Yekaterinoslav 
on the evening of March 4
th and Dybenko, who did not waste time creating the illusion of 
cosmetic order, easily prevailed over his detractors, reduced in the eyes of the commission to 
petty and bilious ‘factionalists’ (fraktsionery).
177 The divisional commander, on the contrary, 
slighted by the ‘spiteful’ Averin, the local “Pompadour” in Antonov’s quip,
178 emerged 
innocent, “a conscientious communist” whose deeds respected the moral constraints of his 
mission.
179  
                                                 
174 Tretii z’izd Komunistychnoi partii (bil’shovykiv) Ukrainy, 17  
175 ibid., 137 
176 ibid., 137-138 
177 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 176; RGVA f 6 o 4 d 92 l 47 
178 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski, v. 3, 176 
179 RGVA f 6 o 4 d 92 l 47  
  350
 
Needless to say, this only ended the formal part of the “Dybenko affaire,” his imperious 
manner changing little in the wake of this exoneration. At his own discretion Dybenko raised 
and reduced the officers in his brigade, meriting from Skachko a sobriquet of dubious honor: 
“autonomous ataman Dybenko.”
180 Later, at the time when strategic necessity demanded all 
available resources to be concentrated against the Volunteers and the Cossacks pouring out 
from the Don, he carried his rugged army in the singularly vagarious manner deep into 
Crimea,
181 where a jocular Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic was established with a 
humorless and short-tempered dictator at its head. Reports kept on amassing, portraying 
Dybenko as a great purloiner of the provision trains that, deflected from their Don-bound 
path, seemed to invariably end up in the hands of his starved underlings. Rakovsky even 
threatened to declare Dybenko (along with Makhno) enemy of the proletariat if he does not 
wean himself away from his “bashi-bazouk politics”
182 – an empty threat for the time being, 
since neither the Front nor the government in Kharkov were prepared to countenance the 
consequences of such a momentous rift.  
 
Betraying weakness more than some vestigial affinity, the unwillingness to address problems 
of Insurgency played into the hands of the native warlords, bent on retaining political latitude 
under the hallowing guise of governmental sanction. Dybenko, ataman more naturalized than 
natural, could act practically unperturbed in the lower bent of Dnieper; even greater 
independence was evinced by “the ataman of Khersonshchina and Taurida” Grigoriev, who 
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described the town of Aleksandriia as “my capital” with an ease at once unselfconscious and 
suggestive.
183 Probably most conspicuous was the case of ataman Anton Bogunsky, whose 
word meant law in Zolotonosha uezd, only some 90 miles south-east of Kiev. Nineteen-year 
old stripling styling himself in the fashion of the day with a long-winded “Ataman of the 
Revolutionary army of the Poltava riverbank,”
184 he maintained barely camouflaged 
connections with the ‘mutineer’ Zeleny; together they plotted to overthrow the Bolshevik 
regime in Kiev,
185 but Bogunsky withdrew in time when risks appeared unpardonably high. 
Intolerant of anyone or anything impinging upon his authority, the young ataman did not 
shirk from arresting certain “comrade Laipass,” when the latter arrived to Zolotonosha with 
an assignment to organize a regiment.
186 Similarly, when the local Executive Committee 
began acting as a cover for the CheKa, he unceremoniously dismissed it, bringing in its stead 
a revkom from the “unaffiliated comrades (bespartiinykh), right and left S-Rs” with himself 
set as its chairman.
187 The Bolsheviks, apprised of Bogunsky’s antics, showed astounding 
insouciance, limiting their repressive countermeasures to an hour-long dressing-down session 
with the Front Commander. “We decided not to fan the flames of that story,” commented the 
man, who would rather look past the brewing treason than forsake his faith in the peaceful 
domestication of the insurgents.
188 
 
The tri-partite tug of war, locking together agents from the government, the army and the 
Front was eventually arbitrated through the intervention of Moscow. The interest of the 
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Russian center in Ukrainian affairs developed only gradually. Thus, disconcerted by the rapid 
advance of the partisans, Lenin proceeded to reprimand Trotsky, who should have allegedly 
kept them in check. On January 3
rd 1919 Lenin communicated his concerns to the leader of 
the Russian Red Army: “I am very worried about you becoming too enmeshed in Ukraine to 
the detriment of the general strategic task (obshchestrategicheskoi zadache), insisted upon by 
Vatsetis and which consists in a speedy, decisive and general offensive against Krasnov. I 
fear it utterly that we might be getting on too late with this…”
189 Although after some 
acrimonious exchange with Serpukhov Antonov succeeded in making the latter acknowledge 
the existence of the distinct Ukrainian Army, the idea of the Front’s independence sounded 
like anathema to the ears of the Supreme commander. Vatsetis thought it most sensible to 
raise the Dnieper into a defensive limit of the struggling Soviet Republic.
190 Ukraine for a 
while filled roles of secondary import – a buffer separating Russia from the West and an 
ancillary flank to the Don and Caucasus, where the resolute battle was scheduled to take 
place.  
 
Moscow had to radically revise its attitude toward Ukraine once events on the Southern Front 
took an ominous turn. The military and political leadership was caught completely off-guard, 
for, much as Moscow was habituated to news of resounding defeats in the North Caucasus, it 
took the victory in the Don region for granted. The steady advance of the 10
th Army from 
Tsaritsyn southward against the demoralized Cossacks and the persistent albeit ineffectual 
push to dislodge Denikin’s volunteers from the right bank of Seversky Donets
191 allowed 
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Trotsky to prophesize in early April that the ‘counterrevolution’ would be quashed within a 
fortnight.
192 “Krasnov is beaten. Denikin will be beaten,” he confidently proclaimed before 
the Party members and Soviet functionaries in Samara on April 6
th, 1919.
193 Tested shortly 
afterwards, Trotsky’s prediction  turned out to be a sham. On April 8
th, the Kuban corps of 
general Andrei Shkuro struck at the 8
th Army and found itself face to face with the brigade of 
bat’ko Makhno. Skachko, Commander of the 2
nd Ukrainian Army and Makhno’s nominal 
superior, was alarmed by these developments. “Volnovakha is taken by the enemy,” he 
anxiously reported, “Mariupol is cut off… Makhno left Mariupol for the Front, but he would 
not be able to reach the battle site … We could consider our entire left flank, from Grishin to 
Volnovakha, to be fully denuded.”
194 A few days later, the careworn commander painted an 
even more distressful scene: army regiments from the neighboring Southern Front fleeing in 
panic, Shkuro’s “wolf hundred” of 5000-strong
195 in pursuit of the 9
th Division, and 
Makhnovites, their “remnants” to boot, trying their utmost to stanch the avalanche of the 
Kuban horsemen.
196 Turning to Antonov, Skachko implored him “to pull out the cavalry 
from the west and fling it to us in the east.” “It is going to be a rotten affair otherwise.”
197  
 
No doubt, in his response to the “hysterical commander” Antonov hit the nail right on the 
head when he stated that Shkuro’s strength was blown out of proportion and that his 
breakthrough was but a minor raid.
198 However, the raid brought Ukraine into the field of 
vision of Russian battle-planners and battle-makers. Moscow plumbed the pluck and the 
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hardiness of the Armed Forces of South Russia (as the combined troops of the Don Host and 
the Volunteers became known) and discovered that its capacity in overcoming the resistance 
of the whites was incumbent upon Ukraine’s unconditional support of its, Russia-oriented, 
strategy. Ukrainian Bolsheviks were thus expected to supply their northern neighbor with 
men and arms, yet, instead of lining themselves up in the state of subordinated coordination, 
the Front, the insurgents and even the overwhelming majority of Kharkov’s government 
were seen as working in cahoots to subvert central authority (nedopustimo 
samostiinichaet).
199 “There is no divide between the Southern Front and the Ukrainian 
Front,” was Lenin’s brusque riposte to the Ukrainian military command when the latter 
insisted on Ukraine’s unique conditions and the necessity of keeping the Ukrainian 
insurgents within the bounds of their homeland.
200 Lenin, however insisted, and on April 22
nd, 
he issued an order that would result in the near-collapse of the Ukrainian Army and the 
definitive abolition of the separate Ukrainian Front. “Ukraine,” he wrote to Rakovsky “is 
beholden (obiazana) to accept the Don basin as the unquestionably most important Ukrainian 
front.”
201 
 
It was in accordance with this injunction that the Command of the Southern Front 
(represented by the cadre officer in Bolshevik service, Vladimir Gittis), Serpukhov and the 
Kremlin began imposing demands upon the Ukrainian Front that it was incapable of meeting. 
Skachko’s originally modest request for one brigade
202 quickly snowballed into two divisions 
that Lenin, in Podvoisky’s rendition of Leader’s wishes, wanted immediately transferred to 
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the Don.
 203 “We have three divisions,” asserted Skachko in a dramatic letter to the Ukrainian 
Front Commander, “and we could give them by removing two from the Odessa and Kiev 
directions.” “Two divisions to the Eastern Front, the Don-Mariupol Front! Two divisions or 
death of the revolution!” the missive’s pitch reached an ecstatic chanting.
204 Antonov’s 
reaction was one of befuddlement and indignation. Years later he wrote his belated response 
to the Commander of the 2
nd Army, Vatsetis and those in the Party leadership, who insisted 
on sending all available resources in the direction of Donbass:  
To exact three divisions! – and in such a time, when protracted battles against 
the Petliura army were still taking place at Shepitovka, against the mixed 
white forces at Tiraspol, when almost an entire division was held up by the 
suppression of internal uprisings; three divisions, i.e. essentially everything 
that we somehow managed to put up together …  
Giving away three battle-ready divisions to the Southern Front in addition to 
what  we had already given, would have meant in those conditions not only 
the rejection of the ‘breakthrough to the West’, but the deliverance of Ukraine 
into the hands of the  petliurovtsy (who were yet far from being broken).
205  
  
The willingness of the Center to engage similar arguments with the counter-arguments of its 
own was perfectly encapsulated in Vatsetis’ militarily curt response: “Carry out the order and 
report back.”
206  
 
Presaging the subsequent dissolution of the Ukrainian Front, Nikolai Kakurin, one of the 
earliest and otherwise levelheaded commentators on the Revolution and Civil War, once 
claimed that the Command of said Front “was not particularly inclined to accommodate the 
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needs of the Southern Front.”
207 Still,  in the month of April alone the Southern Front 
received over 8 thousand bayonets, 3 thousand cavalry and two armored trains from its 
western neighbor.
208 Sometime in the late March Antonov and Dybenko let the entire 3
rd 
Transdnieperian brigade of bat’ko Makhno (about 10 thousand men according to Kakurin)
209 
slip into the operational command of Gittis.
210 Other units soon followed suit: the 11
th and 
12
th regiments (collectively known after their commander as “the Tekendzhants’ brigade”), 
the Internationalist regiment, a mixed brigade commanded by Iakov Pokus, etc.
211 They even 
discussing the imminent dispatching of Grigoriev’s brigade, still flush with its staggering 
victory at Odessa; Antonov, however, had a second thought and decided to send more 
manageable men in lieu of Grigoriev’s unruly soldiery.
212 Before long, Antonov - goaded by 
Rakovsky, Podvoisky and naturally Lenin himself – made a solemn promise of a hefty 
delivery, which was supposed to consist of 30 thousand bayonets, 3 thousand cavalry and 60 
guns to top it all off.
213 Grigoriev’s uprising clearly left no time for the execution of such 
promises, although it did, ironically enough, destroy the Ukrainian front and so deliver its 
remnants to Moscow.
214   
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Thus, it was not exactly for the lack of trying that the Command of the Ukrainian Front failed 
to propitiate the Russian center. The issues between Moscow and the Front, invisible or 
neglected at first, stemmed from the irresolvable difference in the principles according to 
which the two thought and operated. The existence of the separate Command, responsible de 
jure  to Kharkov (rather than Moscow), but de facto only to itself, broke the unity of the 
strategic plan, articulated and finessed by the Russian Bolshevik leadership. Inversely, it 
created a condition under which the pursuit of a parallel strategy became a possibility and 
ultimately, a reality. To be sure, as a man who had been commissioned down south to Kursk 
with an express purpose of splicing an army from the disjointed insurgent fragments, 
Antonov had to recognize the centrality of the Don region and the primacy of the Serpukhov 
military will; yet as a Commander-in-Chief of a state, allied with yet independent from (if 
nominally) Russia (a position acquired subsequently to his appointment to Kursk), Antonov 
transformed into an embodiment of that parallel strategy, fixing his gaze unflinchingly 
westward. “At the threshold of a corridor to Europe, we face enormous tasks,” blared the 
commanding voice of Antonov’s telegram to Rakovsky.
215 In his response to Skachko, 
composed around April 20
th, the Commander of the Ukrainian Front gave a plenary 
explanation of those tasks:  
The Rumanians are currently advancing against Hungary, Bulgaria is primed 
to fall upon Rumania, in Turkey there is ferment. The whole Balkan Peninsula 
is boiling. And the entire task [consists] in organizing the strike, capable 
of crushing down the last barriers for the development of revolution. 
There is a lot of strength [available] locally and one cannot engage them 
elsewhere. Once it ignites up there (tam tronetsia) – then would our hands 
be fully untied (Antonov’s emphasis).
216  
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Expressed in those words, the so-called “breakthrough to the West” – proryv na zapad – 
evolved into a sole raison d’etre of the Ukrainian Front, other ‘strategic assignments’ 
appearing bleak or nonexistent in the light of Entente’s hectic retreat from the coasts of the 
Black Sea and the seemingly imminent collapse of the Nationalist resistance in the yet 
unoccupied patches of Volhynia.
217 Turning – literally and brazenly – its back on Russian 
affairs (unfolding towards a climax in the Don-Seversky Donets region), the Soviet Ukraine 
informed the world of its west-bound orientation in a double ultimatum with which 
Rakovsky’s government attempted to stun Rumania (sent on May 1
st and May 3
rd). The exact 
terms were of consequence only insofar as they were meant to cause a provocation or a 
precedent, their fulfillment skillfully ruled out by the immoderation of demands.
218 With 
Europe therefore looking like an overripe fruit ready to be plucked, the Command of the 
Ukrainian Army was making last preparations before launching itself on the path of the great 
Red Crusade.  
 
The Ukrainian Front, the acting military organ of a respective Soviet republic, insisted on 
defining its own strategy despite the fact that Vatsitis had for some time talked of the Front’s 
tasks as being successfully resolved.
219 That stubborn, even recalcitrant, adherence of 
Antonov to the precepts of autonomy no doubt reflected his own ambitions as well as those 
of his aides, who, like Bubnov, espoused views of the “Left Bolshevism.” Still, more than 
anything else, the distinctiveness of the Front’s outward striving betokened its partisan origin 
and its evolving insurgent content – essential characteristics, which, in the final analysis, 
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were fully independent of the Front’s commanding officers, be they in the Antonov’s Field 
Staff or the Revolutionary Military Council. When sometime in the late twenties Vatsetis 
blamed the partisans for having carried the Ukrainian Red army “well beyond the 
assignments, imposed upon it by the High Command,”
220 he was merely reiterating an 
opinion, current among certain military circles at the time of the said events. On April 17
th 
Glagolev, for instance, apprehensively reported that 
[h]aving gone far and beyond the basic directive of the High Command (to 
settle firmly at the Dnieper river and limit oneself to reconnoitering), the front, 
naturally, could only stop now at Dniester, although the inclusion of the 
Bessarabian insurgents into its ranks indicates that the front, comprised of the 
insurgents, may move even further to the west. 
221  
 
The Front, impervious to notions of discipline and regularity, prone to high desertion rates, 
could only sustain itself by drawing from the inexhaustible spring of the armed countryside. 
To survive it had to absorb and to absorb it had to advance forward, like the momentum-
gaining oceanic wave, or, better yet, an avalanche, rolling menacingly down the declivity 
into the distressed valley of the alarmed European bourgeoisie.  
 
The westward leaning of the Front was additionally buttressed up by the professed reluctance 
of the Red insurgents to risk their lives in the name of ‘Muscovy’ (Moskovshchyna). “For 
Russia we won’t fight, for Ukraine we will” – that phrase, attributed to the mobilized 
residents of the Chernigov province
222 concisely verbalized the sentiment of the entire 
Ukrainian Red Army (with a possible exception of Makhno’s brigade
223). Etiologically akin 
to the resentment of the region-bound militiamen, it pointed in no uncertain terms to the 
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development of the positive kind, namely, to the advent of a greater corporate identity, 
wrought out of the common ‘insurgent experience’. Although the partisan, geographically 
and mentally extricated from his village, was yet not too keen on recognizing in the 
lineaments of “the whole World” features of his mother, as one idealistic poet might have 
wanted, he certainly could situate his own interests and welfare within an enormous 
compound of the Front and the Ukrainian Bolshevik statehood. This spicy concoction out of 
Bolshevism and Nationalism found its way in the resolutions and proclamations, released or 
voted on behalf of the atamans while they were still formally attached to Kharkov. In one 
compromising leaflet Anton Bogunsky envisioned Ukraine as a culturally and economically 
independent entity, a country, governed by the “local Ukrainian people (liudei-ukraintsev),” 
defining this category in terms of territorial origin rather than religious or ethnic affiliation 
(“all living in Ukraine”).
224 His closest associate Grudnitsky, chairman of the Zolotonosha 
executive committee by decree of the revolutionary Fortune, expressed the same idea without 
the superfluous finesse of Bogunsky’s legalism. “It is not necessary to abide to the Center,” 
he told the soldiers, congregated to perform the rite of election, “Neither should one be 
subordinated to the oncoming Muscovites (moskaliam).”
225 Too complex and fraught with 
consequences for the future to be impounded within the constrains of a single paragraph, that 
clamor for native leadership and native politics, intermixed with increasingly violent attacks 
on Jews, local or not, Russians, “Latvians, Chinese and Magyars” (when those latter were 
around),
226 became first audible and then grew louder in direct proportion to the involvement 
of the Soviet Russia in the affairs of Ukraine – as if the revelation of the sham of 
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independence made the insurgents cherish with double and triple force the very object that 
the Moscow’s tactless agents held in so low an esteem. Antonov understood this very well, 
better, in fact, than most of his colleagues, who tended to ascribe “the chauvinist tincture” of 
the insurgents to the effects of the nondescript “Ukrainian judeophobia” as well as the 
machinations of incidental “blackguards” (prokhodimtsev).
227 Bypassing Rakovsky’s 
government, Antonov went straight to Moscow, imploring it to “compel the ‘great Russian 
carpetbaggers’ (naezzhikh ‘velikorossov’) to treat the locals and the circumstances under 
which they lived with greatest possible tact” lest they succeed in marring the Soviet power 
with denigrating epithets of an occupying force.
228 From the perspective of the Front 
Commander, the plea came none too late, the recent defection of the 14
th Mirgorod Regiment 
to the side of the UNR
229 and the rapid proliferation of the ‘unaffiliated’ bands, with certain 
among them adding a yellow-blue standard to the stock of Bolshevik-inspired amulets,
230 
divulging undeniable symptoms of the metastasizing disintegration. As the unwelcome 
prospect of warring for Russia on the eastern border of Ukraine began to advance from not so 
distant a future, many partisan units thought it apt to cross the border of a different kind – 
that same line between relative legality and the state of insurgency from which they had all 
so recently emerged.  
 
Was Moscow even conscious of the dangers involved in playing against an opponent who 
held the trump card with a dreadful word “rebellion” written on it? The attitude that Moscow 
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had assumed toward the Ukrainian Front and Ukrainian army was dictated perforce by the 
desire at rendering them innocuous so that at all subsequent rounds the man with arms would 
yield without much resistance to the superior will of the state. A mite too fractious for its 
own good, the staff of the Ukrainian Command could nonetheless be brought in line by 
means of cajoling and reprimands; in the unlikely case of obstinate perseverance, Antonov 
and his supporters could simply be dismissed on charges of proverbial samostiinost’ 
(impermissible autonomy) and be replaced with more amenable individuals.
231 On the other 
hand, the Ukrainian ataman-turned-regimental (brigade, divisional) commander and, even 
more so, the rank-and-file insurgent presented a dilemma of an altogether different caliber. 
Outgrowth of state erosion, they had not only habituated themselves to acting independently 
in the absence of exacting central authority, but elevated this practice into the central tenet of 
their existence, the cornerstone of their revolutionary pride. Their indiscipline was profound, 
corporeal, epistemological. Similarly, the measures that Moscow had to adopt to introduce 
order and obedience had to be precise and radical, a deft combination of a surgeon knife and 
a powerful antibiotic designed to excise the tumor and preclude the possibility of recidivism. 
The bulky body of the Ukrainian front, which the Russian Bolsheviks coveted so much – 
even if it comprised but of “bayonets and machine-guns in prodigious quantity”
232 – could 
only be won over by pouncing upon bodies of individual partisans and disciplining them into 
the material, suitable to enter into la grande muette of the Soviet Republic. 
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With this in mind, Moscow endeavored to break through the carapace of insurgent practices 
and seize the self-mobilized and self-propelled insurgent, hoping to succeed there where the 
Ukrainian government had failed. Their numbers and frequency of visits growing 
exponentially from early April onwards, the northern emissaries were dismayed at the state 
of dereliction in which most of the partisan units were discovered. “When speaking of 
Grigoriev’s brigade,” concluded one of the inspectors of the 1
st Transdnieperian brigade, 
“one cannot but point out at the critical lack of … experienced political workers and that of 
the apposite literature.” “The Red Army soldiers,” continued another in the same vein, “are 
by and by politically illiterate (daleko politicheski negramotny)… in consequence of that 
both anti-Semitism and drunkenness are flourishing in these troops.”
233 Makhno’s men, 
praised until recently for their bravery and spirit of self-sacrifice, came under the fire of 
critique, directed at them, from beyond the Ukrainian border. “Political work worthy of 
mention is entirely absent in the troops of Makhno… one often observes [propensity] to hard 
drinking and dissolute behavior among the commissars, which sets a ground for the 
[subsequent] corruption (razlozheniia) of certain unconscious (nesoznatel’nych) soldiery 
masses.”
234  
 
The fact that the Transdnieperian division (Makhno, Dybenko and Grigoriev) joined the 
body of the Front in the later stages of the Ukrainian scramble and was generally notorious 
for its willfulness did not weight all too heavily in the making of such judgments, for other 
units – those which had traced the track of the Bolshevik advance from its first unsteady 
steps – were too placed on the scales of revolutionary solvency and found utterly wanting. 
                                                 
233 RGVA f 25860 o 1 d 557 ll 1-6 
234 Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine, v. 1 b. 2, 374  
  364
The 7
th Sumy Regiment, upon which Antonov lavished expressions of unstinted enthusiasm, 
was seen as a breeding ground of alcoholism with company commanders among its principal 
fanciers.
235 The legendary Bogun Regiment, the veritable kernel of the entire Ukrainian 
Army, fared even worse. Having acknowledged its achievements in opening phases of the 
struggle, comrade Eidelshtein, an employee of the Central Bureau of Communication and 
Information, spared no disparagements in narrating the history of its subsequent degeneration: 
“After the regiment spent some time in Kiev and Vinnitsa… [where] it met the 
counterrevolutionary and anti-Semitic peasantry, a good half of men became converted to 
anti-Semitism, one quarter professing their sentiments overtly.”
236 Bereft of conscientious 
guides, the Ukrainian Army, never too reliable force to begin with, seemed to careen towards 
the ideal of smug licentiousness, cleaving to the human and material assets of the land when 
Lenin’s Russia needed them so acutely. 
 
Convening on April 8, 1919 to discuss military-related questions, the Central Committee of 
the CP(b)U resolved, among other things, “to heed most serious attention to the political 
work in the Army,” “to supply [it] with the maximum quantity of the communists [to serve] 
as rank-and-file soldiers as well as political commissars,” “to assign [the army] party cells 
the task of establishing immediate connection with the military department of the Central 
Committee,” and, finally, to exert oneself in the “direction of preventing Petliura elements 
from penetrating the Army.”
237 Grosso modo, this set of decisions summarized the soft – 
“pedagogical” – aspect of reform that Party in Moscow intended to pursue with 
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unconditional assistance from the local Bolshevik government. Having declared Ukraine to 
be the “military camp”
238 – in neat concord with Podvoisky’s earlier recommendations
239 - 
Kharkov proceeded at once to mobilize all communists with an aim of creating “military 
units, ready to assemble speedily and march off at the injunction of the Party center.”
240 The 
so-called reserve regiment of the Kiev organization of the Communist Party, decreed into 
existence on April 12
th “in conjunction with the latest developments”– was among several of 
similarly willed detachments, distinct from the rest by virtue of having Bolshevik top-brass 
in its ranks (Bubnov serving, for instance, as its political commissar).
241 These measures, 
intended more for the nearby future rather than for the urgent present, were accompanied by 
the efforts at strengthening position of the serving communists within already existing troops. 
Setting up of the party cells, task half-neglected until now, resumed in earnest, supported by 
the internalized belief that their presence automatically diminishes instances of “banditry” 
and that, on the contrary, propensity to insubordination grows markedly when the soldiers 
and their commanders are left unobserved – or “unenlightened in matters of the Communist 
teaching” – by the party organizations. “The communist cell is being established anew,” 
commented the political commissar of the Transdnieperian division upon the situation in the 
5
th Regiment of its 2
nd brigade. “Strict revolutionary discipline is introduced in the regiment. 
The best regiment of the 2
nd brigade…”
242 Typical was the observation made in early May 
with regard to the 13
th Regiment of the 3
rd Border division: “The Communist cell includes 20 
communists and 27 sympathizers. Despite the low numbers, the cell spawned up ambitious 
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party work (razvila bol’shuiu partiinuiu rabotu).”
243 True enough, in the spring of 1919 the 
actual count of the card-carrying members tended, if anything, to diminish, susceptible as the 
communists were to the scything effects of lead, disease and desertion; the party cells, on the 
other hand, being perhaps a better representation of the Bolshevik foothold in the Army, 
were most certainly proliferating. Thus, if in the late February of 1919 the  2
nd Soviet 
Ukrainian division encompassed about 40 cells (with over 400 members, not counting troops 
of Grigoriev, then part of the said division),
244 two and a half months later, that is on the eve 
of Grigoriev’s mutiny, its political commissar Isaak Mints could report presence of 61 cells 
(albeit housing only 248 communists).
245 As a consequence, the cells were often very small, 
totaling, as in one regiment of Grigoriev’s brigade, as few as three members;
246 few 
regiments could boast as many as 50 communists (the 5
th Regiment of the 2
nd division was a 
notable exception). Still, they were functioning as key nodes in the nexus of communication 
and surveillance as well as loyalty dischargers, releasing the political commissar from the 
state of forced isolation and helping him lay the foundation of the establishing party control, 
at least in theory.
247  
 
When these relatively mild measures proved insufficient, the Center felt tempted to sterner 
measures. The 2
nd division tottering on the brink of mutiny in the last week of April, the 
inspection recommended immediately establishing  “a divisional tribunal and extraordinary 
investigatory commission.”
248 Similarly, in a belated reaction to pogroms in Berdichev, 
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staged by the soldiers of the 9
th, 21
st and 5
th Cavalry Regiments between March 19
th and 
March 22
nd, its commanders were instructed to present themselves before the court of 
revolutionary justice.
249 Exasperated at the stubborn refusal of the Makhnovites to accept 
regular army norms,
250 Grigori Sokolnikov, then a member of the RMC of the Southern 
Front, made the radical suggestion – “Remove Makhno” – which gained immediate approval 
from Lenin.
251 Another enfant terrible of the indomitable Ukrainian insurgency, ataman 
Grigoriev, also appeared on the black list of commanders the Party wanted to disavow. “It is 
the opinion of the Central Committee,” Piatakov informed his colleagues in the Ukrainian 
RMC, “that Grigoriev … needs to be liquidated.”
252 How exactly Moscow and Kharkov 
intended to execute this risky maneuver was not yet specified. Antonov’s account of these 
events enables one to make such a conjecture
253, as do the fictionalized memoirs of 
Bazhenov-Trifonov,
254 for a brief moment political commissar appointed to Grigoriev’s units.  
 
Still, for as long as Antonov and the apparatus of the Ukrainian front maintained influence 
over the Bolshevik proceedings in Ukraine, assassination of the major warlords, let alone 
trial by tribunal and execution by firing squad, was thought unwarranted and dangerous. 
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Army reorganization, the most ambitious undertaking of its kind since the by-gone days in 
the Neutral Zone, held more realistic promise. In early April of 1919 the Transdnieperian 
division, the most exceptionable part of the Ukrainian Red Army, was finally broken up in 
three pieces, with Dybenko’s second brigade destined to evolve into a separate Crimean 
army,
255 the third brigade of Makhno allotted to Gittis’ Southern Front and Grigoriev’s first 
transformed into the 6
th division.
256 His vanity undoubtedly flattered by such a promotion, 
Grigoriev, nonetheless, found himself subordinated to the newly created 3
rd Ukrainian Soviet 
Army, headed by the spets Nikolai Khudiakov; the sovereignty of the great steppe ataman 
was thus compromised as a result of establishing more proximate and precise jurisdiction. 
Smaller atamans from the region – Popov, Bogun and Grigoriev’s competitor and successor 
Pavel Tkachenko – were thrown together with the unruly Bessarabian partisans to produce 
the so-called 5
th division. Commanded by another outsider, Peshekhonov, it complemented 
Grigoriev’s troops within Khudiakov’s gestating army.
257 The ambivalent position of 
Makhno, tied operationally to a different military formation, yet politically and sentimentally 
an exponent of Ukrainian affairs, allowed it to remain unaffiliated for the time being – until 
Antonov and Skachko agreed to use the brigade as the foundation for a planned 7
th 
division.
258 Although additional, reputed trustworthy, units were to enter into its ranks – with 
a clear aim of allaying the explosive nature of the Makhnovite tinder – the division still 
worried the Command of the Southern Front. To those critics who saw this transformation as 
a fatal empowerment of Makhno, Skachko and the Revolutionary Military Council of the 2
nd 
Ukrainian Soviet Army responded with an argument that could have been applied to changes 
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elsewhere on the Ukrainian Front: “The restructuring of Makhno’s brigade … could create 
conditions auspicious for internal work in it, for it gives [us] an opportunity to send a large 
number of our political workers as well as commanding officers.”
259 The circle of reform 
was expected thus to be completed – first, by renaming and reshuffling the troops and then 
injecting into the resultant mass sufficient quantity of the party appointees to keep them 
morally hale and physically malleable.  
 
These reforms, implemented now with greater consistency than ever before, had only 
intensified the very evil they were supposed to curb. The mass of insurgents, bearing 
collectively the name of the Ukrainian Red Army, remained averse to the attempts at making 
a regular force out of them with a near prospect of being used against Russia’s whites; what 
is more, their dissent became more frequent, more violent, and, if one could say so, “aimed,” 
the ultimate object of the outbursts being the Soviet authority itself and those that came to be 
associated with it either symbolically or institutionally. For all their complexity, the Jewish 
pogroms, until late March of 1919 sanguinary prerogative of the UNR troops and the 
unclassified peasant bands, represented radical repudiation of the stately order, which 
allegedly betrayed the Revolution and subverted the spirit of Bolshevism (and not vice 
versa).
260 The Commander of Rzhishchev garrison in the Kiev province expressed this idea 
in the succinct apology of ataman Zeleny, whose mutinous activities he was actually obliged 
to counter:  
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We found out that the followers of Zeleny also stand for the Soviets, that they 
are ‘independent Bolsheviks’, that the Ukrainians cannot look by indifferently 
as the Russian conquerors, calling themselves communists, are foisting 
everywhere their commissars and the ‘yids’, that these latter are keeping all 
power in their hands and that [men of Zeleny] fight against the condition 
under which the country with 80 percent Ukrainian population is governed not 
by the Ukrainians but by the ‘yids’, Great Russians and the Latvians.
261  
 
 
It was, therefore, not merely in a fit of panic, or out of unbearable fatigue and frustration, but 
in an act of deliberate provocation of central power that the Red insurgents, previously 
relatively unaffected by the anti-Semitic propaganda, turned their weapons against the Jewish 
populace of the former Pale. The aforementioned pogrom in Berdichev in the last week of 
March was followed by another one in Belaia Tserkov, perpetrated by the “exemplary” 6
th 
Regiment
262; or one in a small Volhynian town Sal’nitsa, which the “bandit” 5 Cavalry 
Regiment had duly recorded to the list of its “accomplishments” alongside that in Berdichev; 
the “legendary” tarashchantsy (2
nd Tarashcha regiment) were responsible for the particularly 
vicious pogrom in Chudnov-Volynsk, leaving behind at least 10 dead and the whole village 
burned to the ground;
263 insurgents from the 4
th Nezhin regiment had almost outcompeted 
their comrades in criminal malfeasance when they passed through the city of Kazatin.
264 A 
pogrom staged in the town Malin (ukr. Malyn) in the first week of April by the soldiers of 
the 11
th and 20
th regiments must have seemed to its residents only as a second act in the 
drama of plunder and murder, the opening scenes of which were performed only days before 
by the followers of ataman Struk.
265 When seen separately, as a double crime of local 
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significance, this particular event harks back to the fact of real juncture between Struk and 
men of the 20
th regiments, Struk’s fellow-villagers and, in the days of the November uprising, 
comrades in arms. From a broader perspective, however, pogrom in Malin – as well as, for 
example, the recurrent ‘acts of license’ (beschinstva) of the 6
th regiment in the area of 
Vasil’kov, the turf of Zeleny
266 - manifested profound affinity with, or even sympathy for the 
deeds of Zeleny, Struk or Sokolovski, all of whom at one point counted themselves among 
the allies of the Soviet power. Admittedly minor in comparison to the contemporary 
massacres in Chernobyl (April 7-12) or Zhitomir (March 22-24) with their death tolls 
measured in hundreds of victims, pogroms perpetrated by the Red insurgents were 
nonetheless related to the latter just as the acts of provocation are to the state of war, which 
divided the said atamans, by now fully autonomous, from their former Bolshevik protectors.  
 
Antonov had implied exactly that when he informed Lenin of his dark presentiment. “I see,” 
went his dispatch from April 19, “that our army swells with an unhealthy swelling (pukhnet 
nezdorovoi pukhlost’iu), and I see disintegration (raspad) ripening up in its interior.”
267 The 
pogroms, of course, were the most radical, often irrevocable expressions of that “swelling” – 
and therefore rather exceptional. On a more mundane level, the growing chasm between the 
stiff-necked insurgents and the authority that strove to domesticate them found its 
articulation in the acts of violence committed against various “soviet workers,” members of 
the communist cells, commissars, local revolutionary and executive committees, chekists and 
military inspectors. Although appeals to settle scores with the “overbearing appointees” – 
naznachentsy, as the representatives of central power were indiscriminately referred to – 
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circulated already in the earliest stages of the Bolshevik offensive,
268 only in April did they 
finally began to bear the intended fruit. An epidemic of anti-communist, better said “anti-
state,” manifestations swept the army. On April 15, soldiers of the Serebriia regiment, “over 
the protests of the commanding officers” arrested the commissar and thrashed him within an 
inch of his life; afterwards, the same informant claims, “the red army men of the very same 
regiment beat up the political worker who was disseminating newspaper ‘Zhitomir 
communist,’ threatening to kill him if he reappears with an aim of conducting communist 
propaganda.”
269 With two of their comrades court-martialed and executed – allegedly for 
showing too much zeal in divesting civilians of their possessions – insurgents of the 6
th 
regiment swore to “slaughter” local revkom in retaliation.
270 This threat was carried out, if 
belatedly and vicariously, when on May 2, 1919 soldiers of the 21
st regiment shot three 
members of the Zhitomir revkom and released their fellow men at arms, previously arrested 
by the CheKa.
271 Unwilling to try their luck, the soviet authorities in Berdichev readily 
yielded to the antics of Shchors, whose ‘messengers’ stormed in demanding 240 vedro of 
alcohol – “for the automobile repair purposes,” they asserted.
272 The Berdichev appeasers did 
succeed in melting the Red Army anger into transient hilarity (the sources record this 
obligingly), managing thus to postpone the pogrom, but on May 9, with the renewed pressure 
from the UNR direction compounding to the widespread anxiety, soldiers of the 22
nd and 8
th 
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regiments fell upon Berdichev CheKa, broke into the municipal treasury and left laden with 
plunder – all under the indifferent gaze of the 1
st Army Revolutionary Military Council.
273 
 
It was not, however, in Volhynia (operational theater of the 1
st Soviet Ukrainian Army), but 
in southern Ukraine, Crimea and Donbass, dominated by the overgrown parts of the former 
Transdnieperian division, where the animosity between the insurgents and the soviet 
authorities reached its zenith. A political commissar, sent in April of 1919 to the 3
rd brigade 
of Makhno, relayed the comportment of the Makhnovite chief of staff Boris Veretel’nikov 
(mistakenly referred to as Veretennikov), who “was boasting how one would annihilate all 
those naznachentsy and chase them out from [all] the villages, where they would [only] dare 
to appear.”
274 The result of such campaign of intimidation was such that, another agitator 
telegraphed, “political workers decline to go and work among the troops of Makno.”
275 
Shafranski, one-time fearless commissar of the Shchors’ Bogun regiment, refused outright 
the dubious privilege of spreading the truth and instilling revolutionary discipline in 
Grigoriev’s quarters. “I would rather submit to the arrest warrant than become political 
commissar,” he is said to have declared.
276 His fears were not exaggerated, for the troops of 
Grigoriev, with or without explicit permission of their ataman, launched veritable hunt on the 
soviet workers. “Destroyed are entire volost executive committees,” wrote the district 
military commissar of Krivoi Rog (ukr. Kryvyi Rih) on April 24, “Twenty-seven communists 
are killed in Shesternia (ukr Shestirnia), twenty-two in Kazanka.”
277 Less than a week before, 
insurgents of Grigoriev’s Verbliuzhka regiment, who abandoned their position despite 
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Antonov’s categorical objection
278, disarmed the railroad guard at Dolinskaia junction, killed 
its commanding officer and took whatever money, clothing and food they could find; this 
attack might have been written off as straightforward looting by the famished soldiery had it 
not been inscribed into their programmatic slogan: “Down with the communists, 
extraordinary committees and commissars.”
279 Hastening to the troubled surface of the 
Bolshevik dominion, these outbursts were giving the brewing underlying unrest dimensions 
of an open uprising.  
 
In the context of such lethal skirmishes, Grigoriev’s attempts at shifting burden of 
responsibility onto the shoulders of local authorities
280 seemed, at the very least, superfluous, 
although the Front Commander kept on listening, preferring to treat the affair as transient and 
adventitious. This peculiar correspondence between Grigoriev’s half-sincerity and Antonov’s 
cultivated naiveté had long outlasted its own practical import and entered into realm of pure 
and inconsequential histrionics, the actual future of the soviet project in Ukraine being 
decided on the ground level of the political and military hierarchy. The intelligence report 
delivered to the Staff of the 1
st Ukrainian Soviet Army on May 2, 1919 transmitted the 
laconic verdict, pronounced by the rank-and-file: “All soldiers are in the mood antipathetic 
(nastroenny protiv) to the civil authority.”
281 Their political education commenced and 
completed in 1917, the Ukrainian insurgents, whose commanding and ‘discourse-generating’ 
spearhead consisted of the privates and NCOs (unteroffitsery) of the former Imperial army, 
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indwelled the world, forged in the laboratory of the Greater February – the world that had 
enjoined free elections of the commanders, encouraged cacophonous deliberations over 
affairs petty and grand and apotheosized small-scale politics. In other words, the post-
Imperial chaos was their native element, the ruins of authority – their habitat and, by inverse 
reasoning, the recrudescent central state – their anathema.  
 
The language, employed when talking about the state was varied, but the attitude toward the 
object of conversation – invariably negative. The Makhnovites, the most sophisticated and 
organizationally sufficient species in the great Partisan kingdom, railed against the 
“authorimaniac” (vlastnicheskii)
282 penchant of the Center, its narrow party-mindedness and 
flagrant disingenuity of intent, which saw the installment of the pro forma communes 
(kazennye kommuny)
283 side by side with that of the “contemporary okhranka” – CheKa.
284 
Their celebrated slogan – “Down with the Commissarocracy!” (komissaroderzhavie)
285 – 
embraced as much constructive political content as that otherwise decomposing and anti-
political movement was capable of garnering at the moment. Others, less steeped in theory 
and more in quotidian rural existence, perceived the authority through the prism of its 
distance and its foreignness, the resultant invisibility rendering it in their mind insensitive 
and necessarily unjust. Appearing in the guise of some “military specialist” exported from 
Russia or a city-nurtured Jewish propagandist, the authority developed a habit of ordering 
and exacting without ever remunerating the insurgents for the good faith shown; so resolves 
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itself the mystery of that strange nationalism, espoused by one Bogunski or one Zeleny, who, 
while decrying preponderance of the non-Ukrainians, could dissociate themselves 
uncompromisingly from the statist projects of the Petliura’s circle. The most basic objection, 
however – complaint so evocative of the February 1917 and therefore so relevant – had been 
voiced in the barracks of the Kharkov garrison: “It is said that one is reverting to the old style 
of command (staromu poriadku komandovaniia, i.e. ancien regime) and it is likely that soon 
they will start beating you as they had done before.”
286 Not that, of course, the partisans were 
such touch-me-nots, the widespread use of corporal punishment by Shchors or Grigoriev 
clearly disabusing anyone of that illusion; yet, they certainly found it demeaning that the 
appointed higher ranking officers (rather then their own elected bat’ko) could handle them no 
better than some remorseless “gold-epauletted” reactionary.
287 In short, the problem with the 
state – the problem of any transcendent authority – was not the beating itself, but the 
nonconsensual, un-family-like nature thereof, abuse that reeked of counter-revolution.  
 
It was precisely this resentment that had given birth to the paradoxical opposition between 
the “Bolsheviks” and “Communists,” a rapport that was conveniently and conventionally 
reduced to the ignorance (temnota) of the masses both in the coeval bureaucratic reports and 
the subsequent histories of the Civil War. “We are for the Bolsheviks but against the 
communists,” the soldiers of the 11
th border guard regiment were apparently claiming in the 
month of April,
288and this assertion propagated through the open space with a facility of an 
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age-old beloved folksong. “Zeleny calls himself a Bolshevik, but says that he is not a 
communist,” so went the unintentionally incredible but utterly humorless report on the April 
Fool’s day.
289 Ataman Angel from Chernigovshchina established his political identity in 
duplicate terms.
290 “Bandit” Klimenko (or Klemenko), formerly commander of the Uman 
garrison
291 declared in a forged issue of Izvestiia that he “goes for the Soviet Russia, but 
against the communists and the yids.”
292 Showing minimum creativity, Makhno reckoned 
himself among the so-called “free communists,”
293 category established to draw attention to 
the inauthenticity of the Party-bound comrades. Having supported the Bolsheviks in their bid 
for power, the insurgents became united with the spirit of Bolshevism, or, at least with its 
decentralizing – centrifugal – tendencies; the history of state disintegration and of army 
collapse (to say nothing of land seizures and other peasant “incivilities”) was, few 
reservations considered, more their history, or pre-history, than that of the capital-ensconced 
revolutionaries. The communists with their plans at bringing the state back into operation 
appeared as the Revolution’s illegitimate children, or, what is worse, as the outright 
imposters – either way, the insurgents believed, they had forfeited all inheritance rights to the 
post-revolutionary tomorrow, because they had been acting in the style of the pre-
revolutionary yesterday. For a while the secret tension between the insurgents and 
communists had no visible consequences, the Party being too weak and sufficiently agile to 
risk provoking the Army. Yet, with Kharkov first supported and then practically replaced by 
Moscow, with events in Caucasus and Severski-Donets sending ominous echoes across 
Kremlin halls, the centripetal drive began to grow at the rate of an imperative, threatening to 
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undermine the fragmented paradise of the ataman-ruled Ukraine. This interaction between 
antipodal tendencies resembled less the cool-headed vector summation than an exothermic 
chemical reaction, for, rather than yielding a certain harmonious balance at the end (as 
Antonov, the Front Command and the Left Communists might have hoped), it resulted in an 
explosion which were only to strengthen one of the elements at the price of annihilating the 
other.  
 
Grigoriev’s uprising was such an explosion – a violent clash of the rural, militarized and 
anarchistic Bolshevism with the urban, civil and etatist Communism.  
 
Part V: Mutiny 
The uprising, which brought an end to the strained collaboration between the Partisans and 
the Soviets and which interred the vexingly autonomous Ukrainian Front, seems superficially 
easy to recount and account for. It is usually seen to be the handiwork of one man, Ataman 
Grigoriev, invariably described as a sot, scoundrel and adventurer and his enterprise, by 
extension, as drunken debauchery and pure adventure (avantiura).
294 The speed with which 
Grigoriev’s main forces were defeated and the regular nature of operations undertaken makes 
it appear kindred to the series of other failed military coups (those of Muraviev in July of 
1918 or of Mironov in August of 1919), while the simultaneous outbursts of rural violence, 
more collateral than causal, couple it with the fully-fledged peasant rebellions (or ‘wars’) in 
the Volga (‘Chapan war’ in March of 1919), Tambov (1920-1921) and West Siberian (spring 
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of 1921) regions. Structural similarities aside, neither ‘putsch’ nor ‘peasant movement’ 
render full justice to grigorievshchina, the former erring on the side of belittlement and the 
latter ascribing to the ataman reserves of agency he did not possess. Rather, the uprising 
functioned as a mechanism of accelerated political demarcation, in the course of which the 
players, previously implicated with each other in a rapport of misjudged consanguinity, some 
infantile association, had recognized their mistake and, as if overcompensating with the bill 
of regret and embarrassment, set stringent limits to the permissible in the exercise of state-
building, army command and, ultimately, revolutionary guidance.  
 
Appropriated as it may have been by the agitated peasantry in search of an apposite pretext, 
Grigoriev’s violent volte-face organically stemmed from the debate over political precedence, 
a conflict that had already grown old – to the extent at least that anything could be classified 
as having age in this time of fleeting scenes and self-abbreviating stages. The task of the 
Communists, more urgent than ever in the light of troubling news from the Donbass, 
consisted in taming the great ataman and in imparting “regular form” upon his troops or in 
disbanding them with a subsequent redistribution of men among the more “reliable units.”
295 
At certain point – against Antonov’s by now rather impractical admonition to moderation – 
blandishment with high offices and press accolades gave way to impatience and irritation, 
major figures at the Center (Kamenev, Piatakov, Ioffe) lobbying for the immediate removal 
of Grigoriev.
296 The ataman – a true megalomaniac who preferentially resided in the celestial 
realms of fantastic endeavors – nonetheless correctly made out the shape that the events 
closer to his earthy dwelling were gradually taking and readied himself for what appeared 
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inevitable; using the forthcoming May 1
st festivities as an excuse, he concentrated his troops 
around major railroad-junctions and cities under his control, Yelisavetgrad in particular, 
excising it beforehand “from the outside world.”
297 Communists, municipal executive 
committees, organs of Cheka were pressured into silence and inactivity, cowed by visions of 
speedy and often lethal reprisals. Finally, leaflets of unambiguous content started to circulate 
around Grigoriev, which, although never signed by the ataman himself, urged the Red Army 
men to make their choice – “between the commune” with its appointed officers, as one 
intercepted telegram put it, or “the honest socialist of Ukraine ataman Grigoriev,” who 
“stands unflinchingly on the Soviet platform” and “does not trust the incomers from the 
North.”
298   
 
It was after one of those largely anonymous exhortations that things came to a head. On May 
7, Nikolai Khudiakov, the commander of the 3
rd Army and Grigoriev’s nominal boss, 
presented his notorious subaltern with an ultimatum: either impose order upon the troops, or 
face removal.
299 On the very same day, the ataman issued his memorable Universal.
300 
Testament of the national Bolshevik ideology, this signal document effortlessly combined 
notions of the “Ukrainian people” (Narod Ukrainskii) with that of the “toiling masses” 
(triushchegosia liuda), appeals to popular rule and nonpartisanship with an authoritarian tone 
that brooked no dissent, a peremptory call to order (Poriadok neobkhodim  - “order is 
necessary”). “Here is my order,” so began the programmatic part of the Universal: 
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Mobilize in three days all those capable of bearing arms, and immediately 
occupy all railroad stations, leaving your own commissars at each station. 
Each volost’, each village should form troops and send them to their uezd 
town; from each uezd town send four hundred of your best fighters to Kiev 
and two hundred – to Kharkov; if you have weapons, send them with weapons, 
if not – send them forth with pitch forks, but I ask you to carry out my order 
and victory will be ours. 
 
Having proclaimed the government of the “adventurer” Rakovsky deposed, the 
Universal, nonetheless, reaffirmed the supreme right of the All-Ukrainian Congress 
of Soviets to form the new government according to the will of the people. Heeding 
the model once formulated by its equally famous predecessor, i.e. the November 
Address of the Directorate, Grigoriev’s appeal asked all “political speculators” 
(Communists in Kharkov) to abandon their offices peacefully, without forcing 
anyone resort to violence; unlike the aforementioned prototype, the document 
carefully avoided any liberal allusions to “democracy” (demokratiia) and “citizenry” 
(hromadiane), preferring to employ the SR-inspired stand-ins (“people’s power”, 
narodniia vlast’ and “laborer”). Bestrewn with sacerdotal terms and invocations 
(“holy laborer,” “man of God,” “godly people”), it was certainly and perhaps even 
exclusively destined for a peasant audience, with whom Grigoriev hoped to strike an 
alliance and whose discontent he purported to understand and embody.  
 
Much confusion ensued in the following three days with Grigoriev actively disavowing the 
authorship of the Universal
301 and Antonov refusing to give up hope of conciliation. “In the 
name of glory and honor and welfare of the Ukrainian peasants and workers,” he wrote to the 
ataman on May 7, “you take the regiments into your iron hands and forward to new victories. 
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The Commander of the Ukrainian armies gives his full confidence to the Red regiments of 
Kherson region and their invincible leader (vozhdiu).”
302 Antonov cleft with “optimistic 
obstinacy” to the possibility of peaceful resolution, beseeching the government in Kharkov to 
bide their time while he managed to clear up the misunderstanding and provocation. On May 
10, the Front Commander finally succeeded in getting Grigoriev on the line.
303 Grigoriev no 
longer played innocent, not only recognizing the Universal as his own, but actually 
subjecting his interlocutor to the inconvenience of hearing the entire text read aloud. 
Grigoriev denied outright any connection with either the White or Petliura agents. “[When 
writing the Universal]” he claimed, “we had thought above all about the Rumanians, the 
Poles, Denikin and even Kolchak… Do not worry… if you need an army against Kolchak, 
we will send it.” Similarly, having reiterated his opposition to Rakovsky’s “regime,” 
Grigoriev continued to count on Antonov’s support and collaboration, congratulated the 
Front Commander for visibly sharing the stance of the insurgents (govorite kak nash 
edinomyshlennik), and even proposed he should lead the army as he did before, against all 
“violators of the people’s will” old and new. Antonov noted that the Soviet government 
enjoyed the unconditional support of the army. “I would like to report,” was Grigoriev’s 
impatient rejoinder, “that the 1
st Army will not fight against me, part of the 2
nd army is on my 
side, part of the 3
rd Army through the brigade commander Makhno maintains contact with 
me, delegates of Bogunsky are now at my place …[and] the railroad personnel is on my side 
[as well].” Putatively loathe to see unnecessary blood spilt, the ataman asked his despairing 
ex-boss to let him occupy Nikolaev and Kherson since orders to take over Kiev, Poltava, 
Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov had already been provisionally and providently issued by him. 
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Antonov must have struggled to understand the exact meaning of the planned undertaking, 
but to Grigoriev it seemed obvious – a military action or a coup, carried out by revolutionary 
troops against the government that through a sequence of compromising steps had lost its 
right to represent and serve these troops.   
 
This interpretation of the rebellion remained dominant among Grigoriev and his followers 
even if events were not unfolding according to his predicted scheme. Grigoriev’s was not a 
mutiny of an overweening corporal primed to become the new hetman of Ukraine
304, but a 
vocal statement of the “Red Army risen (vosstavshaia krasnaia armiia)… to fight against 
mendacity, darkness, provocation, violence, political speculators and adventurers.”
305 So 
wrote Ivan Masenko, Grigoriev’s long-standing assistant and his deputy at the time of the 
uprising. He specified further both the purpose of the struggle and the manner of conducting 
it:  
We ask all honest fighters for the workers’ and peasants’ revolution to join 
our ranks, and so united we will march forth against those who with their 
politics make international predators out of our worker and peasant friends 
[stationed] along the Red front… The government of Rakovsky, elected by its 
handful of hangers-on, called itself the workers’ and peasants’ [government], 
but from the first day of its domination it locked us up and placed the yoke 
upon our necks. Such humiliation we cannot endure and thus we decided that 
it was better to die than carry out the will of the handful of charlatans [whose] 
politics was knitted together from lies and deception, insincerity (lzhi i 
obmana, fal’shi), provocation, betrayal of the workers’ and peasants’ 
revolution. 
 
Iurko Tiutiunnyk, for the moment Grigoriev’s chief of staff and second in command of the 
rebellious army, situated the present endeavor of the ataman within the ongoing struggle of 
the Ukrainian people “for human existence” (chelovecheskoe sushchestvovanie) against all 
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recent oppressors: Wilhelm’s “iron army,” Petliura, and, finally, boastful “powers of the 
imperialist Entente.” He adamantly denied the accusation, disseminated by Kharkov, namely, 
that Grigoriev’s troops were acting in the interests of Denikin; “if we meet up with Denikin, 
it would be only to settle scores with him, as we did with the White Guard at Kherson, 
Nikolaev and Odessa.”
306 In other words, the army was conceived as a bastion against all 
forms of counter-revolution, irrespective of its professed political color (white, red, yellow-
blue).
307 
 
Tiutiunnyk was right, or almost right, for the Army began to lose its formal unity, 
remonstrate with the ‘civil’ authorities and lambaste the Communists, though not necessarily 
in Grigoriev’s direct favor. Some troops, to be sure, joined the ataman without reservations 
and delay once the fact of the uprising became known.
308 Such was, for instance, the 4,000-
strong garrison of Yekaterinoslav, in particular the 56
th and the so-called Black Sea 
regiments (known also as the 57
th Regiment), which took over the city, opened the prisons, 
declared allegiance to the ataman and compelled the remaining soldiers to follow suit.
309 
Garrisons of Cherkassy, Kremenchug and Kherson likewise surrendered their cities to the 
advancing troops of the rebels when the latter appeared nearby.
310 Somewhat more complex 
was the case of Nikolaev, a port city submerged in a four-day long foment, which ended on 
May 16
th in the pogrom of the CheKa and the establishment of the Nikolaev Soviet of the 
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workers and red army soldiers.
311 Presided over by two obscure sailors, Proskurenko and 
Yevgrafov, the newly-formed Soviet maritime republic warmly received Grigoriev’s 
delegates but refused to let his main forces cross the city line;
312 on the 19
th of May, however, 
the sailors linked up with the ataman, thus inciting the remaining Soviet authorities to a 
speedy and disorderly evacuation.
313  
 
Generally speaking, the news of Grigoriev’s ‘treason’ furnished the troops and their 
commanders that lacking mite of courage which allowed them to translate their barely 
concealed exasperation with the Bolshevik rule into an overt rejection thereof. To put it 
differently, the uprising functioned less as a trigger than as a pretext for opening hostilities 
against Kharkov (and in this respect deserves to be treated as the culmination of a long-
brewing process rather than the inception of a new development). In the small town of 
Iuzefovka on a key strategic railroad line Kazatin-Uman, soldiers of the 6
th company of the 
58
th Regiment fell upon the armored train “Kiev Communist,” contriving to tear off Red stars 
from the defenders’ caps due to the star’s reputed ‘Jewish’ connotation. About 50 miles 
south of Iuzefovka, in Lipovets (ukr. Lypovets), a local garrison rose up against the 
authorities, inauspiciously denuded of all protection with the departure of the communist 
detachment to the tumultuous countryside. The 58
th regiment, a garrison in Lipovets, the 8
th 
regiment and other units scattered across Volhynia gravitated towards most notable of the 
regional rebels – Klimenko (formerly Red army commander), ataman Volynets, Bondarenko, 
etc
314 - just as the soldiers of the 20
th and 151
st regiments towards theirs (Sokolovski and 
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Struk).
315 A champion of the Bolshevik cause during the German occupation and one of the 
organizers of the Partisan troops in the Neutral Zone, Fiodor Grebenko (Gribenko) resolved 
to act on his own, possibly taking a cue from the ataman himself: on June 1, 1919, Grebenko 
stopped carrying out orders and pulled his 1
st Cavalry regiment from the city of 
Starokonstantinov, which he was bound to defend.
316 Riotous, or very close to being such, 
were the activities of Primakov’s Red Cossacks, pride and glory of the entire Ukrainian Red 
Army; sent on May 18
th to fight Grigoriev, the cavalrymen marked their path by routing 
CheKa, disarming militia, breaking into the prison of Lubny and preying upon the civilians; 
so great in fact was the risk of losing the regiment to the rebels that its destination was finally 
changed to Donbass, where the sobering presence of Denikin’s Whites proffered a promise 
of their gradual ideological convalescence.
317  
 
That even the best units were not averse to such conduct demonstrates the extent to which the 
Ukrainian Red Army – the arms-carrying body soldered from the former insurgents – was 
susceptible to the decimating effects of the pestilential grigorievshchina. “In essence, any of 
our regiments (in May of 1919) could have hoisted the flag of rebellion against us and at 
times it was not altogether clear why this or that unit fought on our side and not on the 
other.”
318 Zatonsky, who indited those lines years after, when Time’s poultice had soothed 
and flattened Grigoriev’s uprising from the dire emergency into a safe (albeit unpleasant) 
memory, only restated the simple realization, which so angered, confused and chagrined the 
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Bolshevik leadership during those suspenseful days: the army became highly unreliable, the 
army was no more. Voroshilov, recalled from his cabinet work in the Ukrainian People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs to head the much-expanded Kharkov Military District (May 
10
th),
319 complained in the final days of the uprising that “there had been not a single 
steadfast unit [available] to fight Grigoriev. Numerous regiments had gone over to Grigoriev, 
others declared themselves neutral, some began executing battle orders but not before routing 
CheKa, staging an anti-Jewish pogrom, etc.”
320 Podvoisky, his position suddenly 
circumscribed to the task of overseeing the administrative activities of the military 
commissars,
321 fully concurred with his colleague, recognizing, in fact, in the uprising a 
plenary confirmation of the ancient suspicion that he harbored vis-à-vis the partisans.
322 
“Many front-line units, which haven’t yet rebelled, are no better than those of Grigoriev,” he 
noted, not without a degree of acrid satisfaction.
323 Factually correct, Antonov’s observation 
regarding rear-guard troops’ greater proclivity to panic and disaffection (as opposed to those 
under his direct command)
324 seemed now carping at best and irrelevant at worst since the 
absence of a clear distinction between the front and the rear, epitomized by the failure to 
create a regular army (structure) and accentuated by the rebellions in April and May (event), 
had been one of the key features of Bolshevik rule in the first half of 1919.
325 Be that as it 
may, his words could not and did not evoke much sympathy, for the near-complete collapse 
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of the partisan army had already divested its administrative-operational extension, i.e. the 
Ukrainian Front, of its raison d’etre – and its commander, of his former political weight.  
 
The Front was not done away in one blow, but rather was dismantled stepwise, at a pace and 
rhythm established by the unfolding of the military operations against Ukraine’s main 
turncoat. At first, however, it appeared that the long-standing competition between Antonov 
and Podvoisky for seniority in the military affairs had been resolved in favor of the former; 
on May 11
th 1919 the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense of the Soviet Ukraine saw 
Antonov at last endowed with a title comparable to that of Vatsetis – commander-in-chief of 
all Ukrainian armed forces.
326 Made in the midst of grave crisis, this decision actually aimed 
to transform the Ukrainian Front into the “internal front” (vnutrennii front) ;
327 with one deft 
stroke, therefore, the Army found itself stripped of the permanence that ‘national’ status 
should have otherwise warranted. Now events began to proceed at a greatly accelerated rate; 
on May 19
th the Ukrainian Politburo, meeting with Trotsky present, decreed: “The Ukrainian 
Front, as the front of all Ukraine, shall not exist (suchchestvovat’ ne dolzhen).”
328 On May 
24
th the membership of the Revolutionary Military Council was expanded to accommodate 
two newly-sent “specialists” from Russia;
329 on the very same day, a preliminary agreement 
was reached, according to which the abolished front’s assets were divided three ways, with 
one piece passing to the Western Front, another to the Southern Front, and the rest 
temporarily forming the so-called Expeditionary Corps, expressly charged to fight Grigoriev 
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under Antonov’s curtailed command.
330 With the release of the landmark Order N 104 a 
fortnight later, even that stump of the former Ukrainian Army ceased to exist: the 2
nd Soviet 
Ukrainian Army, so bitterly contested by Gittis, Skachko and Antonov, was to form the basis 
of the future 14
th Army, the 1
st and what remained of the 3
rd were to be merged into the 12
th 
Army of RSFSR.
331 Antonov lingered on for a short time, yet on June 19
th Trotsky 
announced the task of the Ukrainian Front accomplished, thanked its Commander and the 
personnel and asked them all to leave.
332 
 
Together with Antonov, another Moor was ushered out – ataman Grigoriev. The uprising that 
he began represented, as was indicated earlier, the greatest internal crisis faced by the 
Ukrainian Red Army and the Soviet Ukrainian state; it did have a chance of carrying the day, 
not least because Grigoriev’s slogans,
333 as the political commissar of the 2
nd Army 
Vishnevetsky put it, found resonance among the Red Army soldiers as much as among the 
“petty bourgeoisie” (i.e., middle peasantry), from which that Army emerged.
334 In the course 
of few days Grigoriev succeeded in taking Yelisavetgrad (May 9), Uman, Cherkassy (May 
11), Kremenchug, Zolotonosha (May 12), Yekaterinoslav (May 15), Nikolaev (May 19), etc; 
most of these towns and cities became scenes of vicious pogroms with hundreds of dead, 
thousands of maimed, violated, traumatized. Yelisavetgrad, large and once flourishing 
trading town that had experienced several pogrom waves, “was turned into a tomb, a ruin.”
335 
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Jews and non-Jews were targeted, although not with commensurate perseverance – the latter 
for working in the Soviet institutions, for being communists, commissars or chekists, and the 
former, to use Masenko’s appeal once more, “atoning” for the transgressions of their 
“agents,” whose “dirty and provocation-ridden work did much to taint honest, loyal and 
devout sons of the revolution, the frontovik Red Army soldiers” – in essence, for letting their 
kinsmen serve the Soviet state.
336  
 
Once the initial shock dissipated its benumbing spell, the Bolsheviks waded into the task of 
self-defense. Antonov’s officers, thoroughly compromised in the eyes of authorities both in 
Kharkov and Moscow, inspired little faith and were quickly eclipsed by new and tested men 
from the Southern Front and Kharkov military district – Voroshilov, Aleksandr 
Parkhomenko, Yevgenii Trifonov, and others who would comprise the backbone of the 
Soviet High Command, expurgated from the ‘amateur dabblers’ with partisan proclivities. 
Even less faith did the Bolshevik capitals confide in the Ukrainian soldiers, who 
demonstrated chronic proneness to fraternize with the insurgents. One had to seek help 
elsewhere in order to put forth units “untouched by the chauvinist, anti-Semitic agitation.”
337 
It seemed most natural to follow the example of the Lugansk communists and ask for a few 
“hardened Great-Russian” regiments, even if on occasions one had to countenance murmurs 
of resentment in their midst: “Why should I fight for the khokhols, what good is this Ukraine 
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for me?”
338 The international units begrudged their lot less than did the Russians and looked 
the part too; alongside with the preexisting regiments and companies of the Rumanians, 
Hungarians (2
nd International Regiment of Rudolf Fekete), Volga Germans (Katharinenstadt, 
or Ekaterinenstadt Regiment, commanded by A. Fuchs), Chinese and Latvians, new units 
were formed from the mobilized Bulgarian and Czechoslovak communists.
339 Their utility, 
however, was of limited scope, for, albeit battle-worthy, they often behaved towards the local 
populace with unwarranted brutality, negating whatever tactical gains they might have 
obtained on the front-line by leaving behind a seething and disgruntled countryside.
340  
 
All in all, the Ukrainian Communists could only fully count on themselves and on those 
social layers and sub-layers that feared Grigoriev and the jacquerie of the ‘soldierized’ 
peasantry more than the Bolsheviks. On May 12
th, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U 
issued a circulaire to eleven provincial party committees, ordering them to marshal all 
available internal resources to fight the ataman – “without touching the front.”
341 That same 
day Podvoisky announced the formation of communist units from the mobilized rank-and-
file party members; each cell, union, industrial enterprise or institution was expected to 
produce new platoons and companies.
342 Simultaneously, every citizen of the Soviet Ukraine 
aged 18 to 40 could consider himself liable for call-up, a potential defender of the threatened 
regime.
343 Mindful, however, of the difficulties involved in such large-scale mobilizations, 
recalling the shameful failure that it had suffered previously attempting to bring under arms 
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residents of Kiev and Kharkov provinces, the Party focused exclusively on workers, “both 
those in service of enterprises as well as those temporarily unemployed, but registered in the 
labor exchange.” Quotas of workers were established for the large cities that roughly 
corresponded to the strength of the municipal and provincial party organization: Kiev and its 
environs, afflicted by the bands of Zeleny, Angel, Sokolovsky and the rest, had to supply 
only 7,000 persons; Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav and the Kharkov district – 24,000; Odessa, 
Nikolaev and their surrounding area – 14,000.
344 The intention was clear. “In order to ensure 
peaceful positive work,” wrote Kharkov Izvestiia on May 22, 1919, “and to augment the 
might of the Workers’ and Peasants’ republic, encircled everywhere by enemies, one needs 
to create a strong armed force, an army, that would not succumb to petty-bourgeois and 
adventurist influences…”
345 To put it differently, communists, workers, internationalists and 
the Great Russian units had to coalesce into a new army, preferably urban,
346 certainly party-
bound and instrumentally obedient, to fight the remnants of the old, built in the hinterland by 
private initiative during the former absence of state authority.  
 
Although that new army did not come into being overnight, the Bolsheviks managed all the 
same to tilt the scales of the conflict in their favor. Grigoriev was first halted and then sent 
back to his point of departure. The Bolshevik troops – communists, internationalists, cadets 
(kursanty), the few accountable Ukrainian units at Kharkov’s disposal – inflicted heavy 
defeats upon their opponent, taking back Kremenchug on the 19 of May, Cherkassy (which 
changed hands at least twice) on the 21 of May, and Yekatrinoslav, where battles seemed 
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particularly dogged. On the 22 of May, the informal capital of Grigoriev, the large town of 
Aleksandria, had fallen to the group of P. Yegorov; there, according to official figures, most 
likely exaggerated, the followers of Grigoriev lost up to 3,000 men, five armored trains, 
thirty guns and two echelons filled with cannon shells.
347 By the end of the month, out of  
the15 or 20,000 men the Bolsheviks felt safe to ascribe to their adversary,
348 the ataman 
commanded the loyalty of perhaps 3,000; 9 of 11 armored trains passed into the hands of the 
Communists; 45 guns out of 52 that Grigoriev’s 6
th division once possessed were either 
captured or destroyed in fighting. Within two weeks, wrote Antonov, “Grigoriev was 
reduced to the role of the bandit ataman à la Struk or Angel.”
349  
 
The official announcement about the definitive suppression of Grigoriev’s “adventure” 
(made a tad too early in accordance with an established Russian tradition) anteceded the 
Order N 104 by a little over a week.
350 These two quasi-simultaneous events – Antonov’s 
demission and Grigoriev’s reduction, to bring it to the level of personalities – concluded the 
whole phase of the Civil War, a period that began sometime in the fall of 1918, was pierced 
through by the German Revolution, bracketed the collapse of the Hetman’s state and the 
emergence of the ephemeral Directorate, ordained rural insurgents to power, rolled out the 
red carpet to the Bolsheviks, and brought the strange child named “Ukrainian Red Army” to 
life – only to blow it up into pieces on the dusty roads of the sun-filled country. It could be 
dubbed the time of improvisation and brinkmanship, insofar as the political uncertainty, 
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precipitated by the defeat of the Central Powers, a situation more promising than alarming, in 
tandem with the extreme attenuation of resources available to warring parties, made them 
seek partnerships that one might have not even thought about, or may otherwise have been 
warned against contracting by some prismatic and authoritative will. Yet, this will being 
absent, the Bolsheviks and the atamans found themselves fighting the same opponent 
(Petliura’s Nationalists, the Entente and the Volunteers), giving the proverbial “strange 
bedfellow” concrete dimension. Whether this alliance was meant to outlive its own 
usefulness or whether either of the sides expected rather naively to remain immune to the 
influence of another is futile to ask; suffice it say, however, that whatever attitudes and 
intentions the Bolsheviks had shared or borne in 1918, by the spring of 1919 there had been a 
solid minoritarian contingent in the Party circles who not only considered this solution 
workable but who were ready to accommodate the partisans in key questions of army 
command and, ultimately, power distribution. Intermediaries for the most part between the 
civil authorities in provincial and republican capitals and the warlords in the hinterland, these 
men absorbed the shocks of the centralizing politics and limited the depth and extent of 
Kharkov’s jurisdiction; yet, in a rather ironic twist, they safeguarded Ukraine’s strategic 
initiative as well as its partial political independence; in short, they adhered to the model 
articulated by the Bolshevik Left – classified earlier as autonomist and regionalist. The 
outburst of the uprising in May of 1919 – provoked by the tension of multiple appearances 
(conjugate conflicts between the Front and the Government, the Periphery and the Center, 
military and civil institutions, etc) - dealt these protectors of the partisans a blow from which 
they never recovered. At the same time, with the May crisis having ousted successes of the 
vertiginous Ukrainian epopee from the Bolshevik political memory, the victorious  
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mainstream in the Party was compelled to stipulate and hone principle, which, when 
translated into the realm of action, would protect the center from arrangements that may 
prove either compromising to its monopoly on army management or disruptive to the unity 
of unity of the strategic planning. It could be said that Grigoriev taught the Bolsheviks to 
reconcile themselves to the position of Staatsmachthaber, pure state power-holders, and 
finally to act as such.  
 
Conclusion: Ukrainian Lessons 
 
Trotsky, whose appearance in Ukraine coincided – non-accidentally – with the dissolution of 
the Partisan army and the crisis of Bolshevik power – arrived exactly to the aforementioned 
conclusion, namely, that the position of political domination requires approaches to war-
making radically different from those that had been practiced up to that point.
351 “In the 
actual Ukrainian mutiny,” he wrote in his “Ukrainian Lessons,” the Bolshevik credo-setting 
statement in the wake of Grigoriev’s uprising, “we find savage and inebriated degeneration 
of the very same partizanshchina.”
352 This “partizanshchina of the cursed memory,” as he 
dubbed it a little later,
353 was understood by him and his colleagues as a phenomenon with 
two faces. Parizanshchina on the ground – we could call it atamanshchina proper or even 
immanent partizanshchina – expressed itself in the advent of autonomous and semi-
autonomous armed units, held together by the authority of sundry “atamans, little fathers 
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(batek) and little uncles (diadek).”
354 Less interested in that facet of the decried development, 
Trotsky reduced it rather hastily to the inadequate effort exerted in converting partisan units 
into regular formations, “when troops would simply rename themselves into brigades and 
divisions with corresponding renaming of their chieftains.”
355  
 
Trotsky’s opponents, individuals akin to Antonov and Andrei Bubnov, impressed both by 
their first-hand experience of the troops and by a degree of sympathy towards them, supplied 
Trotsky’s observations with the lacking analysis. In an article pointedly entitled “What 
lessons are we talking about?” Bubnov discovered that:  
If there is no proper organization of the centralized supply, [capable of 
procuring] the army with all the necessities, from cannons to puttees, if the 
army lives by grazing (na podnozhnom kormu), a thrifty [and] energetic 
commander, [likewise] skilled in the military art, will always succeed in 
gaining prominence and in rendering his troops… dependent upon his will – 
by means of concentrating in his hands everything that his unit has either 
obtained [in the battle] or received. 
  
Trotsky’s demand to have a “certain regime” imposed might have been made in vain, yet, 
continued the former member of the Front’s Revolutionary Military Council,  
[i]f in the armed units, even when they are endowed with a proper internal 
organization, strict discipline is lacking, order of subordination is not established, 
that is, if the elements of volunteering and a troop system (otriadnoi sistemy) are 
still alive, a prominent commander, if he is an adventurer and a rogue, would 
pupate from the ataman to the counterrevolutionary insurgent, i.e. the organizer 
and leader of the armed mutiny.
356 
Commenting upon those events years later, Antonov reiterated the testimony of his then 
subordinate and brought his train of thought to the anticipated destination: “The army 
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remained half-naked, half-shod, half-starved… Hence, the clout of the free (volnych) bat’ki 
and the atamans-go-getters (atamanov-dobytchikov) was strengthened to the extreme despite 
the transition from [irregular] parties to regular regiments (my emphasis).”
357  
 
To ascribe the roots of partizanshchina to deficiencies in the supply system and the inability 
to construct a viable mobilization apparatus (as did Antonov and Bubnov) could have not 
been Trotsky’s intention for the reason that it would have implicated the civil state in the 
excesses of the Ukrainian front, would have discredited it, in fact, beyond repair. The 
variables arranged themselves to produce a typical “chicken or egg” quandary – the question 
being whether failures of the state engendered partizanshchina or vice versa, whether 
partizanshchina undermined the state. To that question the Russian Narkom had, 
unsurprisingly, only one emphatic answer: partizanshchina was at the root of the problems. 
This, namely, the primordial and congenital opposition of partizanshchina to the central state 
authority, constituted another facet of the phenomenon,
358 far more dangerous, in Trotsky’s 
mind, than the attachment of the soldiers to their immediate leaders with all their willful 
vagaries and antics. In contrast to the immanent partizanshchina, that other breed of 
partizanshchina possessed an ideological, even a transcendent dimension. Progressive in its 
creatively “destructive” tendencies at the outset of the revolution, partizanshchina, in 
Trotsky’s estimate, surrendered its “quite legitimate [historical] rights” once the proletariat 
took over power;
359 but for the chance of self-liquidation, however, it elevated misrule into a 
principle of rule, swapping thus its revolutionary overcoat for a reactionary livery. Pervasive 
and insidious, the overarching political-military modality of partizanshchina finds its 
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apologists in the Bolshevik leadership, “the unconscious and semi-conscious ideologues who 
concluded that partisan troops cannot be subordinated to the ‘armchair’ (kabinetnomu), 
‘learned’ command, [and] that they require some special management (osoboe 
rukovodstvo).”
360 Indubitably Trotsky meant Antonov
361 without yet as much as mentioning 
the organization he headed by name. His Ukrainian counterpart, Podvoisky, avoided 
Trotsky’s bashful circumlocution, encapsulating the crux of the transcendent 
partizanshchina in a formula: “To eliminate (likvidirovat’) partizanshchina in truth (v 
deistvitel’nosti) means to eliminate the proverbial separatist autonomy (samostiinost’) in 
matters of military management.”
362 In light of this prescription, the Ukrainian Front 
epitomized simply a different order of the same reality of which Grigoriev cast only the most 
visible figure – not even as a body, enfolding and protecting various insurgent units, but as 
an administrative instrument of the Soviet Ukraine’s will to strategic initiative (if not overt 
independence), the carrier of that ‘separatist autonomy’ against which Podvoisky directed the 
fire of his critique.
363   
 
In short, partizanshchina represented an outgrowth of the state destruction that expanded 
horizontally and rose vertically as a type of a cancerous ersatz, a peculiar organism that 
might have taken a form and appropriated functions of a state without authentically being 
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one – a species of political weed. Podvoisky called it Ukraine’s “greatest calamity… 
supported… not formally, but essentially and hence factually by the entire apparatus of 
command.”
364 That symbiosis between the insurgents and the Front seemed at first sight 
hardly natural, for, after all, the officer in Antonov’s headquarters and the ataman of a 
peasant band each availed themselves of concepts and categories which had to reduce ground 
for mutual understanding to a tiny sliver indeed: one measured the Revolution’s progress in 
great abstractions of nations, continents and classes whereas the other saw only to his turf, 
his men, his repute. Yet, even if they looked and thought differently, they found themselves 
united by a certain centrifugal nature of their reified ambition, with the Front as whole 
moving away from Moscow in a west-bound direction, to Bessarabia, Galicia and Hungary 
and its composite parts drawing into themselves, further from the swarms of the emissaries, 
dispatched by the center. In the end, the Front and the army acted as one body, attained an 
unspoken consensus concerning strategy and tactics – and as such, as a double-headed 
symbol of Ukrainian “adventurism,” were judged responsible for the criminal misuse of men, 
land and weapons when these means of war-making were rapidly vanishing in the maelstrom 
of Denikin’s breakthrough.  
 
Of the two problems – that of the Front and that of the partisans, each reflecting, as pointed 
out, different facets of partizanshchina – the former seemed easier to handle. The separate 
Ukrainian command, the step-wise dismantlement of which has already been chronicled 
above, stood on the way of completing “the military unification of Russian and Ukrainian 
republics.”
365 With the sphere of Antonov’s prerogatives first being reduced to that of the 
                                                 
364 RGVA f 33221 o 1 d 30 l 1 
365 RGVA f 25860 o 1 d 45 l 6  
  400
‘internal front,’ and then to the transient ‘expeditionary corps,’ the great formal hurdle was 
removed, and therewith went all the compunctions respecting the denunciation of republican 
autonomies. The draft of the Central Committee Directive on the Military Unity, signed by 
Lenin and Stalin in May 1919, clearly stipulated that the “necessary condition for succeeding 
in that war lies in establishing (iavlaietsia) the unitary command over all troops of the Red 
Army and the most rigorous centralization in the manner of disposing (v rasporiazhenii) 
forces and resources of the socialist republics.”
366 That document became soon the basis of 
the Decree, issued on June 1
st (i.e., three days before the Order Nr 104 formalized the end of 
the Ukrainian Front), which constrained Ukrainian initiative to the necessity of combating 
“forces of international imperialism.” Summoning Ukraine along with the papier-mâché 
constructions of the Soviet Lithuania, Latvia, Crimea and Belarus, to form ties of “the closest 
association” (tesneishego ob’edineniia) with Russia, the Decree authorized transfer of 
control over the army command and organization, national economy, railroad management, 
finances and labor politics from the republican to the federal level, an administrative 
metamorphosis memorialized in the enlarged Russian Council of Defense.
367 The two 
Ukrainian military districts (Kharkov and Kiev) subsequently had to enter into “the general 
organizational system of the federal republic” with a vaguely defined task of “creating red 
Ukrainian units from the Ukrainian workers and Ukrainian peasants… with the Ukrainian 
officer corps and the command in the Ukrainian language.”
368 Linguistic vestiges rather than 
instruments of manipulation, the frequent allusions to ‘things Ukrainian’ (units, workers, 
language) offered poor consolation to the Ukrainian Soviet state, denuded henceforth of any 
real substance; much less could these words have tempered Lenin’s intent, gradually brought 
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into execution, to have “all [forces] from the [Ukrainian] western front” join Moscow’s 
military effort in Donbass
369 even if this meant calling off the planned breakthrough to the 
West and abandoning struggling Hungarians to their own highly insufficient devices. In the 
test of strategic wills, Russian affairs took clear precedence over any professed commitment 
to the International Revolution.  
 
Unlike the Ukrainian Front, the partizanshchina on the ground could not have been crossed 
out from the political landscape at the stroke of a pen. In theory, of course, units were now 
disbanded with greater ease and at slighter provocation, shuffled together with other 
dissolved formations to reemerge with a cleansed record, renewed command and changed 
name; that new bout of name-making, in fact, had to intimate the growing Russian-Ukrainian 
military consolidation. As indicated, the three old Ukrainian Armies were reduced to two, the 
12
th and the 14
th – to fall into the hedged ring of the Russian armies like missing teeth into 
the vacant alveoli. Likewise with the divisions: the fiery and insubordinate one of Shchors, 
providently infused with the sedative substances from the 3
rd Frontier division, became 
known in June of 1919 as the 44
th division
370, the 5
th Ukrainian division with the remnants of 
the Grigoriev’s former 6
th was reformed into the 45
th division, Lengovsky’s 2
nd, enriched by 
some partisan material from Volhynia, hitherto became known as the 46
th division, etc.
371 
Irrevocably losing their purposefully capricious appellations, markers of hubris and deeply-
conceited belief in their own special destiny, regiments too quickly succumbed to the 
anonymity of ordinal digits: 41
st (former Shevchenko regiment), 42
nd (former Dniester 
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regiment), 43
rd (Berezino-Tiligul’sk regiment),
372 388
th, 389
th, 390
th (odds and ends of the 
overgrown Bogun regiment)
373… Plans were further made to anneal the reformed Ukrainian 
troops with fresh recruits from the RSFSR or, in fact, to have the Ukrainians replaced with 
the detachments from the “Great Russians” and “foreign communists”;
374 on the other hand, 
the Ukrainians, especially those that were caught roiling Soviet waters with sediments of 
popular disaffection (like POWs of Grigoriev’s defeated army), were presented with the 
unenviable option of confronting the Russian Whites on the hills of the Urals or in the 
suburbs of Petrograd.
375 In perspective, this combination of internal renewal with external 
exchange, described in one contemporary memorandum as “the politics of soviet 
colonization,”
376 had to isolate the army from its country-side environment, divest the rebels 
of the latent support stored up in the ranks of the Red regiments, and finally entrust the hard-
pressed Bolsheviks with a reliable instrument of defense and policing. 
 
Victorious but weakened, the Bolsheviks reemerged from the crisis with a conviction that 
any ongoing collaboration with the remaining warlords, Makhno in particular, representing 
as it did the practical outcome of the liquidated Front’s political promiscuity, had to be 
curtailed or abrogated altogether. In his dispatch to Voroshilov and Mezhlauk, Trotsky 
asserted that that “the [current] task boils down to turning the defeat of Grigoriev’s bands to 
good account,” that is, “to breaking up the Makhnovites by removing their top (verkhushku) 
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and pulling up their lower strata (nizy).”
377 Although bat’ko had distanced himself from 
Grigoriev – with some delay and tinges of prevarication 
378 - his repute as “the honest and 
brave soldier” (Kamenev’s words)
379 vanished overnight, replaced by the image of a turncoat 
and a werewolf, a counterrevolutionary mountebank, who gave asylum to the “elements of 
dissolution, decay, agitation and putrefaction.”
380 Conveniently and uncompromisingly, the 
blame for the misfortunes in the Donbass region was laid on Makhno despite the fact that his 
retreat before the Kuban Cossacks of Shkuro resulted from the defeat of the Southern Front’s 
own 13
th Army.
381 This concentrated campaign of anti-Makhnovite harassment, conducted 
on the lines of secret communiqués, transcripts of the Bolshevik-sponsored Congresses and 
broadsheets of the official Soviet press culminated on June 6
th with Order 107, which 
declared the anticipated Makhnovite congress illegal and equated their leader to the deserter 
deserving undelayed death.
382 Taking note of Grigoriev’s failure, Makhno thought it most 
prudent to resign from command of the brigade; once accomplished, he absconded with a 
small cavalry escort, to the visible consternation of his troops.
383 The Bolsheviks, on the 
other hand, appeared ostensibly satisfied with such an arrangement, for they decided not to 
press claims any further, allowing Makhno’s closest associates (Belash, Kalashnikov, 
Kurilenko, etc.) to remain in charge of their old units – in the slightly altered capacity, to be 
sure, of the Red Army officers.  
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There remained, of course, many other insurgent atamans in the Soviet service, the great and 
small hero brigands of the Revolution, regarded now with unconcealed suspicion as if their 
defection were but a matter of time. Names of Shchors, Bozhenko or Bogunsky continued to 
appear in war communiqués and correspondences, more frequently as harbingers of 
discomfiting news – cases of disobedience, rampages and pogroms – than as heralds of 
victories. Tolerated out of necessity, they saw their clout drastically reduced owing not only 
to the formal inclusion of the Ukrainian troops in a much larger Russian military-
administrative system, but also to the radical shift in the operational center of gravity from 
the Right-Bank Ukraine to Don and Seversky Donets. In essence, the partisans were left with 
two options – to abide by the general instruction and follow in Don-bound direction, or to 
remain stock still, fastened to the land, closer to their lifelines in the Ukrainian village, 
faithful to themselves and their vol’nitsa. Neither of the options seemed unquestionably 
preferable, for if the eastward progression signified exposing oneself to the drills of the 
Bolshevik inspectors and the cannonade of their opponents, the latter retrogression to the 
original condition meant placing oneself in opposition to the state as well as a dangerous 
acceptance of the actualized “partisan” identity.  
 
In the summer of 1919 the gestation period came to a close. The Bolsheviks, who had 
attempted to ride the wave of massive upheaval with the intention of harnessing popular 
energies and directing them in the desired channel, were compelled to repudiate uprising as a 
mechanism for winning the war and an algorithm for building up the state. Their army might 
still be called Red to remind one of its extemporaneous, rebellious, Red Guard origins, the 
Bolsheviks, nevertheless, opted for the forces mobilized, organized and led according to the  
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principles of the overturned Empire; as much as they talked about the International 
Revolution, the Bolsheviks fought fundamentally for that same Empire, the easy surrender of 
Ukraine to Petliura and Denikin standing for a type of a second Brest-Litovsk, i.e. a major 
tactical concession for the sake of an even greater strategic gain. That reconciliation of the 
Bolsheviks with their place and tradition – an ideological triumph of the imperial and 
centralist vision over the regional and autonomist one – was accompanied by the 
crystallization of the insurgency into a force of its own, a hydra-like creature with multiple 
heads and multiple names, none flattering when proceeding from the Moscow power-
holders.
384 With boundaries thus delineated, the intermediaries had either disappeared 
(Ukrainian Front) or lost much of their significance (Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, as 
it was known then). What remained was a nondescript body of Red Army soldiers, squeezed 
between the Uprising and the State as Ulysses’ crew between Scylla and Charybdis. 
Although many, perhaps most, were “dreaming about returning to Makhno,”
385 they were 
prevented from doing so out of fear of being shoved to the dark side of illegality - of 
becoming ‘outlaws’ without the right of appeal and the grace of amnesty. That fear, more 
than the defeat of Grigoriev, resounding and speedy though it may have been, constituted the 
real victory for the nascent regime. 
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The crushing of Grigoriev’s mutiny, achieved by dint of strenuous effort, did not reassure the 
Bolshevik control over Ukraine, let alone their victory in the southern sector of the Civil War. 
On the contrary, in a rather paradoxically manner they succeeded thanks to the powerful and 
sweeping offensive launched form the direction of Don as it compelled Moscow to ferry 
Russia’s substantial resources from the Urals southwestward in anticipation of a crisis there. 
Such was ultimately the irony of a proper timing between Grigoriev’s action and Denikin all-
out offensive,
1 multiplied by the boon of immense space and scarce forces, which allowed 
the Bolsheviks in escape the trap of a two-pronged attack (really, a three-pronged attack if 
one counts revived activities of the UNR) and parry and destroy one of the menacing thrusts 
in the meantime.  
 
Although the war was far from over, being destined to go on for another two years, its 
strategic outlook changed as did political aims of its principal competitors. To the extent 
permitted by ruined infrastructure and stalled industrial production, the war ceased being an 
ad-hoc movement of troops of questionable loyalty and indeterminate provenance, 
developing into what traditional narratives always held it to be: the struggle of the Moscow-
based Red North against the Cossack-heavy White South. This centralization of political 
wills manifested itself almost tautologically in the suppression of local autonomies, 
concerted military actions, better-drawn front lines and mobilization schemes more in tune 
with the exactions of the true war. Under such circumstances atamanshchina had to fall by 
                                                 
1 Whether Grigoriev intended to time his rebellion with Denikin’s operations still remains disputed. Suffice it to 
say, however, that Makhno himself used the alleged correspondence between the two as a pretext for staging a 
speedy trial over Grigoriev and killing the great ataman subsequently (the story of Makhno’s hosting Grigoriev 
with an intention of ridding himself of his guest is presented in all major Makhnovite accounts; one could, for 
instance, refer to the depositions of Chubenko, Makhno’s adjutant found in Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie na Ukraine, 
1917-1922, 776ff).  
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the wayside, as a sign of early confusion and unwarranted mass enthusiasm. Without 
disappearing, it devolved from a poignant expression of radicalized rural life to a form of 
political banditry – i.e. to the highly combustible residue of the revolutionary popular 
initiative.  
 
The experience of confronting the atamans taught the protagonists in Ukraine possibly their 
most important lessons. For one, the Bolsheviks, who threw in their lot with the rural 
insurgency and suffered costly consequences, seeing not only the troops but also their men 
slip out of the Party control, resolved to abstain from similar experiments in the future. Thus, 
mindful of the debacle, which hatched from the thin shell of their previous success, the War 
commissar Leon Trotsky issued a warning on December 11, 1919 to the troops of the 
Southern front en route into “the areas of Ukrainian partisan activity (partizanstva).” 
Measures of extreme caution were recommended lest the troops succumb to the “infection of 
partizanstvo and makhnovshchina”:  
a)  organize extensive agitation campaign in print and in word, explaining 
advantages of the regular army over the insurgent troops…; 
b)  cleanse the units entering Ukraine of the commissars, commanders and 
Communist cell members disposed to indiscipline and partisan war;  
c)  take all necessary measures which would prevent the Red Army men of 
Ukrainian origin from leaving their units for their native village, all the 
more so with arms; 
d)  raise the discipline level in general among the troops, conducting rigorous 
struggle against all manifestations of banditry (banditizma) and license 
(proizvola). 
 
No partisan troop was to be allowed to serve in the ranks of the Red Army; if only for the 
fear that they might build coteries of loyal men around themselves, commanders were 
prohibited from accepting any volunteers, be they part of the group or just lone stragglers.
2  
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This list of precautions couched in the language of peremptory demands seemed to have 
inspired another symptomatic document of the era. Bearing the title “Our Military Politics in 
Ukraine” and signed off by a set of Bolshevik and Borotbist notables, it made explicit the 
link between the centralization of the war-making both on the level of command and that of 
execution. The need of to fully integrate Ukrainian forces into the Russian Red Army 
running through this declaration as an absolute imperative, it was “the evil of professional 
partisan style war, makhnovshchina and banditry” which stood as the obstacle towards the 
accomplishment of that process. The tendency to autonomous action, strengthened through 
revolt and revolution, was equated with the greatest calamity, whose eradication underscored 
the question of Soviet Ukraine’s very survival. “All partisan troops should be disarmed 
immediately and those offering resistance should be extirpated” – this programmatic 
statement, laconic and unambiguous, appeared all the more remarkable since it came from 
men who, like Zatonsky, less than a year before that, were vociferously encouraging the 
masses to taking up arms against the oppressors without waiting for the deliverers from the 
north. Now the order was reversed with those masses being enjoined to surrender their 
enormous stocks of weapons lavished upon them by the “sundry regimes in their posthaste 
efforts to build up the Ukrainian army.” Although the irony might have gone unnoticed for 
the authors themselves, the overall point could have hardly been made clearer: disarming of 
the populace would sever the tie of kinship between peasantry at large and the ataman-
controlled army as its expression and, by putting an end to practices forged within the smithy  
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of rural militancy, would endow the Bolsheviks with dependable and manipulable force at 
once.
3  
 
Subsequent events showed that the Bolsheviks did not always steer clear of consorting with 
“the elements of social decay, chaos and destruction of Ukrainian statehood.”
4 The alliance 
with Makhno concluded in autumn of 1920 to fight Wrangel might have been judged as an 
example of Moscow’s inconsistence had the diplomatic duplicity not arrogated upon itself 
the distinguished place of a top characteristic. Carefully sequestered from the rest of the 
Army, the Makhnovite troops saw themselves stripped of all immunities once the Perekop 
isthmus was taken and Wrangel made harmless, experiencing on their own skin the import of 
Bela Kun’s famous remark: “Crimea is a bottle from which no counterrevolutionary would 
manage to leap out…”  
 
The non-Bolshevik Ukrainian national Left – the Socialist-revolutionaries and Social-
democrats of all hues and persuasions – never recovered from the shock of defeat suffered 
shortly after their greatest triumph, i.e. the overthrow of Hetman and the capture of Kiev. 
The inability to domesticate the ‘peasant elements’ and to keep the atamans akin to Zeleny 
and Grigoriev from defecting to the other side tried and tore the loose fabric of the Ukrainian 
block, separating the warp of socialist threads from the weft of nationalist matter. Volodymyr 
Vynnychenko, for instance, was inclined to see the failure of the Directorate as an 
incontrovertible evidence of its sliding in the direction of the reaction, away from the 
principles upheld by the social revolt. In his historical magnum opus, Vidrodzhennia natsii – 
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a book of penance and remorse – the former chairman of the UNR tirelessly stressed how the 
Ukrainian government forfeited the interests of the “popular (naridnykh) masses” for the 
sake of propitiating appetites of the “national (natsional’nym) petty bourgeoisie.”
5 His 
comrade in triumph and in misery, a notable Ukrainian S-R Pavlo Khrystiuk seconded 
Vynnychenko’s critique. ‘Bolshevik’ on the surface and in the vigorous lines of its 
declarations, the government created on the Christmas night of 1918 proved to be a “typical 
product of the Ukrainian National Union”: narrow enough to give substance to the 
accusations of ‘chauvinism’ and too petty bourgeois and moderate to be truly revolutionary.
6 
The disappointing sojourn in power truncated by “popular uprisings” – mostly defections of 
the atamans – convinced a number of the UNR supporters to follow the atamans’ lead by 
accepting the “soviet platform” and to come to terms with the advancing Bolsheviks. In the 
end those individuals found themselves either dissolved within the Communist Party 
(Borot’bists and many of the independent social-democrats, the nezalezhnyki) or forced into 
exile, where they would dwell, like Vynnychenko himself, in the state of political prostration 
and unavenged bitterness.  
 
In contrast with their disenchanted colleagues from the Vynnychenko camp, elements 
associated with Petliura decided to jettison the ballast of socializing slogans and accentuate 
instead the national – anti-Russian, anti-Bolshevik, anti-colonial – aspect of the struggle. No 
doubt this was partially motivated by the desire to solder the ties with uncountable guerrilla 
groups whose reluctance to support UNR proved so critical a factor in its jousting match with 
the Soviet Kharkov. Their efforts were not spent in vain with some of the great atamans –
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Iurko Tiutiunnyk, Iulian Mordalevich, Evhen Angel or ataman Orlyk among them – joining 
the anti-Bolshevik cause under the nominal guidance of Petliura. The disadvantage of this 
seemed all too obvious however, for the atamans, intractable as always, could hardly be 
expected to obey the weakened regime in some remote Podolian town.  
 
In essence, Petliura did what the Bolsheviks had refused to do: by loaning his name to the 
partisan leaders and alienating bits and pieces of the UNR authority, he disappeared in the 
movement of a loosely-knit guerilla war. From late 1919 onward and with increasing 
frequency the Bolsheviks were speaking not of Petliura himself, but of the bands of the 
‘petliurovite’ coloration (petliurovskoi okraski) or of petliurovshchina in general
7 - just as 
they spoke of the Makhnovite bands and makhnovshchina. Sharing the monopoly with 
Makhno over the vague spirit of the late Ukrainian insurgency, Petliura reemerged in the 
cloud of a fabulous aura, “a myth, born in Ukraine in the mist of the frightening nineteen-
eighteen” as an anonymous citizen of Bulgakov’s White Guard put it.  
 
The immediate victim of the great peasant jacquerie, Hetman Skoropadsky and his entourage 
seemed to have harbored no anger for the peasant masses themselves, evincing a type of 
patronizing generosity of seasoned land grandees. “The people,” wrote the Hetman in his 
memoirs, “desire only to improve its situation (byta), yet it is fully incapable of making sense 
of the questions [pertaining to its wellbeing – M.A.].” 
Earlier, under the old government, he was told that all evil comes from the 
rioters. “Beat them up” – and he beat them up. “All evil comes from the 
burzhui, beat him up!” – and he beats him up, for he thinks this alone is going 
to better his station. All those programs, even those which are now considered 
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moderate like those of the socialist-revolutionaries, stand incomparably 
farther left than the convictions dwelling in the healthy mass of people; only 
the war coupled with the demoralizing effects of the revolutionary 
government resulted in making people believe that one could simply chase the 
landowners away from their property without paying them a halfpence.
8 
 
In Hetman’s view, the difference between “Petliura et Vynnychenko” and the Bolsheviks 
counted only insofar as the former functioned only as the transition to the latter – with the 
latter, to be sure, being but harbingers of chaos and “final depredation.”
9 Dictatorship, 
therefore, represented the single panacea against the license ushered by the revolutionary 
politics
10 – as well as the means of self-discipline exercised by the nation to keep itself 
without bounds of reason. 
 
As early as April 1919, when the aforementioned memoirs were completed, Skoropadasky 
stumbled upon the notion of a cordon sanitaire. Ukraine had to be strong militarily, 
politically and socially – buttressed by the army, powerful executive and the cohort of solid 
smallholders (khleboroby) – in order to withstand the onslaught of the hydra-like Bolshevism 
with its multiple heads. The ancien regime sentimentalities and the distrust of popular 
instincts differentiated this vision from the fascism of the inter-war era; the revived 
Hetmanate would align itself more with the string of militarized Central European regimes, 
which clothed their abnegation of the revolution in the astute language of liberal promises.  
 
The peasant resistance – passive at first and then overt and violent – left an indelible 
impression upon those, who came to Ukraine as the outside deliverers. Contrary to what 
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might have been expected, the leading representatives of the Central powers came out with 
their faith in the virtues of occupation strengthened rather than weakened. It was the 
tampering of the civil authorities with the procedures of the military – the “hapless attitude of 
Berlin towards ‘militarism’” in Ludendorff’s turn of the phrase – which restricted the 
extracting capacities of the army and egged the peasant onto the acts of sabotage.
11 The last 
commandant of the ill-starred Austro-Hungarian “Eastern Army” Alfred Krauß accused 
Vienna of political escapism, unwilling to admit that the absence of “the ruthless and 
consistent application of power” accounted for the failure of Habsburg Ukrainian policy; 
lacking courage to face the truth, the obsolescent empire endeavored in vain to correct its 
errors by replacing convicted scapegoats with scapegoats-to-be.
12 Indirectly the author was 
suggesting that the next occupation – if there would be any – should cast aside any pretence 
of humanity or humility as irrelevant for the aims at hand and teach the populace to defer to 
the law of bayonet in silent resignation. Whether they have read Ludendorff or Krauß, the 
German generals from 1941 had outdone themselves in ruthlessness of the military rule – 
with the catastrophic effects for the occupied and the occupiers. 
 
Although they did not regard themselves as outsiders – certainly not to the extent of the 
Germans – the Galicians wore out their welcome in the “Great Ukraine” all too quickly. 
According to Evhen Konovalets, the rada of the Galician Sich Riflemen attempted to 
dissuade the Directorate in November 1918 from issuing a general mobilization order, 
believing that it would sprout to life a score of “unorganized and undisciplined units.”
13 
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Insofar as the atamans’ subordination to the UNR authority was concerned, the judgment of 
the Galicians proved to be correct. Their drama, however, was that the Sich Riflemen had to 
pull the Directorate’s chestnuts out of the fire as they strove to stanch the wave of peasant 
uprisings, being, after all, the last reliable force at the regime’s disposal. The peasant, as 
Osyp Nazaruk avers, could not forgive the rifleman his participation in punitive actions, and, 
as he went on assaulting minor detachments and breaking up connections with zeal and ardor, 
he seemed to draw his inspiration from the earlier deeds of the Polish villagers during their 
showdown with the rebels of 1830 and 1863.
14  
 
When the agreement with Denikin was added to the roll of crimes, the predicament of the 
Sich Riflemen – and politically involved Galicians in general – became worse than 
unenviable. “Moscow and Poland regarded them as the greatest support of the execrable 
Ukrainian statehood, and their own Ukrainian people – from the rural masses all the way to 
the upper layers of intelligentsia – were pointing at them as those guilty of all the ills, which 
befell Ukraine.”
15 What was the combined effect of marginalization, loneliness and 
disillusionment on the political education of Andriy Melnyk, Dmytro Paliiv and Konovalets 
himself, who started their political life in the ranks of the Sich Riflemen, moved through the 
various conflicts in the aftermath of 1917 only to settle for the post-war Ukrainian Military 
Organization (UVO) and finally the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) (Paliiv 
went even further to serve in the SS)? Could one discern in those formative years when the 
Ukrainian peasant revealed his unwelcoming face to the stunned Galician youth roots of 
successive and seemingly relentless radicalization of the latter? Maybe not in the manner of 
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strict causality – but the repugnance for revolutions with its utopian slogans, fear of anarchy, 
distrust of the political intrigue (politykanstvo) and, finally, the glorification of state 
sovereignty for sovereignty’s own sake were all there – contained in that baggage of complex 
sentiments, which they were seen carrying off from the turbulent and frustrating years of the 
Eastern European Civil War.  
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